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Social capital – What’s in a name? 
In recent years, few concepts have so powerfully appealed to the imagination of 
researchers and policy makers as that of social capital. It has been labelled a deus ex 
machina (Schuurman, 2003) for all kinds of societal problems, a ‗missing link‘ 
(Grootaert, 1998) to development and democracy, even a ‗catalyst for peace‘ (Cox, 2009). 
In other words,  social capital has become something of a panacea for maladies affecting 
societies all over the world (Portes, 1998). Social capital‘s conquest of the world has been 
marked by the work of one man: Robert Putnam. In his famous study on Italy, Making 
Democracy Work (Putnam, 1993: 167), he defined social capital as the ‗features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions‘, and was the first to release the appealing 
argument that social capital was indeed the ‗missing link‘ to achieve economic prosperity, 
democratic governance and ‗healthy‘ societies.   
However, social capital has also become one of the most contested concepts within the 
social sciences. Since Putnam‘s first use of the social capital concept, the debate has 
substantially evolved. His original concept and thesis have been criticized as historically 
inaccurate (Tarrow, 1996), normative (Edwards & Foley, 1998), tautological (Portes, 
1998), mixing up sources and causes ( Woolcock & Narayan, 2000), confusing attributes 
of individuals and collectivities (communities/states) (Portes, 2000), blind to the ‗down 
side‘ of social capital (Portes & Landolt, 1996), negating the role of the state (Evans 
1996), obscuring the inequality of social capital (e.g. Cleaver, 2005; Edwards & Foley, 
1997), paying lip service to neo-liberal Third Way policies and the Post-Washington 
consensus (Fine, 2001; Harris, 2001) and so on. Yet, the common sense idea holds firm – 
‗social relations do matter‘ – and the scientific need to integrate human social interaction 
into our understanding of economic and political development issues remains valid, 
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necessary and clear from evidence spanning social and natural sciences (Woolcock & 
Radin, 2008). 
Notwithstanding its contested nature, social capital has become an influential concept 
within development and poverty reduction policy. In these policy circles it is Putnam‘s 
early normative notion of social capital which still monopolizes much of the debate. In 
particular the World Bank further developed Putnam‘s concept, and became one of its 
major institutional proponents. For some within the World Bank, the so called ‗tacticians‘ 
(Edwards 2006), social capital was a blessing, a way to convince hardline economists to 
integrate more properly social analysis within the dominant economic thought of the 
World Bank (see Bebbington et al., 2006). Promoted by the World Bank, social capital 
soon became mainstreamed within other development agencies such as DFID, which 
integrated the concept in their sustainable livelihoods approach (Francis 2002, Toit et al., 
2005). One part of the explanation for its popularity within policy circles has been that 
Putnam‘s social capital concept merged well with the communitarian and neo-liberal 
policies of that time: it gave academic back-up for Third Way policies and the Post-
Washington consensus, underscoring the view of the free market and a minimal state 
(Fine, 2001; Harris, 2001). Another reason is the fact that Putnam‘s concept makes ‗the 
social‘ measurable, which allows to integrate it into ―conventional economists‘ models in 
terms that allow generalization, prediction, and policy relevance and that follow 
economics reasoning.‖ (Mosse, 2008: 96). For policy makers, Putnam‘s equation of social 
capital with civic organizations not only provides an easy solution – reinforcing civil 
society – but also an easy way to measure the progress and success of their policies, 
predicated simply on 'how many new associations were built or strengthened'? As 
Edwards (2006: 102) observes well with regard to the World Bank: ‗Donor agencies such 
as the World Bank have a natural tendency to focus on the short term and the easily 
measurable, and therefore concentrate on the physical infrastructure of civil society and 
the mechanics of social capital ('forms, not norms').‘  
The rise of social capital sparked a polarized debate between proponents and 
opponents, either entirely embracing or rejecting the term (see Wilshusen, 2009: 389-
392). On the one hand, in line with Putnam, what can be called the ‗developmentalist‘ 
camp uncritically promotes the term as the accumulation of collective cooperative 
capacity positively affecting democratic governance and economic development. The 
central hypothesis is that ‗developing‘ new stocks of social capital will enhance such 
positive outcomes. To a great extent, this approach is followed by economists, who are 
indeed convinced by the fact that social capital is the ideal concept to integrate ‗the social‘ 
into their econometric equations and models. Thus, the quest for a statistical concept of 
social capital, leading to aggregate data sets which can empirically verify the different 
correlations between high ‗stocks‘ of social capital and a diversity of positive outcomes 
stands central in this strand of research. 
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On the other hand, opponents have radically rejected the concept as a ‗manifestation of 
neoliberal hegemony‘ (Wilshusen, 2009: 390). Their radical position is based on a critical 
reflection on the genealogy of the concept within the World Bank, and points to a 
‗paradigmatic battle‘ between academic disciplines. For scholars like Harris (2001) and 
Fine (2001), the rise of social capital is only one illustration of how social theory is 
colonialized by neoclassical economics. Social capital supporters present the concept as a 
way to convince economists to take more seriously social analysis. Opponents, however, 
argue that exactly the opposite happens: social capital integrates ‗the social‘ within the 
‗econometric imaginary‘ (Toit et al., 2007: 3), and turns several ‗social‘ disciplines 
(sociology, political science, anthropology, …) into another brach of micro-economics 
(Edwards, 2006: 96). In their view, social capital is not about science but about a religion, 
functioning as an ideal compliment to neoliberal economic thinking and policy. As Fine 
(2003: 147), one of social capital‘s most fierce antagonists, comments the methaphor of 
social capital as the ‗social glue‘ which makes societies healthy: 
[…]  it is more akin to a religion. It is the missing link; it is ephemeral but its effects 
can be seen everywhere; it has its sects, disciples, followers and high priests; it has 
its downside and a struggle between good and evil; there is the prospect of a 
promised land; harmony and trust must prevail over conflict, it is based more on 
belief than it is upon reason, although those beliefs evolve around, and are presented 
and interpreted in, increasingly complex scriptures; and so on. 
In sum, these radical opponents a priori reject the social capital concept, and refuse to 
take position within the social capital debate, primarly because of its ‗neoliberal 
undercurrents‘.1  
Gradually, however, a third strand of research has tried to adopt a middle course in this 
polarized debate, by referring back to an often forgotten originator of the social capital 
concept – Bourdieu – and presents a political economy view of social capital (e.g. 
Bebbington, 2002, 2007; Bebbington, Dharmawan, et al. 2006; Cleaver, 2005; DeFillipis, 
2001; Toit, Skuse & Cousins, 2007; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Molyneux, 2002; Portes, 
1998; Silvey & Elmhirst, 2003; Svendsen & Svendson, 2003; van Staveren, 2003; Vasan, 




 Their critique should be taken seriously, but their analysis has two main shortcomings: (i) their critique is 
correct for Putnam‘s original notion and the research which following his line of thinking (unfortunately indeed 
the majority), but it fails to appreciate the academic work which has been done since that time, in particular what 
I call the third strand of research; (ii) their critique is mainly a critique of neoliberal policies, often limited to one 
particular institution (the World Bank), and the particular use, some refer to ‗lazy‘ (Bebbington, 2004: 344) or 
‗banalized‘ (Molyneux, 2002: 169) use, of the social capital concept within these powerful institutions. Although 
their genealogical analysis has interesting things to say about the politics of theory production and the supremacy 
of economic thought within such institutions, it remains limited to a particular Putnamian conceptualization of 
social capital, and does not necessarily present a substantial analytical critique of the concept. 
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2007; Wilhusen, 2009). These scholars take seriously the critique of economic 
imperialism within the social sciences, and reestablish social capital as a sociological 
concept. They criticize mainstream social capital thinking because of its tendency to 
undue ‗the social‘ of its contingent character, in order to integrate it into ‗essentialising‘ 
models with universal applicability. Therefore, in line with Bourdieu, they argue in favour 
of a relational and contextual view of social capital, and integrate the nature of power 
relations within their analysis, while underscoring the crucial fact that social capital 
cannot be understood separately from the particular contexts and practices with which it is 
entangled.  
This thesis positions itself within this social capital debate. Whereas certain authors 
such as Fine (2001) and Harris (2001) a priori refuse to engage with the debate, this 
dissertation chooses to engage with the debate by looking at the potential values and 
shortcomings of the concept. Concretely, the thesis engages in the debate between the 
mainstream (Putnamian) and political economy (Bourdieuian) views on social capital, 
while applying this debate to the field of post-conflict reconstruction theory and practice. 
Post-conflict reconstruction – in search of ‘liberal peace’ 
Post-conflict reconstruction has become the ‗core business‘ of the international 
humanitarian and development community (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). Often it is 
bracketed together with concepts such as rehabilitation, state-building, peace-building, 
reconciliation or conflict management and resolution. It reflects the merging of the 
security, development and relief agenda‘s of the international community, in order to 
safeguard peace in places as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Iraq, Afghanistan, or the country which will be the case study of this dissertation, 
Burundi (Duffield, 2001). All of these countries have been labelled ‗new wars‘ (Richards, 
2005) or ‗complex political emergencies‘ (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999), and are 
characterized by the following features: they occur within and across boundaries, are 
political in nature, have multiple and interconnected causes, are protracted in duration, are 
expressions of existing social, political and cultural divisions in societies, and involve 
identity-based ‗predatory‘ social formations (de Zeeuw, 2001: 11).2   
                                               
 
 
2 Concepts like war, conflict and peace can be interpreted in multiple ways and are not always easily 
distinguishable from one another. Conflict, for example is a common form of social interaction, both in war and 
peace time. However, in this thesis conflict refers to ‗violent conflict‘ or ‗armed conflict‘, i.e. when a destructive 
cycle of physical violence begins because a society can no longer peacefully manage and resolve struggles or 
conflicts between different interests (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999: 14). Furthermore, it is questionable if a clear 
 23 
 
These ‗post-conflict‘ countries all pose serious challenges: they have been called 
‗failed‘ or ‗collapsed‘ states, where peace is fragile and premature and the economy 
damaged. These  countries are in serious risk of slipping back into conflict. To avoid this 
relapse, key issues include: consolidating peace, rebuilding efficient states and 
kickstarting the economy. According to the World Bank (Kreimer et al., 1998) – one of 
the leading agencies in this field – post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) should combine two 
overall objectives: the transition to sustainable peace and supporting long-running social 
and economic development. Unlike post-natural disaster reconstruction, the emphasis is 
not on physical reconstruction but on rebuilding the institutions of society, politics and the 
economy at large. In sum, they seek nothing less than to resurrect the ‗holy trinity‘ of 
peace, democracy and development. 
The international community has been criticized for its handling of conflict-affected 
countries (Cramer & Goodhand, 2002; Duffield, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2002; Goodhand, 
2006, Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Milliken & Krause, 2002; Ottoway, 2002; Paris, 1997; 
Rathmell, 2005; Richards, 2005; Vlassenroot & Raeymakers, 2004). These critiques can 
be summarized in reference to three problematic assumptions on which post-conflict 
reconstruction policy is based. First, PCR rests on the assumption of developmentalism, 
part of the myth of modernity, i.e. that social progress is universal and linear, with all 
societies ‗naturally‘ evolving from backwardness and barbarism to rationality, civilization 
and democracy. The power of this assumption reveals itself in the teleological postulate of 
the ‗liberal peace‘ (Duffield, 2001) – a combination of free markets and liberal democratic 
states – as the ultimate objective of post-conflict reconstruction. Both are utopian 
‗fantasies‘ (Cramer & Goodhand, 2002), showing a lack of historical and contemporary 
understanding of state formation, yet they continue to inform PCR policy design.  
Second, as a result of the previous factor, war or conflict is equated with anomaly, 
social regression or as a ‗failure of modernity‘ (Duffield, 2002). Conflict is quarantined as 
a ‗disease‘ (Richards, 2005), an aberration of normalcy. The result is a naive dichotomy 
between ‗bad‘ war and ‗good‘ peace, as clearly distinguishable time frames with 
incompatible logics and a linear progression thesis, as if life resumes its ‗normal‘ pre-war 
course once war has stopped. This ignores the fact that war and conflict are best 
interpreted as ‗social transformations‘ instead of ‗social regression‘. Keen notes that 
conflict is ‗not the irrational breaking down of societies and economies: rather, ―it is the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
distinction between war and other forms of collective violence can be drawn (Goodhand, 2006: 10). Therefore 
war and conflict are here used interchangeably. Also peace is not easily distinguished from war or conflict, yet 
most scholars agree on its double interpretation given by Galtung (1969): ‗negative peace‘ (absence of physical 
violence) and ‗positive peace‘ (the absence of structural violence or social injustice). From war to peace is best 
understood as a continuum. As Goodhand (2006: 11) states, the main observation should be that ‗Whichever 
term is used, ultimately every conflict is unique […] and this highlights the need for detailed analysis and 
exploration of context‘. 
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re-ordering of society in particular ways‖‘ (Keen, cited in Goodhand & Hulme, 1999: 19). 
Therefore, the notion of ‗post-conflict‘ is problematic and misleading, as there is no clear 
dividing line between war and peace, conflict and post-conflict: ‗Simplistic dichotomies 
between peace and conflict must be avoided as ―the habitual association of violence with 
disorder, and peace with the return of order, is an over-simplification‖‘ (Stepputat, cited in 
Goodhand & Hulme, 1999: 15). In this respect, post-conflict reconstruction is mostly 
confronted with a timeframe that can be characterized as ‗no peace, no war‘ (Richards 
2005). Thus, although the term ‗post-conflict‘ can be used, it should be understood ‗as 
distinctive spaces that follow their own logic, not just as an ―in-between‖ phase.‘ 
(Lambach, 2007: 5).  
The third and final problematic assumption on which PCR policy relies, is that the only 
way out is a ‗an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves 
transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-
shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through 
political and economic liberalization‘ (Paris, 1997: 56). The international community 
assumes that a sophisticated technical ‗social engineering‘ approach can ‗telescope‘ a 
process that took Western countries decades and centuries to establish (Krause & 
Jütersonke, 2005: 451). Duffield (2002) illustrates how this caused a radicalization of 
development: humanitarian aid and development have been subordinated to the security 
agenda of the international community. It is in this ‗social engineering‘ approach to peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction that social capital plays a critical role. 
Social capital and ‘social engineering’ – engineering peace 
and development  
The concept of social capital has only recently gained significance in studies of peace and 
conflict (Cox, 2009). In the early 1990s, the social capital debate focused on development, 
democracy and civil society; but it has lately been integrated into research on violence, 
conflict and post-conflict reconstruction research (e.g. Barron et al., 2004; Bohora et al., 
2006; Colletta & Cullen, 2000a, 2000b; Cox, 2009; Goodhand, 2006; Goodhand et al., 
2000; Morfit, 2002; Pickering, 2006; Pinchotti & Verwimp, 2007; Richards et al., 2004; 
Varshney, 2001; World Bank, 2006).  
At the end of the 1990s, however, social capital rapidly became a central concept in the 
‗social engineering‘ model: it grounded the need to (re)build civil society institutions as a 
crucial component of PCR policies (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). In this model, civil 
society-building (nurturing social capital, strengthening community associations, etc.) and 
state-building (peace agreements, democratic elections, etc.) are two sides of the same 
coin. The social capital argument was used by international development corporations to 
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justify ‗social engineering‘ operations, alongside post-conflict physical reconstruction and 
rehabilitation work (Englebert, 2001: 16-17). The work of Colletta and Cullen (2000b) has 
provided a reference point for the World Bank and many other international agencies for 
integrating the social capital concept into their PCR policies. It is worth quoting them 
(2000b: 122-123) at length to fully grasp the ‗enormous experiment in social engineering‘ 
(Paris, 1997: 56) that is behind the social capital concept: 
Peacebuilding is, at its core, civil-society building. Measures of civic engagement, 
along with human security and government efficacy, transparency, and stability, are 
fundamental social capital indicators for comprehensive reconstruction. Social 
networks and organizations are essential assets in the portfolio of resources drawn 
on by the war-affected to manage risk and take advantage of opportunities. 
Peacebuilding involves not only economic reconstruction, or the rebuilding of 
physical infrastructure and economic stabilization, but also the fundamental 
revitalization of positive social capital and the strengthening of social cohesion. The 
solutions to conflict prevention lie not only in demilitarization and in jump-starting 
the economy, although these are important. They lie also in good governance – the 
rule of law, justice, and human rights – and in strengthening social capital at every 
level. […] Development needs to nurture and transform social capital in order to 
create and maintain the mechanisms and institutions necessary for strengthening 
social cohesion, managing diversity, preventing violent conflict, and sustaining 
peace and reconciliation. 
By and large, the policy has focused on reinforcing civil society organizations, while 
creating social capital (e.g. Fischer & Ropers, 2001; Kreimer et al., 1998: NEPAD, 2005; 
Obidegwu, 2004; OECD, 2001; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006; UNDP, 2008; World Bank, 
2006; World Vision, 1998). The role of these civil society actors fits in a broader and 
more generalized approach to post-conflict reconstruction: that is, community-based or 
community-driven reconstruction (e.g., Cliffe et al., 2003; Fearon et al., 2009; Strand et 
al., 2003; USAID, 2007). This approach aims to combine economic and social 
reconstruction, i.e. to alleviate immediate community reconstruction needs – tangible 
‗quick wins‘ or ‗peace dividends‘ – while empowering the community, restoring 
community cohesion, and strengthening local conflict resolution capacity. Social capital is 
inextricably bound up with this renewed interest in the ‗community‘ and the strategies of 
community-driven development: ‗The general reasoning is that, if levels of engagement in 
civil society are raised (shown by improved input indicators such as membership of 
associations), this will lead to improved coordination (evident in the outputs of trust and 
collective action) and ultimately to increased levels of accountability and democracy.‘ 
(Mosse, 2008: 98). 
However, in post-conflict settings, these civil society organizations are meant to build 
social capital in two particular ways (Paffenholz, 2009). On the one hand, as indicated, in-
group socialization should support the practice of democratic values and attitudes within 
26 
 
society. On the other hand, and this is specific for post-conflict settings, through joint 
development activities, they should facilitate cooperation between adversarial groups in 
society, resulting in inter-group social cohesion or the much praised ‗bridging‘ social 
capital. In other words, these community-based or civil society organisations are seen as 
‗agents of peace‘, capable of promoting conflict resolution and peaceful cohabitation  
(Varshney, 2001).  
In sum, the central argument is that, if social capital is rebuild in post-conflict settings, 
this will strengthen local capacity for conflict resolution. This is how social capital relates 
back to the broader ‗social engineering‘ agenda, while defining the particular role of 
NGOs. As Duffield (2002) and Goodhand (2006) indicate, in particular NGOs are 
expected to build social capital and strengthen local civil society, which turns their aid 
into a strategic tool for conflict resolution and social reconstruction.   
Rationale and aims  
After having ‗set the scene‘, the rationale and aims are presented. Concretely, this thesis 
aims to present (i) a critical analysis of the debate on the social capital concept and the 
claims which are made about its role in post-conflict settings, and (ii) a critical analysis of 
the ‗social engineering‘ approach to post-conflict reconstruction which is influenced by 
the social capital debate. This will be done through a descriptive multiple case study 
approach, which allows to grasp the particular reality of three NGO-interventions and 
their attempts to ‗social engineer‘ peace and development in the north of Burundi after 
more than ten years of civil war. 
This choice is based on the presence of three main gaps in research and the debate on 
the current application of the social capital concept in post-conflict reconstruction policy 
and practice. 
 
 First, there is an empirical gap. In line with certain of the above criticisms, it can be 
argued how the social capital term is largely applied as a ‗leap of faith‘. Systematic 
empirical evidence on conflict and social capital is still very limited (Goodhand, 2006). 
Although most contemporary research on post-conflict reconstruction or peace-
building speaks of social capital, it mainly deals with the concept indirectly. Colletta 
and Cullen (2000a, 2000b) have thus far offered the most comprehensive effort to 
systematically integrate social capital theory into the study of conflict. In addition, 
research on particular policies has been one-sided, as most research has been 
commissioned by the World Bank (e.g. Colletta & Cullen 2000a, 2000b; Richards, 
2005; World Bank, 2006). The edited volume of Cox (2009) has been one of the first 
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attempts to present a systematic study of the links between social capital, conflict and 
peace.  
 Second, there is also a theoretical gap. Post-conflict reconstruction policy is mainly 
based on Putnam‘s (1993) early normative conception of social capital as ‗networks of 
civic engagement‘ which are assumed to nurture cooperation, trust and solidarity. 
Putnam‘s (1995, 2000) concept of ‗bridging‘ social capital has become central to the 
social capital argument in post-conflict settings: social networks that ‗bridge‘ social 
divisions and bring opposing groups together after conflict, are praised for their 
capacity for conflict resolution, reconciliation and social cohesion at community level. 
As such, policy fails to take account of the progress made in the social capital debate 
towards a Bourdieuian or political economy perspective. This reflects the ‗lazy use‘ 
(Bebbington, 2004) of the concept when traveling from research to policy; it also 
points to a lack of academic research bringing new insights to the policy level.  
 Third, there is what I call a ‗local level‘ gap. While there are extensive critiques on the 
‗social engineering‘ model to post-conflict reconstruction from a national and 
international perspective (Cramer & Goodhand, 2002; Duffield, 1994, 1999, 2001, 
2002; Goodhand, 2006, Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Milliken & Krause, 2002; 
Ottoway, 2002; Paris, 1997; Rathmell, 2005; Richards, 2005; Vlassenroot & 
Raeymakers, 2004), little research has critically analysed its effects at local level from 
the perspective of NGO-interventions. Goodhand (2006) wrote an extensive 
comparative study on the role of these NGOs in peace-building, but he noted that 
concrete ethnographic empirical research on the community level was still limited. 
Especially on this local level, a social capital perspective is in its place because mainly 
NGOs are expected to restore social capital and civil society institutions within the 
conflict-affected communities.  
 
Therefore, while drawing on the insights of contemporary social capital literature, the 
aim of this thesis is to provide: 
 
 A critical analysis of the current application of the social capital concept in post-
conflict reconstruction policy and practice: which conception of social capital is central 
to contemporary post-conflict reconstruction policy and practice, and which claims are 
made about its role and function? 
 A comparative perspective within the social capital debate, opposing mainstream 
(Putnamian) and political economy (Bourdieuian) views on social capital: does a 
political economy perspective offer an added value in comparison to mainstream 
thinking on social capital (and if so, can it help us to describe, understand and explain 
more thoroughly ‗social engineering‘ activities)? 
 A critical empirical analysis of local NGO ‗social engineering‘ practice to post-conflict 
reconstruction: how effective is the ‗social engineering‘ approach of NGOs at local 
level? Are they indeed capable of upgrading social capital and is their aid a strategic 
tool for conflict resolution and social reconstruction? Or as Duffield (2002: 1067) 
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notes: are they able of ‗getting inside the head to govern the hand‘ by changing 
behavior and attitudes instead or next to building schools and feeding the hungry?  
 
These questions will be addressed via a descriptive multiple case study of three 
concrete NGO-interventions in northern Burundi. 
The case – Burundi  
Burundi is a country that desperately needs the ‗holy trinity‘ of peace, economic 
development and democracy. Over 10 years of civil war have destroyed an already weak 
economy, further deteriorated a governance deficit, and disrupted the social fabric of 
Burundian society. Its violent past has pitted groups against each other, and subdivided 
society along ethnic, but also regional, gender, clan, urban-rural and more recently 
political lines. Approximately 300,000 people lost their lives during civil war 
(Lemarchand, 2009), and violence has forced over half of the Burundian population to 
flee their homes at least once since the beginning of the civil war in 1993 (Uvin, 2009: 
29). The agricultural sector, once the engine of the Burundian economy (and capable of 
covering national food consumption before the civil war), collapsed and pushed back the 
majority of Burundian rural households to subsistence level. According to the Human 
Development Report 2007/2008 (UNDP 2008), 87.6% of the population lives below $2 a 
day, and 54.6% below $1 a day.  
Since the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000, Burundi can be 
considered one of those proving grounds where ‗liberal peace‘ is engineered (Daley, 
2008).  Burundi has been urged to accept and apply the ‗universal blueprint‘ for 
international peace-building. In a nutshell: after a cease-fire, a peace agreement is signed, 
after which a transitional government is put in place to demilitarize the country and 
introduce institutional reforms, ending in free and democratic elections, after which an era 
of post-conflict reconstruction starts to remove the structural causes of conflict (Daley, 
2006a).  Burundi is approaching democratic elections in 2010, which will hopefully 
consolidate the peace process. Most analysts agree that the Burundian transition has been 
a success story for the international community (Uvin, 2009; Lemarchand, 2006; ICG, 
2007). At least it has been able to install a minimal ‗negative peace‘ (Galtung, 1969). 
Relative stability and security returned to the country after the largest rebel movement, the 
Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) signed a cease-fire agreement in 2003. 
The result of the 2005 democratic elections was accepted by all parties without a return to 
violence. On 22 April 2009, the last rebel movement, the Front National de Libération 
(FNL), also transformed itself into a political party.  
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Yet the current situation in Burundi is best subscribed as a ‗no war, no peace‘ setting 
(Richards, 2005). Potential for conflict is continuously reproduced, undermining – overtly 
or indirectly – the democratic transformation, conflict resolution and peace-building 
efforts (Dijkzeul, 2008: 2). Burundi is therefore a long way from a ‗positive peace‘, in 
which not only direct but also ‗structural violence‘ is eradicated (Galtung 1969). This 
structural violence – i.e. the social injustices caused by inequality, discrimination and 
exclusion – remains a giant seed-bed for potential conflict, and it will demand a time-
consuming social transformation of the Burundian society to eradicate it. It is questionable 
if the ‗liberal peace‘ model will achieve this by a rapid modernization of Burundian 
society through the construction of new and liberal institutions. (Daley, 2008: 34). Uvin 
(2005, 2009) points to  a general critique on the ‗liberal peace‘ model, i.e. that the 
introduction of such institutions at national level in Burundi has installed a liberal-
democratic facade, which may obscure the ‗real‘ transformation of Burundian society 
beneath this ‗formal‘ transformation process. 
 
For the most part, however, this dissertation will examine Burundi from a micro-
perspective. It will present ethnographic findings on three livelihood interventions on 
three particular collines (hillsides – administrative unit) in the north of Burundi. The 
interventions were chosen for their representativeness in post-conflict reconstruction in 
general, and reconstruction activities in Burundi in particular. Livelihood interventions are 
identified as appropriate instruments to implement post-conflict reconstruction policy in 
protracted crises situations (Russo et al., 2008); their focus on food security aligned well 
with the Burundian context of protracted food insecurity and the critical role of the 
agricultural sector in the livelihoods of Burundian households.  
The interventions were made by three American-based international NGOs under the 
umbrella of the Livelihood Security Initiative Consortium (LSIC), funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). This Consortium implemented 
projects in four provinces in northern and central Burundi (Kirundo, Muyinga, Gitega, 
Karuzi) between 2005 and 2007, and $2.5 million dollars of resources were requested for 
the implementation of the total initiative (LSIC, 2004). 
Concretely, the thesis will look at (i) the CIBA project on Burara colline (Busoni 
commune, Kirundo province), (ii) the LITA project on Tangara colline (Butihinda 
commune, Muyinga province), and (iii) the CLC project on Cumba colline (Muyinga 
commune, also in Muyinga province). For the sake of discretion the identity of the 
different NGOs is not disclosed.3 I use the pseudonyms Consortium Initiative Burara 
(CIBA), Livelihoods Tangara (LITA), and Cumba Livelihood Consortium (CLC). This 




 Similarly, the real identity of interviewees or other persons linked to the projects or localities are not revealed. 
Also for these individuals pseudonyms are used throughout the text. 
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confidentiality is a personal decision and the reason is simple and straightforward: this 
thesis is not about three particular NGOs, but discusses the interaction between social 
capital, conflict, and post-conflict reconstruction. Naming the NGOs would only result in 
misinterpretations. Indeed, the thesis will reveal things that went wrong, yet this is not 
because NGOs are ‗bad‘ per se, but simply because the reality in which they worked was 
extremely complex, and the ideas, paradigms and models on which they base their work 
are sometimes questionable. Pointing a finger at one particular actor is short-sighted and 
simplistic. Instead, the situation requires a detailed and nuanced analysis. 
The fieldwork planning was approved at headquarters in Bujumbura by all three NGOs. 
I gained access to all documents and could count on the cooperation of all staff employed 
on the projects. My research was however drafted independently, and with the exception 
of preliminary joint visits to the field, the field research was  performed autonomously. As 
a researcher I also remained financially independent. In the scope of this dissertation 
approximately 15 months were spent in Burundi, including 10 months of actual fieldwork 
on Burara, Tangara, and Cumba collines. 
The thesis 
First, it has to be mentioned that the seeds of this thesis were sowed in an article I co-
wrote with Dr Kristof Titeca, which was published in World Development (Titeca & 
Vervisch, 2008). In that article, I had the opportunity to develop and test some of the 
theoretical insights, which led me to formulate the theoretical framework of present work. 
I‘m grateful for this collaboration, as it was an essential step in guiding my further 
research. 
 
Part one of the thesis gathers both introductory chapters. The first introduces the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. It is argued in several steps that Putnam‘s normative 
reworking of the social capital concept should be challenged. While relying on a 
theoretical framework in which different combinations of social capital (bonding, 
bridging, linking) account for a diverse range of outcomes, a political economy 
perspective on social capital is presented as a radical alternative framework. In addition, it 
also briefly introduces the links between social capital theory and three topics of 
importance for the Burundian case study: conflict, livelihoods, and development projects. 
The second chapter presents some methodological notes on the case study research and 
the field work conducted for this thesis. I explain my choice of a multiple descriptive case 
study approach, discuss the selection of my case studies, list the most important research 
questions and themes, expound the various techniques used to gather the data, and briefly 




Part two consists of chapters 3 and 4, and introduces the Burundian case study. The 
first chapter presents a national level analysis. It gives a brief outline of the Burundian 
conflict and the current post-conflict situation. In addition, it makes an attempt to apply 
my theoretical argument, and as such, a broader political economy perspective is 
introduced to frame the following chapters dealing with social capital as a micro-
phenomenon. Chapter 4 makes the switch from the national to the local level, and 
introduces the three collines and the NGO-projects as my three concrete case studies.  
Part three contains the body of the thesis: in four chapters the empirical reality of the 
three case study NGO-interventions is described, as a basis to critically discuss social 
capital and social engineering. The four chapters are presented as papers, so there may be 
some contextual and theoretical repetitions. The bibliographies are, however, included in 
the general bibliography at the end of the thesis.  
 
Before focusing on the NGO-interventions, chapter five presents an analysis of the 
functioning of social capital on the three collines. The chapter focuses on the question of 
how  rural households‘ social capital portfolios adapted to a situation of protracted crisis. 
It demonstrates how social capital turned into an unproductive asset for the poor, and how 
this reflected the impact of broader institutional aspects. Social capital portfolios are put 
forward to integrate a broader political economy perspective into the actor-oriented 
livelihoodframework. 
 
Chapter 6 deals with the community-based methodology used by the NGOs to 
implement their projects: such participatory-focused methodologies are based on the idea 
of social capital, and are assumed to have a positive effect on it. The chapter questions 
such community-based reconstruction as a mechanism to rebuild social capital after 
conflicts, where direct livelihood support is provided. It criticizes the ‗technical 
procedural design‘ on which it is based, and its underestimation of the contrast between 
‗development‘ and ‗post-conflict‘ settings. A revaluation of ordinary ‗physical 
engineering‘ is considered an alternative to the current popular ‗social engineering‘ 
approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on  ‗bridging associations‘ as universal blueprints of social capital 
building to bring peace and development. An interesting comparison was possible, as all 
three NGOs held different opinions, in theory and in practice, on working with such 
associations. The use of ‗bridging associations‘ demonstrates the effects of a ‗liberal 
peace‘ model on a micro-perspective: its incapacity and unwillingness to enter into 




Lastly, chapter 8 deals with one particular project activity: the ‗solidarity chain‘. The 
‗solidarity chain‘ is a livestock credit rotation scheme, implemented by all three NGOs. It 
is a classic example of post-conflict reconstruction, in which economic (livestock 
restocking) and social (reinforcing community cohesion) reconstruction are combined. 
The chapter questions the general assumption that post-conflict reconstruction policy 
should focus on transforming exclusive (mono-ethnic) bonding into inclusive (multi-
ethnic) bridging social capital. In contrast, the chapter presents micro-empirical insights 
that point to a) a more fundamental and general lack of bonding social capital and b) the 
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Chapter 1  
The political economy of social capital 
1.1 Introduction 
‗It‘s not what you know, it‘s who you know.‘ (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000: 225). This 
phrase summarizes the common sense notion of social capital, through a comparison with 
one of its twin concepts, human capital. Not only the knowledge, capacities and skills you 
have acquired throughout life, but also your connections with other people will, among 
further assets (e.g. financial, cultural), help you to further develop your life chances. It is a 
very simple and intuitively accepted idea: family members stand in when children are sick 
as a safety net, membership of a trade union will defend your basic social rights, and the 
right friend in the right place will inform you about new job opportunities. Yet, behind 
this common sense idea, a plethora of definitions and theoretical views have produced an 
abundant literature on this concept, The Handbook of Social Capital (Castiglione et al., 
2008) being one of the latest attempts to summarize this work.  
The aim of this chapter is not to unravel these many conceptual discussions or to define 
social capital once and for all. Instead, the idea is to present some evolutions within the 
debate and introduce some bodies of literature, in order to identify some of the 
implications for my empirical case study analysis. This is done in four steps. 
First, the different sources of inspiration of the social capital debate are mentioned. 
Second, the debate is outlined, while starting from Woolcock‘s and Narayan‘s 
identification of the four principal positions: the communitarian, network, institutional and 
synergy view on social capital. Third, in the next section, I will argue that these different 
positions indicate an evolution in the debate towards a political economy or Bourdieuian 
perspective on social capital, and I will outline the main elements of such a view. Fourth, I 
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will refer to three bodies of literature, dealing with the link between social capital and 
respectively conflict, rural livelihoods and development projects. This literature will only 
be briefly introduced, as these issues will recur and be explored more in depth throughout 
the subsequent chapters discussing my empirical case study research.  
1.2 Sources of inspiration : three research programmes 
Instead of concentrating on definitions, I follow Castiglione's (2008) suggestion to use 
research programmes as an entry point to clear our path through the social capital debate. 
Castiglione distinguishes three such research programmes, each with a particular 
intellectual history (Table 1). I will take this analysis a step further to clarify that the 
choice for each is not without consequences, in that it stipulates if research uses the 
concept normatively or analytically, and focuses on the ‗up‘ or ‗down‘ side of social 
capital. This will become clear in both the intellectual concerns grounding the research 
programmes and the ensuing policy implications.  
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1.2.1 James Coleman : the rationalists 
The first research programme is very much related to the work of James Coleman (1990), 
and centres around the question of sociality, i.e. researching the main motivational drives 
of human action in social contexts (Castiglione, 2008: 184). Coleman (1990: 302) defines 
social capital functionally:  
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of 
different entities having two characteristics in common. They all consist of some 
aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are 
within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making 
possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. 
Two broader issues shape the author‘s concern with social capital. The first is 
theoretical, as Coleman perceived social capital as a tool to construct a broader theory of 
human action. Coleman aimed at solving the problem of both over- and under-socialized 
theories of human behaviour, merging economics with sociology (Coleman, 1999). Yet 
his attempts are clearly grounded in rational choice and methodological individualism. 
Self-interest as the primary mover of human behaviour and the ‗principle of action‘ – 
maximizing utility – have never been questioned in his work. Therefore Coleman‘s 
conception of social capital is primarily economic. As he clarifies his approach: ‗My aim 
is […] to import the economists‘ principle of rational action for use in the analysis of 
social system proper, including but not limited to economic systems, and to do so without 
discarding social organization in the process. The concept of social capital is a tool to aid 
in this.‘ (Coleman cited in Castiglione, 2008: 184-85). Castiglione (2008) identifies two 
steps whereby Coleman succeeds in his aim. First, he argues that the impact of social 
structure on human behaviour (through the internalization of norms and obligations) 
originated in a rational calculation of the individual. Second, Coleman rejects the old idea 
of social relations as being irrelevant or constraining factors for rational individuals 
(Woolcock, 1998); instead, he presents these social structures as useful and ‗good‘ 
resources for self-interested actions. As such, the social is rationalized, which yields him 
the critique of making sociology the handmaiden of economics (e.g. Fine, 2001; Harris, 
2002).  
Coleman‘s second concern follows ethical-practical lines. It originates in his work on 
education, and reflects his unease with the disappearance of primordial (family, kin, 
community) ties – performing the social control function of social capital (norm-
observance) – as a main factor in the coming of various social ills (crime and insecurity, 
blurring of moral standards in public schools, etc.). Portes (2000: 3) finds a double 
solution for these ills in Coleman‘s work: his celebration of existing community ties and 
the creation of new ‗purposively constructed‘ organizations to fulfil this social control 
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function. This second preoccupation reveals the normative undercurrent in Coleman‘s 
work, social capital being a ‗good thing‘. Although Putnam brings this value-laden, norm-
centric character to the core of the concept, Castiglione (2008) notes that a Putnamian 
normative approach was already prevalent in the work of Coleman. 
Coleman‘s work has led economists in particular to champion the concept of social 
capital. Indeed, the economic strand of social capital research follows Coleman‘s focus on 
human action; it is grounded in microeconomics (Fine, 1999; see e.g. Collier, 2002) and 
understands social capital as pooling trust and information, thus reducing transaction costs 
(Edwards, 2006), while clarifying economic performance. This strand of thinking has 
been highly influential in the World Bank since the 1990s. Edwards (2006: 94) explains 
the reasons of this group of enthusiasts (mainly economists): ‗For them, social capital is 
the missing ingredient, that, by integrating ―non-market rationality‖ into economic 
models, explains why some countries or communities grow faster than others.‘ Wolleb 
(2008: 375), introducing the section on economic development in The Handbook of Social 
Capital (Castiglione et al., 2008), explains why social capital matters for economics: 
‗Generally speaking, social capital intervenes in the economy when the market fails.‘ He 
defines two broad types of market failures. First, based on theory of transaction costs, 
social capital is there to smoothen out trade and increase economic efficiency through the 
reduction of risks and costs of economic transactions (social capital creates trust which 
makes doing business ‗easier‘). Second, and based on public goods theory, social capital 
is meant to facilitate collective action to produce public goods, which cannot, or at least 
not sufficiently, be produced by the market (e.g. safe neighbourhoods). In addition, social 
capital, if not producing public goods, is meant to make the delivery of public goods and 
services more efficient (e.g. parents associations in public schools).  Concluding, the 
central thesis of this research programme is that ‗―more social capital‖ is associated with 
―better economic performance‖‘ (Edwards, 2006: 94). 
It is easy to understand how this research programme is linked with Third Way policies 
in the Western World and the Post-Washington Consensus for development countries (e.g. 
Fine 1999, 2001; Harris, 2001). In both cases, after successive failures of planned 
economies (states) and free market economies (markets), social capital is the academic 
counterpart of society itself, which is asked – as a third partner (society) – to smoothen 
out the excesses of neo-liberalism. Thus, in the hands of neo-liberal policy makers social 
capital underscores their view of the free market system and the minimal state. Market 
imperfections are caused by non-market society, and thus society itself is best placed to 




1.2.2 Robert Putnam : the communitarians 
The second research programme has been the most influential and is linked mainly to the 
work of Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000); it focuses on the question of sociability, i.e. 
questioning people‘s tendency to unite and associate in groups (Castiglione, 2008: 188). 
Putnam (1993: 167) defines social capital normatively: 
Social capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions.  
Again, the author‘s concerns are clearly theoretical and practical-ethical. Both concerns 
were already reflected in the title of his famous Italian study Making Democracy Work 
(Putnam, 1993). Putnam made a theoretical contribution to democratic theory by arguing 
that 'civicness' played an important role in explaining differences in institutional 
performance between north and south Italy, presenting his ‗social capital as civicness‘ 
thesis as a reconfirmation of De Tocqueville‘s (1835/1840) argument on American 
democracy (Putnam, 1993). In line with Castiglione (2008) three successive steps can be 
distinguished throughout the Italian study. First, Putnam makes a causal link between the 
degree of civicness and institutional performance. He explains this link in two ways, 
combining a culturalist and structuralist interpretation of social capital (Castiglione, 
2008). On the one hand, Putnam presents a historical account of the republican tradition to 
explain the high degree of civicness in Italian city states, postulating the path-dependent 
character of social capital, i.e. it slowly emerges from historical processes.  On the other 
hand, toward the end of the book, Putnam couples civicness with the presence of dense 
networks of associations, echoing De Tocqueville‘s (1835/1840) point on the importance 
of a vibrant civil society for American democracy.  This structural analysis enables 
Putnam some specification, as he argues that only voluntary, horizontal and bridging (i.e. 
inclusive and open) associations – in contrast with the vertical and bonding (i.e. exclusive 
and closed) networks in the south (ref. e.g. Banfield‘s (1958) ‗amoral familism‘ in the 
Mezzogiorno) – produced the necessary ‗networks of civic engagement‘ (Putnam, 1993: 
171-186). Such associations are perceived as the learning schools for democracy; by 
joining them, people are socialized into a democratic value pattern. Therefore, a civic 
culture, derived from networks of civic engagement, brought efficient democratic 
institutions to the north of Italy.  
Putnam‘s more ethical-practical concerns become much more explicit in his second 
major work, Bowling Alone (2000). It is here that Putnam aims to deliver scientific proof 
for Coleman‘s unease with the disappearance of community ties in American cities and 
neighbourhoods; Putnam argues that social capital and civic engagement did steadily 
decline at the end of the twentieth century. Both the conception of American civic life and 
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the solution for its decline are inspired by his Italian analysis, in particular the structuralist 
part of it. Now, Putnam explicitly uses the concept of ‗bridging‘ social capital, to argue in 
favour of a revival of ‗networks of civic engagement‘.   
In the wake of Putnam‘s work, a vast number of political scientists have extensively 
researched the core idea of this social capital research programme: the importance of 
associational life for healthy societies and democratic states. This strand of research has 
focused on macro-dynamics, in many cases comparing communities, cities, regions and 
even states with each other (e.g. Knack & Keefer, 1997), equating social capital mainly 
with membership in horizontal associations (e.g. Hooghe, 2003; Mayer, 2003), and 
researching it as an independent variable to explain democracy (Foley & Edwards, 1999).  
Conservative and communitarian policies have been receptive for this explicit 
normative and value-laden strand of research. It gives their proponents academic back-up 
for their defence of a moral revival in western societies, in which extreme individualism 
should be counterbalanced with self-sacrifice and commitment to the community and the 
common good (Harris, 2001). Communitarians emphasize the benefits and self-
sufficiency of local communities – small is beautiful – and perceive Putnam‘s networks of 
civic engagement as the building blocks for socially cohesive communities. As Woolcock 
and Narayan (2000: 229) state: ‗The communitarian perspective equates social capital 
with such local organizations as clubs, associations, and civic groups. Communitarians 
[…] hold that social capital is inherently good, that more is better, and that its presence 
always has a positive effect on a community‘s welfare.‘  
1.2.3 Pierre Bourdieu : the critics 
The third and last research programme is grounded in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1986), 
and relates to the question of social embeddedness, i.e. researching the mechanisms of 
social reproduction (Castiglione, 2008: 191). Bourdieu (1986: 248-49) defines social 
capital as follow:  
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of a durable network […] The volume of the social capital possessed 
by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can 
effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital [economic, cultural, symbolic] 
possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is 
connected. 
Bourdieu‘s concerns with the concept of social capital are, likewise, both theoretical 
and practical-ethical. First, Bourdieu‘s broader theoretical framework is a theory of social 
reproduction. His conceptual framework of economic, cultural, symbolic and social 
capital enables Bourdieu to argue first that economic capital reproduces itself, and that 
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this reproduction is interwoven with the reproduction of more cultural dimensions. Like 
Coleman, he recognizes the embeddedness of economic and social life (Rankin, 2002), yet 
his point of departure is different: he is not interested in how human behaviour reacts in 
social contexts (sociality), instead, he wants to describe the mechanisms of how social 
context reproduces human behaviour (social embeddedness). In the case of social capital, 
Bourdieu introduces two intertwined elements to establish his argument: ‗content‘ and 
‗context‘.  
The first factor, content, is already clearly specified in Bourdieu‘s definition. Not all 
social networks produce similar social capital. Social capital varies depending on its size 
and structure (cf. e.g. rural versus urban household) and on the volume and nature of the 
capital (cf. e.g. dockworker versus manager versus academic) accessed through it.  
Second, this internal differentiation is influenced by ‗context‘, referring to Bourdieu‘s 
concept of habitus. As Bebbington (2007: 156) states: ‗While each agent‘s habitus has a 
certain biographical, idiosyncratic dimension, it is also heavily structured by where it falls 
within wider relationships and structures of social difference: class, gender, ethnicity, and 
so on. These structures of difference are characterized by distinct distributions of capitals, 
social, cultural, symbolic and economic.‘ It is then a small step towards Bourdieu‘s more 
ethical-practical concerns with social capital.  In the hands of Bourdieu, social capital as a 
tool is used for entirely different purposes than was the case for Coleman and Putnam. As 
Somers (2005: 245) correctly states: ‗His Marxist roots spurred him to explain the 
reproduction of class power, and he found social capital useful for this purpose.‘ 
Although most scholars identify Bourdieu as one of the three founding fathers of social 
capital, still this strand of research has been much less visible in comparison to Coleman‘s 
and certainly Putnam‘s influence. This can partly be explained by the attractiveness of 
Coleman‘s and Putnam‘s work, which chimed so well with the ideological undercurrents 
of neo-liberalism and communitarianism. Yet it also relates to the unattractiveness of 
Bourdieu‘s story, as he presents us social capital as part of the problem instead of the 
solution. Scholarship of this research programme, mainly conducted by sociologists and 
various applied social scientists, has been working on the micro-scale, arguing that social 
capital reproduces inequality, poverty and power structures (Bebbington, 2007; Cleaver, 
2005; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Mayer & Rankin, 2002; Molyneux, 2002; Rankin, 2002; 
Vasan, 2007), i.e. that social capital is the dependent or intervening variable during social 
stratification (Edwards & Foley, 1999).  
The unattractiveness of this research for policy has two causes. First, their policy 
conclusions run counter to ideological policies defending a minimal state, as this strand of 
research argues that social capital can never substitute for sound redistributive state 
policies, and defends the ‗developmental state‘ (Fine, 1999, 2001; Harris, 2001). Second, 
it does not provide policy advisers with clear-cut solutions. Bourdieu‘s work emphasizes 
social capital as a constraining factor in the lives of many, hence social capital should be 
destroyed and created at the same time. In other words: social capital policies should 
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‗challenge structures and institutions as much as build assets‘ (Bebbington, 2007: 159).  
However, building assets is much easier, at least in Putnam‘s framework: for policy 
makers his normative ideas illustrate not only the ease of the new solution – building more 
community organizations – but also the ease of measuring the progress and success of 
their policies – how many new organizations were built or reinforced? (Ponthieux, 2004). 
At least, this is what policy makes of academic research, reflecting the ‗lazy‘ (Bebbington, 
2004: 344) or ‗banalized‘ (Molyneux, 2002: 169) use of concepts when travelling from 
research to policy. As Edwards (2006: 102) observes well: ‗Donor agencies such as the 
World Bank have a natural tendency to focus on the short term and the easily measurable, 
and therefore concentrate on the physical infrastructure of civil society and the mechanics 
of social capital (―forms, not norms‖).‘ Critical research based on Bourdieu, however, 
warns about such quick-fix policies, which run the risk of creating new ‗forms‘ that only 
reproduce the old wrong ‗norms‘; thus deepening a situation of inequality and poverty. In 
their view social capital policies should have a more ‗politico-emancipatory‘ (Schuurman, 
2003) function, challenging existing social structures, power relations and inequalities, 
through the 'counterwork' of oppositional social movements (Bebbington, 2007). 
Immediately, concepts such as ‗counterwork‘, ‗opposition‘, and ‗struggle‘ differentiate 
these policies from those of third-wayers and communitarians, which are based on the 
more normative work of Putnam and Coleman and embrace concepts such as ‗consensus‘ 
and ‗partnership‘ (Edwards, 2006). 
1.2.4 ‘Up’ side versus ‘down’ side 
The aim was not only to differentiate the various sources of inspiration, but also to clarify 
the ideological underpinnings of all three research programmes. Social capital researchers 
should be aware of these ideological undercurrents and look for a concept with analytical 
value. Ultimately, the basic touchstone of this should be that the concept incorporates both 
the ‗up‘ (positive) and ‗down‘ (negative) sides of social capital, confirming both its 
constraining and liberating power.  
The choices made on this important issue sometimes depend on deep but not explicit 
convictions and beliefs, and can ultimately be reduced to ‗Hobbesian‘ pessimistic 
(individuals are egoistic in nature and need third-party enforcement to enter into a social 
contract) versus ‗Rousseauian‘ optimistic (individuals have a ‗good will‘ in nature and 
enter into a social contract through self-enforcement) views of human nature (Paldam & 
Svendsen, 2000). Smith and Kulynych (2002) refer to two traditions of theorists claiming 
that integrative (Coleman & Putnam, ref. Rousseau) versus coercive (Bourdieu, ref. 
Hobbes) processes were the primary aspect of social relations. In line with this, they 
(idem) also refer to Stone‘s (1989) influential concepts, to differentiate between 
Coleman‘s concern with ‗power to‘, to attain certain goals, and Bourdieu‘s concern with 
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‗power over‘, which reproduces social differentiation. Also Putnam‘s (1993: 177-185) 
concerns with social capital are entrenched in these inexplicit views of human nature; for 
example, when he distinguishes his ‗civic‘ social capital in the north of Italy with the 
Hobbesian amoral familism of the south. However, this struggle of Hobbes versus 
Rousseau presents us with a false, normative dichotomy about the origins of human 
behaviour, as empirical evidence from both social and natural sciences strongly reaffirms 
that ‗the social‘ or ‗the relational‘ is a fundamental determinant of human behaviour, for 
better or worse (Woolcock & Radin, 2008). In this respect, the capability to incorporate 
both the ‗up‘ and ‗down‘ sides of social capital is a minimal but central touchstone for the 
conceptual framework.  
It is then sad to observe that, in the past, ‗ideological clubbiness‘ has stagnated much of 
social capital research (Roca cited in Bebbington, 2004: 347). Vast amounts of paper have 
been wasted on social capital research, while ignoring its down sides. Many illustrations 
can be given of selective reading (Bebbington, 2004). Putnam (1993), for example, does 
not once mention Bourdieu when he discusses social capital in Making Democracy Work, 
still this book was once the starting point of all current debates. Another illustration is 
much of the work done within the World Bank. Also here, for example, Bourdieu was not 
mentioned once in the 424 pages (!) of Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective 
(Dasgupta & Serageldin, 1999). The denial of many (Rationalists and Communitarians) to 
take seriously the constraining factors of social capital have led to an international 
community wasting considerable amounts of time in policies based on a too optimistic 
and highly unrealistic view of social capital. Yet, on the other hand, the failure of 
Bordieuian analysis (Critics) to argue what an efficient developmental state should look 
like (inevitably coming back to the question of how society – and thus, social capital – 
should look like, in order to create such a developmental state), and their failure to affirm 
the ‗up side‘ or the emergence and potential of ‗disinterested, cooperative, or solidaristic 
[sic] action‘ (Bebbington, 2007: 160) also points in the direction of one-sidedness.  
Still, the fact is that until now Putnam‘s communitarian notion of social capital has 
monopolized most of the academic debate, and even more the development policies and 
practices which have been inspired by this debate. In the following sections I present how 
different strands of research present alternative views on the communitarian concept of 
social capital. A first step is to shortly mention the main findings of network theory to add 
‗content‘ to the social capital concept. Second, mentioning the insights brought by the 
institutional view indicates that the social capital concept should be put back in ‗context‘. 
Lastly, the synergy view is discussed as a way to integrate the main conclusions of both 
the network and institutional perspectives.  
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1.3 The debate: the search for synergy 
1.3.1 Networks and ‘content’: good versus bad social capital 
The network view focuses on both the ‗up‘ (‗good‘) and ‗down‘ (‗bad‘) side of social 
capital (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Network scholarship has done this through adding 
‗content‘, i.e. to investigate internal differentiation of various kinds of social networks 
leading to different types of social capital (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Three social capital types (source author) 
 BONDING SOCIAL CAPITAL BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL LINKING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
WHAT 
Horizontal relations with close others  Horizontal (symmetric) relations bridging 
across social divisions 
Vertical (asymmetric) relations with formal 
institutions 
FUNCTION ‘To get by’ 
Preserving resources 
Closure 
‘To get ahead’ 
Obtaining resources 
Brokerage 
Access to formal institutions 
Obtaining resources 
Brokerage 
EXAMPLE Friends, Family, Neighbours Peasant groups, Women’s associations, 
… 
Community member – local 
administration, health worker, … 
DOWNSIDE Exclusiveness 
Excessive duties  
Restriction of freedom 
Conflict between interest-groups 
Groups with anti-social outcomes 
 
Unequal and oppressive relations 
 
 
Network research measures internal differentiation along two factors: embedded 
resources and network location (Lin, 2001). Lin‘s (2008: 51) social capital definition is 
exemplary for this strand of research (NB the similarity with Bourdieu): ‗Social capital is 
defined as resources embedded in one‘s social networks, resources that can be accessed or 
mobilized through ties in the networks‘. It was Granovetter‘s argument of ‗the strength of 
weak ties‘ that grounded this kind of research. Granovetter (1973) showed that more open 
ended networks between people who do not know each other very well (that is, weak ties) 
are more effective for job-seekers than networks between people who are closely knit 
(that is, strong ties). This led to the formulation of two distinct and well documented 
network mechanisms (Burt, 2001). The first is ‗closure‘: a dense network of strong ties 
between similar individuals facilitating access to redundant information/resources and 
social control. The second is the ‗structural hole‘ mechanism: weak ties performing a 
brokerage function between non-similar individuals, facilitating access to non-redundant 
information/resources, and inclusion in new opportunities. The main sociological 
mechanisms explaining these network functions – closure and brokerage – are 
respectively the homophily and heterophily principles (Lin, 2008: 60-61). The homophily 
principle advances a strong link between the intensity of interactions and shared sentiment 
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(accounting for the social control function), and shared resources (accounting for access to 
redundant, and thus less strategic resources). The heterophily principle states the opposite: 
less intense interactions occur between more diverse individuals, giving access to 
heterophilous resources.  
Both kinds of network refer to the clear distinction between bonding (strong ties) and 
bridging (weak ties) social capital (Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). 
Briggs (1998) differentiates between social support (bonding) and social leverage 
(bridging) networks. The social support dimension refers to social capital that helps one to 
‗get by‘. Social capital as social leverage, on the other hand, helps one to ‗get ahead‘. 
Rather than being a coping strategy, it helps to create new opportunities for socio-
economic mobility.  As a consequence, ‗I am more likely to have the leverage I need to 
get ahead if I have at least some ties to people who are quite unlike me.‘ (Briggs, 1998: 
179). As such, Briggs distinction echoes Granovetter‘s (1973) argument of ‗the strength of 
weak ties‘ and corresponds with Lin‘s (2001: 10; 2008: 52) distinction between 
‗expressive actions‘ (preserving or maintaining resources in a closed – bonding – network, 
in order to maintain cohesion, solidarity or well-being) and ‗instrumental actions‘ 
(searching for and obtaining resources in an extended – bridging – network, in order to 
gain wealth, power or reputation).  
Later on, linking social capital has been introduced as a subtype of bridging social 
capital, as it connects people across explicit vertical power differentials in society (Szreter 
& Woolcock 2004). In network terms, the difference is between ‗symmetric‘ (bridging) 
and ‗asymmetric‘ (linking) power relations. Compare a link between a company employee 
and his manager and the link between two employees of different firms: both are weak, 
bridge different networks, have a potential brokerage function, yet the first is asymmetric, 
the second symmetric. Whereas bonding and bridging social capital are horizontal 
metaphors, linking is about vertical ties. Examples of this vertical dimension are relations 
between doctor and patient, social worker and client, community member and local 
administration, and so on (Woolcock & Radin: 432). Although some question whether 
bridging and linking social capital can be distinguished reliably and empirically from each 
other (e.g. Putnam, 2004), most scholars highlight its importance in linking micro 
(bottom-up) and macro (top down) processes (see section 1.3.3.). 
Two main arguments point to the advantages of the network view. First, the functional 
and micro (relational-structural) interpretation gives the notion its most clear-cut meaning 
as both ‗social‘ and ‗capital‘. On the one hand, its ‗social‘ character: in line with the 
definitions of Coleman and Bourdieu, what makes social capital unique is that it lies in 
relations between individuals and groups, not in individuals alone, nor in entire societies. 
Edwards and Foley (1998) clarify by making the difference with human capital. When 
people move out of a certain social context, they easily take their human capital 
(knowledge, skills) with them, yet their social capital is bound to that particular social 
context, in which certain social relations were built up and maintained. Thus, particular 
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social networks form the first and main constituting factor of social capital: without them 
there can be no social capital of any kind. Social capital defined as a macro concept 
(communities/societies), as is the case for communitarian conceptions, negates this 
embeddedness in these micro-processes, while aggregating context-dependent measures 
towards a trivial common denominator for entire societies (Edwards & Foley, 1998).  
On the other hand, on the micro-level, social capital fits most with the meaning of 
‗capital‘. Part of the literature has questioned whether social capital can really be defined 
as ‗capital‘ (e.g. Arrow, 1999; Solow, 1999). In particular, capital demands a ‗deliberate 
sacrifice in the present for future benefit‘ (Arrow, 1999: 4). However, most social 
interactions occur for their intrinsic value; their future benefits are unintentional side-
effects. On the other hand, the use of ‗capital‘, from a network view, is not merely 
metaphorical, as it presents some broad similarities with the ‗capital concept‘, and 
presents us with a ‗capital theory‘ (Lin, 2008). Social capital is ‗capital‘ – broadly defined 
– in the sense that it is functional: it is perceived as a ‗resource‘ or ‗asset‘, on which 
individuals can rely to attain other resources or benefits (ref. definitions of Coleman and 
Bourdieu). As such, in some cases people will make intentional ‗investment‘ in their 
social capital (in addition, social capital always demands an ‗investment‘ of time and 
effort, producing some costs, even when this investment produces future benefits only as 
unintentional side-effects), everyone has a certain ‗stock‘ of social capital on which they 
can rely (similar to human capital), and one may speak of the ‗returns‘ it has produced. 
More importantly, social capital presents a ‗capital theory‘, as it gives a conceptual 
framework to describe how capital is captured and reproduced for returns, or more 
specifically: ‗social capital theory conceptualizes production as a process by which 
‗surplus value‘ is generated through the investment of social relations (Lin, 2008: 51). 
Thus, this network conception of social capital, emphasizing both its ‗social‘ and ‗capital‘ 
character, corresponds best to the emerging consensus, both in theory and empirical 
evidence, that social capital is best understood as a ‗micro phenomenon‘ (Woolcock, 
2005: 220). 
The second argument in favour of the network view is that it has opened up the debate 
about ‗perverse‘ (Rubio, 1997) social capital, or the ‗down‘ or ‗dark‘ side of it (Portes & 
Landolt, 1996; Portes, 1998).  Network research on the functional differentiation of social 
networks led to the conclusion that social capital valuable in certain contexts and to 
certain ends is not valuable or has even negative effects on the achievement of other ends 
in other contexts. In this respect network scholarship has warned of the dangers of 
tautological and normative definitions of social capital. Portes and Landolt (2000: 532) 
start from the following definition: 
The definition of social capital as the ability [italic added] to secure resources by 
virtue of membership in social networks or larger social structures represents the 
most widely accepted definition of the term today. 
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Tautological definitions are then the result of mixing up the ability to secure resources 
with the resources themselves (Lin, 2001; Portes & Landolt, 1996, 2000; Portes, 1998). In 
that case Lin (2001: 11), presenting an example, indicates that social capital is only 
identified when it works: ‗[…] for actor X, kin ties are social capital because these ties 
channel X to a better job, and for actor Y, kin ties are not social capital because these ties 
do not channel Y to get a better job.‘ Defining social capital in that way is ‗saying that the 
successful succeed‘ (Portes, 1998: 5). Yet, when social capital is defined as the ability to 
secure these resources, tautology is prevented, and can then be measured by the ability to 
access or mobilize the embedded resources (Lin, 2008).  
In the case of Putnamian or communitarian definitions of social capital, as a result of 
their macro (communities/societies instead of individuals) and cultural (value/norms 
instead of networks) foci, tautological reasoning has led to highly normative social capital 
conceptions (Lin, 2001; Portes & Landolt, 1996, 2000; Portes, 1998). Social capital itself 
can no longer be distinguished from its outcomes, which risk limiting social capital only 
to those ‗good‘ or ‗civil‘ outcomes which one is looking for, giving social capital the 
character of an ‗unmixed blessing‘ (Portes & Landolt, 1996). Portes illustrates this with 
Putnam‘s equation of social capital with ‗civicness‘. Portes cites Putnam (1993: p. 36 
cited in Portes, 1998) to indicate the circularity of his argument:   
Some regions of Italy … have many active community organizations … These 
―civic communities‖ value solidarity, civic participation, and integrity. And here 
democracy works. At the other end are ―uncivic‖ regions, like Calabria and Sicily, 
aptly characterized by the French term incivisme. The very concept of citizenship is 
stunted here. 
Portes (1998: 20) concludes: ‗In other words, if your town is ―civic,‖ it does civic 
things; if it is ―uncivic‖, it does not.‘ The metaphor of ‗the hammer‘ elucidates the 
additional problems with such communitarian conceptions (cf.  Woolcock, 2005: 221; 
Fine, 2001: 103-04). If social capital is a hammer, it is the ability to use this hammer to 
construct or destroy a house, it is not the house itself (tautology), and certainly, not only 
when the outcome is limited to the construction of that house (normative). 
The next step was then to look more closely to the ‗down‘ side of social capital. 
Broadly, four negative effects can be distinguished: exclusion of outsiders, excessive 
claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward levelling 
norms (Portes & Landolt, 2000). Examples are respectively Adam Smith complaining 
about assemblies of merchants as ‗conspiracies against the public‘, excessive claims for 
family support wrecking economic initiatives of individual entrepreneurs in Bali, family 
clans in Chinatown enforcing conformity among young people and ruling out internal 
change, youth gangs‘ keeping their members down rather than raising them up, preventing 
them from escaping the youth gang world (Portes & Landolt, 1996). To a great extent, the 
dark side of social capital has been attributed to the bonding type of social capital. 
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Consequently, Putnam (2000) for example, has adjusted his argument by limiting his 
‗social capital as civic engagement‘ argument to the bridging form of social capital 
(Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). Concerns about circularity remain, as this shift has been 
simplified as a contrast between ‗bad‘ bonding and ‗good‘ bridging social capital (Geys & 
Murdoch, 2008). However, bonding social capital fulfils for example an important social 
support function (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Instead, bridging capital with anti-social 
outcomes is of course not excludable. Burt‘s (2001) analysis of ‗closure‘ (bonding) and 
‗structural holes‘ (bridging) does not make normative statements. For example, drug 
traffickers fulfil a brokerage function and bridge a structural hole between supply and 
demand, yet such bridging ties have anti-social outcomes. Putnam (2000) himself points 
to how people at the same time bond along some social divisions, while bridging across 
others. For example, a church or sect can unite people from different socio-economic, 
cultural, and ethnic backgrounds, yet preach exclusiveness and hatred. Thus, both bonding 
and bridging social capital depend on the social or anti-social outcomes for which they are 
used. On the macro level, this debate equates to ‗bad civil society‘ (Chambers & 
Kopstein, 2001). Both the Nazi movement in Germany (Berman, 1997) and the Rwandan 
government during the 1994 genocide (Uvin, 1998) grew from and harnessed a vibrant 
civil society, bridging across social divisions (yet strengthening others), and yet, united 
these people round inhumane purposes. Similar warnings should also be made for linking 
social capital. Putnam (2004) distinguishes between ‗unresponsive‘ and ‗responsive‘ 
linking social capital, arguing that contacts between citizens and government officials (or 
authority relations in general) can also be exploitative and have anti-social outcomes, 
when they for example resemble personalized patron-client ties, resulting in clientelism, 
corruption, and nepotism. However, independent from its social or anti-social outcomes, 
‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital can still be instrumental. Wolf (1966: 16) for 
example described patron-client ties as ‗lop-sided friendship‘: patron-client ties can be 
very asymmetric, with an unbalanced division of rights and duties resulting in 
dependency. However, they still enable the client to access additional resources or 
services, although on unequal terms. Ultimately, besides the positive and negative aspects 
of bonding social capital, bridging and linking social capital respectively have the 
potential to ‗reach out‘ and ‗scale up‘ (Woolcock, 2002: 26) the impact of bonding social 
capital; but again, this can be for the better or the worse.  
One particular and important shortcoming or potential danger of this network view is 
that it focuses almost unilaterally on the structural elements of social capital, while 
neglecting its cognitive elements. Structural elements of social capital refer to the ‗visible‘ 
forms or ‗social wires‘ of social capital, i.e. to the relationships, networks, associations, 
actions and other ‗social structure‘ which connect people; cognitive social capital, on the 
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other hand, refers to the norms, rules and values governing these social relationships (see 
e.g. Uphoff, 2000). When analysing social relations without taking into account the 
institutions governing them one potentially ends up with ‗primitive‘ structuralism.1 Social 
interaction not only depends upon the kind of relationships, but also on the ‗rules of the 
game‘ guiding the functioning of these relationships. Therefore, one should not forget that 
the ‗social wires‘ of social capital function within a broader institutional landscape. This 
observation has been elaborated more in depth by the institutional view. 
1.3.2 Institutions and ‘context’: a ‘stop over’ from micro to macro 
The importance of the institutional view is their attempt to link social capital as a ‗micro-
phenomenon‘ (Woolcock, 2005: 220) to broader institutional processes, and thus, to put 
social capital back in ‗context‘. Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 234) characterize the view 
as follows: 
This approach argues that the very capacity of social groups to act in their collective 
interest depends on the quality of the formal institutions under which they reside. 
[…] the institutional view, argues that the vitality of community networks and civil 
society is largely the product of the political, legal, and institutional environment.  
Thus, the focus is more on cognitive social capital. Unlike the communitarian and 
network view, institutional scholarship postulates social capital primarily as the dependent 
variable (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). As such, they are more concerned with how the 
cognitive aspects of social capital (norms, rules and values) are influenced by broader 
institutional processes, and less with the role social capital itself can play in (re)shaping 
this institutional context. Two variants can be distinguished.  
The first variant, defined by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2002), was a false 
start. This scholarship has shown that items including ‗rule of law‘, ‗civic liberties‘, and 
‗bureaucratic equality‘ have an economic pay-off. In themselves, these findings are 
important and widely accepted. However, this variant equates social capital with these 
macro economic, political and legal institutions (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000), 
differentiating between ‗government‘ and ‗civil society‘ social capital (Knack, 2002). 
Once more, this makes social capital the independent variable. In addition, the possibility 
for tautological and normative reasoning is reopened, as social capital and its outcomes 
are mixed up: societies with high stocks of social capital have high scores on rule of law, 
protection of civic liberties, bureaucratic equality and economic performance, those with 




 I borrow this phrasing from prof. dr. Tom De Herdt. 
50 
 
low stocks of social capital don‘t. It seems that social capital is only social capital when it 
works, a similarity between this institutional variant and communitarian conceptions (the 
connection between both is clear in Knack, 2003). Edwards and Foley (1998) attribute this 
tension to a ‗psychologized‘ and ‗culturalized‘ macro (entire societies) focus, 
disconnecting the concept entirely from its structural micro-component – individual 
actions within social networks (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). If one distinguishes three 
layers in the institutional environment – social structures, rules, and culture (Bastiaensen 
et al., 2002) – it is easy to observe the tendency of both views narrowing down the 
concept normatively, focusing on ‗good‘ governments and civil societies, as if 
exclusionary and conflict-ridden civil societies or authoritarian states are ‗social-capital-
free‘ (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 ‘Government’ and ‘civil society’ social capital (source: author) 
 Social Structure Rules Culture 
Government social capital 
(Institutionalists) 
Efficient bureaucratic state 
apparatus 
Rule of law 
Protection of civil liberties 
Western liberal democracy 
Civil society social capital 
(Communitarians) 
Horizontal, voluntary, and bridging 






The second institutional variant is more promising, as it takes social capital‘s context-
contingency seriously, and indeed, investigates social capital as the micro dependent 
variable of macro processes. It introduces a political economy perspective and is grounded 
in the work of Bourdieu. This variant yields two broad and important conclusions.  
First, the ‗use value‘ of social capital varies according to the context, or the particular 
social location, which is shaped by broader socio-economic and cultural factors (Edwards 
& Foley, 1997). It depends on the ‗fields‘ (Bebbington, 2007) in which the social capital 
operates: e.g. a dockworker‘s network will not be useful in the academic or banking 
world, and vice versa; an academic‘s or manager‘s network will be useless in finding a 
better job in the docks. Or according to Edwards and Foley (1998: 130): ‗The social 
capital of having wide-ranging network connections into a dying industry likewise would 
be of little value.‘ Their example (idem: 130) of human/cultural capital illustrates how the 
‗use value‘ of capitals can change over time: ‗As corporate America awakens to the 
consumer-purchasing potential of Hispanics, the cultural competency represented by 
fluency in Spanish and understanding Latino communities is being accorded more value 
in the market‘. Bebbington (2007) correctly states that in Bourdieu‘s view, the importance 
of this contextual differentiation is that it is accompanied with ‗cultural markers‘. These 
turn social capital into a cultural mechanism that reinforces boundaries between social 
groups, reproducing the supremacy of the world views of some of these groups, while 
dictating the ‗right ways of socializing‘ (Bebbington, 2007). To continue our example: it 
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is most likely that being a member of a bowling team (dockworker – ref. Putnam‘s 
Bowling Alone), is less valued, appreciated and useful in current society than playing in a 
drama club (academic) or being secretary of the Rotary Club (manager).  
Second, access to social capital is not equally distributed throughout societies (Edwards 
& Foley, 1997). Similar to other forms of capital – financial, cultural, human – access to 
social capital depends on one‘s social ‗location‘ including race, class, sex, geographic or 
other social inequalities (Edwards & Foley, 1998). People with higher education (human 
capital), leading a diversified career, earning a high income (financial capital), of which 
the surplus at the end of the month can be spent on social and cultural activities (cultural 
capital) will have access to more and diverse social networks (social capital) compared to 
people without higher education, who work for many years in the same job, earning an 
income which is entirely spent on house rent, food and bills. It turn, access to more and 
diverse social networks (social capital) help to preserve existing capital and access to 
additional human, financial and cultural capital. Thus, social capital is inextricably bound 
up with other capitals (financial, human, cultural), and because of its fungible character, it 
helps to reproduce the capital portfolios of social groups, acting as a kind of catalyst for 
social differentiation (Edwards & Foley, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000).  
This institutional variant has criticized other institutionalists and communitarians 
because they ignore this inequality when measuring social capital at national levels 
(Edwards & Foley, 1998: 130):  
To assume that we can simply aggregate social capital to produce some measure of 
the resources available to society or polity, moreover, is to make the same mistake 
that economists make in using gross national product (GNP) […] The same level of 
GNP per capita can mask vastly different distributions of income, wealth, and 
opportunity among subgroups within society. 
Stated this way, what the institutional view of social capital should do on the national 
level is to come up, so to say, with a GINI-coefficient of social capital, and analyse the 
unequal distribution of social capital in societies. On the policy level, these conclusions 
led to a critical reaction on the contemporary zero-sum opposition between social capital 
(society) and government policy (state). People like Skocpol (1996) and Tendler (1997) 
have presented case studies to prove how the nurturing of social capital in civil society is 
heavily dependent on supporting state policies, in particular because it is the state which 
should act on the unequal distributions of social capital in society. It is this variant which 
has been integrated in the synergy view, emphasizing the complementarity of public and 
private sectors (Evans, 1996).  
Although the institutionalists‘ argument that social capital is embedded in macro 
political and economic processes is a valuable contribution to the debate, it is also their 
weakness. In particular the first variant focuses almost exclusively on national level – 
macro – processes, providing aggregated data and cross-national studies. Such an 
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approach denies the fact that social capital originates in particular social relations, within 
particular contexts, and therefore will mainly be influenced by local level institutional 
factors. As such, this approach, which focuses on statistical data instead of case study 
research, overlooks the most fundamental level of explanantion – the local level – and 
remains blind for the enormous variation within societies (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). 
However, this is not necessarily the case from a Bourdieuian perspective (the second 
variant). On the contrary, the central idea that access to and the functioning of social 
capital depends on one‘s particular social ‗location‘ and the ‗field‘ in which one operates, 
highlights the importance of local level analysis, and underscores a relational and 
contextual view of social capital. Nonetheless, most research done from this institutional 
angle focuses on the impact of macroeconomic processes and policies. 
1.3.3 The synergy view: bottom-up vs. top-down  
The synergy view tries to integrate the main findings of both the network and institutional 
view. Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 236) define three broad conclusions emerging from 
the synergy view: 
Neither the state nor societies are inherently good or bad; governments, 
corporations, and civic groups are variable in the impact they can have on the 
attainment of collective goals. 
States, firms, and communities alone do not possess the resources needed to 
promote broad-based, sustainable development; complementarities and partnerships 
forged both within and across these different sectors are required. 
Of these different sectors, the state‘s role in facilitating positive developmental 
outcomes is the most important and problematic. This is so because the state is not 
only the ultimate provider of public goods […] but is also the actor best able to 
facilitate enduring alliances across boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, 
politics, and religion. 
A special issue of World Development, edited by Evans (1996), has been the central 
reference for the synergy scholarship. In the concluding chapter Evans (1996), reviews the 
evidence, and defines ‗state-society synergy‘ as an equilibrium of complementarity and 
embeddedness. Complementarity refers to mutually supportive relations and actions 
between public and private actors, of which Fox (1996) presents us with a clear example, 
when he describes how by simply providing transportation, the Mexican government 
contributed to the scaling up of peasant social capital, as it enabled them to unite across 
geographical barriers. A more classic example is the protection of rights of association 
(Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Whereas complementarity demands a clear division of 
labour, embeddedness refers to the need for sustaining concrete interactions across the 
public-private divide. Here, the classic example is that of local irrigation officials, 
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engaged by the state, living in the communities which are served by the irrigation 
programme (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  
Thus, the central idea of the synergy view is the synergetic relation between top-down 
(state-centred) and bottom-up (society-centred) models to promote sustainable 
development, a view already emphasized by Uphoff (1992):  
paradoxical though it may seem, ‗top-down‘ efforts are usually needed to introduce, 
sustain, and institutionalize ‗bottom-up‘ development. We are commonly 
constrained to think in ‗either-or‘ terms – the more of one the less of the other – 
when both are needed in a positive-sum way to achieve our purposes. 
Woolcock (1998) has made a remarkable attempt to take up this advice, while merging 
it with the social capital debate. On the one hand, he defines bottom-up approaches as the 
combination of integration (intra-community ties) and linkage (extra-community ties). On 
the other hand, top-down approaches are defined by the combination of Evans' synergy 
(state-society relations) and organizational integrity (corporate coherence and capacity). 
As Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 236) argue, Evans' synergy needs to be completed with 
integrity, as it only works ‗where the actions of public officials are simultaneously bound 
by performance-oriented organizational environments that are competent, coherent, and 
credible.‘  
This analytical framework can be further refined in two ways. First, conceptual rigour 
can be increased by using the concepts of bonding, bridging and linking social capital 
(e.g. Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Woolcock, 2002; 
Woolcock, 2005). Several attempts have been made in this direction, mainly working with 
the bonding and bridging concepts. Bonding (integration - intra-community ties) and 
bridging (linkage - extra-community ties) then account for the bottom-up strategies. Yet 
most of these frameworks, in their attempt to integrate bottom-up and top-down, fail to 
clearly distinguish social capital from the factors influencing it. For example, in 
Woolcock‘s (1998) framework: integration and linkage are clear types of bonding and 
bridging social capital, but are synergy and integrity then types of linking social capital? 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) present another framework aimed at merging ideas of 
bridging social capital with governance: to what extent then is governance linking capital 
or social capital in general?  
A possible answer lies in a clear demarcation of the concept of linking social capital, 
which has not until now been fully integrated in synergy frameworks, despite being the 
central means of linking bottom-up and top-down. Again, the influence of the wrong 
institutional variant obscures our understanding, with its tendency to equate linking social 
capital with its macro-economic, cultural, and normative outcomes. Wolleb‘s (2008: 373-
74) definition, in The Handbook of Social Capital, is exemplary: ‗So in the 
macroeconomic sphere, the relevant social capital is linking social capital, in the form of 
confidence in the correct and equitable functioning of institutions, and more generally the 
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honesty of individual economic actors‘. Compare with Woolcock‘s (2002: 26) micro 
definition of the concept: ‗The capacity to leverage resources, ideas, and information from 
formal institutions beyond the community is a key function of linking social capital.‘ If 
social capital is best understood as a micro phenomenon (Woolcock, 2005), one should be 
consistent, and perceive all its types as micro phenomena.  Thus, coming back on the top-
down/bottom-up framework: linking social capital is the capacity of individuals or 
particular social networks to access formal institutions (bottom-up), the organizational 
integrity and synergy of these formal institutions are not linking capital, but influence this 
capacity (top-down).  
Second, the analytical framework can be made more comprehensive by a clear 
differentiation of the formal institutions influencing social capital in a top-down manner, 
as not only the state plays a role in this respect. Bebbington (1999: 2035) refers to the 
‗familiar trinity‘ of state, market and civil society; i.e. all three institutional spheres having 
their own logics (e.g. patronage versus market transaction versus collective action). From 
the framework follows that their integrity and willingness to synergy will determine the 
effectiveness of the top-down approaches. Viewed from a bottom-up perspective: linking 
social capital is the capacity – ‗the feel for the game‘ (Bebbington, 2007: 156) – to deal 
with the different logics of these three institutional realms; voice, exit and loyalty 
categorizing the three broad ways of interaction (Bastiaensen et al., 2002).  
This presents us with a framework integrating top-down and bottom-up approaches 
(Figure 1). The central idea of the framework, according to Woolcock (2002: 26), is that 
such a ‗multi-dimensional approach allows us to argue that different combinations of 
bonding, bridging, and linking social capital are responsible for the range of outcomes that 
we observe in the literature, and to incorporate a dynamic component in which optimal 
combinations change over time.‘  
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Figure 1 Social capital: synergy between top-down and bottom-up approaches (source: author) 
 
1.4 The political economy of social capital 
The sequence of the above discussed views presents a certain evolution within the 
social capital debate (Bastiaensen et al., 2002). After the network view added ‗content‘ to 
social capital, the institutional view placed it back in its ‗context‘. As such, Putnam‘s 
reworking of the concept – a normative definition that stripped out both ‗content‘ and 
‗context‘ (Harris, 2001) – has been annihilated. Thereafter, the synergy view aimed to 
make a synthesis of the debate. But each view has its weakness: the network view runs the 
risk of remaining ‗simple‘ structuralism, both the institutional and the synergy view tend 
to focus on macro processes, and remain blind for the interaction between social capital 
and the micro-context and local level factors.  
However, a leitmotiv throughout the debate has been the critique on the original 
normative social capital concept of Putnam, and the rediscovery of one of the main 
originators of the social capital concept, namely Bourdieu.  Bebbington (2007) expresses 
an emerging consensus in the social capital debate by saying that ‗even the most trenchant 
critics of social capital [he mentions Fine, 2001; and Harriss, 2001] seem to suggest that if 
the concept is to be of any analytical value at all, it has to be understood in the way that 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu uses it – as part of a theory of practice, itself grounded in a 
broader theoritization of political economy.‘ A strand of research has followed this piece 











































on social capital, although in a unsystematic way (e.g. Bebbington, 2002, 2007; 
Bebbington, Dharmawan, et al. 2006; Cleaver, 2005; DeFillipis, 2001; Toit, Skuse & 
Cousins, 2007; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Molyneux, 2002; Portes, 1998; Silvey & 
Elmhirst, 2003; Svendsen & Svendson, 2003; van Staveren, 2003; Vasan, 2007; 
Wilhusen, 2009). These scholars want to reestablish social capital as a sociological 
concept, and by doing so share the critique of people like Fine (2001) and Harris (2001) 
that mainstream social capital thinking has been used as a discourse to integrate ‗the 
social‘ into micro-economics. Wilhusen (2009: 394) summarizes the difference between a 
Bourdieuian and Putnamian approach as follows: 
In summary, Bourdieu‘s heuristics permit a view of social interaction that is 
contextually grounded, explicitly relational, and attentive to dynamic power 
relationships over time. In contrast, mainstream conceptualizations of social capital 
derive from Putnam focus predominantly on the accumulation of network capacity 
and thus present a static and acontextual perspective on social process. 
Some basic assumptions underlie most of the work done by scholars following this 
Bourdieuian perspective. They can be listed as following: 
 
 A relational view. Social capital is embedded in social networks. What makes 
social capital unique is that it is manifested in relationships among individuals and 
groups, and not in individuals or entire societies. Thus, any attempt to analyse or 
describe social capital should start from the particular social networks in which it 
inheres. Furthermore, social capital is defined functionally as a means to access 
other resources, or in Bourdieu‘s terms, to access economic and cultural capital. As 
such, the definition given by Portes and Landolt (2000: 532) aligns well with this 
Bourdieuian perspective, i.e. social capital is best distinguished as: 
[…] the ability to secure resources by virtue of membership in social networks or 
larger social structures. 
For scholars of the Bourdieuian perspective, this definition conceptualizes social 
capital more narrowly as a ‗social relational and structural resource‘, excluding 
notions such as (generalized) trust, reciprocity, collective action, and other value-
laden terms which have made the concept vague and normative in the hands of 
Putnam (Edwards and Foley, 1998: 135).  
 A contextual view. Social capital is manifested in culturally embedded networks. 
This should overcome the structural bias. The ability to access resources through 
social relationships is shaped by broader institutional and cultural patterns of 
particular contexts. If and how people use their social capital is dependent upon 
their ‗social location‘ (patterned along lines of race, class, sex, geography, …) 
(Edwards and Foley, 1998: 129). In Bourdieu‘s (1977, 1986) terms, this ‗social 
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location‘ is defined by peoples ‗habitus‘ (their predisposition proceeding from their 
social background), their endowments of capital (economic, cultural, social) they 
possess and mobilize, and the ‗fields‘ (different social arenas within society, each 
defined by particular ‗rules of the game‘) in which they operate. Thus, a second 
basic assumption is that social capital can never be analysed apart from the 
particular contexts and practices in which it inheres. A major consequence of this 
contextual view is that efforts to identify context-independent and universal aspects 
of social capital are useless – again a critique towards more Putnamian notions of 
social capital, which, for example, are measured in survey data as the General 
Social Survey (Edwards and Foley, 1998, 1997).  
 A political economy view. Social capital is unequally distributed in society, and 
tends to reproduce power relationships. From its context-dependent character two 
other conclusions can be drawn. First, just as economic and cultural capital, social 
capital is unequally distributed within society: the ability to access resources 
throughout networks is dependent upon your particular ‗social location‘ within 
society. Second, because of its context dependent character, social capital is 
inextricably bound up with the unequal distribution of resources and power within 
society, and as such, reproduces it. From such a perspective, social capital is both a 
product and a producer of broader cultural and policy economy (Bebbington, 2007: 
155). 
 
These basic assumptions are for example nicely summarized by Toit et al. (2007: 2) 
when they outline their paper on the political economy of social capital in Rural Eastern 
Cape: 
It [the paper] argues that if the concept is to be useful at all, it needs to be used in 
ways that are sensitive to the fact that social capital inheres in social relations; that 
these social relations cannot be understood separately from the meaning-giving 
practices and discourses with which they are entangled; that the analysis of social 
capital requires an agent-centred approach that is alive to the way in which it is 
used, transformed, created, made and remade; and that such an analysis further more 
needs to be alive to the nature of power relations both on the micro-level and the 
macro-level of political economy. The analysis of social capital therefore should be 
linked to a careful account of the practices, networks, systems and processes that 
empower some and enable them to climb out of poverty, but which also marginalise 
and trap others in poverty that is deep-seated and chronic. 
 
This demands for a different approach to the study of social capital. These scholars 
want to revalue the ‗social‘ in social capital (and not ‗capital‘). The crucial idea they want 
to underscore is the fact that social capital cannot be understood separately from the 
particular contexts and practices with which it is entangled. As such, their work is also a 
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methodogical critique on the more mainstream social capital research, which is ‗marked 
by a modernist tendency to shoehorn the specificity of culture and society into abstract 
and essentialising frameworks which are then deemed broadly applicable to all cultures 
and contexts (Toit et al., 2007: 3). Therefore, from a Bourdieuian perspective, the analysis 
of social capital should remain dependent upon other forms of social analysis (Mosse, 
2008: 96), in order to present a more fine-grained and contextual analysis. Most of these 
scholars try to achieve this objective through ethnographic and case study research.  
1.5 Social capital and conflict, livelihoods, and projects 
After introducing the social capital debate, a further contextual angle is required. Below I 
present three bodies of literature, dealing with the link between social capital and 
respectively conflict, rural livelihoods and development projects. These tailor the social 
capital debate more concretely to the context of the present work: on the one hand, the 
Burundian context of post-conflict reconstruction (context), and on the other hand, 
development interventions (object). This literature will only be briefly introduced, as these 
issues will recur and be explored more in depth throughout the subsequent chapters. 
1.5.1 Social capital, conflict and post-conflict reconstruction 
Whereas in the beginning of the 1990s the social capital debate was mainly directed 
towards development, democracy and civil society, it has recently been integrated in 
research on violence and conflict (e.g. Bohara et al., 2006; Colletta & Cullen, 2000a, 
2000b; Goodhand et al., 2000; Mehmet & Mehmet, 2004; World Bank, 1999). As a result, 
social capital has become a factor in post-conflict reconstruction research and policy (e.g. 
Barron et al., 2004; Cullen & Forman, 1998; Harvey, 1998; Moser & Shrader, 1999; 
Obidegwu, 2004; Pickering, 2006; Richards et al., 2004) 
At the beginning of this debate, the basic assumption was that violent conflict destroys 
social capital. War and conflict zones were characterized as ‗zones of social capital 
deficiency‘ (Goodhand et al., 2000: 390). Since then, the idea has experienced some 
refinements, i.e. that violent conflict transforms social capital rather than destroying it, 
and that violent conflict can produce ‗perverse‘ or ‗bad‘ social capital (Colletta & Cullen, 
2000a, 2000b; Goodhand et al., 2000). Such refinements have stimulated Colletta and 
Cullen  (2000a, 2000b) to elaborate a more nuanced analytical framework and hypotheses 
on the nexus between violent conflict and social capital, which has been broadly adopted 
in both research and policy, and joins in with the general analytical framework presented 
in the previous section.   
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Colletta and Cullen (2000a) link social capital with social cohesion and quote Berkman 
and Kawachi to define the latter: 
Social cohesion refers to two broader intertwined features of society: (1) the 
absence of latent conflict whether in the form of income/wealth inequality; 
racial/ethnic tensions; disparities in political participation; or other forms of 
polarization; and (2) the presence of strong social bonds-measured by levels of trust 
and norms of reciprocity; the abundance of associations that bridge social divisions 
(civic society) and the presence of institutions of conflict management, e.g. 
responsive democracy, an independent judiciary, and an independent media. 
(Berkman & Kwachi quoted in Colletta & Cullen, 2000a: 4) 
Thus, translated in social capital terms social cohesion is dependent upon a 
combination of: (i) the presence of bonding capital (strong and trusting social bonds), (ii) 
the abundance of bridging capital (associations that bridge social divisions) and the 
existence of linking capital (access to institutions of conflict management, e.g. responsive 
democracy etc.) The relationship between social capital and social cohesion is then 
expressed in ‗the nexus of vertical and horizontal social capital and the balance of bonding 
and bridging social capital‘ (Colletta & Cullen, 2000a : 4). This informs a typology of 
situations (Figure 2). Conflict-prone situations (low social cohesion, high conflict) are 
equated with the sub-optimal combination of strong but exclusive bonding social capital, a 
lack of bridging capital, and links with an oppressive, authoritarian state. Peaceful 
situations (high social cohesion, low conflict) are equated with the optimal combination of 
the absence of exclusive bonding capital, strong bridging capital, and links with a 
democratic state. Based on the earlier work of Woolcock (1998), this typology can be split 
into types of societies (bottom-up), based on the bonding/bridging distinction, and states 


































































































The main policy conclusion, now a mantra in post-conflict reconstruction policy 
documents,  resulting from this literature, has been the need to substitute ‗bad‘ bonding 
social capital for the more inclusive and ‗good‘ bridging social capital. Morfit (2002) 
presents this idea as the core element of the social capital approach for post-conflict 
assistance. Whereas one approach is to design programmes which react quickly to the 
strong injustice felt by one side of the conflict (thus making explicit victims and 
perpetrators), the social capital approach diametrically emphasizes the need for ‗inclusive‘ 
programmes, bringing together all actors in the conflict to transform ‗shallow‘ (simple, 
rigid and exclusive, i.e. bonding) into ‗deep‘ (complex, flexible, and inclusive, i.e. 
bridging) social capital. 
Three broad but important observations can be presented about this policy conclusion. 
First, it reproduces the general, but oversimplified, tendency to equate bonding with ‗bad‘ 
and bridging with ‗good‘ social capital (Geys & Murdoch, 2008). Second, insufficient 
light has been shed on the role of linking social capital. The core idea is centred around 
the bonding/bridging distinction, leaving vertical (linking) issues of post-conflict 
reconstruction aside. And if linking capital is discussed, confusion is prevalent, as there is 
again no clear distinction between the macro influence of different types of states 
(political economy) and the micro ability to access and interact with these states (linking 
social capital). Third, following on from earlier observations, there is a tendency towards 
a one-sided bottom-up and society-centred analysis. An important question here is how 
types of social capital interfere, and how one proceeds from the sub-optimal combination 
of conflict-prone situations to the optimal combination of peaceful situations. From the 
synergy view we remember that causal arrows follow both directions: bottom-up and top-
down. However, with its focus on the bonding/bridging distinction, this policy conclusion 
defines both conflict and its solutions more as a matter of society (uniting and bridging 
different groups within society), and less a matter of state-society relations. Reasoning 
goes from society to the state: transforming bonding into inclusive bridging social capital 
will ultimately lead towards better linking social capital and a state dedicated to peace.  
All three observations reveal that both research and policy linking social capital and 
conflict still partly refer to the communitarian and Putnamian notion of social capital, 
focusing on both the ‗good‘ bridging social capital and the primacy of bottom-up/society-
centred approaches, in which face-to-face interactions on the community level are defined 
as the independent variable and the ‗real‘ source of social capital, which in the end 
produces democratic governance (Szreter, 2002). As such, it partly fails to find the right 
equilibrium between bottom-up and top-down analysis. These are observations which the 
present work aims to tackle. 
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1.5.2 Social capital, poverty and rural livelihoods 
From the beginning, social capital as a concept has been rapidly adopted by the 
international development community, especially the World Bank (Bebbington, Woolcock 
et al., 2006). Social capital has even been called the ‗missing link‘ (Grootaert, 1998) to 
poverty alleviation and development. Especially the Voices of the Poor studies, led by 
Narayan (1997) delivered empirical foundations for the link between social capital and 
poverty, which is twofold. On the one hand, it became clear that lack of social capital 
(lack of social relations and social belonging) is as much a part of the experience of 
poverty as is lack of income. Second, social capital was perceived as an important asset in 
the hands of the poor to empower themselves and cope with their poverty. Not 
surprisingly then, social capital became a new conceptual language which was integrated 
in the World Development Reports (WDR), especially the WDR 2000/2001 (Bebbington, 
Woolcock et al., 2006).  
The bonding/bridging/linking distinction has brought the analysis of this link between 
social capital and poverty a step forward, and produced the broad hypothesis that poverty 
is linked with a combination of high bonding, but low bridging and linking stocks of 
social capital. Woolcock (2002: 26-27) summarizes this hypothesis: 
These distinctions have particular significance for understanding the plight of the 
poor, who typically have a close-knit and intensive stock of bonding social capital 
that they leverage to ―get by‖ ([…]), a modest endowment of the more diffuse and 
extensive bridging social capital typically deployed by the non-poor to ―get ahead‖ 
([…]), and almost no linking social capital enabling them to gain sustained access to 
formal institutions such as banks, insurance agencies, and the courts ([…]). 
This subtle view reflects the need to mitigate enthusiasm about the link between social 
capital and poverty reduction, as social capital is unequally distributed, mostly at the 
expense of the poor, and thus can reproduce as much as it can eradicate poverty.  
The livelihood framework has become a popular framework to link social capital to 
rural livelihoods and poverty reduction (Toit et al., 2007: 3–4). From the definition (Ellis, 
2000: 10) the link between livelihoods and social capital is already clear: 
A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial, and social 
capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social 
relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual of the 
household. 
In this framework, social capital is one of the assets at the disposal of households to 
perform livelihood strategies. As such, the livelihood framework is more inclined towards 
the network view of social capital, defining it as a property of individuals or small groups 
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(in this case, households), integrating both horizontal and vertical relationships (contrary 
to Putnam‘s focus on horizontal associations), and incorporating both benefits and costs of 
belonging to such relations and networks (Ellis, 2000).  
In particular Bebbington‘s (Bebbington, 1997, 1999; Bebbington & Perreault, 1999; 
Bebbington, Dharmawan et al., 2006) work has made more explicit the need for a political 
economy perspective when analysing this link between social capital, rural livelihoods 
and poverty. First, his work has emphasized the importance of social capital as an asset in 
the livelihoods framework, in that it facilitates or hinders access to other assets on which 
households build their livelihoods, and so can work as a catalyst for both the eradication 
and reproduction of poverty. Second, he placed the discussion in a broader perspective, 
while arguing that the functioning of market, state and civil society also defines the rules 
of access to resources, and so has considerable impact on the functioning of social capital 
as an asset in the livelihood strategies of rural households. Such a framework features in 
Bebbington, Dharmawan et al. (2006), which illustrates the combined efforts of political 
economy and social capital analysis to conceptualize village level livelihood and 
governance problems. 
1.5.3 Social capital and development projects 
The third and final link between social capital and external development interventions is 
the one which ultimately grounds the present work, and which will define the main unit of 
analysis, i.e. development projects. That this link should receive attention is clear when 
examining the implications listed by Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 53) of the social 
capital debate for development theory and policy:  
[...] development interventions should be viewed through a social capital lens, and 
assessments of their impact should include the potential effects of the intervention 
on the social capital of poor communities. As we have seen, the social networks of 
the poor are one of the primary resources they have for managing risk and 
vulnerability, and outside agents therefore need to find ways to complement these 
resources, rather than substitute for them.  
Social capital soon became a pillar of development policy, in that external development 
interventions were asked to ‗create social capital that increases the voice and economic 
opportunities of the poor‘ (World Bank, 2000: 129-130). In particular social capital has 
been linked to debates on social funds (e.g. Van Domelen, 2007) and community-driven-
development (CDD) (Mansuri & Rao, 2004), later on added with community-driven-
reconstruction (CDR) (Cliffe et al., 2003; Strand et al., 2003). However, although social 
capital became a new conceptual language in development policy, this did not result in 
strong efforts to use in practice a social capital lens. It will be hard to find a project, 
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programme or policy documents which do not state they increase, nurture or strengthen 
social capital, yet few of these documents will present it as a strategic objective. Relying 
on a normative communitarian analysis, and as a result of the ‗lazy‘ (Bebbington, 2004: 
344) or ‗banalized‘ (Molyneux, 2002: 169) use of the concept, in most cases, social 
capital will be equated with associations, to box it into the logical framework of projects 
and programmes, its measurable indicator being the number of associations built. As 
Francis (2002: 7) describes for the World Bank:  
All Regions of the Bank are, of course, engaged in operations with a bearing on 
social capital […]. More specifically, community driven development and social 
funds, as well as programs in rural and agricultural development, human 
development and poverty alleviation, almost always draw upon and affect social 
capital at the community and local level. Most Regions have made some use of the 
concept of social capital in analytic or investment work. However, no Region has 
made social capital an orienting or strategic concept for its work. 
If the aim of this thesis is to analyse the interaction between social capital and concrete 
development projects, this also demands a theoretical point of departure on how 
development projects should be conceived. In this respect, I rely on the literature defining 
development projects as ‗arenas‘ in which ‗strategic groups‘ enter into ‗conflict‘ with each 
other (De Sardan, 2005). Here conflict has no pejorative meaning; it merely subscribes to 
the empirical observation that conflict is inherent to social life. Thus, conflict is a 
synonym for bargaining processes through social interaction between actors with different 
interests. An arena is then a ‗space in which real conflicts between interacting social 
actors occur around common stakes [in this case, the development project].‘ (De Sardan, 
2005: 190).  The concept of ‗strategic group‘, being an alternative for the rigid and 
mechanical notion of ‗social class‘, then subscribes to the empirical observation that, 
within such an arena, groups are formed to defend common interests. Strategic groups 
have a variable nature, in that strategic alliances can be time-, context- and issue-specific, 
while not excluding that these can evolve into more durable alliances. As such, the 
development project can be characterized by the ‗game‘ metaphor. As De Sardan (2005: 
185) writes: 
A development project (or development infrastructures, in general) thus appears to 
be a game in which players involved all use different cards and play according to 
different rules. It could also be seen as a system of resources and opportunities 
which everyone tries to appropriate in his or her own way. 
Developers (external agencies) and 'developees' (beneficiaries), and several strategic 
groups and individuals within these groups of developers (e.g. expatriate country director 
versus local social worker) and developees (e.g. men versus women), play the game with 
different cards, and all have different expectations about the development project, in terms 
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of their own particular interests. Such observations emphasize the fact that an external 
development intervention always operates within an existing social context. External 
agencies have the tendency to assume that their project is always the recommencement of 
local history, negating both the synchronic (e.g. simultaneous projects of other agencies) 
and diachronic (e.g. past projects) contexts in which they operate. Instead, projects are 
tailored to the local social context, selective adoption (e.g. adopting farming techniques, 
yet rejecting the literacy programme) and sidetracking (e.g. a farmers co-operative using 
the proceeds to buy a minibus to organize transport instead of reinvesting in farming 
activities) being two main principles explaining such appropriation (De Sardan, 2005: 
144-45). The bargaining and appropriation process between the different stakeholders can 
be analysed according to the mediation and brokerage literature, which presents certain 
outcomes in the scope of the development project (e.g. Bastiaensen et al., 2002; 
Bierschenk et al., 2002; De Sardan, 2005; D‘Exelle, 2004).  
Through this literature it is possible to tailor the general analytical framework of social 
capital debate to the particular context of development projects (Figure 4). In doing so, it 
portrays development projects as local ‗arenas‘.  
 




An external development project is therefore categorized as a top-down strategy from 














































projects depends on the equilibrium sought by the external agency between synergy 
(inclusive and participatory relations between the external agency and the community) 
and integrity (ability to avoid local power struggles). From a top-down perspective, the 
question then is how the external agency will nurture, create, change or destroy local 
stocks of bonding/bridging/linking social capital. From a bottom-up perspective, the 
question is how existing stocks of bonding/bridging/linking social capital will change, 
adapt, ease, or hinder the implementation of the project. Brokerage and mediation are then 
placed at the intersection of these two causal arrows. As such, this framework provides an 
analytical visualization of the scope and layout of the present work. 
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Chapter 2  
Some methodological notes 
2.1 Introduction 
Here I explain my research methodology. After presenting arguments in favour of a 
multiple case study approach, I discuss the steps through which this approach 
materialized. First, the identification and selection of the case studies will be discussed, 
followed by a list of the main research themes. The next section examines the various data 
collection techniques used, in particular the use of focus group discussions. I end this 
methodological note with a chronology of the various periods of fieldwork carried out for 
this dissertation. 
2.2 Research aim and approach : a descriptive multiple 
case study 
As has been explained above, the aim of this thesis is (i) a critical analysis of the debate 
on the social capital concept and the claims which are made about its role in post-conflict 
settings, and (ii) a critical analysis of local NGO ‗social engineering‘ practice to post-
conflict reconstruction. This is done through an ethnographic descriptive multiple case 
study approach, which allows to grasp the particular reality of three NGO-interventions 
and their attempts to ‗social engineer‘ peace and development in the north of Burundi 
after more than ten years of civil war. A case study can be defined as: 
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the detailed examination of a relatively few persons or items. The subjects of study 
must of course be appropriate to the matter in hand, but they will not usually be 
chosen by a formal sampling process. [...] The essential methodological feature of a 
case study is that it provides in-depth analysis, detailed analysis. (Caseley & Lury, 
1987: 64-65).  
The choice for a descriptive multiple case study was primarily motivated by the fact 
that context will play a major role in this research. Yin (1993: 3) exactly points to this 
argument when recommending case study research:  
The case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not 
readily distinguishable from its context. It is deliberately including the context as a 
major part of the study. 
For present research, this contextual argument is threefold. First and foremost, as 
described in chapter one, a Bourdieuian political economy perspective, underscores that 
social capital cannot be understood separately from the particular contexts and practices 
with which it is entangled. Therefore, a relational and contextual view with emphasis on 
power relationships is necessary. This demands for a fine-grained and detailed case study 
description, rather than large quantitative data sets that are unable to present a 
contextualized picture of social reality. As a consequence, this political economy 
perspective has mainly produced detailed case studies in which the context dependent 
character of social capital is taken seriously (e.g. Bebbington, Dharmawan, et al. 2006; 
Cleaver, 2005; Toit, Skuse & Cousins, 2007; Molyneux, 2002; Silvey & Elmhirst, 2003; 
Vasan, 2007; Wilhusen, 2009).  
Second, since conflicts are no longer settled on a battlefield, but are fought in the 
streets of cities and villages, it is the community that presents the ‗nexus of conflict 
action‘ (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999), and presumably, also the ‗nexus of conflict 
resolution‘. The case studies will illustrate this point: although the national Burundian 
conflict had serious consequences on and trickled down to the local level, both conflict 
and post-conflict settings are primarily defined by local level factors within the particular 
studied communities. Conflict analysis therefore also requires a detailed micro-
perspective.  
Third and lastly, this thesis tackles the lack of community level analysis of NGO-
interventions in areas affected by conflict (Goodhand, 2006). Despite the natural tendency 
of projects to assume that ‗history begins with the project‘, while underestimating the 
ecological, economic, institutional and political history that came before its arrival, 
‗project/milieu‘ interactions always take place within the particular context, and affects 
project outcomes (Olivier de sardan, 2005: 139). Thus, also these NGO-interventions – as 
the main unit of analysis – are context-dependent, and demand for a contextual approach. 
As such, the thesis hopes to offer a detailed contextual ‗empirical story‘ of three NGO-
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interventions and their attempts to ‗social engineer‘ peace and development in the north of 
Burundi. 
Consequently, the thesis presents a multiple case study, as it gives such an in-depth and 
detailed analysis of three particular NGO-interventions on three particular collines in 
northern Burundi:  (i) the CIBA project on Burara colline (Busoni commune, Kirundo 
province), (ii) the LITA project on Tangara colline (Butihinda commune, Muyinga 
province), and (iii) the CLC project on Cumba colline (Muyinga commune, also in 
Muyinga province). As the case studies will illustrate, this gives the advantage that a 
comparative perspective is possible, both bringing forth similarities between cases and 
highlighting particularities of each case. 
Descriptive case studies can be distinguished from exploratory case studies, which are 
mostly undertaken as preliminary research prior to the final definition of study questions 
and hypotheses. They can also be differentiated from explanatory case studies, which 
particularly seek to explain cause-effect relationships. The definition of a descriptive case 
study therefore reflects best my research set-up:  
A descriptive case study presents a complete description of a phenomenon [social 
capital] within its context [three particular NGO post-conflict reconstruction 
interventions].‘ (Yin, 1993: 5).  
My research approach can be labeled ethnographic, but then defined as:  
referring primarily to a particular method or sets of methods. In its most 
characteristic form it involves the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in 
people's lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to 
what is said, asking questions—in fact, collecting whatever data are available to 
throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research. (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995: 1).  
Thus, I call my case study approach ethnographic, primarily because it is based on 
‗going to the field‘. In general approximately 15 months have been spent in Burundi, 
including 10 months of actual fieldwork on Burara, Tangara, and Cumba collines. For 
each of the cases, daily visits to the field for at least two succesive months have been 
executed, in addition to field visits during preparatory research. However, I never lived on 
the three collines, which limited the opportunity for participant observation. Besides, 
taking into account the complex realities of interventions, these ten months proved quite a 
minimum to me. During fieldwork I was able to achieve a general picture of the different 
histories of the collines in the light of the above research questions (as is presented in 
chapter 4 and throughout the empirical chapters 5 to 8). However, during field research 
one also runs into many other particular and interesting stories or issues which demand 
time to unravel and grasp them fully. Therefore, I decided to focus strictly on the above 
research questions, and the events shaping these different events. Thus, the thesis is not a 
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‗classical‘ anthropological study, based on actually living a substantially longer period of 
time in one particular location. Instead, by being present and researching these three 
collines allowed me a more focused understanding of the lived realities with regard to the 
three NGO-interventions. 
2.3 The case studies : the CIBA, LITA and CLC livelihood 
interventions 
Now to the selection of the case studies. Four American-based international NGOs 
introduced livelihood interventions under the umbrella of the Livelihood Security 
Initiative Consortium (LSIC), funded by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). The projects were implemented in four provinces in northern and 
central Burundi (Kirundo, Muyinga, Gitega, Karuzi) between 2005 and 2007, and $2.5 
million dollars of resources were requested for the implementation of the total initiative 
(LSIC, 2004). This dissertation will present ethnographic findings on three of these 
livelihood interventions in the north of Burundi. Concretely, the three case studies are (i) 
the CIBA project on Burara colline (Busoni commune, Kirundo province) (ii) the LITA 
project on Tangara colline (Butihinda commune, Muyinga province), and (iii) the CLC 
project on Cumba colline (Muyinga commune, also in Muyinga province).1 This case 
selection was done in two successive stages.  
In the first phase, the NGO-interventions were identified. The main criterion guiding 
my choice for livelihood interventions was their representativeness for post-conflict 
reconstruction in general, and reconstruction activities in Burundi in particular. Livelihood 
interventions are identified as appropriate instruments to implement post-conflict 
reconstruction policy in protracted crises situations, and their focus on food security 
aligned well with the Burundian context of protracted food insecurity and the critical role 
of the agricultural sector in the livelihoods of Burundian households. Livelihood 
interventions have become popular because they aim to bridge a particular gap in 
international response to protracted crisis situations, i.e. the need for developmental relief 
(Russo et.al., 2008). As such, livelihood interventions link humanitarian short-term 
interventions with the start of long term measures for reconstruction. Specifically for the 
Burundian case, the focus on food security and agricultural production within such 
                                               
 
 
1 As explained in the introduction, for the sake of discretion the identity of the different NGOs is not disclosed. I 
use pseudonyms, which stand for Consortium Initiative Burara (CIBA), Livelihoods Tangara (LITA), and 
Cumba Livelihood Consortium (CLC). 
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livelihood projects represents the primacy of food security as one of the most urgent and 
important ‗peace dividends‘ for the Burundian population after 10 years of civil war 
(BINUB, 2008), and the need to rebuild the agricultural sector in a country in which 94% 
of the population is dependent on this sector for their livelihoods, and which accounted for 
45.2% of the Burundian GDP in 2005 (RoB, 2006a). 
Due to financial and time constraints, it was impossible to select four case studies, 
which would have enabled me to cover all four NGOs residing under the Livelihood 
Security Initiative Consortium. Only three projects were selected as case studies, in two 
provinces in the north of Burundi. Partly, the choice to work in Kirundo and Muyinga 
provinces was based on practical concerns, since both provinces border on one another, 
which made it more practical to plan and implement the fieldwork. However, the main 
reason was methodological, and is related to the second stage of the selection of the case 
studies. 
In this second stage, a maximum variation strategy was used to select the three concrete 
NGO-projects and the three collines on which the research would be conducted. The 
objective was to select cases rich in information, facilitating in-depth analysis of each 
particular case, but also to maximize variance between NGO-projects, facilitating 
interesting comparisons between the cases. Variance between NGO-projects was observed 
along two criteria: (i) the presence of activities differentiating the project vis-à-vis the 
other interventions, and (ii) variance in intervention approach (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 Variance between NGO-projects (source: author) 
 Intervention Approach Core Activities 
LITA Associational approach Storehouses 
CIBA Mixed associational/household approach Wetland development 
CLC Household approach Health issues / individual training 
NGO 4 Associational approach -  
 
 
LITA used an associational approach to implement its activities, CLC followed a strict 
household approach, and CIBA used a mix of both. Furthermore, the construction of store 
houses was typical for the LITA project, whereas the CLC project was characterized by its 
clear focus on health issues and capacity building (focus on individual training, minimal 
distribution of material resources). Instead, the CIBA project mainly focused on 
development of the wetland. This is a very brief characterization of the three NGO-
projects (chapter 4 will elaborate more extensively on them), but it explains why NGO 4 
was left out: their project had no activities substantially differentiating it from the other 
projects, and their implementation strategy was similar to that of LITA.  
As a consequence, the identification of the collines resulted in the selection of ‗typical 
cases‘ (Patton, 2002: 236) for each NGO-intervention. For the CIBA project, Burara 
colline was selected, because it was close to the wetland which constituted the main focus 
of the project. In the case of the LITA project, Tangara colline was selected because of the 
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presence of a store house and a large number of associations supported by the project. For 
the CLC project, the selection of the colline was more ad hoc, since no activities were 
limited to particular collines, yet it was found that most of the CLC activities were indeed 
implemented on the selected colline. 
According to Patton (2002: 235), this maximizing of variance between the cases will 
provide two kinds of findings: ‗(1) high-quality, detailed descriptions of each case, which 
are useful for documenting uniqueness, and (2) important shared patterns that cut across 
cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of heterogeneity. Both are 
important findings in qualitative research.‘  
2.4 Research themes 
Based on preliminary research on the three selected NGO-interventions in 2006, several 
research themes came up and further guided the field work experience. Structural 
components of social capital refer to the ‗visible‘ forms or ‗social wires‘ of social capital, 
i.e. to the relationships, networks, associations, actions and other social structures which 
connect people (in addition to cognitive social capital: the norms, rules and values 
inherent in these structures, and which explain their functioning, ref. Uphoff, 2000). Four 
such structural components of social capital came forward as important research themes: 
social support networks, associations, local governance, and project activities.  
All four components will be explained in depth later in this thesis. Here, it is enough to 
indicate the reasons why they were selected as research themes to further guide the field 
work. First, during preliminary research, informal social support networks were observed 
as the most organic and historically embedded component of social capital. Traditionally, 
these networks facilitated mutual support and solidarity, yet the protracted crisis situation 
seemed to have  negatively affected their functioning. Second, as elsewhere in the world, 
two of the three NGO-interventions used associations as ‗universal blueprints‘ to organize 
rural communities and build social capital. Third, all three NGOs made great efforts to 
ensure their interventions were community-based and participatory. Therefore, they 
worked together with local administration and set up new local participatory 
intermediating structures. Both strategies refer to the third structural component of social 
capital: local governance structures. Lastly, during preliminary research, it became clear 
that NGO-interventions did not have a 'one-shot' impact on social capital, but that 
different project activities resulted in substantially different social capital effects. 
Therefore, project activities or components were selected as a fourth structural component 
of social capital (cf. particular actions affecting community cohesion such as weddings, 
communal works, or village festivities) and as a last research theme.  
 73 
 
These research themes clearly overlapped: for example, some project activities worked 
via associations, while others did not; collaboration with local administration can explain 
the effectiveness of certain project activities and vice versa, and in turn associations can 
act as social support networks. Thus, questions on one of the research themes frequently 
generated important information for other themes during field work. It illustrates the 
difficulty of categorizing the relational aspects of development projects, and the context-
dependent character of different forms of social capital that influence one another. Yet the 
overlap and the mutual interference between the different research themes supported the 
idea that the research was working towards an in-depth analysis of the three NGO-
interventions and their social capital effects. 
2.5 Data collection techniques  
Once the research themes fed into the research and field work, appropriate instruments 
had to be identified to collect the data. Focus groups and interviews with key actors, and 
to a lesser extent non-participant observation, were selected for this task. However, before 
dealing with these data collection techniques, a few words must be said about my role as a 
researcher in the local research setting.  
First or all, a researcher should be aware of his own subjective position and motivations 
when going to the field. Particularly important for my field work is the position of the 
researcher vis-à-vis the development project. Because such projects can be described as 
‗arenas‘ (Olivier de Sardan, 2005) in which different groups in the community try to 
appropriate the project, the question should be asked if and how the researcher takes sides 
in this process, and how it influences the research. Most likely, a researcher will feel 
empathy for the underdog, or those who have been disadvantaged, which reflects a 
tendency to choose sides with those who criticize and focus on what went wrong. This 
bias should be taken into account, but also, for example, the consideration that people can 
‗use‘ the research to affect the social positions of others should be kept in mind. When 
things are going wrong and conflicts arise, the truth is not so easy to distinguish from 
rumours, gossip and lies (for an extensive case study on the centrality of rumours in 
Burundi on a national level, see Turner, 2007). However, it also reflects the position of a 
researcher as an ‗engaged observer‘ (Sanford & Angel-Ajani, 2006): one cannot ignore 
the ills and wrongs which have been identified, and sometimes a researcher will make an 
active intervention to change a particular situation. This also relates to the issue of 
researchers struggling with the fact of reciprocity: what can be done as a service in return, 
can we, for example, use our position to defend research participants interests? All these 
considerations also influenced my behaviour and attitudes during fieldwork: feeling 
uncomfortable about the negative effects of the NGO-interventions, reflecting if and how 
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to react upon corrupt practices, a troubled conscience because asking many questions and 
not doing so much in return, and so on. Reflecting in detail upon these issues should bring 
me to discuss concrete cases, but the general point I want to make is that such issues are 
mostly not integrated in research design, yet most researchers are inevitably confronted 
with them during field work. 
Second, a researcher should also not forget that he is himself a research object for the 
local community, hence why self-representation is an important task during field work 
(Brown, 2009). People can have multiple perceptions of the researcher based on aspects of 
race, gender, age, status, and so on. Apart of being a muzungu (a white person), the aspect 
I believe was most critical in my relationship with the communities was my alleged 
relationship with the case study NGOs. De Herdt et al. (2004: 27) correctly state that ‗the 
degree of connection the respondents believe there to be between the research and a 
development intervention‘ is one of the first elements which significantly influences the 
interview situation. Therefore, throughout the field work, considerable efforts were done 
to present the research team and myself as independent from the studied NGOs (visiting 
the collines with own transport probably being the most important factor). However, it 
should be kept in mind that this link between me as a researcher and the ‗aid industry‘ 
necessarily influenced the interaction between the research team and the communities, 
sometimes overtly (people suggesting to finance their new association), sometimes more 
indirectly (the question to report people‘s worries to the NGO managers in the capital 
Bujumbura).  
Which brings me to a third point: the sometimes difficult issue of building up 
acceptance and trust which should facilitate the researcher-participant interaction during 
fieldwork. As will be explained in the following sections, the choice for focus groups 
(instead of individual interviews) and the skills of the focus group moderator are 
important in this respect. However, the most critical factor to achieve this trusting 
relationship was my daily return to each colline for about two months. Although I stayed 
an outsider, the acceptance of my presence was eased by the choice for relative long 
periods of fieldwork in small geographical areas. Within a couple of days, the majority of 
people were aware of my presence and my objectives. As field work progressed, people 
learned more about the research through fellow community members which already 
participated in the focus groups. Sometimes, in the last focus groups people referred back 
to earlier focus groups held on their or neighbouring sous-collines, which indicates that 
the research also became a topic of discussion in daily community life. In sum, the crucial 
element in creating trust and willingness to cooperate with the research was the fact that 
people appreciated that not a small group of people, but a large part of the community was 
invited to focus groups or interviews, and could express their views and opinions. It 
reflects Wood‘s (2006: 382) point that acting as an ‗engaged listener‘ was some sort of 
service in return for their willingness to share their views with you, but in my case it was 
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particularly the inclusiveness of my ‗engaged listening‘ which proved to be of major 
importance (see also further).  
2.5.1 Non participant observation  
Social, cultural and political factors limit the opportunities to conduct full participant 
observation (Patton, 2002: 266). In my case, the population on the three collines continued 
to perceive myself and my assistants as outsiders. Every morning we arrived on 
motorbikes and every evening we went back to the provincial city, as there was no 
accommodation available on site. In addition, this region had a history of bazungu white 
people coming to their hills, mostly in big white jeeps, to distribute all sorts of things (also 
one of the reasons why I preferred motorbikes). As such, it would have been unrealistic to 
make my observations as a participant in project activities and daily life.  
However, observation was used during research, in particular during preliminary 
fieldwork, to understand the projects and their activities, and to form a picture of the 
general research context. In some cases, I joined NGO staff when they were conducting 
activities such as meetings with beneficiaries, seed distributions, inspection of works, 
capacity building of associations, and so on (once preliminary research was finished, also 
joint field visits with NGO staff stopped). On many other occasions, I visited the collines 
individually with my interpreter. Observation was used to go and look at some project 
activities, but also to analyse a diverse range of contextual factors that influenced the 
NGO-interventions: e.g. the observation of beneficiary identification for other projects, 
food distributions by WFP, communal meetings or activities, etc.  
2.5.2 Key actor interviews  
In general, key-actor interviews were used on a complementary basis with the focus 
groups: actors which could not be tackled during focus group interviews, such as elites, 
were addressed during these interviews, and they allowed the cross-checking and 
substantiation of focus groups.  
Key informants are knowledgeable about the inquiry setting and their insights can 
prove valuable to understand and explain certain general events, but they also provide 
additional information because of their particular situation. (Patton, 2002: 32). Thus, for 
example, interviewing a member of the local administration did not only yield new 
information on project activities or general community issues, but was also an opportunity 
to ask more questions about his or her particular function in local administration, and the 
potential responsibilities he or she had within the project.  
76 
 
The key informants can be subdivided into four groups (Table 5). A first group presents 
local administration such as chefs de colline, chefs de sous-colline, and the nyumbakumi 
(chief of ten households). A second group assembles the mediating structures: all the 
people involved in the implementation of project activities (presidents of associations, 
encadreur de base, captains, members of committees, and so on). A third group includes 
the staff of the various NGOs, and lastly, there was a remaining group of people who for 
one or another reason were important on their hill (e.g. petty traders, politicians, teachers, 
and so on). 
 
Table 5 Key-Actors Interviews 
 LITA CIBA CLC 
Administration 11 4 10 
Mediating Structures 13 13 9 
Staff 3 4 4 
Other 3 2 / 
TOTAL 30 23 24 
 
 
The selection of key actors was different for all three NGOs. In general, more 
interviews were done for LITA, because of the complex situation and the difficult 
cooperation with local administration. Administration was less important for CIBA as 
they worked with more NGO staff in the field and so fewer interviews were conducted 
with local administration. CLC, in turn, worked less with mediating structures than both 
other NGOs. In conclusion, the selection of key actors was tailored to the context of each 
NGO-intervention. 
The interviews were done by local assistants. They used an interview guide to 
maximize the conversational and flexible character of the interview (Patton, 2002: 343). 
During my preliminary research it became clear that conducting my own interviews with 
an interpreter was not a good option. In one-to-one interviews, people are reticent towards 
a white researcher and his interpreter, and do not feel at ease, in particular when 
answering questions about sensitive topics such as corruption or the mismanagement of 
project benefits. (In focus groups this problem is less present because of the group 
dynamics and the group tasks, see further). My local assistants memorized the different 
interview guides and started a conversation with the informant, while taking some notes 
and writing down important quotes. At the end of the interview, the interview guide was 
checked to ensure no information was missing. Only afterwards the assistants made their 
report, in which they put together the quotes, notes and remarks. 
How my local assistants were selected is explained in the section on the chronology of 
the various periods of fieldwork. However a short note should be made about their role in 
the research process. One should be aware that also local research assistants are 
themselves a research object for the local community:  
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Research participants use researchers‘ physical appearance, accent, mannerisms and 
multilingual abilities to identify them with certain ethnic, regional and even political 
groups [...] The collection of identities on a research team can also make them more 
or less likely to be perceived by participants as biased, foreign, or unfriendly, which 
would hamper their ability to work ... (Paluck, 2009: 45). 
Although unintentionally, my research team was composed of two Hutu and two Tutsi. 
However, I‘m unable to give a clear picture on how their ethnicity could have played a 
role. One issue that did came up, when discussing this item with my research assistants, 
was that ethnicity primarily played a role when interviewing notables and more prominent 
and powerful individuals in the communities (this was much less the case with ordinary 
community members). One example was the interview of a powerful Tutsi businessman 
with clear links to a political party: the assistants spontaneously proposed that it was better 
that an assistant of the same ethnicity could interview him. But even more important was 
that it should be the eldest among them, because the businessman would never accept to 
be interviewed by a young person. And indeed, in general, the local assistant with 
considerable more difficulties than the others to put people at ease was the youngest 
among them (a problem I also faced as a young researcher). In retrospect, the most 
important decision was probably  that I decided to work with local people, and not with 
more experienced people from, for example, the capital Bujumbura. My decision had 
advantages and disadvantages. Surely, although all research assistants had previous 
experience with interviewing, it took them some time to acquire the research questions 
and techniques. However, what was observed as extremely important during field work, 
was to avoid that research participants were treated high-handedly (people can be very shy 
when confronted with people coming from the city). The only way to earn the trust of 
these people is to show a sincere and honest interest in their lives and problems. Because 
of their earlier experiences with interviewing or working as local social workers in NGO-
projects, and living near to these rural areas, my local assistants were experienced in how 
to handle this issue. The ‗distance‘ between them and the rural households could be 
bridged. However, this also had a drawback: although I was sure than none of them had 
worked on the particular hills for the NGOs under study, I could not exclude that my 
assistants were completely unknown on the collines. For example, my interpreter/research 
assistant lived a considerable time of his life close to one of the collines I researched. 
Another one was married with a women which grew up close to another colline under 
study. Furthermore, my research assistants all lived in the provincial city of Muyinga,  and 
as such, had their own opinions on how the civil war had raged in the north of Burundi. 
As such, my local assistants became important advisors to explain local customs, attitudes 
and behaviour of people I could not fully grasp, or to inform me about some broader 
historical or political facts. This also facilitated that they felt responsible for the research 
and were attached to it. Yet, on the other hand, it was important to permanently realize 
that this information was based on their subjective interpretations (in this respect, the fact 
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that there were four ‗subjective‘ interpretations helped of course). These issues indicate 
that one should not neglect the role local research assistants play in the progress of field 
work. 
2.5.3 Focus groups 
As focus groups constituted the main instrument to collect the data, these are explained in 
depth. Focus groups are a specific type of group discussions, in which group interaction is 
encouraged. They can involve different group compositions and various group tasks 
(Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999: 5-6). A focus group can be defined as: 
[…] a carefully planned discussion designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area 
of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening environment. It is conducted with 
approximately seven to ten people by a skilled interviewer. The discussion is 
relaxed, comfortable, and often enjoyable for participants as they share their ideas 
and perceptions. Group members influence each other by responding to ideas and 
comments in the discussion. (Krueger, 1988: 18) 
The definition already presents the main arguments for using focus groups. First, the 
strength of the focus group technique is that it is ideal for understanding how people think 
or feel (Krueger et al., 2001: 2). Focus groups are used to determine perceptions and 
feelings of consumers about products, services, or opportunities (Krueger, 1988: 29). In 
particular, they can be used to evaluate how well programmes or projects are working 
(Krueger & Casey, 2001: 5-6). Indeed, perceptions can differ substantially from the 
objective reality of programmes or projects, yet these subjective perceptions and feelings 
held by ‗consumers‘ will to a great extent determine the impact of such programmes or 
projects. Thus, for the present research, focus groups were used to explore and analyse the 
perceptions and feelings of community members about the selected NGO-interventions, 
and in particular, in relation to their social capital effects. In addition, the aim was not to 
know ‗how many‘ people hold a certain opinion – questionnaires are more appropriate to 
get such information – but ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ these opinions were constructed and 
expressed (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999: 5).  
Second, the power of focus groups is their specificity (Patton, 2002: 344). Whereas in-
depth ethnographic research is more suited for analysing broad cultural issues, focus 
groups are more appropriate for studying specific topics (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999: 5). 
Thus, a focus group must be seen as a carefully planned discussion to obtain data on a 
well defined area of interest, that is, for this research, the interaction between social 
capital and external interventions, and more concretely, the four specific components of 
structural social capital: social support networks, associations, local governance, and 
project activities. Therefore focus groups are to a great extent analyst-driven. Yet they 
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stay flexible enough because of the open-ended questions that are used in the discussion. 
As such, one can still go into unanticipated issues that come up during the discussions 
(Krueger, 1988: 45).  
A third reason why focus groups were used, was the simple reason that they obtained 
better results. During preliminary research, individual interviews and more formal and 
structured interactions (questionnaires) were also conducted. Both the formal/structured 
and individual character of these interactions scared people off. Being the sole focus of 
the interaction, and sitting in front of a researcher filling in different forms, put too much 
pressure on most participants. In individual interactions also more apathy was 
experienced, in that people indicated they did not have much to say about the topic. 
Inviting them in group and providing participants with some enjoyable group tasks made 
them much more at ease and active in sharing views and opinions. As such, my 
experience supports the idea that in some circumstances focus groups can reveal more 
specific and meaningful answers than is the case with formal and/or individual techniques 
(Patton, 2002). 
Lastly, focus groups can enhance the quality of the data as participants provide checks 
and balances, thus weeding out false or extreme views. In addition, it is relatively easy to 
assess if there is consensus or a great diversity of opinions on a specific topic (Patton, 
2002: 386).  In particular, in their article that analyses social capital in context, Dudwick 
et al. (2006: 4) point to the fact that asking open-ended questions about social capital to a 
group of people can yield more nuanced data than surveys. Discussions on the chef de 
colline on Tangara colline have been only one clear example of this argument. During 
these discussions, people were asked to rank the chef de colline according to criteria such 
as trust, effectiveness, and his intention to help community members. Two totally 
different yet not incompatible answers returned: they respected their chief when he took 
up his traditional role as mediator in the resolution of communal conflicts, yet they did not 
appreciate at all how he managed the LITA project and the aid distributions in general. A 
general survey question on the perception of local administration would have had 
difficulties in revealing such nuances.  
There are however also limitations when using focus group discussions. Among other 
things, fewer questions can be asked in a group setting and there is less time for each 
individual; sensitive topics are difficult to discuss, minority views are difficult to incline, 
and discussions can be dominated by an opinionated member. (Patton, 2002: 286-387; 
Stewart et al., 2007: 43). In other words, working through focus groups cannot always 
succeed in grasping the diverse realities and opinions of individuals or groups of 
individuals. Focus groups became popular with the emergence of participatory 
development and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) 
techniques, and share with them the tendency to treat ‗the local‘ as a harmonious 
community, with a consensual view (Mohan & Stokke, 2000: 253). Instead, conflict 
analysts deliberately search for conflicts within communities, as they start from the 
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hypothesis that conflict is inherent to social life, since society is a pluriform entity, with 
interdependent but autonomous actors with different world views engaging with each 
other (De Hert et al., 2004: 20).  
Several steps were taken to anticipate these potential limitations of focus groups. First, 
fieldwork started from an analytical point of view that draws particular attention to 
conflict and power relationships, and is aware of the danger to ‗romanticize‘ communities. 
As elaborated in chapter one, a Bourdieuian political economy perspective on social 
capital exactly criticizes mainstream social capital thinking for its romanticized 
communitarian views and the negation of power relations in their analysis (see section 
1.4). In addition, when discussing the link between social capital and development 
projects, the latter have been identified as ‗arenas‘ in which different ‗strategic groups‘ 
enter into conflict (see section 1.5.3). Thus, the deliberate search for conflicts within 
communities, as applied by conflict analysts, formed a crucial part of field work. 
Second, and as a consequence of the foregoing, this emphasis on conflict and power 
relations was translated into the questions asked and tools used to guide focus group 
discussions. As the term indicates, a focus group is a planned discussion focusing on some 
specific topics or issues. Therefore, the success of and the kind of information accessed 
through focus groups largely depends upon the questions asked, and the quality of the 
discussion in general. Therefore, when designing, preparing, and executing the focus 
groups discussions, particular attention was paid to reveal both ‗cooperation‘ and 
‗conflict‘ within the communities. 
Third, a combination of focus groups, key-actor interviews and non-participant 
observation was used to cross-check and substantiate the focus group findings. 
Furthermore, observing community live, consulting documents related to project 
activities, and interviewing key-actors yielded important information to nurture focus 
group discussions, and reveal certain complexities and conflicts within the communities. 
Lastly, and most crucially, by organizing a high number of focus groups on each 
colline, a substantial part of the community members had the opportunity to attend a focus 
group and express themselves. As such, the research attempted to reach a maximum of 
diverse views within the different communities, in order to go beyond the homogeneity of 
community views.2 A second advantage was that this enabled me to go beyond elite 




 One example, based on personal experience, illustrates the importance of this issue. In 2009, participatory 
consultations were organized, in order to fix the priorities of a large scale UNDP funding for income generating 
activities in three provinces of Burundi. I happened to be at the community headquarters of Isale, when such a 
focus group was held with some local authorities, technical community staff (agronomist, etc), and some 
members of the community development committee (CDC). The priorities that were listed as an outcome of this 
consultation was the need to support agro-forestry associations and associations of brickmakers, together with 
the need for a food-for-work programme and the rehabilitation of the rural road. Only to illustrate that focus 
groups can be used in very different ways, since the risk of hearing a ‗fairy tale of a united and dynamic village‘ 
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views. Elite capture and control is both a crucial aspect and a potential problem of 
development projects, in particular for community-based development (Platteau, 2004). 
Local elites mostly mediate the interaction between external actors and the communities at 
large, while acting as ‗development gatekeepers‘ or ‗development brokers‘. Therefore, the 
risks are also high that only elite views are gathered when researching development 
projects. Of course, these elites yield interesting and additional information, and their 
views were therefore gathered during key-actor interviews. But the combination with 
focus groups enabled me to also go beyond these elite views. Thus, a high number of 
focus groups was used to access a maximum of diverse views, and make research as 
inclusive as possible within the time-limits of the field work period. 
2.5.3.1 Focus group participants 
The selection of participants is not always an easy task. In hypothetical ‗ideal‘ 
circumstances, participants are strangers to each other, have more or less a homogeneous 
background and are selected after a pool of participants was compiled (Krueger & Casey, 
2001). The circumstances on the three collines made it impossible to meet these 
requirements. Several reasons guided my selection process. 
First, the purpose of the research should drive the study, and as such, also the selection 
of the participants (Krueger, 1988: 92). It was therefore decided that the focus groups 
should represent a cross-section of the community population. Since the main unit of 
analysis was the NGO-project, the main goal of the research was to compare the three 
collines, and not to make comparisons between subgroups on each colline. Therefore, the 
homogeneity of the focus groups was broadly defined: the common characteristic that 
united the participants was that they lived on one of the three hills and as such were 
confronted with the activities of the NGO-project on their hill. 
Secondly, it was difficult, almost impossible, to further subdivide the population in 
more homogeneous groups or categories (see e.g. also Uvin 2009, expressing similar 
problems with categorizing his Burundian interviewees). In most cases, a pool of 
participants is based on lists that assemble people that fit the selection criteria (Krueger & 
Casey, 2001: 10). However, there were no data or lists to further subdivide the population 
by age, gender, socio-economic situation or occupation. There was also no time to 
conduct a poverty assessment myself based for example on wealth rankings. There were 
also no unified lists of beneficiaries of the projects. In addition, as was observed during 
preliminary research, a further subdivision of the population only resulted in biases and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
(Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 1997; quoted in De Hert et al., 2004: 20) is much higher when organizing one 
focus group for an entire commune with 17.106 households than when organizing 37 focus groups for one 
particular colline with a maximum of not more than 1000 households (as was the case in Tangara). 
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wrong interpretations because of the close link between the research and the development 
projects. As a consequence, every attempt to break down participants of focus groups into 
more homogeneous groups, resulted in the population reinterpreting the criteria as criteria 
to access some kind of material gain. Of course, you can hardly blame them, since the 
previous history of external interventions on their collines, each time subdividing the 
population into beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, is completely different from a 
researcher who is interested in more homogeneous groups, simply because of 
methodological reasons. 
 
For all these reasons the most open selection process was used: everybody could join 
the focus group. The only selection criterion was being a member of the community. As 
such, a diversity of opinions would be addressed, consensus and broad conclusions would 
be based on this diversity of opinions, and no criteria could be wrongly interpreted and 
lead towards biases.  
One particular disadvantage of this open selection approach was that I could not control 
the ethnic composition of the focus groups. However, it would have been clearly rude to 
openly ask for ethnic representation in focus groups. Also when asking some basic 
questions on socio-economic background at the beginning of each focus group, we did not 
ask participants‘ ethnicity. This does not mean that ethnicity was not discussed during 
focus groups. Burundians are remarkably open on the ethnic issue, they acknowledge the 
errors of the past and particularly express their willingness to work towards a peaceful 
cohabitation in the present and the future (this openness is however relative because it is 
expressed in general terms, on the level of personal stories people are much more 
reluctant to dig into the violent past). Thus, whenever ethnicity spontaneously came up 
during discussion, I took this opportunity to elaborate further on the issue. In addition, 
information on ethnic issues within the community was mostly gathered through 
individual key actor interviews, or in indirect ways (e.g. the presence of IDP camps 
reflects the presence of Tutsi, local struggles between political parties can have ethnic 
connotations, land conflicts with returning refugees from Tanzania reveals similar ethnic 
tensions, and so on). It was also not to objective to gather individual stories, but to reveal 
if and how ethnicity was an ‗issue‘ with regard to the development projects. As will 
become clear throughout the different chapters, apart from Burara colline, ethnicity was 
less important than expected.  
I also mixed up men and women, old and young. This was justifiable because the 
research topics were in general not gender or age sensitive (Krueger, 1988: 92). The 
opinions about the projects were very much similar between men and women, young and 
old. Specifically with respect to gender, it should be indicated that also women 
participated as lively and dynamically in these mixed focus group discussions. One 
particular example illustrates this point. When discussing the role of the adminstratice (of 
the commune) on Tangara colline, this always led to animated discussions between men 
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and women. Often, the administratice addressed men hanging around in rural centres, 
making them clear that they should be working on their fields together with their wives. 
Unsurprisingly, men disapproved such brutality, yet women openly defended her 
approach to mobilize these men.  However, as in any group, some individuals were more 
shy and reserved than others, but these could be both men and women, younger and older 
people. Tools (matrices, drawings, rakings, etc.) and group tasks have been used to 
maximize the participation of all participants.  
 
To a certain extent, this open selection process was also guided by an ethical 
consideration. The communities did not want to be divided and subdivided over and over 
again because of external actors requesting the identification of beneficiaries for material 
gains or the selection of participants for meetings or other affairs. Most held the generally 
accepted conviction that ‗identification‘ equated ‗corruption‘, leading to repeated 
privileges for a small group of people within the community. This open selection process, 
and the choice of working on the small scale of the colline level, aimed at staying long 
enough on each colline to go beyond the small circle of people that always appears and 
speaks to external actors whenever they are visiting the collines, i.e. to communicate with 
the communities at large. And indeed, because of the long presence on each colline 
(approximately two months) and the high number of focus groups on each colline 
(between 200 and 300 participants for each colline), a substantial part of the community 
had the opportunity to attend a focus group discussion. On all three collines, the same 
process was observed: more prominent residents who were used to acting as mediators 
between their communities and external actors all passed by in the first two or three focus 
groups, expressing more optimistic and positive views, (most project evaluations stop here 
because of time concerns), yet thereafter, the majority of focus groups allowed 'ordinary' 
and sometimes very poor and destituted community members to express themselves.  
 
This research therefore controlled geographical coverage and eliminated power 
imbalances. The focus groups were geographically representative, since I worked through 
the chefs de sous-colline (and nyumbakumi‘s – chiefs of ten households) to organize them, 
so that community members of all sous-collines (both close and more remote from centres 
and rural roads) could join and participate. Second, power imbalances were avoided by 
excluding people which took up a role as mediator in the projects or who fulfilled an 
important function in the community (in particular, local administration). These 
individuals were not sidelined (as they can yield interesting information) but instead 
invited for key actor interviews. Sometimes, I was not able to avoid these power 
imbalances and more focus groups were conducted if necessary. This was for example the 
case on Tangara colline, because local administration was substantially involved in some 
cases of project corruption, and tried to boycott the focus groups or at least control them. 
But in most cases it worked out well. Several times participants clearly expressed their 
84 
 
satisfaction with the way of working: small groups, a more or less closed room or isolated 
place where everybody could speak freely, and the absence of local administration or 
other mediators. This was in contrast with general practices of NGOs, which preferred 
open community meetings in which everybody could join and speak up. However, people 
were reserved during such meetings, since local administration or others could remember 
who held more critical views. As one person in Tangara expressed: 
When LITA comes for a meeting, then it is with everybody and we are scared to 
present our problems. It is better in a small group, like here, we are more at ease. 
(focus group, 31/05/2007, Tangara) 
Furthermore, focus group participants were asked some basic questions. Their sex, age 
and sub-hill; and to have some idea of their poverty level, questions were asked about 
access to land and livestock, and the quality of their housing (a generally accepted and 
quick method used in Burundi, see e.g. Uvin, 2009). In addition, participants were asked if 
they had benefited from the NGO-project. These findings are presented below (Table 6), 


























Table 6 Focus Group Participants (source: author) 
CIBA  CLC  LITA 
           
SEX # %  SEX # %  SEX # % 
man 123 58  man 103 53  Man 158 51 
woman 90 42  woman 90 47  Woman 147 49 
           
AGE # %  AGE # %  AGE # % 
 <20 5 3   <20 6 3   <20 10 3 
20-30 55 26  20-30 60 31  20-30 81 27 
30-40 60 28  30-40 54 28  30-40 86 28 
40-50 43 20  40-50 30 16  40-50 65 21 
50-60 24 11  50-60 25 13  50-60 41 13 
>60 26 12  >60 18 9  >60 22 8 
           
BENEFICIAIRY CIBA # %  BENEFICIAIRY CLC # %  BENEFICIAIRY 
LITA 
# % 
ben 112 53  ben 73 38  Ben 141 46 
non-ben 101 47  non-ben 120 62  non-ben 164 54 
           
SUB-HILLS # %  SUB-HILLS # %  SUB-HILLS # % 
munyonza 71 33  cumba 72 37  Tangara 63 21 
bucanka 31 15  rutamba 70 36  Masiga 52 17 
kirerama 20 9  ryaruvuno 52 27  Kiguruka 54 18 
rusarasi 85 40      Kivoga 70 23 
mpinga 6 3      Rurembo 66 21 
           
POVERTY 
SITUATION 
# %  POVERTY 
SITUATION 
# %  POVERTY 
SITUATION 
# % 
livestock    livestock    Livestock   
no 150 78  no 147 69  No 208 68 
small (goat, etc) 43 22  small (goat, etc) 45 21  small (goat, etc) 95 31 
cows 0 0  cows 21 10  Cows 2 1 
land    land    Land   
<50x50 103 53  <50x50 116 55  <50x50 161 53 
50x50 - 100x100 73 38  50x50 - 100x100 75 35  50x50 - 100x100 119 39 
>100x100 17 9  >100x100 22 10  >100x100 25 8 
housing    housing    Housing   
thatched roof 146 76  thatched roof 99 47  thatched roof 181 59 
roof with tiles 47 24  roof with tiles 109 51  roof with tiles 124 41 
tiles and ciment walls 0 0  tiles and ciment walls 5 2  tiles and ciment walls 0 0 
           
TOTAL # %  TOTAL # %  TOTAL # % 








2.5.3.2 Focus group questions 
Focus groups need to take a questioning route (Krueger & Casey, 2001). Both the topics 
of discussion and the questions must be carefully predetermined and sequenced, based on 
the analysis of the situation. Different focus group discussions were conducted, in line 
with the four research themes identified during preliminary research. By using 
predetermined group tasks, the questioning route was drafted again and the focus groups 
were made enjoyable for the participants (some flip chart presenting group tasks – a 
matrix, drawing, ranking, etc. – can be found in annex 1).  
For the research theme ‗social support networks‘ mainly two different focus groups 
were conducted. First, the resource exchange matrix used by Kuehnast and Dudwick 
(2004) was tailored to the Burundian context. By using this matrix it was possible to 
differentiate between what kind of resources people gave/received through which kind of 
social support networks. In a second focus group the people were asked to list the existing 
conflicts within the community (between neighbours, friends, family and community 
members in general), and which potentially stressed or changed the functioning of these 
social support networks. Drawings were used to present these different types of conflicts 
and afterwards the participants were asked to make a ranking. 
For the research theme ‗associations‘ focus groups differed according to the NGO-
projects, since all three collaborated differently with associations. For example, in the 
LITA case, most associations were producer groups and received similar support from 
LITA (seed credits). As such, focus groups were held on these associations in general. By 
contrast, in the CIBA case, associations had substantially different activities and received 
different support from CIBA: e.g. rice associations, tree nursery associations, anti-erosion 
associations. Here, road maps were used to analyse the specific evolution and problems of 
these particular associations. Lastly, since CLC did not work with associations, and a 
general absence of associations was observed, in this case, discussion groups focused 
more on the reasons for this absence.  
For the research theme ‗local governance‘, two types of focus groups were conducted. 
First, an institutional matrix was drawn up based on Dudwick et al. (2006: 24). 
Participants were asked to score and rank different local structures (administration, 
committees, etc.) on accessibility, trust, efficiency and democratic decision making. 
Second, a variant of the venn diagram (itself too complex to be used properly) was used to 
map out the entire intermediation scheme which linked the external NGOs to the 
communities. This intervention map presented a river which separated the NGO (vehicle) 
from the community population, and participants were asked to list and draw the different 
islands which the NGO vehicle should pass to bridge the river and arrive at the 
community. This way of working was very efficient. Several times, straightforward 
questions on the functioning of intermediation structures found no answer, or at least not a 
detailed one. However, during discussion, participants were occupied with drawing all 
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these islands in the river, and only at the end it was asked if any of these mediating 
structures did not function well (in their words: NGO benefits failed to reach the other 
bank of the river and ‗disappeared into the river‘). In many cases, a much more animated 
discussion followed. 
For the research theme ‗project activities‘, one additional focus group was conducted, 
in which participants were asked to rank the different project activities according to 
certain criteria on social cohesion in the community: How well were community members 
informed about the activities? Did the activity help to reduce some community conflicts or 
did new conflicts arise? Did the activity affect trust and cohesion among community 
members? And so on. 
Lastly, one focus group yielded information on all four research themes, except the 
‗social support networks‘ theme. In this focus group, access to (i) project participation 
(and thus activities and benefits), (ii) local administration and other mediators, and  (iii) 
associations was examined more in depth. Through this access matrix, it was analysed 
what relationships and assets were important to participate in project activities, access 
local administration and mediators, and become a member of a local association. During 
the focus group, participants were asked to gives scores to the different aspects that 
defined their access. 
 
This brings us to seven different focus groups. Below (Table 7) I present the different 
types of focus groups and for which research theme they yielded information.  
 
Table 7 Focus Groups (types) (source: author) 
 Focus Group Explanation Research Theme 
1 Resource Exchange Matrix What resources are exchanged between which 
people? 
Support Networks 
2 Conflict Ranking Ranking of important conflicts in the community. Support Networks 
3 Associations  Motivational, functional and sustainable aspects 
of the working of associations. 
Associations 
4 Institutional Matrix Performance of institutions on accessibility, trust, 
efficiency and democratic decision making 
Local Governance  
5 Intervention Map Schematic mapping of mediating structures used 
by NGO to intervene. 
Local Governance  
6 NGO Activity Matrix What is the impact of different activities on social 
cohesion in the community? 
NGO Activities 
7 Access Matrix What determines access to NGO aid, local 
administration and mediators, and associations? 







To determine the number of focus groups, I used the theoretical concepts of 
redundancy and theoretical saturation (Krueger & Casey, 2001). Focus group discussions 
on a certain topic were conducted until no new information was presented (in most cases, 
three to four focus groups were sufficient for each topic). In Tangara, considerably more 
focus groups were hed because of problems with the local administration (their efforts to 
control the research). In most cases between 6 and 10 people took part in each focus 
group, which conforms to the rule of thumb (Patton, 2002: 385). In total 83 focus groups 
were conducted (37 for LITA, 24 for CIBA and 22 for CLC) with a total of 711 
participants.  
 
Table 8 Focus groups (#) (source: author) 
Focus Group LITA CIBA CLC 
 # groups # part. # groups # part. # groups # part. 
Resource Exchange Matrix 5 43 3 27 3 27 
Conflict Ranking 4 31 3 28 3 25 
Associations  9 75 6 51 4 29 
Institutional Matrix 5 39 3 26 3 30 
Intervention River 5 43 3 30 3 28 
NGO Activity Matrix 5 44 3 26 3 26 
Access Matrix 4 30 3 25 3 28 
TOTAL 37 305 24 213 22 193 
 
 
The focus groups were conducted in teams of two, one moderator and one reporter, as 
is advisable (Patton, 2002: 386). The most basic level of recording was used: the reporter 
took notes and for all discussions a flip chart presented the drawing, matrix or ranking 
exercise (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999:15). These field notes yielded two different forms of 
data: general notes on content and progress of the discussion and quotes by various 
participants (Krueger & Casey, 2001: 14).  
 
When searching for patterns and general conclusions triangulation was used to increase 
the validity of the data. First, a group discussion allows people to change and modify their 
opinions during the discussion, which creates a process of ‗indefinite triangulation‘. This 
triangulation can yield more qualitative data when compared to a definitive statement of a 
single person at a certain moment (Morgan, 1993: 24). Participants triangulate amongst 
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themselves during the discussion, and in the process of analysis afterwards, the analyst 
can triangulate between the different opinions in search of internal consistency.  
Second, triangulation between the different focus groups dealing with the same topic 
was possible. The standardization of the focus groups and their questioning routes 
facilitated this as it made the comparison between the focus groups more easy. Thus, 
general patterns and conclusions were derived from consistency within but also between 
the different focus groups. However, both divergence within and between focus groups 
could also provide interesting insights, comparable to outliers in a regression analysis 
(Dudwick et al., 2006: 11).  
Lastly, the focus group data were triangulated with the data from the key actor 
interviews, and to a lesser extent with the non-participant observation and documents 
related to the project and context. As mentioned, the interviews with the key actors used 
insights from the focus groups to obtain the opinions of the key actors but also to verify 
and complete some of the focus group data.  
2.6 The field work : chronology 
I end this methodological note with a chronology of the different periods of fieldwork 
conducted. I visited Burundi for the first time in September and October 2005. These six 
weeks were used to familiarize myself with the country and to look for interesting entry 
points for my research. During this period, I had the opportunity to participate in a mid-
term evaluation of a CARE project: ―Renforcement de la Société Civile et Education aux 
Droits Humains‖ (SCEDH). This evaluation brought me to five different provinces and 
provided me with a general view on Burundi in a short period of time.  
 
My second period of fieldwork was planned from February until May 2006. The main 
objective of this period was to select the NGO-interventions which would serve as case 
studies for my research, and to conduct preliminary research, to prepare the genuine study 
of the three case study interventions in 2007. As a starting point in my selection process, I 
used the organisation RESO (Rassemblement, Echanges et Solutions entre Organisations 
Non Gouvernementales). RESO was an umbrella organization that assembled about the 40 
most important international NGOs intervening in Burundi. They provided me with a 
report that gave an overview of the sectoral and geographical spread of NGO-
interventions at that time, and a list with contacts. Based on the broad conclusions of my 
previous fieldwork, I selected some of these NGOs, and had a first round of contacts in 
the headquarters in Bujumbura. As explained in the section on the case selection the 
projects of CIBA, LITA and CLC were chosen. However, it was not an easy task 
convincing NGOs to tolerate a researcher analysing their projects. Some NGOs, like 
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CIBA and LITA, were enthusiast from the beginning. CLC, by contrast, was very 
reserved. As a consequence, CIBA gave their official agreement in the beginning of 
March, LITA came later on, and it required almost the four whole months to get an 
official agreement from CLC which would permit me to analyse their livelihood project in 
2007. As a researcher, I remained totally independent financially. The NGOs only asked 
their staff to answer my questions and to present all documents available. In general, I 
underestimated the efforts and time it would require to convince the NGOs to agree with 
my proposal for cooperation. 
In addition to this administrative part of my second field trip, the preliminary research 
during this period contained two main components. First, I analysed in depth the case 
study projects, as fortunately enough, all three NGOs agreed to let me analyse the main 
project documents, to talk to staff in headquarters and to make visits to their provincial 
offices, to obtain a complete understanding of the different projects, even before official 
agreements were obtained for further collaboration. Second, field work was conducted in 
Busoni commune, to get a preliminary view on the functioning of social capital in the 
lives of rural Burundian households (the fieldwork was conducted in Busoni, the 
intervention area of CIBA, since they agreed to join the research project early on during 
my second stay in Burundi). From a livelihood perspective, both a household survey (with 
particular attention for social capital issues) and a wide range of focus groups were 
conducted, to obtain preliminary views on my research topic, social capital, or in 
particular, if and how social capital was used in daily livelihood strategies of rural 
Burundian households. In sum, together with the analysis of the three case study projects, 
this preliminary field work on the functioning of social capital, enabled me to prepare 
more efficiently for the real field work of 2007. This resulted in the identification of the 
four research themes, the further refining of research questions and methodology, and the 
selection and further drafting of the data collection techniques (interviews, focus groups, 
questioning routes and questionnaires, etc.).  
 
Finally, during my third and most extensive period of field work of seven months – 
January until July 2007 – the genuine comparative analysis of the three case study projects 
was conducted. First, I composed my research team. Fortunately, I could fall back on my 
interpreter/research assistant whom I had contracted for my fieldwork period in 2006. 
After spending several months together for this preliminary fieldwork, he was familiar 
with the research and became trained in moderating focus groups, a trusting relationship 
was established between us, and above all, he held the right attitude to communicate with 
Burundian farmers: he could put them at ease, he respected them as equals, and his 
humour was key to animating the group discussions. In addition, I selected a group of 
three assistants. Where I was based, in Muyinga, I informed administration and 
international and national NGOs that I was looking for assistants. About 15 candidates 
presented themselves for the interview and examination. Their previous working 
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experiences were taken into account, and their knowledge of the French language and 
their reporting skills were tested. Through role playing, their interviewing skills and their 
contact with possible interviewees was tested. Five candidates were selected to conduct 
three days of field research. After this exercise of three days, the three most capable 
candidates were selected. All three had previous experience with interview techniques. 
They were further trained about the research and for the specific tasks they had to execute. 
Thereafter, I selected one colline – Tangara – to test and further refine the different 
techniques for collecting the data. From preliminary research, it was already clear that 
focus groups were an efficient instrument to collect the opinions and feelings of the 
population about NGO-interventions, and that interviews with key actors were 
preferentially conducted by Burundian interviewers. However, further refinement of 
matrices, maps, rankings and other group tasks was completed during this test phase. This 
period was also used to further train my assistants in interviewing key actors and 
moderating focus groups.  
Finally, the analysis of the three case study projects was finished colline by colline. 
First, the research team travelled to neighbouring Kirundi province, to work on Burara 
colline (CIBA), then we turned back to Muyinga province and worked on Cumba (CLC) 
and Tangara (LITA) colline. We spent approximately two months on each colline, during 
which time we arrived daily early in the morning on hired motorbikes. After our 
introduction on the colline (presenting ourselves before local administration, some 
preliminary focus groups or interviews on the history of the colline and the project 
intervention, the identification of the key actors to be interviewed, and the preparation of 
the focus groups) during the first days, a daily routine was set in: together with my 
interpreter/assistant I descended towards one of the sous-collines, to conduct one or more 
focus groups, while my three assistants tried to make appointments and interviewed key 
actors or also conducted focus groups. In the early evening we returned to Muyinga and 
Kirundo city, where the assistants compiled their reports, and I handled the focus group 
data and the interview reports of the day before. Every day, important observations were 
discussed in group, to further refine the work for the following days. After the last visit on 
each colline, major observations were again discussed, and the end of work was 
celebrated with beer and chicken. These six months of daily field work were intense for 


















PART TWO : 








Chapter 3  
Introducing the Burundian context 
Burundi is a small landlocked country situated in the Great Lakes Region, bounded by 
Rwanda in the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the west, and Tanzania 
in the south and east. Its hilly and mountainous surface of 27,830 sq km had an estimated 
total population of 8.3 million in 2008, almost half of which is under 15 years of age.1 
According to the Human Development Report 2007/2008 (UNDP, 2008), Burundi has a 
GDP per capita of 699 (PPP US$). The report adds that 87.6% of the population lives on 
less than $2 a day, and 54.6% on less than $1 a day. With an annual population growth 
rate of 3.2%, and a population density over 300 inhabitants/sq km (one of the highest of 
Africa), the country experiences serious pressure on the availability of fertile land, 
endangering the livelihoods of many. Life expectancy at birth is 48.5 years, the adult 
literacy rate comes to 59.3%, and HIV prevalence is estimated around 3.3% of the total 
population. As such, Burundi is ranked 167th of 177 countries in the Human Development 
Index (HDI = 0.413) of 2007/2008, presenting one of the poorest countries of the world. It 
is clear that Burundi‘s violent history has played a catalyst role in creating this current 
poverty profile. 
 
This chapter will introduce the Burundian context in two phases. After introducing the 
history of the Burundian conflict, a broader political economy perspective is introduced, 
                                               
 
 
1 Estimates and calculations of demographic and socio-economic indicators differ according to sources. Here, I 
rely on World Bank, IMF, UNDP, WFP, and Burundian Government data. A comprehensive overview can be 




to frame the following chapters dealing with social capital as a micro-phenomenon into a 
broader historical context of macro-processes. Therefore I follow the approach of 
Bebbington (Bebbington, 1999; Bebbington, Dharmawan et al., 2006) and introduce a 
description of the three institutional realms of society, state, and the economy. I introduce 
these briefly as a framework, since particular expressions of processes of social 
stratification, state formation and the interplay with the economy will recur throughout 
subsequent chapters.  
3.1  The Burundian conflict 
One could argue that Burundian history starts round 1700, when Mwami (Kirundi for 
king) Ntare I creates the first kingdom in what is now called Burundi (Eggers, 2006).  He 
and his successors remain in power until the colonial area, at the end of the 19th century. 
First the Germans, and then the Belgians, controlled Ruanda-Urundi through indirect rule, 
leaving the King and his court to rule the country under the auspices of colonial 
administration. However, the Belgians introduced some important administrative reforms 
from 1926 until 1933, after which Burundi would never look the same again (Uvin, 2009). 
The reason for this indelible impact was the ‗hamitic hypothesis‘ on which these reforms 
were based. This hypothesis, based on 19th century European race theories, placed 
ethnicity in the forefront of Burundian history (Lemarchand, 2009). 
During pre-colonial times ethnic identities2 did exist, based on occupational 
specialization, differentiating between Hutu (agriculturalists), Tutsi (pastoralists) and Twa 
(hunters and gatherers), and a somewhat special class of Ganwa or princes (see further).3 
The Twa, an often forgotten small minority, yet the first inhabitants to settle in the area, 
were marginalized by both Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsi had immigrated to Rwanda and 
Burundi during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, while Hutu agriculturalists arrived 




 In line with Fearon and Latin (2000: 848) I define ethnic identity as a social category, i.e. a set of people ‗given 
a label (or labels) and distinguished by two main features: (1) rules of membership that decide who is and is not 
a member of the category; and (2) content, that is, sets of characteristics (such as beliefs, desires, moralm 
commitments, and physical attributes) thought to be typical of members of the category, or behaviors expected 
or obliged of members in certain situations (roles).‘ This reflects a social constructivist position, rejecting the 
notion of unchanging, essential ethnic identities of primordialists, Burundi being an illustration of how ethnic 
identities have been changed over time and by context. 
3
 Since Belgian occupation figures of 84% (Hutu), 14% (Tutsi), and 1% (Twa) have been replicated. Although 
the accuracy of these numbers has never been proved and is questionable, all agree on the fact that the Hutu 




some centuries earlier from central Africa (Uvin, 1999; Lemarchand, 1970).4 The 
differentiation between Hutu and Tutsi was however not so straightforward (Lemarchand, 
1995: 6-10). First, the occupational dichotomy is not absolute, as the Tutsi did not have 
the monopoly on cattle herding. Second, Hutu and Tutsi were not rigid as social 
categories, as inter-caste mobility was undeniable, upward mobility (from Hutu to Tutsi 
status) known in Kirundi as Kihutura. Third, Hutu and Tutsi referred to both cultural and 
social identities, in the latter case, based on the social status obtained through patron-
client ties, which presents confusing situations:  
Thus a Tutsi cast in the role of client vis-à-vis a wealthier patron would be referred 
to as ―Hutu,‖ even though his cultural identity remained Tutsi. Similarly, a prince 
was a Hutu in relation to the king, and a high-ranking Tutsi was a Hutu in relation to 
a prince. (Lemarchand, 1995: 10) 
Instead, the hamitic hypothesis ‗naturalizes‘ ethnicity while ascribing a genetic 
interpretation to these social categories (Daley, 2008: 49). From this racial point of view, 
the Tutsi minority was identified as ‗―born rulers‖, superior in every respect to the [Bantu 
or Hutu] ―dark agricultural‘‖ masses.‘ (Lemarchand, 2009). Thus, Tutsi were called 
‗Européens à peau noire‘ or ‗Juifs de l‘Afrique‘ (Chrétien, 1997: 151), because of their 
alleged links with the Caucasian race as Hamites (Sanders, 1969). These racial ideas led 
the Belgian administration to dismiss all Hutu of political positions during the reforms 
between 1926 and 1933, and to reduce access to secondary schooling to only a small Tutsi 
elite. As a consequence, Belgian colonisation introduced the supremacy and domination 
of the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority, sowing the seeds of ethnic conflict and the 
manipulation of ethnic identities throughout post-colonial history.  
 
Burundi became independent on the first of July in 1962, installing a constitutional 
monarchy in the country. A year before, the legislative elections of September 1961 were 
won by the nationalist Uprona party (Parti de l‘Union et du Progrès National). At that 
time, both the Uprona party and its leader Prince Louis Rwagasore had the potential to 
unite all Burundians – both Hutu and Tutsi – around a national identity based on the 
struggle for independence. However, the assassination of Rwagasore by agents of the 
PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien, close to the Belgian government), and the Hutu social 
revolution in neighbouring Rwanda (triggering ethnic tensions in Burundi), created an 
ethnic polarization within the Uprona party between the ‗Monrovia‘ (Hutu) and 
‗Casablanca‘ (Tutsi) groups. In 1965, new elections brought a second victory for Uprona, 
yet more importantly, with a clear ascendancy of Hutu political leaders. However, mwami 




 The origins of the Tutsi are not formally established, and statements in this respect are to a great extent 
speculative, but it is assumed that they originate from the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia (Lemarchand, 1970). 
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Mwambutsa refused to appoint a Hutu prime minister. A failed gendarmerie Hutu coup 
was put down by loyal Tutsi military officers, resulting in the assassination of many of the 
Hutu political leaders, and a weakened royal Court. One year later, Major Michel 
Micombero, one of the main actors during the repression, took over government, after a 
peaceful military coup on 28 November 1966, and installed the First Republic of Burundi 
while declaring himself Burundi's first president. This marks the beginning of the military 
dictatorship of ‗la maffia de Bururi‘ (Chrétien, 1997: 160), the Tutsi-Hima clan of the 
Bururi province, with two palace revolutions dividing the period between 1966 and 1993 
into three republics, under three presidents from the same Rutovo commune in Bururi: M. 
Micobero (1st Republic, 1966-76), J-B. Bagaza (2nd Republic, 1976-87) and P. Buyoya (3rd 
Republic, 1987-93).5 During these three decades, Uprona was the single political party. 
Both the party, the government and the army became strongholds of the Tutsi minority, 
and gradually a system was put in place, resulting in the total exclusion of the Hutu 
population: exclusion from political participation, no access to education, no opportunities 
for jobs in the army or the government administration. Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000: 
390) note: 
For instance, in 1985, there were four Hutu out of twenty members of the cabinet; 
seventeen Hutus out of sixty-five members of a non-elected parliament; two Hutu 
out of fifty-two members of the Central committee of the then state Party, 
UPRONA; two Hutu out of fifteen governors of province; one Hutu out of twenty-
two ambassadors; ten Hutu out of ninety University professors; nearly 20% of Hutu 
among university students, no Hutu among the country‘s prosecutors; and no Hutu 
among education inspectors, etc.  
By contrast, through job distribution, corruption and clientelism within the 
administration and numerous state enterprises, the Burundian state became a ‗milking 
cow‘ for the elites controlling it (Uvin, 2009: 11).  
The events of 1972 marked the beginning of this exclusionary system. After a Hutu 
rebellion, the Tutsi dominated army executed a ‗selective genocide‘ (Lemarchand & 
Martin, 1974; Lemarchand, 2009), eliminating the educated Hutu class. Estimations vary 
between 80,000 (Uvin 2009) and 300,000 (Lemarchand 2009) Hutu killed during the 
army's pogrom, yet many more fled the violence. Hence, all educated adult Hutu males 
were either assassinated or driven into exile. The 1972 events also gave rise to Hutu 
radicalism, as only a year later the Palipehutu (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu) 
was born in a refugee camp in Tanzania, of which the anti-Tutsi ideology has until 




 It reflects that factionalism between clans within the same ethnic group – e.g. between the Banyaruguru and the 
Hima, between the Rutovu and Matana factions – was often more important to the dynamics of Burundian 
politics than Hutu-Tutsi divides (see e.g. Lemarchand 1995). 
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recently influenced the Palipehutu-FNL rebellion of Agathon Rwasa (Lemarchand, 2009). 
However, out of a general fear for a repetition of such events, and because all opponents 
were marginalized, Burundi endured relative peace until the end of the 1980s. In 1988 
ethnic violence erupted again, but on a more local scale in Ntega and Marangara 
communes in the north of Burundi. One of the main differences with 1972 was the 
different reaction of the international community, in particular the attitude of the U.S.A. 
(Lemarchand, 1995). Whereas the international community simply averted its eyes in 
1972, it sharply condemned the 1988 violence, which at the same time marked the start of 
the international community‘s pressure for democratization of Burundian politics and 
society (Reyntjens, 1993). 
 
This democratization process culminated in 1993 with the first democratic elections 
held in decades, albeit in a climate of ethnic polarisation between the two main political 
parties: the (Tutsi-)Uprona party and the (Hutu-)Frodebu (Front des Démocrats du 
Burundi) party. Melchior Nadadaye, the Frodebu candidate, surprisingly defeated the 
incumbent president Buyoya (Uprona), gathering 64.75% of the votes in the presidential 
elections on the first of June 1993 (Reyntjens 1993). A few weeks later Frodebu won the 
national assembly elections with an overwhelming majority of votes (71.40%). As such, 
Ndadaye became the first Hutu president of Burundi. With Frodebu's victory, the Hutu 
majority also won a political majority in the national assembly: as parliament was 
composed of 85% Hutu and 15% Tutsi (Uvin, 2009).  
Barely 100 days in power, Ndadaye was assassinated on the night of 20-21 October 
1993, during a coup d‘étât by units of the national army, which marked the opening of a 
civil war that raged for more than a decade throughout Burundi. One of the main reasons 
was the rapid ‗FRODEBU-ization‘ of the lower levels of the state, which led to the fear 
among the Tutsi elite that the army would follow, until then acting as the safeguard of the 
Tutsi minority (Uvin, 2009). Although the coup d‘étât failed, it sparked violence across 
the nation. The day after the assassination of Ndadaye, the Hutu population took revenge 
on their Tutsi neighbours, partly expressing popular anger, partly mobilized and organized 
by local Frodebu cadres. In response, the Tutsi dominated army tried ‗to restore order‘, 
short-hand for the deliberately murder of Hutu and Frodebu members. 50,000 people – 
approximately an even number of Hutu and Tutsi – were killed in the days following 
Ndadaye‘s assassination (Reyntjens, 2000).  
 
During the next ten years the entire Burundian population suffered as ‗proxy targets‘ 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998) in the civil war between the national army, Tutsi militias 
and several Hutu rebel movements, of which FDD (Forces pour la Défense de la 
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Démocratie, the military wing of CNDD – Conseil National pour la Défense de la 
Démocratie)6 became the main armed opposition, in addition to Palipehutu and later on 
FNL (Front National de Libération) and Frolina (Front pour la Liberation Nationale). 
The capital Bujumbura was divided into Hutu and Tutsi ‗quartiers‘; straying into the 
wrong ‗quartier‘ meant certain death. In the countryside the Tutsi population fled to urban 
centres and military posts, creating IDP camps, to seek protection from the army. Instead, 
many Hutu fled to neighbouring countries, to escape prosecution for their killings, or the 
retaliations of the army. Later on, from 1996 onwards, Hutu who remained in the country 
were forcefully displaced into ‗camps de regroupement‘, officially to protect them against 
the rebels, yet in reality prisoners of the army to cut them off from Hutu rebel groups 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998). Recent statistics indicate that some 52% of the population 
have fled their homes at least once since 1993 (Uvin, 2009: 29), and that around 300,000 
people lost their livee during the civil war (Lemarchand 2009), not to mention the 
devastating impact on the economy and the looming humanitarian crisis, which to date is 
still not entirely under control (WFP, 2008).  
On the political level, the power vacuum left by the assassination of Ndadaye led to a 
‗creeping coup‘ of the army and oppositions parties (Reyntjens, 2000). In 1996 this was 
translated into an effective coup d‘étât by former president P. Buyoya. This led to an 
economic embargo imposed by the neighbouring countries, only increasing the suffering 
of the Burundian population. At the same time, the international community put pressure 
on Buyoya to talk with rebels and open peace negotiations. After almost ten years of 
fighting, with no clear winner, most factions realized that a military solution was 
impossible, and an overall ‗war fatique‘ was prevalent, as people were ‗sick of an 
unwinnable war‘ (Uvin, 2009: 18).  
 
On 20 August 2000, both sides, comprising the G10 (ten Tutsi parties) and G7 (seven 
Hutu parties), signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, after mediation by 
the former presidents of Tanzania (J. Nyerere) and South-Africa (Nelson Mandela), and 
under major pressure from the international community. This peace negotiation process 
has twice put Burundi in a somewhat illogical situation. Consider the ‗universal blueprint‘ 
of peace negotiations in a nutshell: after a cease-fire, a peace agreement is signed, after 
which a transitional government is put in place to demilitarize the country and introduce 
institutional reforms, ending in free and democratic elections, after which an era of post-
conflict reconstruction starts to remove the structural causes of conflict (Daley, 2006a).  
The first illogical situation is one of ‗peace without a cease-fire‘ in 2000, as the main 
rebel groups – the CNDD-FDD and the FNL – did not sign the Arusha Agreements. Only 




 The CNDD-FDD has been formed after President Melchior Ndadaye‘s assassination. The FDD has been one of 
the more visible rebel groups during civil war, operating from DRC and Tanzania.  
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in 2003 did relative stability return to the country after the largest rebel group (CNDD-
FDD) signed a cease-fire with the transitional government. At that time, power-sharing 
had to be renegotiated to include CNDD-FDD both as a military and a political partner, 
which confused the further planning of the transitional phase, in particular the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process (ICG, 2004a, 2004b). 
Under international pressure, the transitional period was concluded with democratic 
elections held in 2005, with a victory for the CNDD-FDD on al levels, and their 
strongman P. Nkurunziza overwhelmingly elected as the new president of the republic.   
This introduced a second illogical situation of ‗democracy without peace‘ in 2005, as 
the last Hutu rebellion, the FNL of Agathon Rwasa, was still active throughout the 
country, and in particular in Bujumbura Rural, holding a strong grip on the capital. Only 
recently, on the 22 of April 2009, the FNL transformed itself into a political party after 
signing and implementing a cease-fire agreement, the last step in the pacification of 
Burundi, and this nine years after the first peace agreement was signed in Arusha. Thus, 
from 2000 onwards until today Burundi is best characterized as a ‗no war, no peace‘ 
situation (Richards 2005). Burundian post-conflict society should be understood as a 
‗distinctive space‘ with its own logic (Lambach, 2007: 5), in which potential for conflict is 
continuously reproduced (Dijkzeul, 2008: 2).   
Yet most analysts agree that the Burundian transition has been a success story for the 
international community (ICG, 2007; Lemarchand, 2006; Uvin, 2009). To a certain extent 
this is the case. The 2005 democratic elections took place in a calm and peaceful climate, 
the democratic result was accepted by all parties, relative security returned to the country 
(except for the FNL), and constitutional reforms together with consociational government 
reconciled Tutsi rights with Hutu demands, which in turn, on a very short period, pushed 
ethnic conflict to the background of both political and everyday life in Burundi 
(Lemarchand, 2009). Keeping this process on track has been the result of the shared 
efforts of Burundians, neighbouring states, and the international community. Given the 
lack of any geo-political or economic importance, international efforts are all the more 
surprising (Uvin, 2009).  
However, the challenges ahead are enormous. Because all intervening partners focused 
much of their efforts to come to an agreement with the FNL until recently, not much time 
was left to address the structural causes of the conflict. Security Sector Reform still faces 
many challenges (Nindorera, 2007; HRW, 2008); DDR programmes booked successes 
(Uvin, 2007), yet a new wave of demobilisation of FNL-rebels has sought extra capacity 
and resources (AFP, 2009b); ‗democratic culture‘ is still weak, exemplified by a 
‗governance deficit‘ (Lemarchand, 2009) and a disappointing record of human rights 
violations and intimidation of political opponents and civil society actors, e.g. the 
‗Muyinga case‘ (HRW 2006) and the alleged coup d‘étât of September 2006 (Cenap 
2006); the Radjabu case – dividing CNDD-FDD into pro-Nkurunziza and pro-Radjabu 
factions – illustrates the internal democratic deficit within the CNDD-FDD, but is also 
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exemplary of how the ‗pratiques de maquis‘ in general are introduced within the newly 
founded democratic institutions (Lemarchand, 2009); there is the problem of the refugees, 
IDPs and their access to land (ICG, 2003b); and still 66.9% of the Burundian population 
lives below the poverty line (RoB, 2008).  
As a thread running through most of these different factors, explaining the motives of 
the main parties, and this from the very beginning after the 2005 elections, is the prospect 
of the 2010 elections, the next opportunity to gain or lose power over the state in a country 
in which access to that state is the only way to attain one‘s goals. According to many 
observers, in particular the competition between the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, and more 
generally the CNDD-FDD's fear of losing the elections, are factors which could 
destabilize the situation. As such, it is important to follow up how several of the listed 
challenges will evolve within a time frame dedicated to political mobilization in the run 
up to the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections. These elections will test the 
sustainability of the Burundian peace process.    
3.2 A political economy perspective 
3.2.1 Burundian society 
From pre-colonial time onwards Burundian society has been strongly organized and 
structured in a vertical fashion (Laely, 1997). In particular, vertical patron-client relations 
were seen as one of the cornerstones of social life and mobility (Lemarchand, 1995). 
Central to this clientage system stood the traditional institution of ubugabire. Translated 
as ‗cattle contract‘ or ‗contract of pastoral servitude‘, it involved a transaction of pasture 
land or cattle in exchange for services (workforce), offerings in kind (e.g. harvest), and 
loyalty via a highly personalized relationship between a patron (shebuja) and a client 
(mugererwa) (Lemarchand, 1970, 1995). It is here that Hutu and Tutsi as ‗social‘ 
identities recur, as ubugabire is based on their occupational specialization – Hutu 
agriculturalists versus Tutsi pastoralists – and ‗the unequal distribution of cattle and 
wealth between the patrons (Tutsis) and the clients (Hutus)‘ (Daley, 2008: 45). Yet it is 
important to underscore that this clientage system represented more a ‗basis for closer 
union‘ (Lemarchand, 1995: 9), working as a ‗glue cementing different social strata of the 
society‘ (Daley 2008: 46), rather than reinforcing ethnic boundaries or social inequalities 
between Hutu and Tutsi (in contrast to Rwanda, cf. Lemarchand, 1970). In this respect, 
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patron-client relationships were perceived as a vehicle for enrichment (but also for social 
mobility).7 Lemarchand (1995: 13) quotes some Kirundi proverbs to illustrate the positive 
affinity towards these dependency relations:  
‗Amasabo arakize (Dependency makes one wealthy); Udasavye ntakira (He who 
does not have a protector will never get rich); Amasaka aba ku masabo (Sorghum 
[serial crop] grows in the shade of subjection).‘ 
These expressions illustrate well why Wolf (1966) described patron-client ties as ‗lop-
sided friendship‘, because of their instrumental nature. However, inequality and coercion 
was not absent in these kind of relationships, especially in the higher echelons of society 
where clientage was linked with political power, and clients were not in the position to 
refuse certain obligations. The stability of these relationships, based on fair exchanges and 
a balance of rights and obligations on both sides, was mainly influenced by contextual 
factors. For example, general resource scarcity often increased the potential exploitation 
of the clients by their patrons, and in a post-independence context of ethnic polarisation 
ubugabire also became ‗ethnicized‘, as in the Hutu-ideology patron-client relationships 
were presented as a mechanism of past Tutsi-domination (Lemarchand, 1995). 
In development literature, and in social capital literature in particular, these asymmetric 
dependency relations are mostly unilaterally equated with its negative, say oppressive, 
consequences, and presented as characteristic of ‗backward‘ societies. Putnam (1993), for 
example, highlights the ‗bad‘ vertical patron-client networks to explain Banfields (1958) 
‗amoral familism‘ present in the south of Italy. He defines patron-client ties as 
‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital, as the bridging of power differentials is only used by 
the powerful to control the powerless (Putnam, 2004)8. However, the traditional social 
mobility function of patron-client ties through the institution of ubugabire may equally 
refer to ‗responsive‘ linking social capital, as it potentially redistributes resources, ideas 
and information in the advantage of the powerless (Putnam, 2004; Woolcock, 2002). To 
some extent, the Burundian context turns Putnam‘s thesis (1993) upside down, as exactly 
the clientage system – which, according to Putnam, can only result in ‗exclusive‘ social 
capital – actually possessed the capacity to ‗bridge‘ different social groups, and worked 
‗inclusively‘. 9 At least in the Burundian context, this demands a more nuanced analysis. 




 The difference between ‗enrichment‘ and ‗social mobility‘ is that the latter implies change in status. This 
change in status or inter-caste mobility was called Kihutura in Kirundi, and was undeniable in pre-colonial times 
(Lemarchand 1995: 8). (I thank prof. Tom De Herdt for his remark on this difference). 
8
 Patron-client ties are defined as linking social capital, because of the explicit power differential that they 
bridge. Whereas bonding and bridging social capital are mainly captured in a horizontal terms, linking social 
capital refers to the vertical and assymetric character of social relationships (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). 
9
 This indicates the risk of essentialising types of networks, and highlights the need to keep in mind that 
particular social networks are dynamic and can simultaneously take up different roles, with different effects. In 
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Whether ‗responsive‘ or ‗unresponsive‘, these vertical patron-client relations have long 
played a central role in Burundian society (e.g. Laely, 1997; Kamungi et al., 2005).   
 
This is not, however, to suggest that horizontal and symmetric relationships do not 
exist in Burundi (Laely, 1997). A much less discussed type of social network in 
Burundian society is that of abatererezi, or what Trouwborst (1973: 111) has called the 
network of ‗beer friends‘. Traditionally, Burundian rural households are part of a 
horizontal social network, based on the institution of ukuterera, which means the gift-
giving of food and beer during ceremonies (Trouwborst, 1973: 111). In particular each 
married male has the social duty to offer beer during festivities, and in turn, will receive 
beer when he himself organizes a ceremony. People rely on these networks for the 
preparation of their land, the guarding of livestock, the construction of houses or helping 
the sick (Badionona-Tshondo, 1993: 9-10). The network is mainly based on solidarité par 
parenté (kinship solidarity) and solidarité residentielle (neighbourhood solidarity), as the 
core of the network is a relatively unchanging local group of relatives and neighbours 
(Badionona-Tshondo, 1993). When Burundians refer to mutual help and solidarity among 
the population, they mostly have this type of network in mind. Yet, as Uvin (2009) 
describes, the help and solidarity found in these kind of networks are currently under 
pressure because of the devastating consequences of civil war (social divisions, economic 
crisis), echoing the link between conflict and social capital, in that conflict zones can be 
described as ‗zones of social capital deficiency‘ (Goodhand et al., 2000). 
However, the abatererezi network also illustrates the fact that beyond the extended 
family, and the bonding social capital linked to it, there is little horizontal or community 
organization in Burundian rural social life. As Uvin (2009: 69-70) nicely summarizes:  
All early scholars agree that the only centre of a Burundian‘s life was his family. 
Typically, one‘s neighbours are one‘s family, and while there is a sense of joint 
belonging to a colline, that is hard to separate from belonging to an extended family. 
[…] There are no traditional village chiefs or masters of ceremony, no age groups or 
secret societies.  
It reflects a society in which rural households do not live in villages, but in isolated 
homesteads (sometimes called rugo), close to their itongo (land), scattered all over the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
this case, a patron-client relationship could both ‗link‘ (across socio-economic boundaries) and ‗bridge‘ (across 
ethnic boundaries) at the same time; just like patron-client ties, but then from a mono-ethnic character, could 
result in more exclusive ethnic bonds, when they were instrumentalized during political struggles. Although 
Putnam (2000) himself admits that social relationships can bond and bridge at the same time, the search for a 
typology of networks, which to a great extent has its basis in Putnam‘s normative dichotomy between ‗bad‘ 
bonding and ‗good‘ bridging social capital, engenders the danger of essentialing the functioning and outcomes of 
social networks.  
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collines of Burundi. Thus, if any social capital able of cutting across social divisions was 
present in Burundian society it was embodied in the vertical, more personalized patron-
client ties described above, and much less in horizontal, associational, and group-based 
social structures. In this respect, Burundian bridging social capital is far removed from the 
Putnamian (1993) horizontal ‗networks of civic engagement‘, which are in many cases 
presented as ‗universal blueprints‘ of such bridging capital, or social capital in general 
(Molenaers, 2003).  
There is however one exception, which adds to the notion of community organization 
in the Burundian context, i.e. the institution of ubushingantahe, a legal and moral 
authority playing an important role as ‗advisor‘ in local conflict regulation (Laely, 1997). 
A mushingantahe (singular) or ‗wise man‘ is a person who embodies ubushingantahe:  
‗The set of virtues that include having a sense of justice, as well as honesty, righteous self-
esteem, and an ethic of hard work – roughly summed up as ―integrity‖‘ (Nindorera, 2003: 
30). One only becomes a mushingantahe after passing several stages of initiation by 
practising bashingantahe, and after approval by the community. As such, the authority is 
sustained from within the community, and thus from below. However, after the colonial 
period, its history has been one of manipulation and politicization from above, with an 
ambiguous role during the civil war; some trying to stop the violence, others participating 
in it, still others criticized for not having done enough to stop the violence (Dexter & 
Ntahombaye, 2005). Current arguments within international donor circles, about 
‗traditional‘ transitional justice and reconciliation, has led to large amounts of donor 
money being invested in the rehabilitation of the institution (Dexter & Ntahombaye, 
2005). Unfortunately, this externally driven ‗scaling-up‘ process has deprived the 
institution of the bashingantahe of its local embeddedness, while transforming it into a 
national and top-down led organization. Although many agree with this criticism of the 
institution, the idea and the values behind it are still highly valued by the Burundian 
population (Uvin, 2009).  
 
It should now be clear that Burundian society has long been highly complex. A tangle 
of kinship and clan ties, ethnic affiliations, and patron-client ties define the position of an 
individual in the social order (Lemarchand, 1995: 13). To give a final example, Burundian 
society is divided in 220 clans (umuryango). Burundian identity in the past has much 
more been based on lineage affiliations (cf. solidarité par parenté), their locality (cf. 
solidarité residentielle) and other geographically-based collective identities than on 
‗ethnic‘ belonging (Daley, 2008: 45).  
However, no-one can deny the strong ethnic polarization that has characterized 
Burundi for more than half a century. Whereas pre-colonial times present a structured and 
integrated Burundian society, in which distinct social groups are well connected and 
mutually dependent (except for the Twa), at the end of the twentieth century Burundi was 
a divided country, the capital Bujumbura split into Hutu and Tutsi quartiers, the 
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countryside into Tutsi-IDP camps and Hutu-regroupment camps, or Hutu and Tutsi 
‗enclaves‘ or ‗colonies‘ (Laely, 1997: 695). In social capital terms, one could speak of a 
country of ‗weak bridges, strong bonds‘, in which inter-ethnic bridging interactions have 
been replaced by more inward looking ethnic bonding ties, resulting in an ‗us versus 
them‘ rhetoric (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 6). 
However, without denying this ethnic component, this is too much of a simplification 
of a complex reality. Social differentiation and exclusion has been shaped by a tangle of 
social divisions (regional, inter-elite, rural-urban and intra-ethnic divisions being the most 
important ones) (Daley, 2006a, 2006b; Lemarchand, 1995; Reyntjens 1995, 2000). 
Regional differences, for example, explain why in the past a Hutu from Bururi, the native 
province of the three Tutsi-Hima presidents, was better off than a Tutsi of the north. Both 
Hutu and Tutsi peasants living in rural areas have been the victims of the small urban elite 
residing in Bujumbura. And also on the political level a complex web of alliances and 
divisions were prevalent. As Daley (2006b: 666) notes: 
In the post-colonial state, the Hutu/Tutsi binary has only limited explanatory value. 
One can identify five distinct cleavages around which conflict occurred: intra-
aristocracy, between the old guard and the young modernised elite, between Hutu 
and Tutsi, intra-Tutsi, between the military and the political elite, and lately intra-
Hutu. 
An example of the latter is the difficult cease-fire negotiations between CNDD-FDD 
and FNL. Although both bear a 'Hutu' stamp, they are now political opponents ahead of 
the 2010 elections. This immediately indicates what has always been at the core of the 
Burundian conflict: elite struggles for control of the state and its resources.  
However, much of the international conflict analysis is stuck in what Chrétien 
(Reyntjens, 2000) has called ‗ethnic regression‘, i.e. the reduction of this complex of 
social divisions to a simple Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy. In this respect, ‗lazy‘ (Bebbington 
2002) social capital analysis becomes problematic, as its matches the far too naive ‗bad‘ 
bonding/‗good‘ bridging dichotomy with the much too simple Hutu/Tutsi binary, 
potentially missing a broad spectrum of nuances of the Burundian conflict, and possible 
answers for post-conflict reconstruction. Both dichotomies are society-centric – both 
conflict and its solution are mainly a case of ordinary people (Hutu/Tutsi), not states; so 
both run the risk of missing the elephant in the room, i.e. the Burundian state, on which I 
turn next.  
3.2.2 The Burundian state 
In pre-colonial times, Burundian political organization was hierarchically structured 
around the king, his court and the princely class of Ganwa at the top, with several levels 
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of Tutsi in the middle, the Hutu population below, and the Twa at the bottom of the social 
ladder. The uniqueness of this situation is best expressed when compared with the 
neighbouring Rwandan kingdom (Lemarchand, 1970; Uvin, 1999). First, Burundi was 
much less centralized because of rivalries within the princely class of the Ganwa. Below 
the king, power was fragmented among relatively autonomous political territories, each 
under the authority of a prince, all of them competing for royal succession. Second, the 
Hutu/Tutsi distinction was not as prevalently integrated into the political constellation as 
in Rwanda. On the one hand, the princely rivalries led to the necessity to seek support of 
both Hutu and Tutsi. On the other hand, intra-Tutsi rivalries between the ‗low-caste‘ 
Tutsi-Hima and the ‗upper-caste‘ Tutsi-Banyaruguru downplayed the potential importance 
of the Hutu/Tutsi distinction. The mwami relied for example on a high proportion of Hutu 
chiefs to oversee the royal domains (territory directly under the control of the king). 
According to Lemarchand (1970: 26) all these elements led to a ‗pyramidal system‘ of 
political authority, with a more fluid character, which explains how: 
This greater variety of status groups, ranging from prince to commoner, is one 
major reason why in the past Burundi society was relatively free of racial tensions; 
just as the degrees of social distance within the Tutsi stratum were at times far more 
perceptible than between Tutsi and Hutu, the distance between them and the 
princely families was equally if not more conspicuous (Lemarchand, 1970: 24).  
Although this political authority is more fluid and varied in character, it did not rule out 
a clear discourse of domination around the monarchical order, defining interaction 
between the governors and the governed. However, in his detailed analysis of peasant-
state relations Laely (1997: 706) shows how this was done indirectly, through subtle, 
multi-layered and overlapping pyramids of mutually dependent people, based on vertical 
patron-client networks, linking the top (the rulers) and the bottom (the ruled) via a nexus 
of  mediators.  
As such, the strongly personalized patron-client ties linked to the institution of 
ubugabire were used as a model to create political ties and reproduce state domination. In 
this broader political sense ubugabire was known as amasabo, defined as unconditional 
loyalty and dependence (Laely, 1997: 704). From the perspective of the governor (or 
patron), thus established from above, the relationship was called kuguba. Laely (1997: 
703-04) brings us as close as possible to the core understanding of ‗authority‘ in 
Burundian society, when he indicates the two meanings of the verb kuguba: ‗to give‘ and 
‗to command/to control‘.  To quote Lemarchand (1995: 13): ‗In the popular consciousness 
of most Barundi, the exercise of power is virtually synonymous with gift giving‘. This is 
present in the notion of God – Rugaba or ‗He Who Gives‘ – but also in the notion of the 
King, who was the owner of the country and its material resources (Ndikumana, 2005). As 
such, the role of ‗distributor‘ is central to the Burundian notion of authority, as this role 
unites the right to control or command with the ability of gift giving. This distributional 
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role becomes even clearer when considering ubugabire or amasabo from below. From the 
viewpoint of respectively the client and the governed, both relations contain the ‗moral 
obligation‘ to ask for these gifts, as the relationship is called gusaba, a verb meaning both 
‗to request‘ and ‗to submit‘ (Laely, 1997: 703). Mu-ganwa, the Kirundi term for prince, 
literally means ‗the one who is approached‘; people not performing their moral duty of 
‗approaching‘ were perceived as rebels and called inyegezi or ‗the ones who do not show 
up to authorities‘, which also repeats the capacity of domination and control executed by 
the governor on the governed through these networks (Laely, 1997: 705).  
It is then a small step to understand the patrimonial character – l‘état patron (Botte, 
1982) – of the Burundian state. The leaders used the resources of the country or their 
territory to safeguard and maximize their personal political and economic power, via the 
establishment of a clientele – mostly restricted by family, clan, ethnic or regional borders 
– to which part of their wealth was redistributed in return for political support and loyalty 
(Ndikumana, 2005). Ndikumana indicates this patrimonialism as the thread connecting 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial state formation. However, it has undergone a 
serious transformation during these periods.  
During colonial times, indirect rule already restructured the existing state structure 
through the concentration of chefferies (chiefdoms) under the authority of princely 
factions (Bwezi and Batare) and Tutsi elements. In addition, colonial rule introduced a 
paternal ‗law-and-order‘ state, based on military repression, while enforcing entirely new 
claims and demands, or prestations (Lemarchand, 1995: 42) on the population, e.g. 
standardized taxes, forced coffee cultivation, and the provision of forced labour (kurarika) 
(Laely, 1997: 708). This considerably changed Burundians perception of their Leta – their 
‗state‘ (Uvin, 2005: 1) – adding far more sentiments of coercion and repression, obeying 
and executing orders from the ‗modern‘ colonial state, while putting aside the pre-colonial 
attitude of actively approaching  superiors from below via personalised relationships. The 
Inamujadi revolt across the Ndora region in September 1934 is significant in this respect 
(Lemarchand, 1995: 44-47). Baranyanka, a Batare from the south was the newly 
appointed chief, and with him, he brought some of his Tutsi clientage to the region. In the 
eyes of the local population this led to a government of ‗―alien‖ elements […] who 
―implemented with iron hand colonial directives with regard to taxes, corvées and 
compulsory crops‖‘ (Chrétien quoted in Lemarchand, 1995: 44). Additionally, it 
dismantled preexisting clientage ties, taking away an important social protection function 
of the local population to cope with the prevailing economic crisis (a combination of 
declining prices paid for commodities and rising taxes). The result was a Hutu and Twa 
led revolt against everything Tutsi, Batare or Muzungo (European). It illustrates the 
effects of coupling the more coercive character of ‗modern‘ colonial administration with 
the policy of ethnic classification, favouring princely factions and the Tutsi minority, to 
the detriment of large parts of both the Hutu and Twa population. 
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Most of the post-colonial state has been a mixture of this ‗modern‘ colonial state 
apparatus, yet grafted onto ‗traditional‘ pre-colonial patrimonialism. Hence, its character 
is neo-patrimonialistic, as behind the facade of liberal-democratic institutions the state 
apparatus has always been guided by patronage politics (Uvin, 2009).  However, as the 
decentralized princely regime under pre-colonial monarchy, via a colonial intermezzo, 
transformed into a centralistic state apparatus in the hands of a small Tutsi-Hima elite, 
patronage also became centralistic and extremely exclusionary. Through the 
‗privatisation‘ of the state (Ndikumana, 2005), both political power and economic wealth 
fell into the hands of this small ethno-regional elite from Bururi, while the UPRONA 
party embodied this ‗monolithic apparatus of power‘ and became the central vehicle for 
patronage politics (Laely, 1997).  
This was a post-colonial state that could not build legitimacy onto broad popular 
support, as the ruling elite represented such a narrow social base (Uvin, 1999). According 
to Uvin, the elite resorted to high levels of brutal violence and repression, a strategy of 
elite maintenance which culminated in the 1965, 1972, and 1988 events. The repression of 
1972 ruled out elite contestation for more than two decades due to a deep-seated fear of a 
repetition of such events. Indeed, as Daley (2008: 234) concludes, militarism has served 
as the ‗dominant ideology‘ for the Burundian state.  Besides this violent repression, the 
construction of a controlling state apparatus, or ‗police state‘, was another important 
vehicle to maintain in power. According to Ndikumana (2005) this was done through a 
mixture of ‗centralization‘ and ‗penetration‘ efforts. He indicates how administrative and 
party structures, from top to bottom, were under control of ‗state agents‘ only accountable 
to central authority; and how the system of ‗expatriates‘ – people of the south controlling 
local administration, schools, clinics, etc. throughout the country – prevented public 
accountability. In addition, the state incorporated civil society within the Uprona party 
structure, be it via its youth, women or workers wings. As such, the state penetrated all 
facets of life throughout the country, yet all power remained centralized in the capital 
Bujumbura. 
 
This entire evolution of the Burundian state, in particular during the post-independence 
period, seriously questions the unilateral society-centric approach of most communitarian 
or Putnamian (1993/1995/2000) social capital analysis – that transforming ‗bad‘ bonding 
into ‗good‘ bridging will ultimately scale up to democratic linking social capital. By 
contrast, it rather subscribes the synergy view of Fox (1996), in that the state can also be 
the primary mover and creator of social capital – causal arrows also going from linking 
down to bridging/bonding social capital. The fact that pre-colonial proto-state/society 
relations (amasabo) were modelled after the social ‗cattle contracts‘ (ubugabire) indicates 
the bottom-up process of social capital formation. However, the entire impact of both the 
colonial and post-colonial state on Burundian society – with its ethnic polarization as the 
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most visible effect – highlights the important role of top-down processes of social capital 
formation.  
Let us, for example, return for a moment to the post-colonial state. First, the state has 
made considerable efforts to destroy social capital that was not under its control. The most 
famous case is the conflict with the Catholic Church (Longman, 2005). The Bagaza 
government feared the power of the Church at the grassroots level, especially as its non-
discriminatory education created potential breeding grounds for a new Hutu generation 
that would contest the status quo.  
Second, several top-down efforts from the Burundian state to promote social capital 
formation resulted in negative experiences for the population. The history of the 
cooperatives is significant on this point (Badionona-Tshondo, 1993). The first 
‗paternalistic‘ cooperatives were created under the auspices of Belgian rule in 1952, rather 
as a means to implement colonial policies than to defend the interest of its members. In 
1976 the Bagaza regime reintroduced a national programme for cooperatives, as part of its 
revolutionary projet de société (Lemarchand, 1995: 107). However, the programme died a 
slow death mired in corruption and fraud. To date, some people still refer back to this 
programme to explain their mixed feelings about cooperatives. The attempt of the Bagaza 
regime to unite the rural masses in villages presents another example of how the state tried 
to introduce more community organization, however, even this villagization was not 
successful, as most peasants interpreted the action correctly as another instrument to 
regulate and control their lives (Lemarchand, 1995: 109). A more current illustration are 
the travaux communautaires (community works) which are executed every Saturday 
morning, and which also have a coercive character. Throughout Burundian history, efforts 
towards collective action and organization have been mostly state-led, with a coercive 
element, and negative consequences for the majority of the population.  
Third, the incorporation of civil society into the party structures gave rise to illustrious 
examples of what has been called the ‗dark side‘ of social capital. Consider the Jeunesses 
Nationalistes Rwagasore (JNR), later on renamed as the Jeunesse Révolutionnaires 
Rwagasore (JRR). This youth wing of the Uprona was one of the initiators of the 
Kamenge riots (riots in the Kamenge quartier of Bujumbura, intensifying ethnic tensions 
in 1962), and  rapidly became an extreme anti-Hutu organization, actively participating in 
the 1972 killings (Lemarchand, 1995).  Several similar youth militias, such as Solidarité 
de la Jeunesse Pour la Défense des Minorités (SOJEDEM), Puissance d‘autodéfense 
‗amasekanya‘ (power of self-defence), Sans Echec (the infallible) and Sans Défaite (the 
undefeated), which recruited school pupils or dropouts, university students, and 
unemployed youth, were formed during the civil war in the 1990s. Even today, in the run 
up to the 2010 elections, the ruling CNDD-FDD party is accused of transforming its youth 
wing Imbonerakure (ligue des jeunes du parti CNDD-FDD) into a new militia (AFP, 
2009a). So, if we look at Burundian history, the state has played a determining role in the 
creation of the ‗exclusive‘ form of ethnic bonding social capital. Or as Lemarchand (1995: 
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63) notes, when quoting a Hutu person in his discussion of the Kamenge riots: ――The evil 
comes from the top‖‘. 
All three cases demonstrate the impact – for better or worse – of top-down state 
intervention on the constellation of Burundian society. They portray the state as a major 
initiator of social capital creation; they note the strong links between state and society 
(linking social capital) in the broader processes of social capital formation in society itself 
(bonding and bridging capital).  
3.2.3 The Burundian economy 
The neo-patrimonial state machinery clearly needed enough ‗fuel‘ or resources to keep 
the system going. So, in turn, both the state model and state-society relations are closely 
linked to the Burundian economic constellation, and vice versa. Oketch and Polzer (2002) 
speak of a predatory model, in which control over scarce ecological and natural resources 
has fuelled the Burundian conflict via the predatory behaviour of urban elites, resulting in 
severe structural violence to most of the rural masses. They note that this predatory model 
is based on two pillars: coffee and international aid. 
 
Burundi is a landlocked and resource-poor country. Compared to countries such as the 
DRC, Sierra Leone or Angola, Burundi lacks mineral deposits, with few opportunities for 
the state to profit from controlling the extraction of these natural resources (Oketch & 
Polzer, 2002). In addition, the country has a small private sector, is poorly industrialized 
(industry only accounting for 15% of the GDP), and the development of a secondary 
sector is seriously hindered by its landlocked character. Consequently, the main source of 
state income is the primary sector. More than 90% of the total population of Burundi lives 
in rural areas and is dependent on subsistence agriculture. Not surprisingly, the 
agricultural sector accounts for almost half of Burundian GDP (48.7% in 2004), and for 
more than 90% of foreign exchange earnings, coffee being the main export crop, and as 
such, the main income resource for both the Burundian state and the rural population 
(coffee employs between 600,000 to 750,000 households, roughly 40% of the population) 
(RoB, 2006a; Kimonyo & Ntiranyibagira, 2007).  
Coffee, the most important cash crop, was introduced under colonial rule. Already at 
that time the  new cash crop economy led to ‗coffee kings‘, local chiefs forcing their 
constituency to cultivate coffee and meet certain quotas, in order to receive personal 
privileges of the colonial state. Thus, from in the beginning coffee production had a 
coercive character, and farmers were whipped by the chicotte (switch) if they failed to 
maintain their coffee plantations (Daley, 2008: 56-57).  
After independence, in 1976, the coffee sector was nationalized and put under the 
management of the OCIBU (Office du Café du Burundi), a reform making the processing 
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(industry) and trade (export) phases of the coffee sector completely under the control of 
the state. An International Alert (Kimonyo & Ntiranyibagira, 2007) study indicates that 
coffee accounted for 50% of cash income among rural households, yet farmers received 
incorrect prices (e.g.  when compared to neighbouring countries such as Uganda), as 
money was diverted to the industrial and management layers of the sector. In addition, 
because of land scarcity, disappointing remunerations, and a higher demand for food 
crops, coffee growing gradually competed with food crops, such as bananas. A law and 
state ‗coffee propaganda‘ prohibited farmers from neglecting their coffee production 
(Oketch & Polzer, 2002: 141). People‘s land was confiscated if they did not obey to these 
orders, with a sometimes clear negative impact on the socio-economic situation of the 
rural households; one Oxfam GB study in Gitega province found that profits and nutrition 
would increase if households could cultivate more nutritious food crops (Daley, 2008). 
Thus, redistribution of natural wealth – agricultural production – into the patronage 
networks of the elite was realized through the foreign currency earnings of the coffee 
export, which reveals a direct economic link between the elites and the rural masses: the 
Burundian population was forced to produce coffee, in order to permit the elites to set up 
rent-seeking activities in the processing and export stage, of which the profits were 
channelled into prestige consumption, the maintenance of a repressive state apparatus and 
satisfying political opponents, in order to protect the system (Oketch & Polzer, 2002). 
 
The second pillar of Oketch‘s and Polzer‘s (2002) predatory model has been 
international aid. Ndikumana (1998: 43) indicates that in the republic era, from 1966 to 
1993, Burundian military regimes collected more than one billion dollars of loans from 
the international community, the Bagaza (1976-87) regime being the most efficient with a 
total of $831 million. In the 1980s Burundi was the highest per capita recipient of low-
interest loans from the World Bank (Daley, 2008: 101). In the beginning of the 1990s, 
before the civil war, half of government expenditures were paid by donor money (Oketch 
& Polzer, 2002: 109). After a sharp decline (a reduction by two-thirds according to ICG: 
2003a) during civil war, especially after Buyoya‘s coup in 1996 and the economic 
embargo which followed, the Arusha peace agreement unblocked aid flows again (Daley, 
2008). In 2006 a stunning 82% of the national budget was externally funded, $341 million 
out of a total of $417 million (Uvin, 2009: 24). It leads Uvin (2009: 187) to conclude that:  
All of Burundi‘s modern institutions (the ones the international community 
recognizes and interacts with) would cease to exist in their current form if it were 
not for foreign money. More than half the state‘s budget comes from aid, and 
basically, so does the entire NGO sector‘s financial lifeline. 
As international aid became integrated in the predatory state model, it has been 
criticized for consolidating a violent and discriminatory state in the past, since regionalism 
dictated why ‗It always rains in the same place first.‘ (Imvura iragwa ntikwira hose.) 
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(Sommers, 2005: 4), with high regional differences of development investments as a 
consequence  (a, 2003). Such clientelism manifested itself in direct lines between state 
departments in the capital and the country side, leading to ‗project islands‘ (Laely, 1997: 
710) and serious ‗geographical favouritism‘, an issue still important for post-conflict 
reconstruction in Burundi (Sommers, 2005; Uvin, 2009: 35). In this respect, the 
educational sector has been a well documented example. Jackson‘s (2000) figures of one 
commune of Bururi province (Mugamba) delivering 15% of the total university student 
population, and the allocation of 60% of donor aid to the education sector in Bururi at the 
end of the 1980s, are clear illustrations of this phenomenon of geographical favouritism.  
 
As the economic model is inextricably bound up with the state infrastructure, its overall 
impact on social capital has been very similar. In social capital literature, a predatory 
economic model like that of Burundi has been linked to the notion of ‗rogue states‘ 
(Colletta & Cullen, 2000b; Woolcock, 1998) (see Chapter 1, section 1.5.1 ). The predatory 
function of the state is then identified as a combination of low organizational integrity 
(state capacity and effectiveness) and high synergy (strong state-society relations), which 
seems to apply for the Burundian case: strong synergy reflects the penetration of the state, 
draining all possible economic profits out of agricultural production and international aid 
on the one hand, and repressing any kind of rebellion through repression on the other 
hand; while low organizational integrity indicates the ‗corrupt rationale‘ for which this 
economic predation was used, as the state only presented and defended the vested interests 
of a small powerful elite instead of being based on a strong and broad social basis. 
From a society perspective, the impact of such an economic model has further 
increased the imbalance of strong bonding and weak bridging social capital, added with a 
highly inequitable distribution of linking social capital. Since most lucrative economic 
sectors were monopolized, economic opportunities were only granted to a minority of 
people with links to the powerful elite. So efforts to create bridging ties (associations, 
cooperatives, trade networks) among the peasants to access more efficiently agricultural 
markets were confronted with markets entirely monopolized by exclusive ties between the 
elite and their clientele. For the coffee sector in particular, although long-standing efforts 
by organizations including INADES to organize the coffee farmers are bearing their first 
fruits (Kimonyo & Ntiranyibagira, 2007), the predatory model has long successfully 
repressed the creation of an organized peasantry to demand a better share of the profits of 
their coffee production or to simply claim their right not to cultivate coffee but food crops. 
Indirectly, the state made sure the peasantry did not have access to the financial and 
material means or infrastructure to unite themselves or to bridge themselves to a more 
diversified network of traders. Investments in the agricultural sector have never been a 
priority of the Burundian government (Ngaruko & Nkuruniza, 2000). Whereas the 
agricultural sector provided 64% of the GDP, it only received 20 to 30% of investments 
from 1972 to 1992. Instead, the industrial sector, only accounting for 16.7% of GDP 
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received 70 to 80% of investments in the same period. This matches t rural/urban split: 
while 90% of the population lived in rural areas, only 20% of state funding during the 
1980s was accorded to the rural sector, instead Bujumbura received 50% of total public 
investment and 90% of social expenditure (Kimonyo & Ntiranyibagira, 2007: 11). The 
agricultural sector was entirely under-funded, which led to a lack of storage facilities, bad 
conservation methods and limited supply channels, resulting in an imperfect market 
structure opposing two unequal players: a large number of producers and a small number 
of traders (Oketch & Polzer, 2002: 128). Concluding, economic predation only increased 
ethnic bonding social capital, as it increased ethnic polarization: 
Coffee production, processing and marketing, including the crop‘s export, reflect 
and reinforce the country‘s ethnic divisions. The Tutsi play an almost exclusive part 
in the role of the ‗minority middleman‘ and the state, effectively controlled by a 
cabal within this group, expropriates the earnings, leaving little trickling down the 
peasants‘ way. (Oketch & Polzer, 2002: 133).  
This link between the economy and civil war has regained importance within the ‗greed 
versus grievance‘ debate, adding economic gains and opportunities to political grievances 
as potential causes explaining civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2000). To a certain 
extent, this ‗greed‘ argument is a welcome modification of the sometimes one-sided 
‗cultural‘ or ‗ethnic‘ interpretations of the Burundian conflict (cf. ‗ethnic regression‘ in 
most conflict analysis), because it points out the importance of economic factors, rather 
than only the ‗ethnic‘ factor. 
The ‗greed‘ argument that potential gains out of controlling primary commodity 
exports plays a central role in conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000), is confirmed by the high 
dependency of the Burundian state on foreign exchange earnings, gained through the 
export of coffee. After independence, coffee, to a certain extent, has played the role 
diamonds, gold, oil, or coltan have played in countries such as Sierra Leone, DRC or 
Angola, in that it financed a repressive state apparatus. One United States report found 
that future coffee production was offered as payment for arms and weapons during the 
civil war (Oketch & Polzer, 2002). As the other pillar of the predatory state model – 
international aid – was largely put on hold after 1993, coffee export was the only regular 
flow of income for the Burundian government to finance their war efforts.  
Yet the greed argument does not entirely follow from this dependency, because rebel 
movements never financed their activities via accessing and controlling these natural 
resources. The reason is that, in the case of agricultural production, as for coffee, wealth 
creation takes place at the processing and trading phases (Oketch & Polzer, 2002). This is 
in contrast to minerals, for example, where predatory behavior of states and rebel 
movements focus on the production and the extraction process, as these natural resources 
are more easily extractable, exploitable, and controllable because they are found in 
localized sites. This is much less the case for agricultural production. Burundian rebel 
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movements have mobilized the population to destroy coffee plantations, and otherwise, to 
smuggle coffee to neighboring countries, yet this was never done to gain control over 
these natural resources, but simply as an act of civil disobedience against the Burundian 
state (Kimonyo & Ntiranyibagira, 2007).  
In other words, the greed argument as such does not strictly apply to the Burundian 
context. Still, the broader expression of the greed hypothesis does, in that political 
grievances have been complemented by economic greed, as both sides were motivated to 
prolong the civil conflict to safeguard economic gains via looting, and in particular, 
smuggling networks (Oketch & Polzer, 2002). This also echoes the argument that conflict 
gives rise to the ‗dark side‘ of social capital, via the creation of new social networks (e.g. 
smuggling networks) with anti-social, i.e. conflict-inducing, effects (Goodhand & Hulme, 
1997). Daley (2008: 99-101) describes the so called ‗gold wars‘ of Bujumbura as one of 
the best known examples of such networks producing ‗genocide economics‘ in Burundi. 
The withdrawal of AFFIMET's licence (which had enabled the company to control the 
smuggling and processing of gold from DRC) by Ndadaye‘s government in 1993 is said to 
have been one of the factors that prompted Ndadaye's murder. Daley (2008: 101) sharply 
notes the close links between conflict and informal economies when she states: 
The AFFIMET affair illustrates the formal and informal connections between 
international capital and local elites […] Genocidal economics involves the merger 
of formal and informal networks of accumulation – a process that has been speeded 
up through the introduction of market liberalism. Other aspects of the informal 
economy flourished under conditions of war; drugs, cannabis grown in Rwanda, 
along with heroin and mandrax worth millions annually, were transited through 
Burundi. 
Another expression of the greed argument is known as the ‗green war‘ thesis, which 
‗postulates a simplified and inevitable progression from environmental degradation 
(including land scarcity, land degradation and desertification, etc.) to poverty and 
conflict.‘ (Oketch & Polzer, 2002: 89). In the case of Burundi, and neighbouring Rwanda, 
many international actors and analysts have emphasized the deadly combination of an 
agricultural-based economy with a high population density as one of the structural causes 
of Burundian conflict, land scarcity being one of the direct triggers of violence. Without 
denying population pressure and land scarcity as determining factors of Burundian 
poverty, Oketch and Polzer (2002: 89) suggest putting ‗―environment in its place‖‘. 
Scarcity of land was never the root cause or direct trigger of mass violence during civil 
war. This is illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of land conflicts have an inter-
familial character, and are not war-related, nor do they have an ethnic connotation 
(Vervisch, 2008). However, there exists a link between land and civil war, but indirectly 
via the state. Access to land has always been unfairly distributed, as it was incorporated as 
another natural resource into patronage politics. Civil war aggravated this situation, as 
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‗official‘ corruption and land grabbing enabled the state and high ranking  officials to 
confiscate and use so-called state-owned land for private and commercial use (Oketch & 
Polzer, 2002). In this respect, the land question in Burundi reflects how ‗Many political 
sources of ecological conflict are mistaken for ecological sources of political conflict, 
sometimes because of wilful obfuscation by those involved.‘ (Huggins, 2003: 4). This 
therefore calls for a more nuanced analysis. It is not only land scarcity (ecological cause) 
which potentially results in violent ‗political conflict‘, but also inequitable access and 
state policies (political cause) potentially leading to an ‗ecological conflict‘ of land 
scarcity.  
 
In sum, the links between the economy and Burundian civil war and poverty are 
complex and diverse. If we, for example, look at the different development traps Collier 
(2007) uses to identify those poor countries which are populated with ‗the bottom billion‘ 
of the world population, they unfortunately all apply to Burundi: Burundi has been 
ravaged by civil war (the conflict trap), although there is no real resource-abundance in 
Burundi to date, it is highly dependent on the export of natural resources (the natural 
resource trap), it has been landlocked and surrounded by unstable neighbours (the 
landlocked with bad neighbours trap), and it has a serious governance problem (the bad 
governance in a small country trap). However, the thread through these different 
explanations remains the Burundian state.  
Thus, central stands this predatory state, which is incorporated in what Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza (2000: 384-385) have called the ‗predation-rebellion-repression‘ model: 
‗predation by power holders who share its rents has led to rebellions by those excluded, 
triggering, in turn, repression by the army, whose primary role has appeared to be the 
defence of the system of predation‘. To a large extent, exclusion has been ethnically 
defined, referring to the ‗horizontal inequality‘ concept of Stewart (2009) between the two 
ethnic groups (Uvin, 2007); yet when taking into account that only a small number of the 
Tutsi ethnic group could profit from their links with the elite, the bottom line of the 
Burundian predatory model has been ‗structural violence‘ (Galtung, 1969) for the majority 
of the population, i.e. social injustice caused by great inequality, discrimination and 
exclusion. The Burundian peace process, at least temporarily, succeeded in breaking this 
cycle of predation, rebellion and repression. For peace to become durable, it will need a 
thoughtful rethinking of the Burundian state, and another kind of economy, which 
presents alternatives to the Burundian elites for capturing the state as the only way to 
preserve and enhance economic wealth.  
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Chapter 4  
Introducing three hillsides and their projects 
Below I introduce the three collines on which the case studies were implemented. Each of 
the collines presents a ‗typical case‘ (Patton, 2002: 236) of the different projects carried 
out by the three development agencies: the CIBA project on Burara colline, the LITA 
project on Tangara colline, and the CLC project on Cumba colline. For each colline I 
briefly present the basic socio-economic figures, discuss their conflict histories, and 
introduce the NGO-projects.1  
Socio-economic data according to collines or zones (the administrative unit just above 
the colline) are not available in Burundi, so I present data at commune level. For the 
conflict histories, I rely mainly on interviews with key-actors and focus groups conducted 
in 2006 and 2007, but also on focus group discussions held in 2009, which aimed to 
compare the conflict history on each colline for the period 1993–2005 and 2005–2009 
(before and after the 2005 elections). As shown below, the general trends shared by these 
conflict histories included (i) the significance of drought and food crises next to the war as 
the main factors of conflict (an observation also made by Uvin, 2009), (ii) the shifting of 
ethnic divisions to economic divisions once relative stability and security returned after 
the 2005 elections (echoing the general trend that total impoverishment after conflict 
marks a shift of focus from political to material concerns and a focus on urgent material 
needs, see World Bank, 2002), and rising tensions ahead of the 2009 elections. For the 
presentation of the three case studies, I rely on focus group discussions with the 
population, rather than logical frameworks and other NGO documents, to present how the 




 For the selection process of the three case study projects, I refer back to the methodological chapter.  
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NGO-projects looked ‗in reality‘ (the programme goals, objectives and results as 
described in the proposal document can be found in annex 2, 3, 4).  
4.1 Burara colline – the CIBA project 
4.1.1 The colline  
Burara colline is one of the 21 collines, subdivided into five zones, of Busoni commune 
(see annex 5 for maps). As the largest commune in Kirundo province, Busoni borders the 
neighbouring country of Rwanda to the north, covers a total surface of 420.89 sq km, 
varies between an altitude of 1500 and 1700m, and to a great extent belongs to the natural 
region of Bugesera, which has witnessed serious droughts from 1997 (El Nino) onwards 
(RoB, 2006c, 2006f). Below I present the basic demographic and socio-economic 
indicators (Table 9).  
 
Table 9 Demographic and socio-economic indicators, Busoni commune 
Busoni Commune (Burara)* 
 
 
Total population 126 626 
Population density (2005)   289 / sq km 
Predicted Population growth / year (2003-2010)  3.7%  
Population under the age of 25 (2006)   69% 
Main agricultural cultures  Sweet potatoes (23.4%) Manioc (23.3%) Beans (17%) Bananas (16%) 
% population in need of food aid**  
(Season 2006B, entire province of Kirundo) 
>51% 
Health Infrastructure 8 CDS (Centre de santé) 
3 CNS (Centre de Nutrition Supplémentaire) 
No. of reported cases of most prevalent diseases / month*** Malaria (54809) 
Malnutrition (7692)  
Respiratory diseases (3843) 
Diarrhetic diseases (2268) 
Dysentery (698) 
Water access  
(standard : 30 hh / water point) 
212 hh / water point 
Primary school enrolment  111.7%**** 
Secondary school enrolment 974 students (4% of the 10-20 year age-group)  
Vulnerable Groups 
 
Child Heads of Household (No.) 
Child Soldiers (No.) 








*Based on Monographie de la Commune Busoni (RoB , 2006c) 
**Based on a joint evaluation of MINAGRI (Ministry of Agriculture), FAO, WFP; UNICEF, and OCHA (RoB , 2006b)  
***To a great extent dependent on the presence of health infrastructure 




Burara colline is located near the administrative centre of the commune. This centre is 
near a bridge linking both sides of the hills surrounding the Muhembezi wetland, itself 
ending in lake Rweru. A large IDP camp straddles both sides of the wetland. The sites are 
named Rutabo and Rusarasi and the latter belongs to Burara colline. As the administrative 
centre of the commune, several public services are available, such as communal offices, a 
primary school and a secondary school nearby, a Tribunal de Résidence (lowest court) a 
Centre de Santé (health centre),  and a market. It is relatively well-connected via rural 
roads with the provincial capital Kirundo, and other communal and rural centres. Burara 
colline has five sous-collines: Rusarasi (site), Kirerama, Munyonza, Bucanka, and 
Mpinga.  
4.1.2 The conflict 
Compared to the other collines, Burara‘s conflict history has been the most severe for two 
reasons. On the one hand, Busoni commune, and Burara colline in particular, has clear 
ethnic segregation. On the Hutu side, the proximity to Rwanda has led to major infiltration 
and mobilization across state borders, and an easy escape route for Hutu after crimes 
committed in 1993. On the Tutsi site, Busoni has a relative high presence of Tutsi. Burara 
colline borders the centre of Busoni commune, the site of the communal administration. 
As all over the country, including Busoni, the Tutsi fled to urban and rural centres, soon 
after the assassination of Ndadaye in 1993, to seek protection from the military. Today, 
the result is still visible, as on both sides of the centre two relatively large IDP-sites are 
still in place: the Rusarasi and Rutabo sites. Their presence is even more visible, as large 
herds of cattle set the scene when arriving in the mornings in the centre of Busoni. The 
commune accounts for 25% of the total livestock of Kirundo province (RoB, 2006f). In 
reality, both sites have become permanent residences for many of the IDPs, based on both 
security and socio-economic concerns (close to markets and public services such as health 
centres and schools). As a result, Busoni is geographically split up into a ‗visible‘ large 
group of Tutsi around the centre, and a majority of Hutu living in the surrounding hills. 
A second reason has been the strong links between the Tutsi of Busoni commune and 
national level politics. Historical links with political elites in Bujumbura were summed up 
when the chef de colline explained the feud between the two strong men of Busoni, each 
from a different Tutsi clan: 
Minani was administrateur during the Bagaza years as an upronist [member of 
Uprona party], afterwards he became a businessman. Rutayisire was two times 
minister under Bagaza, and he also held important offices under Boyaya I and II. At 
that time, they were friends. But with the multi-party system, Minani became 
Parena, the party of Bagaza, and Rutayisire became angry, because he was afraid 
that he would lose his votes in the Rusarasi site. Uprona and Parena are two Tutsi 
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parties and compete for the same votes. Rutayisire lives in Bujumbura and was less 
present in Rusarasi. Minani is rich and he can rally the whole site because 
Rutayisire is not there. (interview Chef de Colline, Burara, 27/04/07). 
Busoni is therefore shaped by a large and politically sensitive group of Tutsi. The 
rallying of Rutayisire (Uprona party) caused frequent tensions between the ethnic groups 
after the elections of 2005. This was not the case for Minani, as he defected to CNDD-
FDD and one of his sons became the gouverneur of Kirundo province.   
 
As in many Burundian communities, ethnic violence broke out in Busoni shortly after 
the assassination of Ndadaye in 1993. The Frodebu administrateur mobilized the Hutu to 
take retaliations: road blocks were set up, and bridges destroyed to hinder the intervention 
of the Tutsi national army. Houses were burned, and cattle, bicycles, and motorbikes were 
stolen. The Tutsi attempted to regroup around the communal centre. When the army 
arrived, several Hutu were shot, among them the Frodebu administrateur, and the 
majority fled to Rwanda. In 1994, a large group of Hutu came back from Rwanda and 
organized themselves in the surrounding hills (near colline Nyakizu), to retake control of 
Busoni. The Tutsi, on the other hand, wanted to revenge the killings of 1993. With the 
back-up of the army, the Hutu group was pushed back, and most fled back to Rwanda. A 
little later, after the outbreak of the Rwanda genocide and the push of the RPF (Rwandan 
Patriotic Front), these Hutu returned to Burundi, many fleeing again, this time to 
Tanzania. In the following years (1995-1997) tensions flared when Hutu were hunted 
down for their active participation in the killings, resulting in large groups of Hutu fleeing 
to Tanzania.  
1998 was clearly marked as the beginning of the droughts, introducing a new era of 
food crisis and general insecurity. The year 2000 was marked by droughts with 
devastating effects. During the food crisis, theft increased substantially, bringing more 
violence to the commune. People destroyed their houses by selling their roofing tiles, and 
other assets were sold (cattle, bicycles, motorbikes, etc). Large groups migrated to other 
communes or to neighbouring Rwanda or Tanzania. In addition, people were forced to sell 
land at low prices, creating tensions with the rich, who were criticized for profiteering. 
From 2002 onwards, cohabitation between both ethnic groups became more peaceful.  
 
On the political level, after the events of 1993 the Frodebu administrateur was replaced 
by several Upronists until the elections of 2005. This was also the case for the chef de 
colline of Burara. At sous-colline level geographical ethnic segregation remained visible; 
the chef of Rusarasi sous-colline (IDP site) was an Upronist, while the four other sous-
collines (further removed from the centre and the IDP site) were Frodebu. In the 2005 
elections, the administrateur was from CNDD-FDD, while the seats in the conseil 
communal were distributed as following: CNDD-FDD (19), Frodebu (4), and Uprona (2). 
The chef de colline was elected as an Upronist. The conseils collinaire were divided 
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between CNDD-FDD (2) and Uprona (3). On the sous-colline level, both sous-collines 
near the Rusarasi IDP site were Uprona, the sous-collines further away in the hills became 
CNDD-FDD. 
During the 2005 elections, changing parties to win or maintain political power has been 
a nationwide strategy for local politicians and other strong men. It was no secret that 
CNDD-FDD would win the elections.  Minani, the Tutsi businessman who defected from 
Parena to CNDD-FDD via his son, is a clear example in this respect. Another illustration 
was the chef de colline of Burara, a member of the Rutayisire clan and Upronist, also 
switching to CNDD-FDD. As a result, the Tutsi of Rusarasi site branded him a traitor. The 
chef de sous-colline of Rusarasi stated: ‗[There is] little trust, because almost everybody 
in the site is family of Rutayisire, and it is as if he defects and takes with him the secrets 
of the clan to the CNDD-FDD.‘ (interview chef de sous-colline Rusari, Burara, 02/05/07). 
 
Shortly after the elections (2005 and 2006), tensions rose again because of le 
terrorisme of CNDD-FDD, claiming a landslide victory in the elections, and replacing 
people from other political parties holding positions. Several Upronists were imprisoned 
on the basis of alleged involvement in land conflicts between IDPs and repatriates. 
Although defined as a problem of political parties, because of the politicized character of 
the commune and the rallying of Rutayisire, tensions were clearly ethnic in nature 
(especially when compared to both other collines).  
In 2007, famine once again pushed these tensions into the background. In 2008, the 
forced reintegration en masse of Hutu refugees from camps in Tanzania intensified 
another kind of conflict, those related to land. The fact that most of these land conflicts 
have no ethnic character (as most conflicts are between neighbours and people from the 
same family), yet seriously increase insecurity in the commune, was illustrated by one 
demobilized person who threw a grenade into the house of his brother, killing 2 people 
and injuring four. From 2009 onwards, tensions within the community increased again, as 
political mobilization began in the run up to the 2010 elections. In particular, the CNDD-
FDD, fearing a defeat, is rallying aggressively, via groups called Imbonerakure, which 
practise sports in public, while singing the CNDD-FDD songs, while also waving 
truncheons to scare the population. In January 2009, the home of a Frodebu member was 
attacked with a grenade, although it is difficult to rule out apolitical motivations (see also 
HRW, 2009).  
4.1.3 The CIBA project 
For several years CIBA has been responsible for relief distributions (in particular food 
and seeds) on behalf of the WFP (World Food Programme) and the FAO (Food and 
Agriculture Organization) in Kirundi province. During fieldwork, CIBA still organized 
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seed fairs by order of FAO and WFP. However, the shift towards development assistance 
was already made with the implementation of the ‗Kirundo Integrated Development 
Programme‘, which started in 2003. The livelihood project, which is the subject of the 
present work, was the continuation of this project. The project focused on developing the 
Muhembuzi wetland and the surrounding hillsides that constitute its basin (see annex 2 for 
the goals, objectives and intermediary results (IR) of this project, as defined in the project 
proposal). 
 
A first component of the project, the cash-for-work programme, aimed at injecting cash 
into the local rural economy through employment intensive infrastructure works 
(irrigation and drainage system in the wetland, road works, supply of clean water through 
water pipes and distribution points). The development of the wetland was particular in this 
case. Instead of earning an income the proposal was that workmen were compensated with 
a plot in the newly developed wetland. To this end local authorities (wetlands are property 
of the state) authorized the distribution of a so far unoccupied section of the wetland near 
the administrative centre of the commune.  
A second project component was the introduction of the ‗solidarity chain‘, a livestock 
credit rotation scheme in order to restock livestock, enhance community ties, increase 
agricultural production through access to manure, and increase milk and meat production. 
Passing on the newborn (in this case mainly imported species of goats) creates a chain of 
beneficiaries, which aims to reinforce ties between neighbours through sharing 
responsibility for the livestock. Closely linked to this was the introduction of a veterinary 
pharmacy in Busoni commune, where the population and veterinarians, trained by CIBA, 
could procure the necessary veterinary drugs.  
A third cluster of activities focused on the sustainable use of natural resources, in 
particular soil protection through the integration of contour berms and agro-forestry.  
The final major component of the project was the development of the wetland and its 
basin through the introduction of rice culture, the multiplication of manioc resistant 
cassava, and the introduction of several other improved crops.  
Capacity building was identified as a transferral activity, as it concerned repeated 
training courses (les formations) on a diversity of subjects (rice culture, soil protection, 
livestock, HIV/AIDS, conflict resolution, etc.). In all focus groups similar components 
always came first, which highlights their importance for the population: distribution of 
plots in the wetland, livestock, introduction of rice, road works, and access to water. 
(Instead, the veterinary pharmacy, training, soil protection, agro-forestry, and introduction 
of other improved crops were not always mentioned or only at the end of the 
conversation). 
 
In sum, the Burara project was geographically the most concentrated of the three 
projects: only one commune, with a focus on two zones. It had an environmental focus: 
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developing the Muhembezi wetland. This resulted in an integrated project, with a complex 
of activities and high visibility. The project had clear technical objectives, focusing on 
irrigation systems in the wetland, water tap infrastructure, road works, improvement of 
local livestock by cross-breeding, certification of improved rice seed varieties, and so on. 
In terms of intervention strategy, the project used a mixed strategy, identifying both 
households and associations as end-beneficiaries. In addition, CIBA followed a top-down 
approach, matching the community-driven character of their project with the achievement 
of technical end-results. 
4.2 Tangara colline – the LITA project 
4.2.1 The colline 
Tangara colline is one of the 30 collines, split up in 4 zones, of Butihinda commune (see 
annex 5 for maps). Butihinda, in the north of Muyinga province, borders Tanzania in the 
east and is close to the important Kobero border crossing. As in Busoni commune, most of 
Butihinda‘s 293.60 sq km belongs to the natural region of Bugesera, varying between an 
altitude of 1500 and 1700m, and with similar periods of droughts as a consequence (RoB, 
2006d, 2006g). Below I list some socio-economic indicators (Table 10). 
 
Table 10 Demographic and socio-economic indicators, Butihinda commune 
Butihinda Commune (Tangara)*  
Total population 97 629 
Population density (2005) 372 / sq km 
Predicted population growth / year (2003-2010) 3.7% 
Population under the age of 25 (2006)   64.6 % 
Main agricultural cultures  Bananas (76%) Sweet Potatoes (13.9%) Beans (2.6%) 
% population in need of food aid**  
(Season 2006B, entire province of Muyinga) 
>51% 
Health Infrastructure 3 CDS (Centre de Santé) 
No of reported cases of most prevalent diseases / month*** Malaria (1184) 
Respiratory diseases (332) 
Diarrhetic diseases (195) 
Malnutrition (192)  
Dysentery (25) 
Water access (standard : 30 hh / water point) 309.5 
Primary school enrolment  56% 
Secondary school enrolment 526 students (2.6% of the 10-20 year age-group)  
Vulnerable Groups 
 
Child Heads of Household (No.) 
Child Soldiers (No.) 






*Based on Monographie de la Commune Butihinda (RoB, 2006d) 
**Based on a joint evaluation of MINAGRI (Ministry of Agriculture), FAO, WFP; UNICEF, and OCHA (RoB, 2006b)  




Tangara colline is located on the rural road connecting the administrative centre of the 
commune and the Kobero border crossing, from which the paved road leads to Muyinga, 
the provincial capital. Tangara has a small rural centre near the road, with a school and a 
small market. A large market is found at Kobero, and the nearest health centre is at the 
communal centre. Tangara has five sous-collines: Tangara (centre), Kiguruka, Kivoga, 
Masiga, and Rurembo. As several sous-collines are relatively far from Tangara centre and 
the rural road, there was a clear distinction and disconnection between the ‗rich‘ centre 
and the ‗poorer‘ sous-collines. The argument of geographical favouritism – ‗It always 
rains in the same place first.‘ – (Sommers, 2005) was illustrated on an extreme local level 
of the sous-collines, in many cases central to people‘s explanations of social life and local 
politics. 
4.2.2 The conflict 
The local situation on Tangara colline followed a similar course to the nationwide events 
of 1993, but was less intense than for example on Burara colline: the Hutu population took 
revenge on the Tutsi population, before the national army arrived and took retaliation 
against the Hutu population. Although killings took place in Tangara, the situation on 
neighbouring collines was more severe, and many fled the violence, both Hutu (to 
Tanzania) and Tutsi (IDP camps in Rugari and Muyinga). The population suffered 
displacement, the material damage of houses, and the looting of cattle, land and other 
assets. In 1996 some groups of IDPs returned to the colline, which led to arrests, 
imprisonments, and occasional torture and executions of Hutu suspected of being actively 
involved in killings or the looting of assets. Some innocent people were arrested or 
assassinated, based on clearly false accusations of victims, etc. Many Hutu fled back to 
Tanzania to escape trial or retaliation. From 1997 onwards the situation stabilized and 
both IDPs and repatriates returned to the colline. In 1999 and 2000 Tangara, and the entire 
region, suffered from serious droughts and famine. People who had just returned from 
refugee or IDPs camps, fled again, but now from hunger. During this period tensions and 
insecurity flared again: richer people profiting from households who were forced to sell 
land, coffee plantations, or roofing tiles, and many households falling victim to armed 
robbers. In turn, the population enforced the law themselves through the creation of civil 
patrol groups. In 2002 both on the political and food security level, the situation calmed 
down, and security returned to the colline. 
 
Butihinda commune and Tangara colline have been strongholds of Frodebu since 1993. 
Both the administrateur, the chef de colline and all five chefs de sous-collines have come 
from Frodebu. With the 2005 elections, Butihinda and Tangara turned into a CNDD-FDD 
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stronghold.  The seats in the conseil communal were distributed as follows: CNDD-FDD 
(16), Frodebu (6), Paribu (Parti pour le Renouveau Intégral du Burundi) (2), RPB 
(Rassemblement pour le Peuple du Burundi) (1). Most positions were taken by CNDD-
FDD. Both the administrateur and the chef de zone of Tangara were from CNDD-FDD 
signature. On colline level the chef de colline, all five conseils collinaire and all five chefs 
de sous-colline were from CNDD-FDD. Again, changing parties explains a great deal of 
this situation, as the chef de colline defected from Frodebu to CNDD-FDD. He had been 
chef de colline (1994-96) and chef de secteur (1996-99) for Frodebu before the 2005 
elections. Even a chef de colline of Uprona was asked to become the leader of CNDD-
FDD in Tangara, however, he declined the offer.  A similar explanation applies for most 
of the chefs de sous-colline: also on this level, most of the individuals remained, since 
only the party name changed from Frodebu to CNDD-FDD.   
Thus, in Tangara ethnic tensions were not as prevalent as in Burara, and the 2005 
elections presented a more ‗classical‘ political party struggle between CNDD-FDD and 
Frodebu to win the majority Hutu electorate. People therefore held administrative 
positions for Frodebu, yet rallied for CNDD-FDD and promised more external aid (which 
they controlled at the time) so long as they were returned to office in the elections. In 
addition, the CNDD-FDD in Butihinda had a militant character, which was personified by 
the administratrice of the commune. Her personal militantism was expressed in the 
populations' fear of her, stories of summary imprisonment, and especially – as a woman – 
her criticizing lazy men only drinking beers in bars, which of course won the approval of 
many women. Under her leadership ‗the party‘ was omnipresent, something which was to 
a lesser extent felt in the two other studied communes. 
The situation of the administratrice of Butihinda offers a present day illustration of the 
continuation of the historical centralised and top-down way of how the Burundian state 
apparatus works, as she fell victim to the national political conflict between Hussein 
Radjabu (President of the CNDD-FDD party) and Pierre Nkurunziza (President of the 
Republic, CNDD-FDD signature). On 7 February 2007 Radjabu was dismissed as 
president of the party at an extraordinary congress in Ngozi, after a political struggle 
between the two big men, which had split CNDD-FDD into two parts (Swiss Peace, 
2007). As a consequence, from the national to the very local level, many political 
supporters of Radjabu were dismissed of official functions. Radjabu is a Hutu from 
Muyinga, not surprisingly then, the Radjabu camp was very strong in the entire province. 
After his dismissal, and later his imprisonment, the Governor of Muyinga province was 
replaced, and also the administratrice of Butihinda commune, a strong supporter of 
Rajabu as they both belong to the Muslim minority, was replaced by the conseil 
communal. It indicates how the functioning of the conseil communal, if necessary, is 
completely orchestrated from above, from the capital Bujumbura. Before, many members 
of the conseil communal were loyal to their administratrice, and also a large part of the 
population (especially the women) praised her efforts to bring development to the 
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commune. As such, her story is a perfect illustration of how democratic elections could 
not alter the ‗traditional approach of top-down governance‘ (Uvin, 2005: 2, see OAG, 
2007 for a discussion on decentralization in Burundi). 
 
After the elections, the population was afraid that tensions would rise again with the 
return of both repatriates and IDPs. The situation remained relatively calm for a time, but 
this changed in 2006 when conflicts between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of aid 
(also from the NGO which has been researched) intensified. This soured relations between 
the population and local administration, as the latter was implicated in the embezzlement 
of external aid. People who remained – and clearly suffered – on Tangara colline during 
the crisis therefore cannot accept that only repatriates receive aid. Despite the clear ethnic 
component (Tutsi IDPs demanding an even package of aid as Hutu repatriates) the 
problem was broader, as many of those who remained were also Hutu. (It was also a 
political move, as CNDD-FDD used aid to win over recent repatriates – representing an 
entirely new constituency – for the elections of 2010). The monopoly on political power 
of a militant CNDD-FDD party enhanced the control over external aid, leading to the 
exclusion of many, and a corrupt local administration. In 2007, the Radjabu case even 
created conflicts on the colline level, and although not violent, through mobilization from 
above, conflicts were rapidly eliminated. In 2008, as was the case in 2000, failed harvests 
and food insecurity increased insecurity, as robberies and conflicts about the selling of 
assets saw a steep rise. Some households living isolated in the hills left their homes and 
tried to find shelter near the rural road, in search of better protection. As in Busoni, also 
here political mobilization in the run up for the 2010 elections started already in 2009, 
although not as intense. 
4.2.3 The LITA project  
Although all three case studies featured a number of similar activities, some were 
particular to each project. For CIBA in Burara this was the development of the wetland. In 
the case of LITA in Tangara, the project was set up around the construction of le hangar, 
a storage facility for agricultural production (see annex 3 for the goals, objectives and 
intermediary results of this project, as defined in the project proposal). 
 
A brief sketch of the project thus starts with the hangar. In several centres of Butihinda 
commune LITA constructed storage facilities for agricultural production of the 
surrounding collines. This was also the case in Tangara colline, and in the eyes of the 
population, the hangar was the ‗concrete‘ realisation of the project: wood and brick 
buildings were constructed to store harvests (potatoes, beans, sorgho, etc.) beside the 
market in Tangara, together with a centre which served as a meeting place for associations 
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or other groups in the community. Closely related to these storage facilities was the seed 
credit system with local agricultural producer-groups, being the main end-beneficiaries of 
the LITA activities. LITA asked the local population to form associations; in turn they 
received a seed credit of beans, peanuts, etc. Afterwards, the producer groups reimbursed 
the credit to the committee of the hangar, which used it to supply other groups.  
A second main component of the project was the introduction of the ‗solidarity chain‘, 
similar to the livestock credit scheme in Busoni. In addition, a veterinary pharmacy was 
also built within the hangar to provide the population with accessible drugs, and a vet was 
chosen and trained to assist the participants of the credit scheme. 
Also similar to the other NGO-projects, both anti-erosion measures (contour berms) 
and reforestation activities (agro-forestry) were carried out to improve the management of 
soil and water resources. 
As a transferral component, training was given on various topics. However, rather 
specific for LITA in Tangara was its focus on both organizational capacities and conflict 
resolution skills. During the project, a goal related to conflict resolution was included 
upon request of the donor. Not many activities could be implemented because of the late 
inclusion, but LITA in Tangara made most progress on this issue.  
 
In sum, the Tangara project of LITA revolved around the locations of the hangars, 
including one in Tangara centre. The project had clear social objectives. LITA in Tangara 
was the consortium partner most focused on participatory group-oriented processes: 
associations were identified as the main end-beneficiaries, storehouses were opportunities 
to create local structures of cooperation and collaboration, and great efforts were made to 
support these participatory processes. In terms of intervention strategy, this was translated 
into an associational focus, and a more bottom-up laisser-faire approach to introduce 
community participation. Rigorous supervision by NGO staff was less necessary, as the 
goal of the project was the participatory process rather than achieving technical end-
results. 
4.3 Cumba colline – the CLC project 
4.3.1 The colline 
Cumba is one of the 51 collines, divided into four zones, of Muyinga commune (see annex 
5 for maps). This is the central commune of Muyinga province, including the provincial 
capital, and bordering Tanzania in the east. Spread across 379.94 sq km the commune 
belongs to two similar natural regions, Bugesera (as both Burara and Tangara collines) 
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and Bweru, varying between an altitude of 1400 and 1800m, with similar climatological 
conditions as both other studied collines (RoB, 2006e, 2006g). Below are key socio-
economic indicators (Table 11). 
 
Table 11 Demographic and socio-economic indicators, Muyinga commune 
Muyinga Commune (Cumba)*  
Total population 125 725 
Population density (2005)   331 / sq km 
Predicted Population growth / year (2003-2010)  3.6% 
Population under the age of 25 (2006)   65.3% 
Main agricultural cultures   Bananas (59.4%) Sweet potatoes (20.4%) Manioc (8.7%), Rice (6.4%) 
% population in need of food aid**  
(Season 2006B, entire province of Muyinga) 
>51% 
Health Infrastructure 7 CDS (Centre de Santé) - 1 Hospital (in provincial capital) 
No of reported cases of most prevalent diseases / month*** Malaria (2899) 
Respiratory diseases (1334) 
Malnutrition (351)  
Diarrhetic diseases (229) 
Dysentery (34) 
Water access (standard : 30 hh / water point) 89.3**** 
Primary school enrolment  84.2 
Secondary school enrolment 2042 students (8% of the 10-20 year age-group) 
Vulnerable Groups 
Child Heads of Household (No.) 
Child Soldiers (No.) 





*Based on Monographie de la Commune Muyinga (RoB, 2006e) 
**Based on a joint evaluation of MINAGRI (Ministry of Agriculture), FAO, WFP; UNICEF, and OCHA (RoB, 2006b)  
*** To a great extent dependent on the presence of health infrastructure 
****Gives a distorted view, because of major differences between rural areas and Muyinga city. 
 
Cumba colline is located on the rural road connecting Muyinga with Karuzi province, 
yet close to Muyinga city (approx. 10 km). Cumba possesses two rural centres, one with a 
small market on the road, and the other being the administrative centre of the Cumba 
zone, with a health centre (Centre de Santé). Cumba zone has both primary and secondary 
school facilities. Cumba colline is divided into three sous-collines: Cumba (near the zone 
centre), Rutamba (near the market), and Ryaruvuno (more isolated from the rural road). 
4.3.2 The conflict 
Compared to the other collines, a similar course of events took place on Cumba colline 
after the assassination of Ndadaye (1993). The Hutu population, led by local politicians, 
killed Tutsi. In turn, the Tutsi dominated army arrived and carried out retaliatory attacks. 
The effects were still visible at the time of research: the ruins of buildings around the 
market were still present after a heavy grenade attack in 1993. The zone office was still 
not reconstructed, and had almost no roof on top of the little building. The expected 
results were Tutsi regrouped into IDP camps (also near Muyinga city), and Hutu fleeing to 
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neighbouring Tanzania, with robbery, destruction of houses and looting of assets such as 
cattle and land by both sides.  
During 1996 and 1997, as on the other collines, fresh trials against Hutu involved in 
killings and looting sparked a second displacement of the Hutu population, joining those 
who fled to Tanzania in 1993. It was also during this period that the Sans Echecs were 
present. This Tutsi youth militia, active throughout the entire country, received back up 
from the national army, and under the pretext of judging participants of the 1993 events, 
carried out retaliatory actions. On 21 February 1997, for example, they attacked around 
ten households on Rutamba sous-colline with grenades, destroying the houses, looting 
several cows, injuring eight and killing three inhabitants with machetes. From 1999 
onwards, the situation calmed down, and relationships between the Hutu still present on 
the colline and Tutsi households from the nearby IDP camp improved. This improvement 
was marked in 2000 by joint nightly patrols to increase security. In 2001 and 2002 
droughts led to generalized food insecurity among the population and a rise in armed 
robberies, and conflicts with those profiteering from the situation to buy or confiscate 
assets because of unpaid debts. 
 
On the political level, Muyinga commune had a mixed Frodebu/Uprona outlook after 
the 1993 events. The function of administrateur changed from Frodebu to Uprona in 
2001, the chef de zone was Upronist until the elections of 2005, while the chef de colline 
was a Frodebu member and the chefs de sous-colline were both Frodebu (2) and Uprona 
(1). With the elections of 2005 seats in the conseil communal were distributed as follows: 
CNDD-FDD (17), Frodebu (6), Uprona (1), and Paribu (1). The administrateur was from 
CNDD-FDD, however as a Radjabu supporter he was replaced by another CNDD-FDD 
member. Both the chef de zone and chef de colline belonged to the CNDD-FDD, and the 
conseils collinaires and the chefs de sous-colline were divided between Frodebu, Uprona, 
and CNDD-FDD, with a majority held by CNDD-FDD.  
Interesting on the political level was the fact that the population of Cumba colline, 
although CNDD-FDD controlled most administrative positions, was not at all militant. 
Instead some people dissociated themselves from the party and mistrusted party members. 
One often quoted reason was the gap between the rural population and their 
administrateur, the latter living in the urban provincial centre, rarely visiting his 
commune, and as such, staying ‗invisible‘ for its constituency.  
The main reason, however, was the general mistrust and fear of the ruling CNDD-FDD 
party, after the killings of 31 civilians by the army and Service National de Renseignement 
(SNR). From July 2006 at least 31 ‗disappearances‘ have been reported by families in the 
communes of Buhinyuza, Muyinga (including Cumba colline) and Giteranyi in Muyinga 
province. In the months thereafter several bodies were found in rivers in Muyinga 
commune (HRW, 2006: 18):  
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ONUB human rights monitors dispatched to the scene found at least four bodies in 
the river near Nyoko, Muyinga commune, on August 25 and three more soon after. 
Human Rights Watch researchers saw bodies in the river near Mageni, Muyinga 
commune, on September 1. 
Later on, more bodies and body parts were found in other local rivers near and in the 
Ruvubu National Park. Although first denied by army and civil authorities, many 
witnesses approved the fact that these people had been arrested and detained at Mukoni 
military camp in Muyinga city, accused of alleged collaboration with FNL rebels, and 
later on eliminated by the military and SNR agents. At the time of field research, these 
accusations of collaboration with FNL rebels were still prevalent, with rebellious 
teachings taking place (OCHA Burundi, April 2007: 3), and illustrated with the alleged 
passing by of a battalion of FNL rebels near Cumba centre, some of them visiting their 
families, the army rapidly intervening to track them down (which they failed to do), and 
the administrateur visiting Cumba colline the next day to reaffirm the government‘s 
control over the situation.    
 
In addition to these events, Cumba colline has suffered from similar conflicts and 
tensions as the two other studied collines. Soon after the elections of 2005, tensions 
increased with CNDD-FDD intimidating members of other political parties to join 
CNDD-FDD. On several occasions external aid of NGOs caused conflicts, in particular 
between the local population and the newly returned repatriates from Tanzania, which had 
been privileged by local administration as these repatriates were a potential new 
constituency for the 2010 elections. Again, these conflicts were not ethnic, as both local 
population and repatriates were to a great extent Hutu. Closely linked to the return of 
refugees has been the increase of land conflicts between family members and neighbours. 
Food insecurity in turn increased levels of armed robbery and conflicts about assets (land, 
cattle) sold at low prices. Again, from 2009 onwards, political mobilization in the run up 
to the 2010 elections started, with CNDD-FDD rallying aggressively with the help of their 
youth groups and demobilized former soldiers.  
4.3.3 The CLC project 
All three NGOs (CIBA, LITA, CLC) used the Livelihood Security Initiative Consortium 
project to switch from a more humanitarian to a more long term development logic, by 
rolling out sustainable household livelihood strategies. However, CLC on Cumba colline 
most clearly translated this shift into a reduction of the distribution of material resources, 
and focusing almost solely on training and raising awareness among the local population. 





Broadly, the project on Cumba colline was divided into two main components, the first 
being the agricultural component. Central to the project was the encadreur de base, a local 
trainer paid by CLC but who lived within the local community. He closely followed the 
participant households in the project to create ‗lead farmers‘ which could serve as an 
example for their fellow community members. The encadreur de base trained these 
farmers in modern agricultural techniques: the construction and use of a compost bin, the 
integration of contour berms on their fields as a combination of anti-erosion measures and 
the production of pasture for the cattle, and so on. The ‗solidarity chain‘ was key: farmers 
who succeeded in all the measures above and who introduced modern small-scale 
agriculture in their community, received a goat as an integrated part of small-scale 
agriculture. 
Health issues were the second component of CLC‘s project. Different from the two 
other projects, CLC spent considerably more time and effort on health issues, such as 
nutrition, household hygiene and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, and sexual violence. For these 
activities the NGO passed via health agents of the provincial health department of 
Muyinga. The NGO provided additional training and encouragement bonuses. In turn, 
agents gave numerous training sessions on diverse health topics throughout the project 
target area.  
 
In sum, the Cumba project differs on some important points from the two other studied 
projects within the livelihood consortium. First, the CLC project was much less 
geographically centralized: the project worked on all collines of the commune, yet always 
with a smaller selection of the population. Whereas CIBA (Burara) to a great extent 
identified its target population according to technical criteria (e.g. farmers with plots in 
the wetland, technical possibility for water infrastructure) and LITA (Tangara) focused on 
social criteria (belonging to a group or association), CLC (Cumba) chose according to 
individual criteria of vulnerability, only working with the most vulnerable (e.g. the elder, 
the disabled, widows, orphans, people affected by HIV, etc.), yet on all collines. This 
choice presented a much more dispersed and less visible project. Second, in terms of 
objectives this was translated into a focus on individual change – in contrast with a more 
technical (Burara) and social (Tangara) focus – which went hand in hand with a household 
intervention strategy. This focused on changing individual behaviour and attitudes, while 
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Chapter 5  
Livelihoods, power and food insecurity: 
adaptation of social capital portfolios in 
protracted crises1 
Abstract. – The failure of food security and livelihood interventions to adapt to the 
conflict settings in which they operate remains a key gap in humanitarian response to 
protracted crises. To tackle this policy gap, the article proposes a social capital analysis. 
This adds a political economy angle on food security and conflict to the actor-based 
livelihood framework. A case study of three hillsides in northern Burundi offers an 
ethnographic basis for this hypothesis. While relying on a theoretical framework in which 
different combinations of social capital (bonding, bridging, linking) account for a diverse 
range of outcomes, the findings present empirical insights on how social capital portfolios 
adapt to a protracted crisis situation. It is argued that these social capital adaptations 
have the effect of changing policies, institutions, and processes (PIPs) on livelihoods, and 
clarify the impact of the distribution of power and powerlessness on food security issues. 
They represent a solid way of integrating political economy concerns into the livelihood 
framework. 




 In a restricted versison submitted to Disasters as Vervisch, T., Vlassenroot, K., & Braeckman, J. ‗Livelihoods, 




The failure of food security and livelihood interventions to properly understand the 
broader conflict environment in which they operate has been identified as a key gap in 
humanitarian responses to protracted crises (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2009; Lautze & Raven-
Roberts, 2006; Pingali et al., 2005; Russo et al., 2008). This implies that most 
interventions are unable to tackle the impact of the broader political economy of conflict 
on food security issues. There is therefore a consensus on the need to integrate a political 
economy perspective into the livelihood framework. Such a perspective highlights how 
the conflict environment affects the distribution of power and powerlessness in society, 
and how this in turn affects people's food security. Several attempts have been made to 
reconcile livelihood analysis and political economy (e.g. the case studies in Collinson, 
2003, or Le Billion, 2000). Yet concepts of political economy, such as the ‗structures of 
inequality‘ (Seddon & Adhikari, 2003) or ‗power‘ and ‗powerlessness‘ remain vague, 
difficult to apply in practice, and far removed from the actor perspective of the livelihood 
framework. 
This article examines the hypothesis that the analysis of social capital portfolios offers 
an opportunity to integrate a broader political economy perspective on food security and 
conflict into the actor-oriented livelihood framework. It is argued that social capital is a 
crucial mechanism through which livelihood assets are distributed, accessed and claimed. 
It comprises the concrete ‗social wires‘ through which the complex interaction between 
livelihood actors and broader policies, institutions, and processes (PIPs)2 crystallizes. Our 
findings present how the adaptation of social capital portfolios reflect the changing impact 
of the conflict environment on the livelihood options of the rural households. As such 
these changing social capital portfolios clarify the effect of the broader political economy 
of conflict on people's daily livelihood choices. They present a concrete entry point to 
integrate political economy concerns into the livelihood framework. 




 Policies might include the policies of governments (e.g. land tenure) , rebel groups (e.g. taxation) and 
international agencies (e.g. international humanitarian law); institutions refer to both formal (e.g. public services 
such as health services, markets or banks)  and informal (e.g. traditional authorities) customs, rules, and norms 
which constitute the ‗rules of the game‘ in societies; processes deal for example with the dynamics of political 




5.2 Research method and context 
This ethnographic analysis is based on 10 months of extensive fieldwork on three collines 
(hillside, administrative unit) – Burara, Tangara, and Cumba – in the north of Burundi 
during 2006 and 2007. The article is part of broader PhD research on the interaction 
between external (NGO) interventions, social capital, and post-conflict settings in 
Burundi. The case study collines were therefore selected using NGOs as the independent 
variable (to select three ‗typical cases‘, Patton, 2002: 236), while keeping the context 
constant. In the scope of this article, this variable is of less importance than the context for 
three reasons: (i) the focus is on the interaction between social capital and the context of 
protracted crises, and all three collines were selected because of a similar crisis profile (in 
particular with regard to food security)3; (ii) the effect of external interventions does not 
present a bias, since external interventions in many protracted crises become a structural 
component of the crisis context (this was confirmed in Burundi: it would be difficult to 
find collines that were not targeted by external agencies); and (iii) this article does not 
claim to be representative for Burundi, but seeks ethnographic evidence to substantiate or 
disprove a theoretical hypothesis.  
The aim of the field research was to examine if there was an ethnographic base that 
supported the hypothesis that the analysis of social capital portfolios can help integrate a 
political economy perspective on food security and conflict into the livelihood framework. 
To achieve this goal we had to demonstrate that changes in social capital portfolios indeed 
reflected the effect of the broader changes in the political economy of conflict on food 
security and livelihood options of households. The central objective of the ethnographic 
case study research was therefore to examine and describe if and how the broader conflict 
environment changed the social capital portfolios of the households, and how this affected 
their livelihood strategies.  
Focus group discussions were selected to collect our data. Critical was the use of the 
resource exchange matrix, adopted from Kuehnast and Dudwick (2004), tailored to the 
Burundian context. It enabled us to examine what kind of mutual help people 
gave/received through which kind of social networks and relationships. Because this 
matrix emphasizes interpersonal interactions, we conducted additional focus groups to 
probe into more associational forms of mutual help. We also relied on focus groups to 
assess more generally the impact of the crisis situation on the social fabric of the 
communities. For all three kinds of focus groups the theoretical concepts of redundancy 




 All three collines were situated in the northern region of Burundi, which has been characterized by the 
combination of the long term effects of civil war and recurrent natural hazards (in particular drought). 
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and theoretical saturation were used to determine the number of focus groups (Krueger & 
Casey, 2001). As a result, for each kind of focus group an average of three to four were 
conducted on each hillside. Between 6 to 10 people on average participated in the focus 
groups, which conforms to the rule of thumb (Patton, 2002: 385). The dynamic of focus 
groups automatically creates a process of ‗indefinite triangulation‘ (Morgan, 1993: 24), in 
which statements and opinions are modified by the group. In sum, the different focus 
groups gave us a general view on the impact of the protracted crisis on the mutual help 
networks.4 In addition, interviews with key local actors were used to verify and clarify the 
focus group findings, and to access information which could not be accessed through 
focus group discussions (e.g. elite views, or information about particular individuals, price 
information, etc). 
During these focus group discussions it was difficult to discuss the effect of the 
protracted crisis situation on the available mutual help within a well-defined period. Most 
focus groups were conducted during the first half of 2007, so we invited people to discuss 
the different types and activities of mutual help on their collines during the year before. 
But mostly the discussion quickly evolved towards a broader time perspective, and 
participants referred to the impact of la crise in general on mutual help. In most cases, this 
was a reference to the civil war which started in 1993, yet in other cases they made 
reference to la famine from 2000 onwards, when several successive seasons were 
unsuccesful because of continuing drought in the north of Burundi.  Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the crisis situation was adapted towards the local contexts on each of the 
three collines: different patterns of insecurity and violence, refugee flows, political 
evolutions, climatological circumstances, and so on resulted in different reference points 
within the history of each colline (see Chapter 4). For example, the return of large groups 
of refugees or IDPs, which fled the civil war in the nineties, or simply people who had 
fled because of food insecurity in more recent years, fuelled social tensions on all three 
collines (increasing land conflicts, cases of theft, familial conflicts, …), but the exact 
moment this happened of course differed on each colline. This difficulty to limit the crisis 
situation to a clear-cut time period, and the adaptation to diverse local settings illustrates 
the protracted and multi-causal nature of the Burundian crisis (see further).  
Nevertheless, a constant during all group discussions was the focus on food insecurity 
as the most important effect of the crisis, which was translated into longer and more 
severe periods of soudure. These are the periods between two harvests that a farmer and 
his family needs to bridge without own food reserves. In Burundi these periods of soudure 




 However, a limitation of working through focus groups was the inability to differentiate more clearly between 
different sub-groups within the community (e.g. how was mutual help between the elite or between the most 
severely destituted people affected by the crisis?). Although sporadic comments indicated some ideas on these 
topics, this was not systematically researched. 
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start from March/April (season B), and from September/November (season A). In 
addition, farmers saw a direct and seasonal returning link between climatological 
circumstances (in particular the delay of rains), a failed harvest, and the extension of the 
period of soudure. Therefore, discussions about ‗la crise‘ focused more on natural hazards 
than on indicators related to the civil war.5  Thus, when de population discussed the 
impact of the crisis on the effectiveness of mutual help on their collines, they particularly 
refered to the food insecurity situation, and more concretely, to the recurring periods of 
soudure.  
 
5.3 Protracted crises, food security, livelihoods and social 
capital 
Flores et al. (2005: 525) define a protracted crisis as a ‗situation in which large sections of 
the population face acute threats to life and livelihoods over an extended period (years or 
even decades), with the state and other governance institutions failing to provide adequate 
levels of protection or support‘. The term was introduced to highlight the protracted nature 
of situations, which were previously referred to as ‗complex (political) emergencies‘; in 
recent years, it has also been linked to concepts of ‗fragile‘ or ‗failed states‘ (Russo et al., 
2008). Providing these concepts with clear-cut definitions remains problematic, but they 
provide a useful, shorthand expression for a range of humanitarian crises, characterized by 
their (i) political, (ii) multi-causal (in contrast with mono-causal natural disasters), (iii) 
violent and (iv) protracted nature (Duffield, 2001; Goodhand & Hulme, 1999; Schafer, 
2002).  
Food insecurity is one of the main characteristics of such protracted crises (Russo et 
al., 2008). Three paradigms have set the debate on food insecurity (Devreux, 2000). 
Demographers (neo-Malthusian or demographic theory) explain food insecurity as a direct 
effect of food shortages caused by climatic change or demographic pressure; economists 
(entitlement theory, see Sen, 1981) focus on the demand side and define food insecurity as 
people's inability to access food because of their poverty situation (‗entitlement failure‘); 
political scientists and human rights activists (e.g. De Waal, 1997) view food insecurity as 




 Uvin (2009: 82) confirms climate change as an important indicator explaining deterioration in people‘s life for 
other regions in Burundi. Indicators that were related more directly to civil war and which were often mentioned: 
the depletion of livestock (because of looting and distress sales), migration (and the loss of properties as a 
consequence), deforestation (resulting in increasing soil erosion), and asset depletion in general.  
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a ‗failure of political accountability‘, caused by the victims' political (instead of 
economic) powerlessness.6 The rise of this third ‗political‘ paradigm is linked to the 
emergence of protracted crises in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa since the 1980s, 
although war and repressive policies have always played a significant role during famines 
(Devreux, 2000). In those situations, food insecurity could no longer be explained by 
referring to poverty statistics or a bad climate, as all these crises were to a certain extent 
political famines, caused by conflict, insecurity, and government policies.   
Currently, livelihood interventions have become popular instruments to deal with food 
insecurity in such protracted crises situations (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2009; Russo et al., 
2008). Most of these livelihood frameworks and interventions are based on Sen‘s 
conception of food insecurity as an entitlement collapse: livelihood assets and strategies, 
and access to both, are the necessary building blocks which affect the entitlements of 
individuals or households to attain food security (Ellis, 2000; Maxwell et al., 2008). Such 
an actor perspective was welcomed because it valued the resilience of people as ‗active 
agents‘ capable of coping with crisis situations. On the other hand, livelihood 
interventions have been criticized because they fail to integrate issues of power (de Haan 
& Zoomers, 2005), and in the case of protracted crises, the effects of the broader conflict 
environment (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2009). In other words, to date, livelihood frameworks 
still need to incorporate the concerns of the ‗political paradigm‘ on food security. Some 
analysts therefore broaden their theoretical models to link livelihood opportunities to the 
broader political economy, thus counterbalancing the actor perspective and emphasizing 
the structural embeddedness of livelihoods (Collinson, 2003; Lautze & Raven-Roberts, 
2006; Seddon & Adhikari, 2003; Vlassenroot, Ntububa & Raeymaekers, 2006; 
Vlassenroot, 2008). In most of these frameworks the central element is how policies, 
institutions and processes – PIPs – of the wider political economy mediate people‘s access 
to resources, needed to secure their livelihood strategies and attain food security. The 
failure to understand this mediation process has been identified as a key gap in 
humanitarian responses (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2009). 
Our assumption is that social capital plays a crucial role in this mediation process. 
Social capital is a basic ‗building block‘ for the adoption and adaptation of livelihood 
strategies. First, social capital is an important asset in itself: it refers to the claims a person 




 The difference between paradigm two and three is not always very clear. Devereux starts from a disciplinary 
difference: entitlement theory mainly has an economic background, and as such focuses more on the relationship 
between people and markets, is grounded in positivist economics, and defines famine as a ‗economic disaster‘ 
caused by the ‗economic‘ powerlessness of individual persons. Instead, according to Devereux, those who view 
famine primarily as a political phenomenon, focus on ‗political‘(lobbying power) instead of ‗economic‘ 
(purchasing power) powerlessness, and as such extent the culpability of famine beyond its victims, towards 
political structures and institutions. However, Sen, for example, has tried to integrate these political dimensions 
of famine in his earlier more economist analysis. (See Devreux 2000: 18–23). 
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or household can draw by virtue of belonging to a social network, which may comprise 
ascriptive or elective personal or family networks, horizontal associative networks, or 
vertical authority relationships with patrons, chiefs, politicians, etc. (Ellis, 2000). Second, 
and critically, social capital facilitates or constrains access to other assets or resources, 
since the depletion, diversification, extension or maintenance of a household's asset 
portfolio are necessarily mediated by social relationships (Bebbington, 1999). Broader 
policies (e.g. land tenure), institutions (e.g. markets, informal credit saving groups), and 
processes (e.g. social marginalization, environmental degradation), mediate this access to 
livelihood assets and their use in livelihood strategies (Ellis, 2000). A household's social 
capital stock demonstrates how it is linked to these broader mediating processes or PIPs. 
In sum, social capital finds itself at the centre of the livelihood framework, as it comprises 
the social ‗wires‘ connecting livelihood actors and broader political economy processes. 
Bebbington (1999: 2023) notes: 
Indeed access to other actors is conceptually prior to access to material resources in 
the determination of livelihood strategies, for such relationships become almost sine 
qua non mechanisms through which resources are distributed and claimed, and 
through which the broader social, political and market logics governing the control, 
use and transformation of resources are either reproduced or changed. 
Therefore in protracted crisis situations where social, political and market logics are 
unpredictable and volatile, social capital is key to helping or hindering people‘s abilities to 
react to such crises.  
5.4 The poor and their social capital portfolios 
Based on network theory, the distinction between bonding, bridging and linking social 
capital has brought the analysis of social capital a step further, by presenting the argument 
that different combinations of these dimensions are responsible for a wide range of 
outcomes (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Bonding social capital refers to dense and strong 
social networks with family, friends and close others (intra-community ties); bridging 
social capital refers to weaker, dispersed social ties with people not belonging to the inner 
circle (extra-community ties).7 Linking social capital is therefore a sub-type of bridging 




 The equation of bonding with intra-community and bridging with extra-community ties in Woolcock (1998) 
and Woolcock and Narayan (2000) is confusing. Part of the confusion is due to the dual interpretation of 
‗community‘, both as a geographical and identity boundary. When Woolcock (1998) describes the intra-
community social networks of first-generation immigrant communities, or when he refers to the ethnic 
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capital, as it refers to vertical relations which cut across explicit power differentials (e.g. 
vertical authority relationships with patrons, chiefs, politicians) (Szreter & Woolcock, 
2004). These networks can also be functionally differentiated. Bonding social capital 
performs a ‗social support‘ function, used to ‗get by‘; while bridging/linking social capital 
performs a ‗social leverage‘ function used to ‗get ahead‘ (Briggs, 1998). Bonding 
networks with people ‗like me‘, will give me access to redundant resources, since similar 
people have similar resources (homophily); instead, bridging/linking networks with 
people ‗unlike me‘, will give me access to non-redundant and more strategic resources not 
available in my own bonding social network (heterophily) (Lin, 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
entrepreneurship literature, community refers to an identity boundary, in this case an ethnic one. When 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) discuss the intra-community ties between women of a village saving group, they 
refer to the village as a geographical-administrative boundary. The example further illustrates that ‗community‘ 
is also used to refer to particular homogeneous interest groups (the saving group). In many cases, geographical 
and identity boundaries can overlap: e.g. most of one‘s ethnic group live nearby. However, this is not necessarily 
the case. For example, ties with a family member which migrated to the city have both an intra-community 
(sharing identity) as an extra-community (linking people in different regions) character. In addition, within the 
same village not so dense extra-community ties can exist: between neighbours of different ethnic identities, 
between the poor and the rich. Both geographical-adminstrative and identity boundaries are not so easy to define, 
and are shifting, overlapping and dynamic. Therefore, instead of linking bonding and bridging ties unilaterally to 
intra –or extra community ties, it is better they are viewed as (i) contextual and dynamic concepts, in order to 
recognize the multiple, overlapping and shifting realities in which people connect to each other, and (ii) with 
reference to the possible and shifting functions they can perform (integration/closure or linkage/brokerage). (See 
chapter 1).  
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Figure 5 – the poor’s social capital portfolios (standard hypothesis) 
ego
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This multi-dimensional analysis has produced a ‗standard hypothesis‘ on the 
composition of the social capital portfolios of the poor, to better understand social capital 
as an (un)productive asset in the lives of the poor (Figure 5). This hypothesis is based on 
three interrelated assumptions. The first assumption is that poor people rely extensively on 
their bonding network, yet these support networks mainly have protection and risk-
management functions (e.g. World Bank, 2000: 128). In the livelihood framework of 
DFID, for example, these support networks are identified as the ‗resource of last resort‘: 
they provide a buffer against shocks, function as an informal safety net, and compensate 
for a lack of other assets (DFID, 1999).  The second assumption is that their vulnerability 
hinders the poor from accessing more cross-cutting bridging ties, which are necessary to 
‗get ahead‘.  Barr (1998) makes this clear when he refers to the ‗solidarity networks‘ and 
‗innovation networks‘ of respectively poor and non-poor entrepreneurs in Ghana. Thus, 
whereas non-poor have more extensive and leveraged networks and play ‗offense‘, the 
poor‘s networks mostly play ‗defense‘ (Woolcock &  Narayan, 2000). The third 
assumption is that the poor are deprived of linking social capital with those in authority 
(chiefs, administration officials, social workers, politicians). This highlights the vertical 
dimension of poverty: their poverty situation creates information and power barriers that 
hinder access to these individuals and institutions. Woolcock (2002: 26-27) presents a 
good summary of the ‗standard hypothesis‘ which results from these three assumptions on 
the composition of the poor‘s social capital portfolios:  
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These distinctions have particular significance for understanding the plight of the 
poor, who typically have a close-knit and intensive stock of bonding social capital 
that they leverage to ―get by‖ […], a modest endowment of the more diffuse and 
extensive bridging social capital typically deployed by the non-poor to ―get ahead‖ 
[…], and almost no linking social capital enabling them to gain sustained access to 
formal institutions such as banks, insurance agencies, and the courts […]. 
We start from this theoretical framework to describe the social capital portfolios of 
rural Burundian households. The main aim of the case study field research was then to 
examine if and how the context of a protracted crisis influenced the composition of these 
social capital portfolios. But let us first introduce the Burundian context.  
5.5 Burundi and its protracted crisis 
Burundi is slowly emerging from a civil war that lasted more than 10 years.8 After three 
decades (1960s–90s) of authoritarian and military rule by the ethnic Tutsi minority, the 
first democratically elected Hutu president was murdered soon after his appointment in 
1993. In the civil war that followed, ethnic strife wrecked Burundian society, 
approximately 300,000 people lost their lives (Lemarchand, 2009), and recent statistics 
indicate that 52 per cent of the total population has fled their homes at least once since 
1993 (Uvin, 2009: 29). Currently, after a transition period leading to the 2005 elections, 
Burundi finds itself in a ‗no war, no peace‘ situation, although relative peace has returned 
to the country.9 The effects of this protracted crisis persist and will take many years to 
overcome. 
Conflict has multiple devastating effects on people's daily livelihoods: in a protracted 
conflict environment livelihood strategies become limited, asset bases are depleted, and an 
institutional breakdown results in dysfunctional social services, markets and state 
institutions (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2009). Burundi was no exception. For over 10 years, 
civil war nullified the security of people and goods as a minimum condition for allowing 
Burundians to work. Insecurity led to restricted mobility, preventing the population from 
working their fields, migrating in search for labour, or trading their agricultural products 
and other goods. For many, their livelihood strategies became limited to subsistence. 




 On the history of conflict in Burundi, see e.g. Daley (2006b), Lemarchand (2009), Reyntjens (2000), and Uvin 
(2009). 
9
 Only on the 22 of April 2009, the last rebel movement, the Front National de Libération (FNL), transformed 
itself into a political party after signing and implementing a cease-fire agreement. In addition, in the run up to the 
elections of 2010 political tensions are increasing again. 
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There has been widespread plundering, destruction and theft of assets by government and 
rebel forces (Human Rights Watch, 1998). In particular, the looting of livestock disrupted 
the mixed farming system: a national survey in 1997 showed losses of 32 and 46 per cent, 
respectively, for large and small stock (Koyo, 2004). In addition, the asset base has been 
further depleted by distress sales. Another crucial effect of the civil war has been forced 
migration, resulting in massive illegal appropriation, occupation, and sale of land. Even 
today, many refugees and IDPs are returning to their hills, finding their land sold or 
occupied by family members or community members (e.g. ICG, 2003b; Kamungi et al., 
2005). On the institutional level, ‗government institutions have been instruments of 
violent oppression, unequal distribution of investments, and unfair regulators of markets‘ 
(Baghdadli et al., 2008: 3). Conflict resulted in long-term under-investment of human 
(education), natural (sustainable development), and physical (infrastructure) capital, state 
action was characterized by predation and corruption, and the private sector focused on 
shallow commercial and business networks to the extent of investing in production 
capacity. In addition to this multiplicity of conflict factors, the effects of civil war were 
combined with recurring natural hazards such as droughts, floods, and crop diseases (in 
particular, the mosaic virus has seriously depleted production of cassava) (Levine & 
Chastre, 2004; WFP, 2004, 2008). 
To date, this has resulted in a generalized and protracted situation of food insecurity. 
Between 1991 and 2002 the number of undernourished people in sub-Saharan Africa 
increased by 37 million, an increase largely due to five warn-torn countries, including 
Burundi (FAO, 2006). From the early 1990s and 2000, during civil war, the number of 
undernourished people in Burundi increased from 2.7 to 4.5 million. In the period 2003-
2005, 63% of the total population was undernourished (FAO, 2008). In 2005, for example, 
the WFP distributed food aid to 1.8 million Burundians, or 25 per cent of the population 
(Baghdadli et al., 2008: 3). There are many confusing statistics about ‗food insecurity‘, 
but the voices of Burundi are clear: for them the inability to feed their families has been 
the single most important symptom of their poverty due to the crisis (RoB, 2006a).  
Next to conflict and natural hazard factors, other elements have caused food insecurity 
(e.g. Levine & Chastre, 2004; WFP, 2008). The most important has been access to land. 
Due to high population pressure, the inheritance system, and deregulated land markets, 
Burundian hills are literally transformed into a patchwork of continuously diminishing 
familial land holdings. A recent survey indicates that 42.1% of households own a plot of 
0.25 ha or less, which is well below subsistence level (WFP, 2008). Consequently, a 
majority of households depend on the market for food. These markets, however, constitute 
a serious constraint to food insecurity. On the one hand, access to these markets is 
restricted to few traders, and many farmers need to use middlemen, receiving low farmer-
gate prices for their agricultural production. On the other hand, households that depend on 
the market for food are vulnerable to volatile price-fixing and sometimes exorbitant 
increases in food prices. In contrast, when food shortages arise, the number of households 
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relying on the sale of labour increases substantially, resulting in a decrease in wages, even 
accepting food rations as compensation. As a consequence, many poor households rely on 
distress sales of assets and indebting themselves to cope with short term food shortages. 
Below we discuss how the social capital portfolios of the rural households on the three 
case study collines adapted to this protracted crisis situation.  
5.6 Social capital portfolios in a protracted crisis: ‘weak’ 
bonds, ‘absent’ bridges, and ‘unresponsive’ linkages 
5.6.1 ‘Beer friends’ : weak bonding social capital 
Traditionally, Burundian rural households are part of a horizontal social network, based 
on the institution of ukuterera, which means the gift-giving of food and beer during 
ceremonies, hence the people comprising these networks are known as abatererezi or 
‗beer friends‘ (Trouwborst, 1973: 111). The network is mainly based on solidarité par 
parenté (kinship solidarity) and solidarité residentielle (neighbourhood solidarity), as the 
core of the network is a relatively unchanging local group of relatives and neighbours 
(Badionona-Tshondo, 1993: 9; Trouwborst, 1973: 114). These networks possess a high 
degree of density and a high frequency of transactions (Trouwborst, 1973). People rely on 
these networks for the preparation of their land, the guarding of livestock, the construction 
of houses or helping the sick (Badionona-Tshondo, 1993: 9-10). These networks are 
generally used as a safety net. As such, they can be equated with bonding social capital, 
while performing a ‗social support‘ function. However, on the three studied collines, these 
bonding social networks degenerated into an unproductive asset in the hands of rural 
households.  
 
In line with the historical description of the abaterezi, people referred to mutual help 
between neighbours, close familymembers and friends (Trouwborst, 1973). Although the 
categories of neighbour, family, and friend did overlap within these networks  – one‘s 
neighbour was likely also one‘s family member or friend, and vice versa – the locality 
proved to be the fundamental reference point for these networks. Because households live 
scattered in their isolated homestead or rugo, and not in villages (Uvin, 2009: 69–70), 
spatial proximity is a crucial aspect of social life on the Burundian collines. Therefore, 
neighbours are crucial because of their proximity: they are the first to intervene when a 
household has a problem. A frequent example which returned during discussions was 
theft. When a household is robbed, close neighbours are the first to intervene: to catch the 
thief, to alert local authorities or the police, and to act as a witness. Another recurring 
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example was illness: neighbours are expected to go and inform family or friends, and have 
the moral duty to help with transporting the sick person to the health centre or hospital. 
Because of this proximity neighbours are ‗condemned‘ to each other, since there is no 
other option than to fall back on each other in many daily situations. Maintaining good 
relationships with close neighbours is therefore crucial, but as will become clear, not 
always easy under certain circumstances (see further).  
 
As assumed by network theory, these networks facilitated access to redundant 
resources, as similar people possess similar resources. During focus groups, people 
described how they relied on these networks for food and non-food transactions, and what 
can be called physical help transactions (offering physical labour). In the case of the latter, 
people referred to helping each other with the collection of firewood or water, support 
with construction works (e.g. repairing the roof or walls after heavy rains, the construction 
of a new house, etc.), and helping the sick (transporting the sick person to the nearest 
health centre or the hospital).10 For non-food items people gave the examples of soap or 
lending out a sleeping mat, kitchenware or farming equipment, in addition to small 
amounts of cash and credit. For food items people gave the examples of ‗a plate of beans‘, 
sweet potatoes, colcase or manioc, salt or cooking oil. Given the protracted food insecure 
situation, the search for food  (or cash to access food items) through these social networks 
stood central in most of the discussions. During a focus group in Tangara a man putted it 
this way: ‗During famine11 everybody has little bags in his pocket. If you meet somebody 
who can give you a plate of beans, then you already have a bag to keep it. Famine is the 
time of the little bags‘ (focus group, 01/06/07, Tangara).  
The above described transactions were not exceptional, and happened frequently. Of 
course, the frequency differed for each transaction and according to specific 
circumstances, but lending some farming equipment, receiving a food ration or a small 
amount of cash, or helping to collect firewood were all part of normal social life. People 
expressed that many of these transactions were part of daily routine, and as such, were 
considered as self-evident social and moral duties: children contributed to better 
relationships with neighbours through collecting firewood or water, women exchanged 
kitchenware, men helped each other with construction works, the neighbourhood 




 In comparison with the historical account of the abaterezi networks, one particular transaction – helping with 
the preparation of the land – was not so often mentioned. This was because in many cases, it was more in 
particular limited to the members of the own household and the family. However, another important reason, as 
will be explained further, is that the supply of labour in the fields was increasingly offered through the local 
labour market (see section on abakozi). 
11
 The people used the word la famine (famine) to phrase their situation because food insecurity was indeed their 




supported the most destitute among them with food rations and small gifts of cash (mostly 
not more than 100 Fbu, 1$ at that time was approximately 1000 Fbu). Credit transactions 
(of cash, but also of seeds), on the other hand, were mainly a matter for men, and were 
more in particular bound to the rules and norms related to the relationship of pfampfe. 
Pfampfe is the word that many people use to identify a close or ‗real‘ friend. In most cases 
it has two related meanings: it is someone with whom you can share your secrets, and it is 
someone on which you can rely for material or financial help; both functions refer to 
Wolf‘s (1966: 10) distinction between expressive or emotional (sharing secrets) and 
instrumental (help) friendship. A credit is a perfect example of a transaction which takes 
place between such ‗close‘ friends: it concerns financial help and it is considered as a 
secret between friends (if not, it would be publicly known that a man is not able to 
maintain his family, which would affect his status in the community). The transaction 
which was generally identified as the most clear moral obligation within the community 
was helping to transport the sick. Whereas helping each other with a plate of beans, soap 
or firewood was perceived as socially desirable but not obligatory, refusing to help a 
family with a sick person was strongly disapproved within the community, and 
sanctioned. As a focus group participant in Burara (16/04/07) comments:  
If we do not help the sick person, we can be punished by the nyumbakumi [chief of 
ten households living near to each other]. It is an obligation. If you refuse you can 
be excluded from society.12  
The diversity and quantity of resources accessible through these social networks was 
however restricted. The protracted crisis produced rather ‗covariate‘ instead of 
‗idiosyncratic‘ risks13: the combination of structural factors (population pressure, land 
tenure, soil degradation, …), the long-term effects of civil war (migration, asset depletion, 
…), and recurrent natural hazards (in this region: drought and the mosaic virus) affected 
entire communities and not individual households. Because of this mix of factors the 
population in the north of Burundi has known yearly recurring periods of increased food 
insecurity since the nineties. This was an irregular evolution, with peaks (e.g. the year 
2000, caused by drought which followed repeated poor rains from 1997 to 2000) and 
more moderate years, and with geographic discrepancies within the northern region 
(Levine and Chastre, 2004: 4). Since then, the periods of soudure, when households need 




 However, this obligation did not apply to everyone in the same way: richer people could not be easily forced 
to take action by local authorities like the nyumbakumi, but they often sent a groom or one of their workers to 
help with the transport. 
13
 ‗Covariate risks‘ are aggregate, economy wide-risks which affect entire communties or regions. Examples are 
drought, civil war, floods, etc. ‗Idiosyncratic risks‘ are indivdual risks which only affect the own household. 
Examples are illness or theft. (Dercon 2000: 142-143). 
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to cope with food shortages between two successive harvests, have become longer, more 
severe, and a structural risk for livelihood strategies. As the majority of households is 
affected by these covariate risks, the resources accessible throughout their social networks 
dry up.  
For food transactions, in many cases only sweet potatoes were still accessible through 
these social networks. Together with manioc, sweet potatoes is considered one of the 
cultures de soudure (Bundervoet, 2007: 17) on which Burundian households rely in the 
period between two harvests (since manioc was affected by the mosaic virus, for many 
sweet potatoes was the only option left). There was still a sufficient supply, and sweet 
potatoes had a low economic value (low price on local markets) which means that 
speculation for this crop was absent. To the contrary, beans, for example, were only 
sporadically exchanged and in very small amounts because they were in short supply and 
had a high market value (and therefore provoked speculation). Although this was an 
observation made on all three collines,  the difference between sweet potatoes and beans 
was most clear on Cumba colline, where people labeled beans as intabonwa or ‗invisible‘:  
The sweet potatoes, we gave for free, but for the other seeds we could not give. 
Seeds of beans, for example, were ‗invisible‘. (focus group, 23/05/07, Cumba)  
 
For seeds of beans, it did not happen once in 2006. With the famine nobody has 
given that for free. But we have given and we have received sweet potatoes. Even if 
there was not much of it, the people have helped each other. Even a poor can give 
sweet potatoes to us, and we can give to our patron or to richer people. (focus group, 
14/05/07, Cumba)  
Also the amounts of cash accessed through these networks decreased. First of all, cash 
credits became rare, and were replaced by seed credits if possible, because ‗we had not so 
much seeds, but even less money.‘ (focus group, 16/04/07, Burara). And if a cash credit 
was given, the amount of money was substantially reduced. During focus groups, most 
examples of credits given within these networks went from 2000 Fbu to 5000 Fbu, 
sometimes up to 10.000 Fbu. Yet, people indicated that this became impossible for many 
in the last years, and that it was difficult to even acces a credit of 500 or 1000 Fbu within 
your own family. It reflects the subsistence economy which is prevalent and the low rate 
of monetization of the rural areas, a major drawback for any strategy to rebuild the rural 
economy of Burundi (WFP 2008, Baghdadli et al., 2008; RoB, 2006a). As respectively a 
man and woman illustrated the inability to help one‘s own family members during a focus 
group in Cumba (23/05/07):  
Really, we cannot give money for free when there is famine, even to your brother 




One day my daughter came, but I could not give, I had no money. Even 50 Fbu we 
could not give for free. 
In fact, only the resources accessed through physical help transactions (collecting 
firewood, helping with construction works, fetching water, offering labour …) stayed 
redundant within these bonding networks. In many cases, people only had their physical 
force left to help others with, and only resources which were still redundant could be 
exchanged. As one person illustrated during a focus group (14/05/07, Cumba):  
‗Even in 2006, during drought, we helped a lot, because we can find firewood and 
water in the nature. There is always water and firewood, we don‘t have to go to the 
market to buy it.‘ (focus group, 14/05/07, Cumba).  
In particular, people tried to help specific vulnerable groups such as the elder, the 
disabled, widows and orphans, i.e. households with a shortage of labour. But although 
people tried to help each other and the more vulnerable within these bonding networks, 
during the periods of soudure, these physical help transactions also became 
instrumentalized to relationships with richer people within the community. People offered 
their force to execute some household work, in order to please richer neighbours, hoping 
for some compensation:  
The poor have to fetch water from the dwell or searching for wood many times, like 
this they hope to get a plate of food when they need it. They have to do it a lot, like 
this they have good relations with the neighbours. This is very important for the 
vulnerable. (focus group, 13/04/07, Burara). 
 
People can give water or search for firewood for somebody who is rich, to show that 
you want to help him when there is a problem. One day he can be of benefit for you, 
so we have to do it. (focus group, 23/05/07, Cumba). 
 
You search [water] for him, that‘s to show your goodwill, one day this can be of 
benefit for you, when the situation asks for help from a rich person. (focus group, 
01/06/07, Tangara). 
In sum, apart from resources accessed through these physical help transactions, more 
strategic resources to cope with food shortages during periods of soudure (in particular 
cash and food) dried up within these bonding networks. As such, these bonding ties could 
no longer perform their social support function to ‗get by‘ (Briggs, 1998) or to ‗play 
defense‘ (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) : households could not rely on their bonding ties to 
cope with their food insecurity situation.  
 
Within these bonding networks also a ‗contraction‘ of reciprocity (Swift, 1993) was 
observed during the periods of soudure. This was mainly the case for loans and credits. 
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The fact that the vast majority of households faced drought and bad harvests (i.e. 
‗covariate‘ risks) led to the problem ‗that scarce resources can leave expectations for 
reciprocity unmet‘ (Domínguez & Watkins, 2003: 114). In the case of credits or loans, 
people stopped reciprocating and broke rules of return by postponing or cancelling their 
part of the transaction. Men indicated that, if possible, they prefer to give a small amount 
of cash for free (as a gift) to a friend, because they are aware of the problems 
reimbursement can give. Yet, during periods of soudure such ‗free‘ solidarity (or general 
reciprocity) became rather exceptional, and in most cases reimbursement, although 
without interest, was agreed (balanced reciprocity). When the borrower could no longer 
reimburse, the ‗secret‘ between both friends (cf. pfampfe) was made public, and local 
authorities became involved, or the case was brought to court. From then on there is an 
open conflict, and the lender starts to ask interest and will try to maximize his profits 
(negative reciprocity). It illustrates how ‗general reciprocity‘ (‗gift‘) was narrowed down 
to ‗balanced reciprocity‘ (‗quasi-credit‘), with stricter rules of return, ultimately replaced 
by ‗negative reciprocity‘ (‗credit with interest‘) by which one partner tried to maximise 
utility at the other's expense (Swift, 1993: 10-12).14 Ultimately, this seriously deteriorated 
existing relationships of mutual help. As one man (focus group, 14/05/07, Cumba) 
expressed the situation:  
During famine a lot of people have asked a credit to a friend. […] We used it to 
search for food or seeds. But it has created conflicts. Before he was a friend, but if 
he cannot pay back, that friendship is finished. Also if I cannot pay back, I lose my 
friends, it is dangerous for the relations with friends.  
Another man expressed more clearly the secret character of the credit transation, and 
the failure to maintain this secrecy, during a focus group in Burara (16/04/07):  
You have cultivated your land, but with the bad climate, you didn't harvest 
anything. This can make an end to friendship. This was a lot the case in 2006, 
without a harvest there were a lot of conflicts between friends. The loan is always a 
secret between friends, but if you cannot reimburse, it is not a secret anymore, 
because he will make a complaint and the whole hill is aware of the conflict. 




 Swift (1993 : 10-11) defines the three categories of reciprocity as following : ‗generalised reciprocity : 
apparently altruistic transactions without any expectation of a return – typically gifts, hospitality, generosity; 
balanced reciprocity: direct exchanges in which there is an expectation of a return, without much delay, of 
something of equivalent value – typically direct barter; negative reciprocity: exchanges in which there is an 
attempt to get something for nothing or for very little; participants confront each other as opposed interests each 
trying to maximize utility at the others‘ expense.‘ 
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A last important observation was the fact that these bonding networks between ‗beer 
friends‘ were severely stressed by an overload of conflicts between family, friends and 
neighbours. Theft of crops, livestock or other valuable assets such as bicycles was 
widespread and cases peaked before the beginning of the new season, when food 
shortages were generalized. In Burara this even led to some serious violence: 
In the beginning of the famine, there was a lot of theft and a lot were killed or even 
burned, but the administration has sensitized and now we have to report them [to the 
police]. They were with so many that they were even brought to the prison of 
Kirundo [capital of the province]. (focus group, 26/04/07, Burara). 
A crucial aspect was that people were not robbed by strangers or organized gangs 
(although some existed, e.g. in Burara because of the nearby border crossing to Tanzania), 
but by their neighbours and close others. Food insecurity was the main cause of increasing 
theft, and most cases concerned theft of crops (in the fields) or harvests (at home). Even 
brothers stole from each other, which created an atmosphere of mistrust among 
community members. As people commented the situation during focus groups:  
In most cases you are not robbed by someone who comes from far away, a 
neighbour or a friend is someone from near by. (focus group, 16/04/07, Burara).  
 
Neighbours rob neighbours, the men, the women, even the children. They were 
hungry, but from that time on the friendship is over, even in the family one can rob 
each other. (focus group, 31/05/07, Tangara)  
 
You have good relationships with your neighbours because they live near to you and 
you help each other, but with cases of theft the mutual help is over, the trust is gone. 
(focus group, 22/05/07, Cumba)  
 
Helping each other becomes difficult, even your brother can steel from you, or one 
of your neighbours. If there are many cases of theft, how can you help people who 
are maybe thieves? (focus group, 30/04/07, Burara). 
Land conflicts posed the next serious threat to harmonious community life on the three 
collines. Many families were divided because of sometimes violent land conflicts, related 
to inheritance or illegal sale of family land. Nationwide, land pressure (related to a high 
population density in a country where more than 90% of the population is dependent upon 
agriculture) causes a serious backdrop in familial relationships. Currently, the average 
land holding of a Burundian household is around 0,5 hectare, which in many cases is 
insufficient to feed one‘s family (Kamunigi et al., 2005). These small landholdings are 
again divided among the sons of the family when their father dies, and this generation 
after generation. As such, as in the past, the inheritance system will further intensify the 
crumbling of familial land holdings in Burundi. As alternative livelihoods outside of 
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agriculture are hardly an option in Burundi, the competition for land is high, also and 
especially within Burundian families. In addition, the large flows of refugees and IDPs, 
caused by the civil war and its humanitarian aftermath, only increases this ‗land time-
bomb‘ (ICG, 2003b), since numerous returnees (both IDPs and refugees) have been 
confronted by properties occupied by family members or neighbours, putting further stress 
on key bonding networks.  
 
In sum, the instrumentality of the described bonding networks was minimal on the 
three collines. Strategic resources to cope with food insecurity were not accessible 
through these networks, and the social networks were sometimes stressed because of an 
overload of conflicts. With regard to the causes why solidarity and mutual help within 
these networks stagnated or decreased, two main lines of reasoning could be 
differentiated. On the one hand, people sometimes referred in general to la crise (the civil 
war) which destroyed basic levels of trust, tore many families apart, installed a culture of 
impunity (resulting in high levels of criminality), and further impoverished the different 
communities. In general, decreasing levels of mutual help was one of the concrete effects 
of how social life had been complicated by civil war.15 When discussing solidarity and 
mutual help with local authorities, for example, the phrase c‘est chacun pour soi (it‘s 
everyone for himself) kept returning. On the other hand, however, in the majority of cases, 
people referred to la famine, and more concretely, to the bad climate, drought and the 
recurring periods of soudure, to explain the fall back of solidarity and mutual help within 
their social networks. As described above, the regression of mutual help was explicitly 
linked to these periods of soudure, during which bonding networks became even more 
stressed because of conflicts and the inability to perform their social support function. For 
many then, economic impoverishment, and not the social divisions caused by civil war, 
was the primary reason why people could no longer help each other as before.16 Or as one 
individual summarized:  
People don‘t really like to help each other. It is because of the famine. We have no 
power to look at the others. Because of the bad climate, we don‘t have rain 
anymore, and we suffered from the famine, and also solidarity has suffered. That‘s 
it, together with the crisis which destroyed a lot of trust. (focus group, 21/05/07, 
Cumba).  
 




 Uvin eplicitly compares mutual help before and after civil war and comes to the same conclusion (see Uvin, 
2009: 112-116).   
16
 A conclusion confirmed by Uvin in other parts of Burundi, see Uvin 2009: 112-116. 
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5.6.2 Associations : ‘absent’ bridging social capital 
The second assumption of the ‗standard hypothesis‘ on social capital portfolios – i.e. that 
poor people have difficulties to create bridging ties to access the leverage they need to 
make progress – was confirmed (Woolcock, 2002). The most natural way to create such 
bridging social capital in rural areas is to unify and cooperate on the basis of professional 
activities, in other words, to structure the peasantry. Through associations and producer-
groups people are organized horizontally – as in their bonding networks – yet are 
connected to a much broader and diversified group of people, which present more 
opportunities for social leverage.  
No high stocks of this associative form of social capital were observed on the three 
collines. However, this was primarily explained by a cultural/historical instead of an 
economic explanation. It reflected the absence of an associational tradition in Burundi. As 
already mentioned, social organization beyond the family has been minimal in Burundi, as 
Burundians live scattered on hills and not in villages. So there is no tradition of village 
associations, age groups or secret societies, and mutual support has been limited to the 
family (Uvin, 2009: 69-70). Closely related is the tradition of a more 
individualistic/capitalistic ethos, where individual initiative is encouraged and personal 
merit admired and developed (Uvin, 2009: 116-122).  These factors, together with the 
hegemonic character of the state order, prevented the nurturing of autonomous peasant 
unions or associations (Laely, 1997). Efforts to organize the peasantry were top-down, 
state-led and not welcome, as their aim was to control rather than support the rural 
masses.  
A recent study of Sebudandi and Nduwayo (2002) estimates that membership of 
associations or groupements in Burundi encompasses 3% to 5% of the total population. 
Although no data were available on community or colline level, focus groups and 
interviews confirmed these low levels of membership. Associations reached a very small 
proportion of the population and most were ineffective. To give just one example, in 
Muyinga province only 186 out of a total of 805 associations (23%) were perceived as 
operational and carried out activities (RoB, 2006g). People were also suspicious about 
associational ‗projects‘ because of bad experiences in the past. During fieldwork, people 
still referred to a nationwide state-led programme from the 1980s that sought to create 
cooperatives. This failed because of widespread mismanagement and corruption 
(Badionona-Tshondo, 1993). In sum, associations were not considered as an useful 
livelihood strategy to cope with food insecurity or vulnerability in general, which stands 
in sharp contrast with the popularity of associations with international aid agencies to 
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implement their programmes and projects in Burundi (see e.g. Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 
2002).17  
5.6.3 Patrons and clients : ‘unresponsive’ linking social capital  
Next to the ‗weak‘ bonding and ‗absent‘ bridging social capital, important stocks of 
linking social capital were observed. Critically, this linking social capital – i.e. vertical 
authority relationships with patrons, chiefs, politicians, etc. (Ellis, 2000) – played a much 
more decisive role in the livelihood strategies of the rural households than their bonding 
and bridging counterparts. This is not surprising, Burundian society has always been far 
more vertically than horizontally structured, as a tangle of kinship and clan ties, ethnic 
affiliations, and clientage ties defined the positioning of an individual in the social order 
(Lemarchand, 1995: 9-14). Historically, the institution of bugabire formalized the most 
common transactions between patron and clients: land and cows were exchanged for 
services (workforce), offerings in kind (e.g. harvest), and loyalty (Lermarchand, 1995). 
Because of their asymmetry, such patron-client ties possessed a double-edged character: 
they facilitated social mobility and protection, but also eased oppression and exploitation 
of the clients (serfdom). To date, patron-client networks still execute an important social 
function in Burundian society (e.g. Kamungi et al., 2005; Laely, 1997). 
The findings demonstrate how Burundian households were forced to rely more 
intensively on their vertical linking social capital to cope with the protracted crisis 
situation, and in particular, with food insecurity. However, this increased reliance 
ultimately strengthened the ‗unresponsive‘ character of their linking social capital. 
Whereas ‗responsive‘ linking social capital refers to a stable authority relationship, in 
which rights and duties on both sides are balanced, ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital 
refers to oppressive authority relationships, in which dependency results in subordination 
(cf. Putnam, 2004; Titeca & Vervisch, 2008). The functioning of this ‗unresponsive‘ 
linking social capital was manifest in three important coping strategies.  
First, ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital controlled access to markets for sale of 
agricultural production. For most cash crops, such as coffee and beans, a trapped system 
of intermediaries was present (cf. Oketch & Polzer, 2002 for a deeper analysis on coffee). 
Merchants from Kirundo or Muyinga city had an extended network of middlemen 
throughout the countryside, which in turn worked with local helpers. These helpers went 
from door to door to purchase individual harvests, or their homes served as local depots. 
Clearly, the farm-gate price was lower than the market price. For local farmers it was 




 This will be handled more in depth in chapter 8. 
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nearly impossible to bypass these local intermediaries as they had no direct personal ties 
with the merchants. Moreover, transportation costs to nearby markets could mount. As a 
consequence, on market days you could find the same middlemen along the roads to buy 
up products before they arrived at the markets, again at a lower price. In both cases, the 
fact that poor people had neither the financial (paying transportation) nor the social 
resources (direct ties with merchants) to access more interesting markets or more 
extensive trade networks was confirmed (Prakash, 2002). Instead, food insecurity only 
increased their dependency on middlemen, as many households had to mitigate immediate 
needs, which gave them even less bargaining power while negotiating the price. During a 
focus group in Cumba, a man put it this way: 
We sell sorgho and other harvests to people who work for the patron. The patrons 
give the money to these people. They [local helpers of the patron] look for the 
harvests and because they also have to make profit, the give a very low price. Later 
on we have to go the patron and buy against a high price. We need to sell our 
harvest immediately after harvesting because we need the money. If our harvest 
[food stock] is finished, then we go to the patron and we buy our own harvest back 
for 600 or 700 Fbu, the harvest that we sold for 150 or 200 Fbu. (focus group, 
23/05/07, Cumba) 
Second, ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital underpinned one of the main coping or 
adaptive strategies during food crises in Burundi, abakozi (Kirundi for workers) or daily 
labour: a farmer offers his workforce to a richer farmer (patron), who will pay him in cash 
or food, mostly on a daily basis. Unless necessary, Burundian farmers will not turn to this 
livelihood strategy. They prefer to work on their own land and be self-supporting. 
However, during food crises, when their own agricultural production does not cover food 
consumption, many are forced to search beyond cultivating the own land. In addition, a 
substantial part of the population (14.7%) is structurally dependent on daily labour/manual 
labour (WFP, 2008). These people are highly vulnerable to food insecurity, since they 
have limited access to land, have few assets, and depend on markets to access food. Thus, 
when food crises set in, an abundant supply of day labourers causes a sharp decline in 
prices. People reported cases whereby the price fell down from 500 Fbu to 100 Fbu per 
day (1 US$ = 1000 Fbu). Simultaneously, prices of all staple crops increase, and the ratio 
between wages and food prices fall out of balance. Increased food insecurity placed the 
day labourers in a subordinate position, yet further increased their dependency on day 
labour to cope with food shortages, and thus minimized their negotiation room. Because 
of this imbalance between labourer and patron, some referred back to the traditional 
institution of bugabire: the unfortunate one is not in need of land (bugabire), but in urgent 
need to feed his family (abakozi), which can lead to temporary exploitation whenever 
food shortages arise. As one man (focus group, 05/06/07, Tangara) expressed his feelings: 
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When there is no famine, then he [the patron] cannot pay whatever he wants, 
because you have your own harvest and if he doesn‘t pay, you give up. But if there 
is famine, then you have no choice, your family is starving and you have to accept.  
A third and final materialization of ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital was in the 
functioning of umugwazo, a form of usury common in several parts of Burundi. It is called 
umugwazo in Kirundo and Muyinga provinces, ubukonanyoni in Ngozi, gukungisha in the 
Imbo plain and imvyazu in Kayanza province (Hakisimana, 2004). The usurer is well 
informed about seasonal trends of different crops and the moments that rural households 
have to tide over periods of food shortages. At that time, they increase their profits by 
asking exorbitant interests. The time to repay is very short as the reimbursement is in 
kind. In practice, a person asks an amount of money from a local petty trader. The latter 
inspects the fields to be sure that the person will have a future harvest to repay, and they 
agree the proportion of the harvest that will serve as reimbursement. An earlier study has 
calculated that this mechanism results in a drop in prices equivalent to borrowing money 
at interest rates of up to 8,400% (Levine & Chastre, 2004). 
The practice of umugwazo made most visible the protracted character of the crisis. 
Umugwazo was not only used to access cash to buy food or other immediate needs, but 
was also relied upon to access seeds for the next season, the hospitalization of a family 
member, or other unexpected costs. And because of seasonal recurring food shortages and 
failed harvests people indebted themselves for several years. One man, for example, 
offered in 2006 his 50 coffee trees to a rich patron, which he could exploit until 2009. 
Another woman offered some of her banana trees in 1996 to one of her creditors. By 
2007, the creditor still exploited her banana trees, as she could not afford to pay back her 
debts. Yet, in many cases, it got worse when people were unable to reimburse umugwazo. 
People were put in jail and livestock or land were confiscated and sold. Food crises 
substantially increased the forced reliance of households on these ‗unresponsive‘ linkages, 
which in turn, strengthened a downward spiral of usury and indebtedness. This ultimately 
led to asset depletion, particularly through the sale of land. People were even ashamed to 
admit that they had sought umugwazo from a patron. Whenever discussing the topic 
during focus group discussions, people started to laugh, as they were surprised that an 
outsider knew this ‗big secret‘. As one person (focus group, 14/05/07, Cumba) answered 
the question after a long discussion:   
Honestly, everyone has done umugwazo, we had no choice, but the people don‘t 
like to tell that, it is a shame and often it gives problems, but it‘s common here.  
However, the ‗unresponsive‘ character of these linkages should also be nuanced to a 
certain extent. First of all, from the viewpoint of the patron there are some serious risks 
involved when taking up the role of middleman, creditor, or employer. Take the example 
of Rachid, a local petty trader acting as a middleman to collect beans (but also coffee) in 
the area of Tangara. He purchases and stores beans immediately after harvest time from 
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individual farmers until he has a considerable amount to resell. Indeed, when interviewing 
him at home, people dropped by several times to sell a small amount of beans. But he also 
hired local helpers to collect the harvest in the surrounding collines. When riding through 
the area, these people could be spotted with their balance hanging on a tree.  A friend of 
him, who is police officer in the capital, then links him up to merchants in Bujumbura 
which can buy up his stock. However, before this chain can be set into action, Rachid 
needs cash to buy up the harvests of individual farmers. Therefore, he receives a credit of 
the merchant who will buy up his stock later on. For 2006, for example, he asked a credit 
for 300.000 Fbu (300 USD). At his turn, he gives credits to his local helpers in proportion 
to the quantity of harvest they foresee to collect this season (four helpers received credits 
from 20.000 Fbu (20 USD) up to 65.000 Fbu (65 USD) in 2006). Both between the 
merchant and Rachid, and thereafter between him and his local helpers the quantity of 
kilo‘s is agreed that should be delivered to disburse the credit. Thus, the price is agreed 
top-down, and each link in the chain needs to make profit, which of course increases the 
difference between farm-gate and market prices. The major risk for Rachid is when his 
local helpers use their credit for other means, and are afterwards unable to pay back or to 
provide the amount of sacks of beans which was fixed. Then he in turn is unable to pay 
back his credit to the merchant. Sometimes the credit is recovered, when his local helpers 
are forced to sell a plot of land to pay back, or when Rachid (together with the local 
authorities) confiscates and sells the livestock of one of his local helpers.18 But in other 
cases, the loss could not be recovered. In 2006, for example, some of his helpers could not 
pay back Rachid and fled to Tanzania and Rwanda. In sum, although these linkages have 
serious negative effects for the people who are dependent upon the patron – i.e. the local 
helpers (forced sales of assets) and individual famers at the bottom of the chain (lower 
prices for their production) – there are also risks involved for the patron. 
Secondly, many of these vertical linkages remain instrumental, also for the person who 
finds himself in the dependent position. Without umugwazo transactions or the 
opportunity to work as an abakozi for a richer person, many would be worse off. During 
focus group discussions, people consistently expressed this idea. Although many were 
quite explicit about the unequal and exploitative character of umugwazo and abakozi in 
the long term, they also perceived both transactions as a kind of solidarity or help. Take 
for example the following quotes on umugwazo:  
People also gave their fields. They had no seeds, so people gave their land. For 5000 
Fbu he (le commerçant) should take a field where he can harvest 300 kilo. You see 
that the profits are very high. He can get 300 Fbu for a kilo, which means 90.000 




 Rachid explained that, in this way, he sold several goats of LITA, which resulted in the malfunctioning of the 
solidarity chain (see chapter 8). 
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Fbu. But we can‘t protest. We were on the point of not eating anymore. He has 
helped us to survive. We have to be grateful. (focus group, 14/05/07, Cumba). 
 
Mostly, it was this [umugwazo] which kept us alive, otherwise we would no longer 
be alive. We needed to go to the boss a lot to ask for this. (focus group, 19/06/07, 
Tangara). 
Also the opportunity to work as abakozi was sometimes perceived as solidarity. This 
was most clear in Tangara, because it was linked to a geographical distinction within the 
colline. For community members of Tangara, there was a clear difference between the 
rural centre of the colline, where the majority of the richer people lived, and the 
surrounding more isolated hills with a poorer population (the rural centre was located on 
an important road which connected the rural area to a border crossing with Tanzania, and 
further on, to Muyinga city). As a consequence, most nearby opportunities for abakozi 
could be found in this rural centre (on the two other collines we visited, Cumba and 
Burara, but also in Tangara people also migrated to find work as abakozi, mostly to 
neighbouring collines, but also to Rwanda or Tanzania). Therefore, when we for example 
asked to the chefs de sous-colline or the nyumbakumi‘s (chefs of ten households) if there 
existed mutual help on their sous-collines, most answered negatively but indicated that 
some solidarity existed in the centre of Tangara, because some richer people could 
contract people as abakozi and give them some money or food: 
Yes, there were just a few places where there was mutual help, I give Tangara 
centre as example, because there you have many rich people, you could go and 
cultivate for the rich, you earned something to eat. (interview nyumbakumi sous-
collines Tangara, 18/06/07, Tangara). 
 
No, it was everyone for himself, expecially on my colline. But at Tangara centre, 
where you have many rich people, you could go and cultivate and receive food or 
money. (interview nyumbakumi sous-collines Masiga, 18/06/07, Tangara). 
 
In Tangara centre, there are many rich, you could go there to work to find 
something to eat. (interview chef de sous-colline Masiga, 18/06/07, Tangara). 
 In sum, although transactions as umugwazo and abakozi were based on sometimes 
very unequal relationships, most of these vertical linkages with richer people (les patrons) 
remained instrumental: in the short term, these linking ties were indispensable to cope 
with food shortages during the periods of soudure (which labeled them as relationships of 
mutual help), yet in the long term they had some serious negative effects (because of a 
downward spiral of usury, indebtedness and asset depletion). 
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5.7 Implications for food security and livelihood 
interventions 
This article presents empirical insights on how social capital portfolios adopt to a situation 
of protracted crisis. The findings question the validity of the ‗standard hypothesis‘ on 
social capital in such situations. (Table 12). The first assumption of this ‗standard 
hypothesis‘ – i.e. poor people rely heavily on their bonding social capital as a safety net – 
was not supported. The protracted crisis situation substantially weakened bonding social 
capital, and turned it into an unproductive asset: bonding networks could no longer offer 
social support or play ‗defense‘ (Woolcock, 2002). The second assumption – i.e. that poor 
people have difficulties to create bridging ties – was partly confirmed: there was indeed a 
lack of more bridging associations, yet this was primarily explained by a cultural (the 
absence of an associational tradition in Burundian society) instead of an economic 
(vulnerability) explanation.  
 
Table 12 social capital portfolio:  standard hypothesis vs. adaptation protracted crisis 






Social capital portfolio of 
the poor  
(standard hypothesis) 
Strong bonding 
Modest stock of 
bridging 
No linking 
 Access to social support, 
to ‘get by’ 
Modest access to social 
leverage, to ‘get ahead’ 
No access 
Social capital portfolio in 
protracted crisis 
situation 
Weak bonding No bridging 
Strong ‘unresponsive’ 
linking 
 Unable to deliver social 
support 
No access 
Access to social support, to 
‘get by’, on unequal terms 
 
 
Finally, and most critically, the third assumption – i.e. that there is no linking social 
capital at work in the lives of the poor – was seriously questioned by an increased 
dependency upon ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital to cope with food insecurity. 
Access to markets (middlemen), labour opportunities (abakozi) and credit (umugwazo) – 
all among the single most important strategies to access food – illustrated how the food 
crisis increased dependency on vertical authority relationships with patrons. Therefore, the 
main conclusion is that the problem of rural households was not their lack of linking 
capital, or social capital in general, but their increased dependency on ‗unresponsive‘ 
linking capital. It confirms Wood‘s (2003) ‗faustian bargain‘ as a crucial aspect of 
poverty, i.e. that survival in the present creates loyalties and duties to certain institutions 
and organizations, resulting in short-term security, but against longer term costs. 
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Whenever insecurity and uncertainty rise, also this ‗faustian bargain‘ rises or is 
strengthened, as was observed during the recurring periods of soudure. 
This increased dependency upon ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital makes tangible 
the concept of ‗powerlessness‘ as a crucial element of vulnerability during protracted 
crisis situations. As such, our social capital analysis reconfirms a central argument of the 
‗political paradigm‘ on food insecurity, that is: food insecurity is ultimately about the 
power and powerlessness of individuals and groups of individuals which determine their 
access to food and other assets (Collinson, 2003: 10). The findings illustrate how social 
capital plays a crucial mediating role in accessing this food and other resources. 
Furthermore, our analysis reinforces the idea that food insecurity brings forward ‗winners‘ 
and ‗losers‘ (Duffield, 1993). ‗Unresponsive‘ linking social capital concretizes the social 
relationships through which the powerlessness of many was reinforced, and how others 
could profit from that: increased vulnerability led to accumulated debts, exorbitant interest 
rates, distress sales, and asset-stripping (livestock, land); the total absence of bargaining 
power on the labour market (accepting food rations in exchange for day labour); and 
extremely low farm-gate prices, and limited access to markets (few middlemen and 
traders controlling the marketing of agricultural production). In three particular ways, 
these findings support the necessity to integrate a broader political economy perspective 
into food security and livelihood interventions in protracted crisis situations. 
First, the findings indicate the necessity to take into account that crisis situations have 
the potential to transform productive livelihood assets into liabilities (Lautze & Raven-
Roberts, 2006). Lautze et al. (2002), for example, have illustrated how credit became a 
liability in Afghanistan, since a prolonged period of draught seriously accumulated debt, 
which resulted in increased distress sales of assets. Our findings present how social capital 
degenerated into a liability: unmet obligations of mutual help further stressed already 
conflict-ridden bonding networks (with sometimes violent conflicts), and ‗unresponsive‘ 
linking capital hampered access to diverse other assets. In particular the fact that social 
capital mediates access to other critical assets, indicates the comprehensive and far-
reaching consequences when it transforms into a liability: it can block or hinder several 
livelihood strategies at the same time. The example of social capital illustrates well how 
vulnerability in a protracted crisis situation is not limited to an external shock (e.g. 
drought, flood), but is central to all elements of the livelihood framework. (Jaspars & 
Maxwell, 2009). Vulnerability becomes structurally integrated in the asset portfolio, 
where assets can turn into liabilities. Unfortunately many food security and livelihood 
interventions simply ‗borrow‘ from responses to natural disasters or more stable 
environments, and do not take into account these more structural causes of vulnerability 
(Lautze & Raven Roberts, 2006; Levine & Chastre, 2004). 
Second, the centrality of ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital reaffirms the necessity to 
consider food security from a broader economic perspective instead of focusing on food 
production. In Burundi, as in many other countries, most food security interventions are 
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based on a narrow subsistence economy paradigm, which equates food security with 
household agricultural production covering household food needs. As a consequence, 
interventions focus on agricultural subsistence production, and distribute seeds, tools, and 
seed protection rations. However, Levine and Chastre (2004), for example, indicate that 
dozens of households assessments in the Great Lakes Region have shown that the 
majority of the poor rely on the market for their food. Yet, in our case, the functioning of 
‗unresponsive‘ linking capital illustrates how access to these markets was severely 
restricted. The shifting of social networks revealed and made more tangible how the 
interlocking of the land, labour and credit markets reduced farmers options to access 
resources (Farrington et al., 2004: 5): as a response to higher levels of risk during the 
periods of soudure people were forced to rely more heavily on a patron, which then 
became the only source to access credit, inputs, and market opportunities while 
strengthening a downward spiral of usury and indebtedness: labour was claimed to repay 
debts, and if not possible, debts were repaid by the usury practice of umugwazo or selling 
assets (e.g. livestock). In turn, indebtedness was an important mechanism influencing the 
local land markets: when debts could not be repaid by abakozi, umugwazo, or the selling 
of livestock or other assets (bicycle, roofing tiles, …), land was confiscated and/or sold. 
Furthermore, stressed bonding networks (and a reduction of mutual help) were to a great 
extent the effect of the functioning of this land market, i.e. land becoming an extremely 
scarce resource, and family ties being the only option left to access land for the majority 
of people. This led to a further crumbling of the cultivatable land (inefficient production, 
overexploitation, and soil erosion) and a multiplicity of familial land conflicts. These 
examples illustrate the need to integrate a good deal of broader structural policies, 
institutions and processes (PIPs) in the analysis of food insecurity: the functioning of 
labour and commodity markets, the crucial aspect of access to land, the local supply of 
credit, and so on. Although these factors are identified as crucial in understanding food 
security in Burundi and elsewhere, most interventions fail to take them into account 
(Levine & Chastre, 2004). 
Third, the importance of linking social capital, and power relations in general, 
reconfirms the necessity of food security and livelihood agencies to focus properly on 
their own role in the entire process, in order not to reproduce or aggravate existing power 
inequalities and imbalances. In conflict and protracted crisis situations vulnerability is 
intensely related to marginalisation and a lack of power, which makes that targeting of 
assistance, in particular the provision of high-value assets, is more difficult (Jaspars & 
Maxwell, 2009). As in many other crises, Burundi is a country where external aid 
interventions represent one of the only flows of resources that arrives at the communities, 
which makes it more than likely that competition for aid will be intense and the risk of 
reinforcing social disruption high (cf. Uvin, 2009: 67-68). If asset distribution is 
necessary, it should be based on sound targeting criteria, and not on some vague notion of 
‗the vulnerable‘, meaning that NGOs can more or less choose arbitrarily their 
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beneficiaries (Levine & Chastre, 2004). Working through local formal and informal 
institutions (local organisations, groups, CBOs) is not an easy solution to this targeting 
problem, since our social capital analysis clearly warns not to start from a naive notion of 
local community organization. These local institutions are likewise embedded in the 
broader political economy of conflict, and therefore their conflict-ridden character should 
be assumed instead of negated. The responsibility which aid agencies should take up is 
perhaps most clear when stated this way: if ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital is indeed 
a crucial factor of vulnerability during protracted crisis, international aid agencies have 
the unique opportunity to break this cycle of powerlessness and marginalisation, by 
setting up an example of ‗responsive‘ linking social capital, i.e. an authority relationship 
between them and the population which empowers the latter. As a baseline, it is indeed of 
utmost importance that aid agencies make efforts to foresee and act upon the potential 
risks and negative effects that their interventions can bring along (Jaspars & Maxwell, 
2009). 
5.8 Conclusion 
The failure of food security and livelihood interventions to properly understand the 
broader conflict environment in which they operate has been identified as a major gap in 
humanitarian response (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2009). It implies that most interventions are 
unable to tackle the impact of the broader political economy of conflict on food security 
issues, i.e. how the conflict environment affects the distribution of power and 
powerlessness between and within groups in society which controls the access to the 
necessary resources to attain food security (Collinson, 2003). To date, the way in which 
these broader policies, institutions and processes (PIPs) of conflict influence the daily 
livelihood options and strategies of households stays poorly understood. 
We believe that the analysis of social capital portfolios, as elaborated in this article, can 
contribute to attain a deeper understanding of this interaction. The importance of social 
capital is that it facilitates or constrains access to other assets and resources: through 
social relationships resources are distributed and claimed, and the policies, institutions and 
processes (PIPs) governing the access and use of these resources exercise their influence. 
In other words, social capital comprises the ‗social wires‘ through which these PIPs are 
structuring people‘s livelihood choices. This means that social capital analysis also makes 
more tangible the concepts of ‗power‘ and ‗powerlessness‘, and the effect of their 
distribution on livelihood strategies: changes in exercise of power or increasing levels of 
powerlessness can be observed as changes in the social capital portfolio. In our case study, 
for example, the increased dependency upon ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital clearly 
indicated an increase in powerlessness, with a constraining effect on livelihood strategies 
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and their effectiveness. Although further research will be needed to refine and test our 
argument, this article delivers ethnographic evidence that changes in social capital 
portfolios reflect the effect of the broader conflict environment on the daily livelihood 
choices of people, which makes these social capital portfolios a concrete entry point to 
analyse and make more tangible the impact of the political economy of protracted crisis 





Chapter 6  
Social capital and post-conflict reconstruction : 
the limits of community-based reconstruction1 
Abstract. – This article questions community-based reconstruction as a mechanism to 
rebuild social capital after conflicts, where direct livelihood support is provided. This is 
analysed through an ethnographic examination of three NGO-interventions in post-
conflict Burundi. It argues that a straightforward and generalized application of 
community-based development (CBD) methodology fails in post-conflict settings: it copies 
the focus on ‗technical procedural design‘ and underestimates the contrast between 
‗development‘ and ‗post-conflict‘ settings. On the theoretical level, the findings suggest 
the need for a political economy perspective on social capital. On the policy level, the 
article suggests a revaluation of ordinary ‗physical engineering‘ actions vis-à-vis the 
current popular ‗social engineering‘ approach to post-conflict reconstruction. 
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Social capital theory has recently been used as a framework to hone post-conflict 
reconstruction policies. ‗The norms and networks that enable people to act collectively‘ is 
a widely accepted definition of social capital (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000: 226). The 
World Bank and other international development organizations have used the social 
capital argument to justify ‗social engineering‘ operations, alongside the usual physical 
reconstruction and renewal efforts in post-conflict settings (Englebert, 2001). It is argued 
that conflict damages and transforms a nation‘s social capital; recovery therefore demands 
reconstruction, not only of a nation‘s infrastructure but also of its social fabric (Colletta & 
Cullen, 2000b). Community-driven reconstruction programs, promoted by the World 
Bank, are designed to rebuild physical infrastructure and social capital. As such, they are 
popular tools to implement recommendations of this social capital approach during post-
conflict reconstruction (Cliffe et al., 2003). These programs therefore rely on a 
community-based development (CBD)2 methodology: integrating local participatory 
structures into short-term reconstruction programs, thus enabling community cooperation 
and social cohesion. CBD methodology is increasingly mainstreamed and adopted in 
several sectors of post-conflict reconstruction, including livelihood interventions (e.g., 
Goovaerts et al., 2005; USAID, 2007).   
This article challenges the appropriateness of CBD methodology for creating social 
capital and cohesion when providing direct livelihood support in post-conflict settings. 
From an ethnographic standpoint, it examines three NGO-interventions that use CBD 
methodology in post-conflict Burundi. First, it demonstrates the main shortcoming of 
CBD methodology: a copied focus on ‗technical procedural design‘, resulting in what may 
be termed ‗supply-driven demand-driven‘ reconstruction (cf. the ‗supply-driven demand-
driven‘ development concept of Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Second, it shows that a 
generalized application of CBD methodology to a post-conflict reconstruction 
environment underestimates the contrast between ‗development‘ and ‗post-conflict‘ 
settings. The case studies illustrate that CBD methodology, initially designed for 
development programs providing public resources/services for entire communities, is not 
easily tailored to post-conflict reconstruction programs, which also provide direct 
livelihood support to households and individuals. 




 I prefer to use community-based development (CBD) rather than community-driven development (CDD). The 
latter concept is bound up with the CDD programs of the World Bank, in which block grants are allocated to 
community councils to fund sub-projects. Here, CBD is used to refer to the broader participatory methodology 
behind these and other programs. 
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The first part of the article outlines the main arguments on conflict, social capital, and 
CBD methodology. A theoretical framework is drawn up, contrasting political economy 
(Bourdieu) and communitarian (Putnam) views on social capital and CBD. The next 
section briefly introduces the Burundian context, indicating how a social capital approach 
to post-conflict reconstruction is put into practice. The three NGO livelihood interventions 
are then introduced as case studies, presenting their participatory intermediation schemes 
(established to give the projects a community-based character). General case study 
findings and conclusions are offered in the final sections. On the policy level, the article 
questions the appropriateness of CBD for providing direct livelihood support in conflict-
ridden communities; more broadly,  it suggests a revaluation of ‗ordinary‘ ‗physical 
engineering‘ actions vis-à-vis the current popular ‗social engineering‘ approach to post-
conflict reconstruction. 
6.2 Social capital, post-conflict reconstruction and CBD 
6.2.1 Social capital and conflict 
Numerous civil wars and intra-state conflicts in the wake of the Cold War prompted the 
international development community to focus again on conflict. Since then, an evolution 
is observed from national level conflict analysis, working with large cross-country data 
sets and delivering technocratic approaches, to local level analysis, introducing social 
structures, inter-group and state society relations – i.e., social capital – as new determining 
factors in conflict analysis (Barron et al., 2007: 4–7). Gaining insights into these local 
‗micro-politics‘ (King, 2004) of conflict illuminates the two-way process of how ‗states in 
transition shape local environments and how local peoples can constrain, interpret and 
realize these changes, in turn shaping the transition itself and the nature of the new and 
reformed state institutions and social structures which result.‘ (Barron et al., 2007: 7).  
Social capital scholarship makes a threefold connection between conflict and social 
capital. First, the basic assumption is that violent conflict destroys social capital. War and 
conflict zones are defined as ‗zones of social capital deficiency‘ because trust and social 
cohesion are eroded in such circumstances (Goodhand et al., 2000: 390).  Second, conflict 
transforms social capital. Conflict is identified with weak bridging and linking, and strong 
bonding social capital (Colletta & Cullen, 2000a, 2000b). Whereas bridging capital refers 
to inclusive inter-group solidarity, uniting people from different backgrounds; bonding 
capital refers to exclusive intra-group solidarity based on ethnicity, religion, cast, class, 
etc. Conflict is also more likely when ‗unresponsive‘ or ‗exploitative‘ (Putnam, 2004: 
669) vertical state-society relations are present (linking capital). Third, in times of 
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conflict, societies integrate the ‗dark side‘ of social capital (Portes & Landolt, 1996). New 
networks arise, with a view to harnessing and prolonging conflict, leading to social capital 
with anti-social effects (Goodhand & Hulme, 1997). 
6.2.2 Social Capital, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and CBD 
A social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction rapidly became popular in policy 
circles. Goodhand (2006) classifies it among the ‗social‘ models of conflict analysis. 
Morfit (2002: 8, 11) differentiates between a ‗root cause‘ and a ‗social capital‘ approach. 
Programs were previously designed to react quickly to the root grievances of specific 
groups. The social capital approach emphasizes the opposite, by promoting ‗inclusive‘ 
programs. It brings together conflict actors with a view to transforming ‗shallow‘ (simple, 
rigid and exclusive, i.e. bonding) into ‗deep‘ (complex, flexible, and inclusive, i.e. 
bridging) social capital. From a social capital approach, post-conflict reconstruction needs 
to transform ‗exclusive‘ bonding into ‗inclusive‘ bridging social capital. In other words, 
reconstruction policies will only be effective if they convert exclusive intra-group 
solidarity (which opposed different identity groups: ethnicity, religion class, region, etc. 
during conflict) into inclusive inter-group solidarity, which can then rebuild bridges 
between conflicting parties after conflict (Colletta & Cullen, 2000a, 2000b). 
CBD is considered an effective mechanism to achieve this transformation because of 
its participatory and thus inclusive methodology. CBD ‗relies on communities to use their 
social capital to organize themselves and participate in development processes‘ (Mansuri 
& Rao, 2004: 6). When applied in post-conflict settings, CBD mechanisms should enable 
community participation and cooperation, and thus inclusive collective action and 
problem-solving for concrete issues in community reconstruction. For example, 
community-based organizations (CBOs), one of the most popular instruments of CBD 
methodology, are portrayed as ‗agents of peace‘ (Varshney, 2001: 363) when they unite 
groups, which had opposed one another during conflict, in addressing common practical 
concerns, while creating bridging social capital between them. In sum, CBD in conflict-
affected areas aims to alleviate immediate community reconstruction needs (tangible 
‗quick wins‘ or ‗peace dividends‘) while empowering the community and restoring 
community cohesion and trust (e.g., Cliffe et al., 2003; Fearon et al., 2009; Strand et al., 
2003; USAID, 2007).  
6.2.3 CBD – failure or success : main argument 
The broader social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction and the particular CBD 
mechanisms both rely on a ‗Putnamian‘ or communitarian notion of social capital (cf. 
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Mansuri & Rao, 2004). The communitarian view argues ‗that social capital is inherently 
good, that more is better, and that its presence always has a positive effect on a 
community‘s welfare‘ (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000: 229). This view equates social 
capital with voluntary, horizontal, and civic associations at community level, following 
the ideal image of Putnam‘s (1993) ‗networks of civic engagement‘. The effect has been a 
strong reliance on these western ideas of community organization when promoting a 
social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction. The popularity of community-
based organizations (CBOs) as ‗peace agents‘ is significant in this respect (Strand et al., 
2003; Varshney, 2001)  
On the operational level of CBD methodology, this communitarian view is translated 
into a focus on ‗technical procedural design‘, in order to copy these western ideals of 
community organization. For an extensive overview of factors explaining failure or 
success of CBD programs I refer to a critical review by Mansuri and Rao (2004). Here it 
suffices to indicate that elite capture has been identified as the core problem of CBD 
methodology: the participatory approach often leads to projects that are dominated by 
elites, thus failing to empower the poor (Platteau, 2004). Most research treating this elite 
capture problem of CBD programs focus on procedural design factors, as most studies try 
to respond to Mansuri and Rao (2004: 30, emphasis added) in seeking ‗what types of 
checks and balances are most effective in reducing [elite] capture and the systematic 
exclusion of the poor and of discriminated-against minorities‘. This is what I call 
‗technical procedural design‘: leadership elections, accountability arrangements, 
leadership-disciplining mechanisms, representative composition of committees and 
boards, and conflict management facilities. These are all considered effective antidotes to 
elite capture, and thus predictors for successful CBD interventions (e.g., Mansuri & Rao, 
2004; Platteau & Gaspart, 2003; Platteau, 2004, Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Classen et al., 
2008; Fritzen, 2007). Relying on Chhotray (2004: 329) this focus on ‗technical procedural 
design‘ is based on a mixture of both liberal and communitarian assumptions about 
community organization. The liberal idea that public deliberation mechanisms, based on 
formal/legalistic procedures, are able to overcome differences between rational 
individuals is linked to the communitarian idea that a shared deliberation process results 
in a ‗perfect consensus‘ within the community. 
From a broader political economy perspective on social capital, the seeming 
‗neutrality‘ and  assumed ‗strength‘ of such formal procedures in CBD methodology to 
change the communities in which they are introduced comes as a surprise. In contrast to 
the communitarian view, a political economy view underscores the context-dependent 
character of social capital (e.g., Cleaver, 2005; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Fine, 2001; 
Molyneux, 2002; Bebbington, 2007). While referring to the original work of Bourdieu 
(1986), these scholars identify social capital and its ‗use value‘ (Edwards & Foley, 1997: 
677) as inextricably bound up with other forms of cultural (e.g. educational qualifications) 
and economic capital (e.g. resources directly convertible into money). Social capital is 
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tightly interwoven with ‗cultural markers‘ (Bebbington, 2007: 156) in the broader fabric 
of socio-economic power relations. It is also a catalyst for social differentiation: people 
and groups of people use their social networks (social capital) to reproduce their social 
positions within society, thus reinforcing existing boundaries between groups. So, from 
this contextualized approach, the optimistic communitarian idea of social capital should 
be mitigated by the fact that social capital can structure both ‗patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion‘ (Bebbington, 2002: 801).  
This article aims to apply a more context-specific reading of social capital and CBD 
methodology. The findings reconfirm a central argument of the political economy 
perspective, i.e. that the functioning of social capital can never be divorced from its 
economic counterpart. For Bourdieu (1986) the outcomes of social capital are reducible to 
economic capital because ultimately people‘s investment and participation in social 
networks (social capital) delivers them access to economic resources (economic capital). 
The article presents empirical observations of the mutual influence between social and 
economic capital within the framework of NGO-interventions. It demonstrates how a 
typology of economic resources (economic capital) distributed by NGOs has clearly 
determined the ‗exclusive‘ or ‗inclusive‘ working of social capital. This link between 
economic and social capital explains why CBD is an unsuitable mechanism for 
strengthening social capital when providing direct livelihood support in conflict-affected 
communities.  
6.3 Burundi : a social capital approach to post-conflict  
reconstruction 
Burundi is slowly emerging from a civil war that lasted over 10 years.3 After three 
decades (1960s–90s) of authoritarian and military rule by the ethnic Tutsi minority, the 
first democratically elected Hutu president was murdered soon after his appointment in 
1993. In the civil war that followed, some 300,000 people lost their lives (Lemarchand, 
2009). Recent figures indicate that 52 per cent of the population have fled their homes at 
least once since 1993 (Uvin, 2009: 29). Currently, after a transition period leading to the 
2005 elections, Burundi finds itself in a phase of post-conflict reconstruction.  
Burundi presents us with a concrete case study of how social capital discourse has 
influenced post-conflict reconstruction policies. The ethnic character of the Burundian 








conflict was rapidly translated into social capital terms. At the end of the twentieth 
century Burundi was a divided country, the capital Bujumbura was split into Hutu and 
Tutsi quartiers, the countryside into Tutsi-IDP camps and Hutu-regroupment camps, or 
Hutu and Tutsi ‗enclaves‘ or ‗colonies‘ (Laely, 1997: 695). In social capital terms, 
Burundi was identified as a country of ‗weak bridges, strong bonds‘, which led to an 
exclusive ‗us versus them‘ rhetoric through the destruction of multi-ethnic bridging social 
capital (Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 6).4 So one of the core questions for Burundi was how to 
convert exclusive ethnic bonding social capital into multi-ethnic bridging social capital. 
This closely follows the core policy implication of a social capital approach to post-
conflict reconstruction. A recent survey of 133 peace building programs in Burundi 
further confirms the dominance of the ‗social capital‘ approach vis-à-vis the ‗root cause‘ 
approach described by Morfit (2002). The survey (Sebundandi et al., 2008) reveals that 
most programs worked on dialogue and conflict management and resolution, while 
focusing on emotional and attitudinal change and healing of individuals and groups in 
society. The authors of this report conclude that these efforts, of which ‗the promotion of 
shared spaces of expression and communication seems to be the point of convergence‘, 
played a key reconciliatory role between ethnic groups. However, they also highlight the 
need to go beyond ethnic tensions and look for ‗root causes‘ as ‗the last few years has 
brought most observers, regardless of background, to converge around the idea that the 
conflict is over control of the country‘s limited resources, and the social and economic 
marginalization that has been occasioned by it‘ (Sebundandi et al., 2008: 40–41). 
On the community level the social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction was 
implemented via ‗bricks-and-mortar projects‘, used as a ‗vehicle to address social issues 
by strengthening inter-group trust and the capacity of communities to collaborate 
effectively and manage conflict without resort to violence.‘ (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 4). 
There was a strong belief that when development agencies work on ‗modes of 
reconciliation and cooperation between groups at the local level […], then this creates 
peace constituencies which can impact on the national level negotiations as well‘ (Oketch 
& Polzer, 2002: 117). Therefore, many international actors and NGOs coupled economic 
with social reconstruction, and used CBD methodology to implement their reconstruction 
projects and programs (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005; Cliffe et al., 2003; ICG, 2003a; Strand et 
al., 2003; USAID, 2007; Uvin, 2007). Below three NGO livelihood interventions are 
presented as case studies.  




 Although the ethnic component cannot be denied, these analyses are prone to ethnic regression, by which a 
complex of social divisions (regional, rural-urban, etc.) are reinterpreted in terms of the ethnic divide. 
(Reyntjens, 2000: 19). 
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6.4 The case studies 
CBD methodology has been mainstreamed and adopted in diverse sectors of post-conflict 
reconstruction, one of them being livelihood support (e.g., Goovaerts et al., 2005; USAID, 
2007).  It is assumed that livelihood support in conflict-affected communities will be 
ineffective if it does not link together economic and social reconstruction (Goovaerts et 
al., 2005). Livelihood interventions ideally provide quick, tangible benefits – ‗quick wins‘ 
or ‗peace dividends‘ – while also providing opportunities to increase community 
participation, cooperation, and cohesion (USAID, 2007).  This article presents 
ethnographic findings on three such livelihood interventions. Three American-based 
international NGOs introduced livelihood projects under the umbrella of the Livelihood 
Security Initiative Consortium (LSIC), which was funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (LSIC, 2004). The projects were implemented in the 
north of Burundi between 2005 and 2007, and all three implementing NGOs put great 
emphasis on the use of CBD methodology to implement their livelihood activities.  
Data and analysis are based on 10 months of ethnographic fieldwork on three collines 
(hillsides, administrative units) in 2006 and 2007. Each of the collines presented an 
illustrative ‗typical case‘ (Patton, 2002: 236) of the different interventions of the three 
development agencies: CIBA (Burara colline), LITA (Tangara colline) and CLC (Cumba 
colline).5 The fieldwork was conducted in cooperation with a team of local research 
assistants by conducting focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews.6   
The community-based methodology of the interventions is briefly presented below by 
considering the participatory intermediation schemes that they established. The schematic 
representations of the intermediation schemes are based on intervention maps, composed 
during focus groups. These intervention maps were used as a variant of the venn diagram 
(itself too complex to be used properly). It presents a river which separated the NGO 
(vehicle) from the community population, and participants were asked to list and draw the 
different islands which the NGO vehicle should pass to bridge the river and arrive at the 
community. This way of working was very efficient. Several times, straightforward 
questions on the functioning of intermediation structures found no answer, or at least not a 




 For the sake of discretion the identity of the different NGOs is not disclosed. I use pseudonyms, which stand 
for Consortium Initiative Burara (CIBA), Livelihoods Tangara (LITA), and Cumba Livelihood Consortium 
(CLC). Pseudonyms are also used for individuals. 
6
 To determine the number of focus groups, I used the theoretical concepts of redundancy and theoretical 
saturation (Krueger & Casey, 2001). Generally between 6 to 10 people took part in the focus groups, which 
conforms to the rule of thumb (Patton, 2002: 385). In total, 81 focus groups were conducted with a total of 693 
participants. A further 77 interviews with  key actors (NGO staff, local administration, etc.) were also conducted. 
 173 
 
detailed one. However, during discussion, participants were occupied with drawing all 
these islands in the river, and only at the end it was asked if any of these mediating 
structures did not function well (in their words: NGO benefits failed to reach the other 
bank of the river and ‗disappeared into the river‘). In many cases, a much more animated 
discussion followed. These discussions have then been complemented with (i) focus 
groups conducting an institutional analysis of these different mediating structures (based 
on Dudwick et al., 2006), and (ii) focus groups discussing the functioning of these 
mediating structures with regard to specific project activities (see annex 1 for visual 
illustrations of the intervention map and the institutional matrix used during focus 
groups). 
 
6.4.1 The CIBA project on Burara colline: a complex of ‘brokerage 
chains’ 
The CIBA project focused on the rehabilitation of the Muhembuzi wetland and the 
surrounding hillsides constituting its basin. A first component of the project, the cash-for-
work program, was designed to inject cash into the local rural economy through labour-
intensive infrastructure works (an irrigation system in the wetland, road maintenance, 
water infrastructure). A second project component was the ‗solidarity chain‘, a livestock 
credit rotation scheme to restore livestock and boost social cohesion via the creation of a 
chain of beneficiaries (i.e. neighbours). This was closely linked to the introduction of a 
veterinary pharmacy and the training of local veterinarians. A third cluster of activities 
focused on the sustainable use of natural resources (soil protection and agro-forestry). 
There was also major development of the wetland and its basin with the introduction of 
rice growing and several other improved crops. Finally, LITA improved access to potable 



























































The intermediation scheme of the project can be typified as a collection of ‗brokerage 
chains‘ (Bierschenk et al., 2002: 25). Each chain vertically connects a small group of 
brokers with one particular local NGO staff member (Figure 6). This results in a 
decentralized participatory structure, as each project component has its particular chain. 
Remarkable was the fact that local CIBA staff were integrated in the scheme, since NGO 
workers are not generally considered to be mediators (it is assumed that they represent the 
external NGO) (D‘Exelle, 2004: 13), and are also not trained for that purpose (de Sardan, 
2005: 169). The other structures can be classified into three sub-categories: individuals 
(captains or foremen, veterinarians), group-based structures (committees and 
associations), and local administration. CIBA opted for individuals in cases where 
technical capacities constituted an important selection criteria (e.g. captains following 
infrastructure works); notably, these individuals were approved by the population during 
public meetings. Committees and associations were mostly introduced to handle collective 
action problems (e.g. maintenance of irrigation system or water infrastructure). 
Meanwhile, the local administration played a facilitating (e.g. mobilisation) or more 
operational role (e.g. taking up positions in the wetland committee).  
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6.4.2 The LITA project on Tangara colline : le club d’hangar 
The three NGO-interventions carried out many similar activities, but some were particular 
to each project. For CIBA, development of the wetland; for LITA, the construction of le 
hangar, a storage facility to improve the conservation of agricultural products, which also 
functioned as the corner stone of the seed credit system with local agricultural producer-
groups. Furthermore, the ‗solidarity chain‘ – the livestock credit scheme – was introduced 
to restock cattle, with access to veterinary drugs and care provided by a pharmacy and one 
trained veterinarian, ‗Mister Tanzania‘ (cf. several in the CIBA project). Both anti-erosion 
measures (contour berms) and reforestation activities (agro-forestry) were implemented.  
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The LITA intermediation scheme paints a totally different picture from that of CIBA. 
LITA presents a ‗brokers‘ club‘ instead of a complex of independent ‗brokerage chains‘ 
(Figure 7) (Bierschenk et al., 2002: 25). This led to strongly centralized intermediation 
and in turn more elite capture. The intermediation scheme was controlled by the club 
d‘hangar, made up of the local administration and members of the local elite (local big 
men such as petty traders, shopkeepers, etc.), headed by the chef de colline and ‗Mister 
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Tanzania‘ (as president of the LITA sub-hill committees). Thus, behind the institutional 
façade of various intermediaries (comité d‘hangar, LITA sub-hill committees, 
associations, pharmacy, etc.), there was a powerful group who populated and controlled 
most of these structures, centralizing intermediation in the hands of a few. Repeatedly, the 
population explicitly expressed both the ‗secret society‘ character of the club d‘hangar 
and clear links to the local administration. 
6.4.3 The CLC project on Cumba colline: a single ‘brokerage chain’ 
The situation on Cumba hill presented a rather more dispersed project by CLC. There 
were two differences. First, whereas CIBA focused on the wetland, and LITA targeted the 
collines near their storehouses, CLC identified the vulnerable (orphans, the elderly, 
widows, people living with HIV/AIDS, etc.) as their primary target group, but on all 
collines of the commune. In line with this targeting, CLC used a household approach, 
minimizing working with associations or other group-based structures. Second, CLC most 
radically switched from a relief logic towards a developmental logic, minimizing the 
distribution of material support and focusing on capacity training. For example, seed 
distributions were kept to a minimum, while modern agricultural training was made 
central (compost bin, contour berms, sowing techniques). Thus, no infrastructure works 
(cf. CIBA) or a substantial seed credit scheme (cf. LITA) were implemented. The 
livestock credit scheme (the ‗solidarity chain‘) was therefore identified as the project's 
main activity. There was also a focus on training and awareness raising for health issues 














































This intervention approach was reflected in a less extensive intermediation scheme 
(Figure 8), presenting only one main vertical ‗brokerage chain‘ (cf. several in the CIBA 
case), personified by Stéphane, the encadreur de base (comparable to a community 
worker) of CLC, and to a lesser extent by Magare, the local veterinarian of the project. 
They both represented CLC at local level. Stéphane was responsible for the 
implementation and follow up of all activities of CLC on three collines: Cumba, and 
neighbouring Burenza and Butihinda. As an employee of CLC, he was paid a salary 
(12.000 Fbu, or 12 USD), received a bike and a budget for reparations of the bike (1.000 
Fbu, 1 USD). Although they always worked in a team, Stéphane was the central mediator, 
while Magare was his assistant. In addition, livestock committees, temporary tree nursery 
groups, a system of lead farmers (with demonstration plots), and one veterinary pharmacy 
association were introduced, but these social structures presented minimal activity and 
were more or less ‗invisible‘. Thus, because of their status as ‗paid employees‘ of CLC, 
the encadreur de base and the vet controlled all intermediation between CLC and the local 
population (their central position is also illustrated in the absence of local administration 
in the intermediation scheme). As such, the CLC intermediation scheme combines some 
characteristics of both the CIBA and LITA project: the centralization of intermediation 
(cf. LITA), and the centrality of local NGO staff in the brokerage chain (cf. CIBA). There 
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was however one component carried out independently from the encadreur de base: the 
health training courses, executed by agents from the provincial health department.  
6.5 General findings 
6.5.1 Elite capture, ‘technical procedural design’ and logics of  
intervention 
A first general finding was that the case studies confirmed the general focus on ‗technical 
procedural design‘ in CBD methodology. Without going in too much detail, all three 
NGOs paid much attention to standard procedures on how committees, associations, and 
other intermediaries were identified and composed, and to the formal procedures guiding 
their participatory, accountable and transparent functioning. All three NGOs used 
democratic elections as the standard uniform procedure to identify capable community 
leaders (e.g., Fritzen, 2007). In addition, concerns about equal representation of both sexes 
and all ethnicities – endorsing the importance of inclusiveness and creating bridging social 
capital – further guided the make-up of the intermediary bodies. For individual 
intermediation, joint decision-making mechanisms with more ‗representative‘ bodies were 
set up; where local administration was involved, their collaboration was subject to similar 
procedures. Unfortunately, in the majority of cases, this array of procedures and 
mechanisms failed to prevent many of the participatory intermediating structures falling 
victim to elite capture and practices of corruption and clientelism.  
 
How these practices developed was very dependent upon the different local settings and 
the particular persons involved.  
In the CIBA project, for example, the captains, being responsible for the selection of 
casual workers for the cash-for-work component, restricted access to casual work on the 
basis of bribes, and more importantly, on the basis of sex. In particular, they used their 
position to ‗collect‘ girlfriends in exchange for casual work (polygamy is illegal in 
Burundi, but in some areas it is widely practiced – among Muslims, but not exclusively – 
and in many cases causes problems, eg. the inheritance of land by suns of different wives). 
In a focus group the issue was further discussed, and especially women were afraid that 
the problem would expand to other girls and their own daughters. As various women 
commented the situation during the focus group (19/04/07, Burara): 
For the captains the girls are important. Even when you have the money to find the 




Even if she is on the list, she does not have to work all days, but then she has to date 
with the captain. When she refuses she is excluded from the work. But if she doesn't 
refuses, it can lead as far as polygamy. The captains have a lot of girls. Four 
captains have already divorced their wife and even Wamare [a CIBA staff member] 
has a wife from here now. She is from Magaramango and she is also captain now. 
He has his other wife in Kirundo. 
 
You have captains who rent a house together with the girl. Others have abandoned 
their wife. 
 
Before this happened at the Rusarasi centre, but know it happens everywhere. It has 
become a routine. 
 
The problem will even worsen. A lot of girls who are still at home see the girls of 
the captains, they have money and they even do not have to work for that. A lot of 
girls want to follow these girls of the captains. 
Also in the CIBA project, the functioning of the wetland committee illustrated the impact 
of the upcoming 2005 elections. This committee was elected by the population to oversee 
the rehabilitation works in the wetland and the (re)distribution of plots within it. 
Notwithstanding the fact that some ‗ordinary‘ community members were elected, the 
committee assembled the most influent people from the local elite: Minani (the most 
important businessman in Busoni)7, his sun Nkurunda (judge in neighbouring commune of 
Mukenke), Rutayikire (judge in Busoni), Pascal (communal accountant), and Prospère8 
(community member and most influential captain within the CIBA project, responsible for 
the construction works in the wetland). They were completed with elected members of the 
local administration (administrateur, …). In particular Minani, Ritayikire and Prospère 
have used the CIBA project to unfairly appropriate large parts of the wetland (instead of 
redistributing plots as compensation for those who participated in the rehabilitation works: 
digging the irrigation and drainage canals). However, in view of the 2005 elections, 




 See chapter 4 for a more detailed description of his role in Busoni community. 
8
 His influential role within the CIBA project was based on a personal connection with one of the high staff 
members of the CIBA office in Kirundo which supervised the project. His wife was from Bururi, like the CIBA 
supervisor, and her father had a direct clan link with him. 
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provincial and communal authorities (the wetland is property of the latter9) were however 
reluctant to solve the problem: both the governor and in particular the administrateur were 
aware of their upcoming defeat (as it was clear that CNDD-FDD would win the elections), 
and realised they would have to coexist with powerful people as Minani and Rutayikire 
afterwards. In addition, these elections installed the sun of Minani as the new governor of 
the province for the CNDD-FDD, which of course blocked the whole situation: ‗And now 
we can‘t do anything, because the son of Minani is the governor. Can he give the order to 
redistribute the land of his father?‘ (focus group, 16/04/2007, Burara). As the vice-
president of the wetland committee – calling himself a figurant in the whole process – 
explained: 
We [the population] thought that they [Minani, Rutayikire and others] would 
represent us properly, because they were intellectual men. But we have seen the 
contrary. It was a way to follow up things closely, to receive more plots in the 
wetland. […] In the beginning, we understood the importance of setting up the 
committee, but little by little we understood we had no power. […] I can say that 
CIBA has done a good job with irrigating and rehabilitating the wetland, but I tell 
you they have failed to cross the slyness of some people.  (interview vice-president 
wetland committee, 30/04/07, Burara). 
Elite capture was possibly most clear in the LITA project: behind the institutional 
façade of various intermediary structures, there was the small club d‘hangar which 
controlled the entire project. During focus groups and in individual interviews, more than 
once, the population explicitly expressed both the ‗secret society‘ character of the club 
d‘hangar and the clear links with the local administration and the ruling party:  
But look, Mister Tanzania and the chef de colline cooperate closely, in the mean 
time one of them [Mister Tanzania] is president of the comité de LITA, veterinarian 
[within LITA project] and president of an association [beneficiary of the LITA seed 




 The question of property rights in the wetland illustrates how institutions, in this case land tenure and land 
politics, influence access to and the distribution of local level resources, and as such, determine the opportunities 
for participatory governance within community projects. According to the outdated Land Code of 1986, 
wetlands are property of the state, and all land transactions should be registrated. However, in reality, large parts 
of these wetlands are occupied and cultivated by individual community members (sometimes with agreement of 
community administration), but in the majority of cases without an official registration. Such a situation of 
institutional vagueness, in which property rights are not secured, only contributes to ad hoc local land politics, in 
which local power struggles and relationships define access to land (see e.g. Kamungi et al., 2005 for an 
elaboration on legal and policy frameworks of land access in Burundi). 
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credit scheme], and the other [chef de colline] is president of the comité d‘hangar en 
president of two associations [also beneficiary of the LITA seed credit scheme] and 
more than a little of the delegates [members of local administration, four out of five 
to be exactly] are part of the different committees. (focus group, 20/06/07, Tangara). 
 
It is the club, they work together, they are friends, they share a lot of secrets. (focus 
group, 31/05/07, Tangara). 
 
It is a club of friends, and the chief, that‘s the chef de colline. He is the patron. 
(focus group, 31/05/07, Tangara). 
 
It is similar to the committees of the hangar or care, it are the same people who 
control the associations, it is a small group which is organized, and if you aren't one 
of them, you can‘t know a thing. (focus group,19/06/07, Tangara). 
 
Those who participate in the trainings, you can‘t know, that‘s for the people of the 
club. (focus group, 04/06/07, Tangara). 
 
They are the same [people], especially, you can find someone who is part of the 
administration, at the same time [part of] the comité de care and the comité d‘hangar 
and president of an association. (interview nyumbakumi sous-colline Tangara, 
18/06/07, Tangara). 
 
The comité d‘hangar is to a large extent the same as the administration. (interview 
nyumbakumi (2) sous-colline Tangara, 18/06/07, Tangara).  
Furthermore, the LITA case was also an illustration of the mergence between 
‗development‘ and ‗political‘ brokerage (Bierschenk et al. 2002). During the 2005 
elections people used their function as a ‗development broker‘ within the LITA project to 
secure political leadership positions after the elections. People were quite open and 
explicit on this issue and the link with party politics: 
During elections they [members of committees] also promised that LITA would 
arrive with a lot of things, even roofing tiles, if we elected them. (focus group, 
01/06/07, Tangara). 
 
In the comité [d‘hangar] there is not one who is not from the party [CNDD-FDD]. 
[…] The secrets of the comité [d‘hangar] are the same as those of the party. (focus 
group, 01/06/07, Tangara). 
 
Some people who held functions with regard to the activities of LITA have 
promised the population that, when they would be elected, they will give goats and 
seed to the population. […] Some people have been elected because they held 
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functions in the activities of LITA. (interview chef de sous-colline 19/06/07, 
Tangara). 
 
Some have used their social and economic position like all politicians do, especially 
the chef de colline who said: I‘m the chief of the storehouse, we work together in 
the association, if I will be elected as chef de colline, I will do everything to 
improve the collaboration [with LITA]. (interview member of comité d‘hangar, 
19/06/07, Tangara). 
 
If they aren‘t Muslims [the chef de colline was Muslim], then they are intimate 
friends of the chef de colline. We [members of committees] are all from CNDD-
FDD with the exception of Grégoire [former Uprona chef de colline and a local big 
man] and two other Tutsi women who act as nonentities. (interview member LITA 
committee, 18/06/07, Tangara). 
The CLC case paints a totally different picture: elite capture and corruption became 
personified in the strong position of Stéphane, the encadreur de base (and to a lesser 
extent his assistant Magare). His strong brokerage position was due to the fact he was 
perceived by the local population as the local representative of CLC (see 6.4.3). However, 
a second important factor was his personal relationship with one of the CLC supervisors 
of the project: they had been colleagues in the past, when the supervisor was still a 
communal agronomist and Stéphane his assistant, and they had a close friendship 
relationship as members of the same Pentecost church. In sum, they functioned as a 
tandem within the project. Stéphane used his brokerage function within the CLC project to 
divert resources: in particular many of the distributed livestock was diverted to a 
neighbouring colline, unsurprisingly where the encadreur de base himself lived (during 
fieldwork you could actually observe the results of this deviation, as it was difficult to 
spot goats distributed by CLC).10 Numerous individual stories were told during focus 
groups. One of these was the story about the showpiece of the colline, a ‗huge‘ male goat 
(imported race) for a crossbreeding program. Nobody had ever seen such a male goat on 
this hill, and even a radio-broadcast had been dedicated to crossbreeding program on their 
colline. But also this male goat was sold by Stéphane to people from Bujumbura. As the 
farmer who received to goat explained:  
The male goat was mine. It was the example for the entire colline, they even talked 
about it on the radio. Désiré [the CLC supervisor] came every day to visit the goat, 
but after Stéphane sold the goat he never came back and he never asked why the 
goat was gone. (focus group, 11/05/07, Cumba).  








As a consequence, CLC cancelled a second distribution of goats, and towards the end 
of our field research, Stéphane had been transferred to another zone of intervention.  
Summarizing, all three case studies illustrate that the ‗participatory‘ procedures, 
mechanisms and structures could not prevent that elite capture and brokerage took place, 
with sometimes clear negative effects. It illustrates that such participatory efforts become 
quickly embedded in particular local contextual settings.  
 
But the case studies also point to a more external aspect: the failure of procedural 
design to prevent elite capture, corruption and clientelism recalls the general critique on 
the ‗technocratic‘ nature of participatory or CBD methodology. According to Chhotray 
(2004: 328–29) this is reflected in a strategy which divides participation into ‗accountable 
segments which can be itemized and recorded on paper along with the project‘s physical 
and financial targets.‘ And indeed, in all three case studies, participation was translated 
into excel sheets listing among other things the legal identity, ethnic composition, 
participation of women, constellation of committees, and frequency of meetings of the 
structures put in place. This itemization of participation has been criticized because it 
negates local politics (Chhotray, 2004), underestimates the ‗endogenous community 
imperfections‘ (Platteau & Abraham, 2002), or overestimates the homogeneity of 
communities (Williams, 2004). These issues have been confirmed throughout the case 
studies. As described above, local politics influenced the functioning of wetland 
committee (CIBA) and the comité d‘hangar (LITA), and corruption and clientelism 
around the cash for work program (CIBA) and the livestock program (CLC) point to 
‗community imperfections‘ and the heterogeneity, power relations, and inequalities on 
which they are based.  
In addition, such a technocratic approach has been criticized because it uses 
participation as a means to an end (Parfitt, 2004). This is illustrated by the wider 
intervention logic of the NGOs and how they shaped the establishment of participation 
and intermediation. Although all three NGOs carried out very similar activities, they 
produced very different intermediation schemes to give the projects their community-
based character. This is immediately clear when comparing the schematic representations 
of the intermediation schemes (cf. Figure 6, 7, 8).  
For example, the top-down yet decentralized nature of CIBA‘s intermediation scheme, 
resulting in a complex of ‗brokerage chains‘, can be traced back to CIBA‘s focus on 
technical end-results. This was for example reflected in staff policy, as technical staff 
(agronomists, veterinarians, engineers) outnumbered social workers. This ‗technical‘ 
focus gave rise to a more top-down approach to match the community-based character of 
the project with the achievement of particular technical end-results. It created a number of 
relative independent ‗brokerage chains‘, for each specific technical end-result connecting 
one particular technical staff member to a participatory community structure: the cash-for-
work component (road and water infrastructure rehabilitation) connecting a constructional 
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engineer with the captains, anti-erosion efforts connecting a forester with specific anti-
erosion and tree nursery associations, the livestock credit scheme connecting a 
veterinarian with specific livestock committees, and so on. 
By contrast, LITA‘s more ‗social‘ focus on participatory processes, resulted in a more 
bottom-up laisser-faire approach. This led to the centralized intermediation of the club 
d‘hangar. LITA‘s focus on participatory group-oriented processes was for example 
illustrated by their choice to work almost exclusively with local associations (and not with 
individuals or households) and the centrality of the storehouses as opportunities for 
community participation and cooperation. As a consequence, the composition of staff was 
the opposite of CIBA: social workers outnumbered technical staff, and LITA‘s more 
bottom-up laisser-faire approach led to less visibility of local NGO staff. For CIBA, I met 
NGO staff on a daily basis in the field, while I only met LITA staff twice when 
conducting fieldwork on their project. Because of less top-down control from NGO staff, 
LITA deliberately left more space for existing social structures to take up intermediary 
roles. This led to the strong presence of the local administration, and ultimately to the 
centralized intermediation of the club d‘hangar. Although diverse participatory structures 
were introduced by the project, the local elite assembled in this ‗club‘ dominated most of 
these intermediation structures. 
CLC‘s ‗individual change‘ philosophy, by contrast, explained their choice of working 
with encadreurs de base. CLC did not believe in the associational model of LITA for 
example, and used a more personal approach, focusing on changing individual behaviour 
and attitudes, and enhancing personal knowledge, capacities and skills. As such, CLC 
opted for a close and constant follow-up of individual households by its encadreurs de 
base, people living among or close to the target population, functioning as the contact 
person between the population and provincial CLC staff for all components of the project. 
CLC even made a long term commitment, intending to employ these encadreurs de base 
in several successive projects. This strategy was expressed in a smaller staff in provincial 
head quarters, closely working together and supervising the encadreurs de base in the 
field, and gave rise to the functioning of one main brokerage chain around the central 
position of the encadreur de base: all participation of the local population in the project 
was linked, supervised and controlled by the encadreur.  
In sum, the findings illustrate that, to a great extent, participation has been used as a 
means to efficiently deliver project outputs, on the one hand a process influenced by wider 
interventionist ideologies and philosophies of implementing agencies; and on the other 
hand the apolitical and technocratic ‗logical framework‘ (reducing participation to 
procedural design) in which time-bound development projects have to be implemented 
(e.g., Brett, 2003; Chhotray, 2004;  Parfitt, 2004). Therefore, the implementation of 
community participation ultimately led to ‗supply-driven demand-driven‘ reconstruction 
(cf. Mansuri & Rao, 2004: 1). Community participation within the projects was structured, 
albeit unintentionally, on the external intervention logics of the different NGOs – CIBA‘s 
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‗technical‘, LITA‘s ‗social‘ and CLC‘s ‗individual change‘ ideologies. And because of the 
‗logical framework‘ straitjacket, NGOs were forced to itemize participation into excel 
sheets counting among other things the number of democratically elected committees, 
their multi-ethnic composition, and meetings, in order to present calculable results in their 
project reports towards the donor.  
To a great extent, the popularity of the communitarian view on social capital in CBD 
methodology, is exactly because it aligns well with such technocratic project planning. 
For policy makers, Putnam‘s (1993) communitarian view provides an easy solution – 
building community organizations means building social capital. It is an easy way to 
measure ‗technically‘ the progress and success of such policies, simply predicated on 
‗how many new organizations were built or strengthened?‘ (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). 
 
6.5.2 Resources and social cohesion: an underexposed but crucial  
factor  
The timing and conditions for channelling resources to local communities are crucial to 
the analysis of elite capture in CBD programs. Several studies argue that offering too 
much too soon attracts wealthier individuals, and substantially increases the risk of elite 
capture (e.g., Classen et al., 2008; Platteau, 2004; Platteau & Gaspart, 2003; Titeca & 
Vervisch, 2008). This resource factor proved to be a strong predictor for failure or success 
of the case studies to improve social cohesion and rebuild local stocks of social capital. 
However, most significant was not the timing or conditions, but the ‗type‘ of resources. 
Therefore, a typology of resources is presented below, in order to further analyse the case 
study findings.  
This typology is based on two axes: public/private goods, and strategic/non-strategic 
livelihood assets. Private and public goods have different characteristics. Bastiaensen et 
al. (2002) differentiate according to subtractability and excludability: private (or market), 
common pool, club (or toll), and public goods. Private goods are rival and excludable, e.g. 
the consumption of food diminishes its availability to others (abstractibility) and it is easy 
to deny others' access to your food (excludability). Public goods are non-rival and non-
excludable, e.g. individual use of a rural road does not diminish its availability to the use 
of others and it is difficult to deny access. In between we find common pool (rival but 
non-excludable, e.g. irrigation water) and club goods (non-rival but excludable, e.g. mill 
facilities). The second strategic/non-strategic axis distinguishes between assets that deliver 
a strategic individual advantage to cope with short-term needs, stress and shock situations 
(strategic assets), and assets that provide opportunities for long-term livelihood strategies 
(non-strategic). Both, however, are key to sustainable livelihoods (e.g., Davies, 1993; 
Scoones, 1998).  
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This enables a classification of project components along these two axes (see Figure 9). 
By way of illustration, two very different project components can be compared.  On the 
one hand, a developed plot in the wetland is privately used, it is excludable (tenure rights), 
causes extreme rivalry (because of general land scarcity), and presents a strategic asset (an 
additional highly valued rice season). On the other hand, road works in the countryside are 
a clear public good (non-rival and non-excludable), and a non-strategic asset (e.g. more 
trade in the long term). In between, the goods of clubs (e.g. storehouse facilities) and 
common pool resources (irrigation water in the wetland) may differ along the 
strategic/non-strategic axis. 
 
Figure 9: Project components according to resource typology (for convenience, not all project 
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Based on this typology, three categories of project components, and their associated 
participatory intermediation structures, could be distinguished according to their impact 
on social cohesion (see Figure 10). A first category, delivering private/strategic goods, 
had a negative impact. These components were characterized by serious information 
barriers between the mediators and the local population (labelling them as ‗secret‘ 
activities), while sparking new conflicts because of unfair distribution or access 
(frustrating bonds and bridges), which also decreased levels of trust in local 
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administration (deteriorating linkages). One of the most clear-cut examples was the 
(re)distribution of plots by the wetland committee in Burara. Without discussion, these 
wetland plots were the most strategic private resource which could be accessed through 
the three projects. Accessing additional land which, on top of that, could be irrigated 
during the dry season, was of extremely strategic value for any household in this country 
where fertile land becomes more and more scarce. However, as ‗people are dangerous 
when it comes to their land‘ (focus group, 12/04/07, Burara), and because of elite capture, 
the (re)distribution by the wetland committee led to serious tensions within the 
community, with a potential outbreak of violence (the governor had to come to calm down 
the situation): 
There was a lot of talking. We would receive plots in the wetland. But now, we are 
tired of this problem. […] for the wetland, it's finished, there is to much money 
implicated. (focus group, 26/04/07, Burara). 
 
On the hill we trusted Rutayikire, the judge, but he took a lot of bands in the 
wetland. Before, he was the friend of everybody,but that's finished now. He took 60 
plots in the wetland, how could our confidence increase? […] He had good contacts 
with the administration and the committee of CIBA. […] He used the works of 
CIBA to take away our plots. (focus group, 18/04/07, Burara). 
 
The people who have a lot of wetland should distribute, but until now nothing has 
changed. These are dangerous things. The people with a lot of wetland have refused 
and threatened. They even said they would chop the head. (focus group, 12/04/07, 
Burara). 
 
There is no confidence anymore between the rich and the poor. The rich received 
the plots while the poor need the plots. They even took our plots. […] They [the 
administration] did nothing when they took the wetland. They were there, they have 
seen it, but they kept silent about it. (focus group, 18/04/07, Burara). 
A second category, delivering public/non-strategic resources, presents the opposite 
picture. These components were characterized by effective information flows and 
reduction of existing conflicts as a positive outcome, while offering opportunities to 
strengthen social cohesion. For example, road works in Burara were appreciated because 
it reduced conflicts caused by traffic accidents within the community. However, more 
importantly, it cut transport costs, which made it easier to travel longer distances and visit 
friends and family. Thus, infrastructure works facilitated mobility, which in turn helped 
people to take up their social lives again. Another example was the repairing and 
replacing of water taps by the CIBA project: it reduced the number of conflicts when 
fetching water (because the number of functioning taps increased) and the water taps 
became again pleasant meeting points where you get to know each other. In Tangara, the 
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functioning of the storehouse had an important side-effect on social cohesion. It did not 
only create new storage facilities, it also reduced the cases of theft on the colline, since 
less people stocked their harvest at home. On Cumba colline, in particular the different 
health trainings which were held in public had positive side-effects. As was the case for 
the water taps in Burara, these trainings were appreciated as moments to meet community 
members and share some of their concerns. In addition, these trainings tackled daily 
problems within the community: sexual violence, but also HIV/AIDS and the prevention 
of diseases linked to hygiene and sanitation.11 As some quotes illustrate for several of 
these activities: 
It was the administration who has asked to rehabilitate the road. Now we see taxis 
going to Kirundo or even Bujumbura. They have done well, they have sensitized. 
(‗road works‘, focus group, 18/04/07, Burara). 
 
In the past, we slid as a snake. Now, there are less conflicts, because less accidents 
happened. (‗road works‘, focus group, 02/05/07, Burara). 
 
Conflicts have been reduced. Before, other [water] taps did not function. But the 
taps of CRS function, even if you are lining up, you are sure that there will be water. 
(‗water taps‘, focus group, 18/04/07, Burara). 
 
This creates a lot of confidence. Now, people come from far away to fetch water. 
Before, you didn't know them, but now we talk and we trust them.  (‗water taps‘, 
18/04/07, Burara). 
 
Before there were not so many water taps, you were waiting with many people and 
you had to push away others. Sometimes people fought. And for this old woman for 
example [pointing to a fellow group participant] it was very hard to receive water. 
(‗water taps‘, 18/04/07, Burara). 
 
It has increased trust among the population. There are less cases of theft and you are 
more at ease at night and with your neighbours. (‗storehouse‘, focus group, 
01/06/07, Tangara). 
 
The storage in the storehouse has decreased cases of theft in the homes of people, 
because thieves even came from Tangara [centre] because they don‘t like to work. 




 Correct information on certain diseases reduced conflicts between neighbours, as before certain diseases were 




Because they think we now bring our harvest to the storehouse, they stop coming to 
steel. (‗storehouse‘, focus group, 26/06/07, Tangara). 
 
The trainings gave us confidence, because they talked about the abuse of women 
and now we are again at ease, because now the population knows the problem and 
the abuses have declined (‗trainings‘, 15/05/07, Cumba). 
 
During the trainings the administration was very dynamic, because we should 
participate with much motivation. We [population and administration] were together 
in the training and we have discussed a lot together. (‗trainings‘, focus group, 
15/05/07, Cumba). 
 
It has reduced conflicts. Every time they sensitized the population to protect 
themselves against HIV/AIDS, they did sensitization about hygiene in the house. 
Before there were a lot of cases of rape of girls, but now there are less cases. Also 
malaria and cholera declined because of sensitization. Before people said that 
cholera was sorcery, we thought you had been poisoned by a neighbour, but now we 
understand that it is a disease and how we have to defeat it. (‗trainings‘, focus 
group, 21/05/07, Cumba). 
The main aspects explaining the positive side effects of most of these activities on social 
cohesion was their inclusiveness (equal access), the restoration of social life (informal 
meeting places and mobility), and the fact that they tackled very concrete social conflicts 
within the community. These aspects confirm some of Uvin‘s (2009: 43-56) observations 
made when he asked what ‗peace‘ means to Burundians. For example, mobility – the 
ability to visit one‘s family and friends – was also a surprising but important way of 
defining peace for many respondents in his study. Second, when people defined peace 
negatively (i.e. as the absence of violence), not politically motivated violence but 
criminality and theft were important references. The priority that people gave to tackle 
sexual violence (in particular in Cumba) and the fact that theft was the single most 
important factor that threatened people‘s safety (of crops, harvests, bicycles, livestock, …; 
see also chapter 5, section 5.6.1) confirms this observation for the three collines. 
Furthermore, what Uvin (2009: 48) calls ‗social peace‘ was also expressed during focus 
groups: a community is in peace when there are strong social ties, and neighbours 
cohabitate and live in harmony. Especially, the quest for informal social contact and 
concrete places to meet fellow community members illustrated this social aspect of peace. 
In sum, Uvin concludes that few people refer to major political issues at stake 
(democracy, human rights, ethnicity, …) when talking about peace. Instead, they refer to 
their concrete problems related to security, development, and social cohesion. In line with 
this argument, the observations made on the three studied collines, add to this that people 
appreciate in particular those activities that, although mostly as a side-effect, tackle these 
concrete social conflicts: quarrels when fetching water (water taps), traffic accidents and 
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transport costs (road works), theft of harvests at home (storehouse), sexual violence and 
disease (health trainings). 
In between, a third category of project components, delivering private but non-strategic 
resources, had a more neutral impact on social cohesion. An illustration which applies for 
all three projects was the distribution of agro-forestry plants: although privately 
distributed, they did not yield a substantial strategic advantage in the short term. 
Therefore, they had no substantial effect on social relations and social cohesion: 
It is impossible to have conflicts because everybody could receive a plant. The 
problem was that a lot of plants died because of the drought, but that is not the fault 
of CIBA. […] Everybody can go and plant, and everybody can benefit some trees. 
(focus group, 18/04/07, Burara). 
 
Everybody was informed, and everybody could cooperate, and there were enough 
trees. So, if you didn‘t join, it was your own choice. (focus group, 15/05/2007, 
Cumba). 
 
Even those who didn‘t work in the tree nursery received plants, and everybody was 
happy. […] No change [in social relations], because these activities didn‘t give 
personal profit. (focus group, 20/06/07, Tangara).  
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The resource typology accounts for different effects on social cohesion because private 
goods pose substantial different management problems vis-à-vis public, common and to a 
lesser extent club goods. (Bastiaensen et al., 2002; D‘Exelle, 2004). Public goods, in 
particular common pool resources, deal with collective action and free rider problems. 
Private goods pose management problems in terms of bargaining processes, i.e. where 
there is lack of agreement on the distribution of the benefits (D‘Exelle, 2004: 7–8). The 
strategic/non-strategic axis was also significant, as illustrated by the following quotes:  
The activities with which something can be earned, are done in secret. [...] It 
[vegetable seeds] hasn‘t changed anything about the confidence among the 
population. It concerns little money. Everybody who wants can buy it on the market 
(focus group, 21/05/07, CLC project, Cumba). 
 
The water tap is for everybody, you cannot exclude people, you cannot make the 
choice who will draw water from the dwell. In the wetland, not everybody is 
present. There you can give something to receive the water you need to irrigate your 
plot of land. But for drawing water you cannot ask money, because it is for 
everybody (focus group, 17/04/07, CIBA project, Burara). 
Both quotes present interesting comparisons. The distribution of vegetable seeds (CLC) 
did not create distributional problems when compared to the seed credit scheme of LITA. 
This is because the latter distributed strategic seeds (e.g. beans), while the former 
delivered non-strategic seeds (e.g. carrots or tomatoes). Similar reasoning explains the 
distinct effect of the distribution of potable and irrigation water in the second quote: 
potable water is a public and less strategic resource compared to irrigation water, which is 
a common pool resource, and a strategic asset in the livelihood strategies of the farmers in 
the wetland.  
A last but crucial remark is that this distinction between public/non-strategic and 
private/strategic goods parallels the respective distinction between public resource/service 
provision in ‗original‘ CDB programs, and the additional provision of private livelihood 
support in ‗CDB-adapted‘ post-conflict reconstruction programs. ‗Original‘ CBD 
programs have been designed to improve the delivery of public goods and services 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Social funds, widespread World Bank programs based on CBD 
methodology, are exemplary in this respect (e.g., de Silva & Sum, 2007). Such funds 
support programs with a focus on infrastructure works (e.g., roads, water supply systems, 
schools) or social service provision (e.g., nutrition campaigns, literacy programs). Instead, 
many post-conflict reconstruction projects need to ‗provide direct livelihood support, 
often in the form of financial resources, to individuals or individual groups rather than 
providing resources or services that benefit the community as a whole‘ (Goovaerts et al., 
2005). The case studies are exemplary: they present a mix of public goods/services (roads, 
water infrastructure, storehouse facilities, public training, etc.) and private livelihood 
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support (developed plots in the wetland, seed credits, livestock, etc.).  However, the case 
studies clearly indicate that a straightforward application of CBD methodology when 
providing direct livelihood support was ineffective: participatory methodology failed to 
nurture improved beneficiary targeting or service provision, and was unsuccessful in 
strengthening community cohesion. By contrast, the introduction of participatory 
structures linked to the distribution of such resources substantially increased the risk of 
elite capture and corruption. Thus, it is illustrated that CBD methodology, initially 
designed for development programs providing public resources/services for entire 
communities, is not easily tailored to post-conflict reconstruction programs providing 
direct livelihood support to households and individuals. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The examination of the three case studies shows the limits of community-based 
reconstruction. First, the narrow focus on ‗technical procedural design‘ of CBD 
methodology was copied. This itemized participation into manageable ‗technocratic‘ and 
‗apolitical‘ procedures and mechanisms, despite post-conflict situations being even more 
politicized than ‗normal‘ CBD situations due to fragmented, contested or opposing 
national and local leadership and a fiercer competition for post-war reconstruction 
resources. Second, a straightforward application of CBD methodology underestimated the 
contrast between ‗development‘ and ‗post-conflict‘ settings. In particular, it negated the 
fact that many post-conflict situations require direct livelihood support to households or 
individuals, as well as public resources and services for entire communities. 
From a theoretical point of view, the findings provide empirical insights in the 
limitations of a social capital concept, as applied so far. It reveals the narrow and 
normative ‗Putnamian‘ or communitarian notion of social capital on which CBD 
methodology still relies (cf. Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Mosse, 2008). From such a 
conceptualization followed a strong belief in ‗technical procedural design‘ to create social 
capital and community cohesion.12 This focus was confirmed during the case studies, as a 




 The link between Putnam‘s conception of social capital and the focus on ‗technical procedural design‘ in CBD 
practice is however not so straightforward. The reasons are twofold. First, the CBD discussion illustrates the 
‗lazy use‘ (Bebbington, 2004: 344) of the social capital concept in policy circles. In Putnam‘s (1993) original 
conceptualization, path dependency plays an important role, i.e. the construction of social capital is the outcome 
of historical processes. This exactly questions the ability to ‗engineer‘ or ‗construct‘ social capital through 
‗technical procedural design‘ in the short term (see section 7.3., chapter 7). Secondly, however, there seems to be 
a contradiction in the work of Putnam himself. Although he questions the constructability of social capital in his 
Italian study (1993), his Bowling Alone (2000) is a plea to rebuild stocks of social capital, as a solution to all 
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range of procedures was set up to guide community participation. Yet their failure to 
prevent elite capture is further evidence that procedural design is based on inaccurate 
assumptions: formalized and legalistic procedures were not able to overcome community 
discord (liberal assumption), and the feasibility of a perfect community consensus was not 
reached (communitarian assumption) (cf. Chhotray, 2004). The communitarian notion of 
social capital is therefore an erroneous theoretical point of departure to inform CBD 
methodology on how to rebuild social capital in conflict-affected communities. By 
contrast, a broader political economy perspective on social capital proved useful to 
present a more realistic analysis of CBD mechanisms. The findings endorsed two broad 
conclusions from a critical and contextualized perspective (e.g., Bebbington, 2002, 2007; 
Cleaver, 2005). First, social capital has potentially negative effects: social capital is 
wrapped up in broader socio-economic power relations, so it may act as a catalyst for 
social differentiation. From this point of view, elite capture within community-based 
projects is a logical result of social capital ‗at work‘, not an aberration of it, as social 
capital has the potential to reproduce the power relations in which it is already wrapped up 
(e.g., Cleaver, 2005). Elite capture may therefore be seen as a potential ‗dark side‘ (Portes 
& Landolt, 1996) of social capital.13 Second, social capital is context-dependent, bound up 
in a broader capital portfolio, interacting with and shaped by cultural and economic forms 
of capital (Bebbington, 2007). The case studies showed how the ‗use value‘ (Edwards & 
Foley, 1997) of community participation, and so of social capital, was mainly shaped by 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
sorts of societal ills in the US (see chapter 1, section 1.2.2 on Putnam‘s theoretical and practical-ethical 
concerns). Nevertheless, Putnam has inspired the communitarian notion of social capital on which most CBD-
methodology relies, i.e. a rather normative and harmonic ideal of the community and its potential for collective 
action (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). By way of comparison: if one starts from a Bourdieuian notion of social 
capital, the analysis should also focus on internal power relations, inequalities and mechanisms of exclusion and 
inclusion within these communities, which in turn, questions the enthusiasm for the empowering effects of 
collective action.   
13
 If elite capture is defined as the ‗dark side‘ of social capital, this does not necessarily mean that elite capture 
cannot be instrumental (for both parties), and always has negative effects. For example, although some benefits 
of the development project can be captured by the elite, the situation is still a pareto-improvement for the 
community when compared to the situation without a development project. Moreover, the ‗capture‘ is sometimes 
accepted by the population as a bonus for the elite member which was able to attract these external development 
funds and projects in the first place (Platteau, 2004). It is therefore important to differentiate between potentially 
more benevolent forms of elite domination and elite capture (Mansuri & Rao, 2004: 23), or between elite control 
and elite capture, the former being the willingness of the local elite to contribute their time and know-how to 
facilitate the execution of development projects (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007: 244). However, in the particular case 
of the three collines, elite capture was very negatively perceived (although objectively, there was a pareto-
improvement, but the elite was not held responsible for this improvement). Examples of elite control with 
positive effects, although less explicit, were also present: e.g. when local administration supervised the works of 
water tap construction, and motivated the local population to collect the necessary resources (sand, bricks, etc), 
local administration was appreciated for their leading role.  
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the economic capital of community participation (see typology of resources). Concretely, 
the provision of private/strategic resources created a higher risk of community 
participation being wrapped up in power relations; as such, social capital facilitated elite 
capture. By contrast, the distribution of less strategic/public resources led to a more equal 
and inclusive resource access, potentially downplaying existing power relations. Once 
more, this reflects the double-edged character of social capital, i.e. social networks 
structuring both inclusion and exclusion. On a general level, these findings stress the 
importance of a broader contextualized political economy perspective on social capital, as 
it was the interaction between economic and social capital that ultimately explained the 
‗exclusive‘ or ‗inclusive‘ effects of social capital within the communities. The findings 
present a concrete demonstration of  Bebbington‘s (2007: 155) argument that Bourdieu 
and a political economy perspective on social capital can and should ‗travel to policy‘. 
This leads to practical policy conclusions. First, the ease with which CBD methodology 
is colonizing different sectors of post-conflict reconstruction should be questioned. As 
noticed, ‗development‘ and ‗post-conflict‘ settings may differ substantially because they 
require de facto various kinds of support. Typical for ‗post-conflict‘ settings is the need to 
provide a mixture of both direct livelihood support to individuals and public 
resources/services for entire communities (Goovaerts et al., 2005). Hence, the assumption 
that community-based reconstruction programs should bridge the humanitarian and 
development phase after conflict, and provide both (Cliffe et al., 2003). However, the case 
studies clearly question the effectiveness of providing both private livelihood support and 
public resources/services with the help of CBD methodology in one and the same project. 
It leads to a ‗tendency to ―bodge‖ instruments for aims and contexts they were not meant 
for‘ (i.e. participatory CBD methodology for short-term livelihood support) (Leader & 
Colenso, 2005: 51). In addition, it negates the potential comparative advantage of external 
agencies, each in their own proper ‗professional field‘. As such, the obvious plea for more 
integration and better harmonization of these different phases is not contested; yet it 
should be questioned if this should be done ‗within‘ programs and agencies instead of 
‗between‘ them. In the case studies, CBD mechanisms had a potentially positive effect on 
community cohesion when applied to public/non-strategic resources; yet the effect of 
community participation turned negative when applied to private/strategic resources. This 
confirms the idea that community participation should not be overrated while livelihoods 
are under serious stress (Steinberg, 2007). It also reflects a broader political economy 
argument on social capital: although civil-society led development and social capital 
policies are important, they cannot replace sound redistributive policies from a neutral 
third party or ‗developmental state‘ (Bebbington, 2007). In many post-conflict 
reconstruction settings, external agencies de facto take over the role of the state, and so 
will always have redistributive responsibilities. It requires them to stay focused or refocus 
their attention on their organizational capacity, flexibility, and integrity to come up with 
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alternative solutions in circumstances in which participation is not the magic panacea for 
successful aid delivery. 
Second, the findings present empirical insights into the limitations of the broader 
‗social engineering‘ approach to post-conflict reconstruction (cf. Goodhand, 2006, chapter 
five). Based on Western models of community participation (sc. the communitarian view 
of social capital), external interventions try to ‗micro-engineer‘ social cohesion and social 
capital through the introduction of ‗technical procedural design‘. However, in the case 
studies most of these efforts failed to nurture better community cohesion. By contrast, the 
case studies highlighted the value of ‗ordinary‘ infrastructure works and public service 
provision as project activities which positively influenced the social fabric of community 
life.  Road works in the CIBA project showed the importance of mobility, of how visiting 
friends and family is a clear ‗peace dividend‘ in Burundi (cf. Uvin, 2009: 49–50). The 
repairing or replacing of water taps (CIBA project) and public training (CLC project) 
created a need for new meeting places, reflecting Burundians‘ preference for informal 
daily interactions rather than formal community associations or committees, designed in 
the image of Putnam‘s (1993) ‗networks of civic engagement‘.  In addition, public 
training on sexual violence (CLC project) did touch one particular consequence of the 
conflict, as rape and sexual harassment constantly fed feelings of insecurity and pitted 
households against each other because of insinuations and forced marriages. The 
construction of better and safer storage facilities by the LITA project, on the other hand, 
reduced theft of harvests at home and so clearly reduced conflicts and distrust among 
neighbours. These examples indicate that ‗physical engineering‘ and ‗ordinary‘ public 
service provision is sometimes more efficient than ‗social engineering‘ when trying to 
strengthen community social cohesion. Instead of trying to ‗micro-engineer‘ social 
cohesion from the top-down, resulting in ‗supply-driven demand-driven‘ reconstruction 
(cf. Mansuri & Rao, 2004: 1), it creates the necessary ‗material‘ or ‗physical‘ 
preconditions, from which a truly bottom-up and organic process of locally embedded 
social engineering can slowly emerge over time. As such, this article presents 
ethnographic evidence that confirms the advice that external agencies should focus on 
understanding how they may create an enabling environment to create social capital, 
rather than trying to engineer it themselves (Goodhand et al., 2000). It suggests a further 
investigation of ‗ordinary‘ infrastructure works and public service provision in post-
conflict settings, with minimal attempts to socially organize or ‗engineer‘ communities, 
and their potential impact on social capital. 
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Chapter 7  
Bridging community associations: the difficult 
merging of social capital endowments and new 
‘institutional settings’1 
Abstract. – Associations have been labelled the main ‗building blocks‘ for creating social 
capital. It has been argued that community associations need to transform bonding into 
bridging ties to ‗reach out‘ while also creating linking ties to ‗scale up‘ (Titeca & 
Vervisch, 2008; Woolcock, 2002). External development actions follow a reverse logic by 
promoting these associations: they assume that linking ties with the external intervener 
will reinforce prior social capital endowments. This article highlights the inherent 
difficulties of such a ‗social engineering‘ approach in the context of post-conflict 
reconstruction, describing three development interventions in the north of Burundi. The 
findings define the process of ‗institutional syncretism‘ (Galvan, 2007) – merging local 
with global institutional settings – as the key to successful social capital building. They 
question ‗bridging‘ associations as ‗universal blueprints‘ for restoring social cohesion 
after conflicts.  
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Associations have been labelled the main ‗building blocks‘ for creating social capital. The 
reconciliatory nature of bridging associations – uniting groups in society that opposed 
each other during conflict – is welcomed in post-conflict situations (Colletta & Cullen, 
2000a, 2000b). Social capital literature argues that community associations need to 
transform bonding into bridging ties to ‗reach out‘ while also creating linking ties to ‗scale 
up‘ the impact of the associations (Titeca & Vervisch, 2008; Woolcock, 2002). However, 
creating social capital from the outside is not self-evident. When external development 
agencies promote the creation of associations they follow a reverse logic, assuming that 
linking ties with the external intervener will create or reinforce locally produced social 
capital endowments.  
The article examines this ‗social engineering‘ approach, presenting a case study of 
three interventions by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) in post-conflict Burundi. 
Burundi is slowly emerging from a civil war that lasted over 10 years.2 After three 
decades (1960s–90s) of authoritarian and military rule by the ethnic Tutsi minority, the 
first democratically elected Hutu president was murdered soon after his appointment in 
1993. In the civil war that followed, approximately 300,000 people lost their lives 
(Lemarchand, 2009). Now, following a transition period that led to the 2005 elections, 
Burundi finds itself in a post-conflict reconstruction phase, featuring many of the external 
interventions noted above. The impact on social capital by these interventions will be 
analysed in terms of their success in creating bridging community associations. 
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, I enumerate the various 
arguments why community associations are seen as ‗building blocks‘ for social capital, 
and why in particular, bridging community associations play a role in post-conflict 
reconstruction. Second, I present a brief discussion of the 'constructability' of social 
capital. Third, after outlining the state of Burundi and its historical social capital 
endowments, I discuss the three development interventions. All three interventions 
highlight ‗institutional syncretism‘ (Galvan, 2007) as key to successful social capital 
building. The cases note the difficulty in finding the right blend to create a new 
‗institutional setting‘, which is ‗soft‘ enough to adapt to prior social capital endowments, 
but ‗strong‘ enough to change or reinforce these endowments to bring positive results. I 
will then explore the overall impact and long-term effects of external interventions on 




 On the history of conflict in Burundi, see e.g. Daley (2006b, 2008), Lemarchand (1970, 1995, 2009), Reyntjens 
(1993, 2000), and Uvin (1999, 2009). 
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social capital endowments, ultimately providing both theoretical and practical 
conclusions. To produce positive effects, one priority is a thorough knowledge of prior 
social capital endowments, combined with a deep awareness of external resources or 
incentives (linking social capital). Also key is the availability of a minimal basis of 
bonding and bridging ties.  
7.2 Social capital, community associations and post-conflict 
reconstruction 
The strong link between social capital and civil society is one of the main consequences of 
Robert Putnam‘s work. He equates social capital with horizontal associations, in what he 
calls ‗networks of civic engagement‘ (Putnam, 1993: 171). These associations have been 
labeled the main ‗building blocks‘ of social capital, which Putnam (1995: 664–65) defines 
as ‗the features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives‘. The equation between social 
capital and community associations has tempted some policy makers to oversimplify the 
debate. Many define a vibrant civil society as the ‗missing link‘ (Grootaert, 1998) to 
economic development and democracy. Community associations rapidly became 
promising new ‗actors‘ in the ‗development industry‘.3 In this respect, a landmark report 
was the Voices of the Poor study by Deepa Narayan (1997). This is just one example of 
the general tendency to use ‗membership in groups with particular characteristics‘ 
(Narayan, 1997: vii) as one of the main proxy measures to build social capital. For policy 
makers, these studies provide an easy solution – building community associations means 




 See for example the World Bank website on the Social Capital Initiative : 
http://go.worldbank.org/XSV70MA600 (Consulted on 2 October 2009). Of course, the ‗participatory turn‘ in 
development practice predates the social capital discussion: well before the beginning of the nineties, non-
governmental organizations already worked trough associations to implement projects and programmes in a 
participatory way. Nonetheless, the social capital concept added another argument to the debate, and succeeded 
to convince actors such as the World Bank, DFID, and USAID to integrate more social analysis into their 
econometric policies, and to apply this ‗participatory turn‘ (see e.g. Bebbington et al., 2006; Mosse, 2008). 
However, the main argument here is more specific on the link between associations and social capital: that (i) 
social capital should not necessarily be equated with associations, but (ii) that exactly this equation has made the 
social concept so popular. First, only a Putnamian concept of social capital as ‗networks of civic engagement‘ 
results in a focus on associational capital (compare e.g. with a Bourdieuian conceptualisation, chapter 1). 
Second, however, Putnams equation of social capital with civic organizations presents an easy and measurable 
concept for policy makers which focuses on the mechanics (‗forms, not norms‘) of social capital, i.e. ‗how many 
new organizations have we built and strengthened?‘ (Edwards, 2006: 102). 
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building social capital – and an easy way to measure the progress and success of their 
policies (predicated simply on 'how many new associations were built or strengthened'?). 
Briefly, membership in community associations has four expected positive effects. 
First, several studies provide evidence that associational membership has a positive effect 
on the welfare and well-being of households (e.g. Narayan, 1997). Second, community 
associations are seen as fostering democracy, since membership in community 
associations facilitates participation, accountability, and democratic governance (Esman & 
Uphoff, 1984; Putnam, 1993). Third, community associations partially explain ‗why some 
villages are peaceful and others not‘ (Krishna, 2002: 115). They are identified as local 
vehicles to bridge ethnic or other social boundaries. Finally, using community 
associations improves project and program effectiveness, as they are seen as preferred 
partners in participatory approaches (World Bank, 2000: 130). In particular, the potential 
bridging character is valued as positive in post-conflict situations. 
Conflict is linked to high stocks of bonding and low stocks of bridging social capital 
(Colletta & Cullen, 2000a, 2000b). Whereas bonding capital refers to exclusive solidarity 
based on ethnicity, religion, cast, class, etc.; bridging capital refers to inclusive solidarity, 
uniting people from different backgrounds (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Community 
associations are labeled as instruments ‗par excellence‘ to transform this ‗exclusive‘ 
bonding solidarity within groups into more ‗inclusive‘ bridging solidarity between these 
groups. In this respect, economic and social reconstruction efforts will only be effective if 
they involve and bridge between different social groups (Colletta et al., 1996; Fischer, 
2004). A particular case of group integration is after ethnic conflict. Institutions fostering 
repeated inter-ethnic interaction together with addressing practical concerns, support the 
reconciliation between ethnic groups (Pickering, 2006: 79). An association in which Hutu 
and Tutsi widows work together after the Rwandan genocide, is a concrete example of 
this (Colletta & Cullen, 2000b: 113). This explains why multi-ethnic community 
associations are seen as ‗agents of peace‘ (Varshney, 2001: 363). 
In sum, community associations have been introduced as the main ‗building blocks‘ of 
social capital. They are not only useful in periods of peace, but also in periods of post-
conflict reconstruction, as bridging associations have the potential to reconcile and reunite 
the conflicting parties. Two questions remain: How easy is it to construct social capital? 
How can external development interventions play a role in this process? The latter may 
seem a rhetorical question; but although the ‗constructability‘ of social capital in policy 
circles seems no longer to be an issue, there is less consensus among social capital 
scholars. This debate is briefly discussed in the next section. 
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7.3 The ‘constructability’ of social capital revisited 
Putnam‘s (1993) path dependency model argues that the construction of social capital is 
the outcome of historical processes. In his Italian study, for example, Putnam illustrates 
this with a historical account of the republican tradition to explain the high degree of 
‗civicness‘ in the Italian city states. The presence of such social capital endowments is 
then perceived as vitally important for the further development of social capital in 
societies.4 This ‗endowment view‘ (Evans, 1996: 1124) gives an idea of social capital 
stocks emerging over long periods of time, leaving little room for change. Others point to 
the fact that social capital patterns are neither stable nor given, and that contemporary 
institutional arrangements can facilitate or erode the production and maintenance of social 
capital stocks (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003: 6). In this view, prior endowments of social capital 
are not the key constraining factor, as ‗soft technologies‘ on an organizational level and 
‗institutional entrepreneurship‘ can build new stocks of social capital or change existing 
stocks (Evans, 1996: 1124). For Evans, the critical question under this ‗constructability 
view‘ is how existing endowments of social capital can be ‗scaled up‘ to increase the 
efficiency of solidarity ties and societal action. Supporters of this view consider both the 
state and civil society as two main actors capable of supporting this ‗scaling-up‘ process 
(Fox, 1996). Both views are not completely opposed, as the discussion is more subtle and 
handles the relative importance of prior ‗endowments‘ on the one hand and the facilitating 
‗institutional settings‘ on the other hand.  
This helps us to sharpen our analysis of external development interventions. It puts the 
process of ‗institutional syncretism‘ (Galvan, 2007) at the heart of the debate. Institutions 
can be defined in terms of layered social structures (organization, networks, etc.), the 
norms (or ‗rules of the game‘) that govern these structures, and underlying cultural 
markers (social identities) (Bastiaensen et al., 2002: 10, 2005: 980). Galvan (2007: 62–63) 
defines institutional syncretism as ‗the creative recombination of institutional elements 
(organizational structures, rules, habits and values) derived from more than one socio-
cultural origin (e.g. from local ―tradition‖ and globalised ―modern‖ models)‘. Whereas 




 As already noticed in chapter 6, there seems to be a contradiction in the work of Putnam on this issue. Although 
he questions the constructability of social capital in his Italian study (1993), his Bowling Alone (2000) is a plea 
to restore stocks of social capital, as a solution to all sorts of societal ills in the US. One of the chapters, Towards 
an Agenda for Social Capitalists, explicitly refers to this objective and presents a concrete programme to achieve 
it. Furthermore, Better together: Restoring the American Community, by Putnam and Feldstein (2003), is even 
entirely focused on how to implement Putnams ideas and analyses into reality. Part of the problem is possibly the 
oversimplified use of Putnams ideas by others, yet the contradiction between his theoretical endowment view 
and his strong practical commitment to influence policy is clearly visible in his works, (see also chapter 1, 
section 1.2.2 on Putnam‘s theoretical and practical-ethical concerns). 
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Galvan explores the capacity of the local population (the ‗recipients‘ of institutional 
engineering) to recombine these institutional settings from different origins, I will focus 
more on this capacity from the ‗supply side‘. As such, the main question is if and how 
well development agencies can play the role of ‗institutional entrepreneur‘, and introduce 
new globalised and ‗modern‘ ‗institutional settings‘, which are able to syncretise with 
prior local ‗traditional‘ social capital endowments.  
As noted in the sections above, community associations are considered an excellent and 
widely used example of a new ‗institutional setting‘ for constructing social capital. From 
an ‗endowment perspective‘ the assumption is that community associations follow a linear 
progression: transforming bonding into bridging ties to ‗reach out‘ while also creating 
linking ties to ‗scale up‘ the impact of social capital endowments (Titeca & Vervisch, 
2008). These steps are clarified in for example the roles Brown (1991) allocates to 
organizations in sustainable development: the ability to maintain local effort, the ability to 
create bridging ties to other organizations and the ability to influence politics through 
vertical ties. However, when external development interventions promote the creation of 
such associations they follow a reverse logic, assuming that linking ties with the external 
intervener will reinforce prior social capital endowments. Through the introduction of 
linking social capital – the capacity of the local population to leverage global, ‗modern‘ or 
exogenous ‗ideas, information, and resources‘ (Woolcock, 2002: 26) from an external 
agent – the aim is to reinforce existing local, ‗traditional‘ or endogenous bonding, 
bridging and linking social capital endowments. This reveals a clear ‗constructability 
view‘, identifying the external agency as a social engineer using institutional ‗soft 
technologies‘ (Evans, 1996: 1124). These ‗soft technologies‘ refer to both the exact 
content of the induced linking social capital (e.g. financial resources, knowledge transfer, 
etc.) and the new ‗institutional setting‘ in which these are made accessible (e.g. 
community associations). When stated this way, linking social capital is central to the 
‗constructability view‘. As identified by Evans (1996), it produces the synergy between 
local dynamic processes of social capital and the policies of external interveners, 
including the state and (inter)national civil society. Below, after introducing the 
Burundian context, I will analyse three case studies of potentially synergetic relationships 
between social capital endowments and external development agencies.  
7.4 Social capital endowments in Burundian society 
Burundi does not have a strong associational tradition. First, Burundian society was much 
more vertically than horizontally stratified, with patron-client ties to a great extent 
determining the outlook of Burundian social life. (Laely, 1997; Lemarchand, 1970, 1995). 
A second historical element is the fact that social organization beyond the family has been 
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minimal in Burundi: Burundians lived scattered on the hills in their isolated homestead or 
rugo, and not in villages (Uvin, 2009: 69–70).  Third, most ‗formal‘ associational life that 
did exist was enforced from above, and left a negative impression: e.g. ‗paternalistic‘ 
cooperatives under Belgian colonial rule (Badionona-Tshondo, 1993), and the Bagaza 
regime (2nd Republic, 1976–87) controlling the peasantry through cooperatives and 
villagization (attempt to centralize the rural masses into villages) (Lemarchand, 1995). In 
addition, the Burundian state has made considerable efforts to destroy social capital not 
under its control, the most famous case being the muzzling of the Catholic Church during 
the 1980s (Longman, 2005). Burundi has also been confronted with the ‗dark side‘ (Portes 
& Landolt, 1996) of ethnically exclusive bonding social capital: several youth groups 
(Jeunesse Nationaliste Rwagasore, Sans Echec, Sans Défaite) illustrate how civil society 
groups have adopted a genocidal logic and taken part in ethnic violence (Daley, 2008). In 
sum, the Burundian people have little experience in voluntary, bridging associational life 
at grassroots level. Instead, they have generally negative feelings toward the forced 
(cooperatives, villagization), suppressed (conflict with the church) or dark (ethnic youth 
militias) character of associational or other collective action experiments. 
Ethnic violence, and the civil war from 1993 onwards, influenced social capital 
endowments in two ways. On the one hand, ethnic strife clearly destroyed existing stocks 
of social capital. The people of Burundi were taken hostage by both sides of the military 
conflict as ‗proxy targets‘ (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Massive displacement tore apart 
families and community life: recent statistics indicate that 52 per cent of the total 
population have at least once fled their homes since 1993 (Uvin, 2009: 29). The crisis led 
to a general decline of mutual help and solidarity, and a further segmentation of economic 
groups (rich/poor) (Uvin, 2009). On the other hand, civil war also transformed social 
capital. During the civil war, most of Burundi was divided into Hutu and Tutsi ‗enclaves‘ 
or ‗colonies‘ (Laely, 1997: 695). The capital Bujumbura was divided into Hutu and Tutsi 
quartiers; walking through the wrong district meant certain death. In the countryside, the 
Tutsi population fled to secure Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, while the Hutu 
population was forcefully displaced into camps de regroupement (Human Rights Watch, 
1998). In social capital terms, one could speak of a country of ‗weak bridges, strong 
bonds‘, in which inter-ethnic bridging interactions were replaced by more inward looking 
ethnic bonding ties, resulting in an ‗us versus them‘ rhetoric (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 6). 
Paradoxically, since 1993, and even more after the Arusha peace agreements of 2000, 
grassroots associations have mushroomed across Burundian hillsides. The explanation is 
twofold (Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002). On the one hand, civil war pushed the Burundian 
population even more towards self-help and mutual help, since the capacity of the state to 
deliver basic public services deteriorated dramatically. On the other hand, the proliferation 
of associations was externally driven, coinciding with the arrival of various international 
and multilateral aid agencies, donors, and NGOs. As a general strategy, the international 
community used bricks-and-mortar projects as a ‗vehicle to address social issues, by 
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strengthening inter-group trust and the capacity of communities to collaborate effectively 
and manage conflict without resort to violence.‘ (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 4). As 
prescribed by social capital literature, bridging multi-ethnic community associations were 
at the centre of this approach (for an elaborated illustration see Rupiya & Schuller tot 
Peursum, 2009). The emergence of a vibrant civil society at grassroots level, promoting 
reconciliation and community development, was therefore seen as a positive evolution as 
part of a conflict-sensitive development strategy for Burundi (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 7). 
Also for the three cases, which will be introduced in below, strengthening and the creation 
of associations was used as a major strategy to increase the capacity for conflict resolution 
on the studied collines. 
7.5 The cases : introducing new ‘institutional settings’  
Three American-based international NGOs introduced livelihood projects under the 
umbrella of the Livelihood Security Initiative Consortium (LSIC), funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) (LSIC, 2004).5 The projects were 
implemented in the north of Burundi between 2005 and 2007. Data and analysis are based 
on ten months of fieldwork on three collines (hillsides, administrative units) in 2006 and 
2007.6 Each of the collines presented an illustrative ‗typical case‘ (Patton, 2002: 236) of 
the different interventions of the three development agencies: Burara (CIBA), Tangara 
(LITA) and Cumba (CLC).7 The fieldwork was conducted in cooperation with a team of 
local research assistants by conducting focus group discussions and semi-structured 
interviews.8  




 The LSCI was a collaboration of four NGOs. It was present in four northern and central provinces: Gitega, 
Karuzi, Muyinga, and Kirundo. For practical (time and financial) and methodological (similar context, different 
intervention strategies) reasons the research focused on three NGO-projects in the northern province of Kirundo 
and Muyinga. 
6
 Clearly, my case study approach does not allow for generalizations for the entire scope of the projects, or for 
the whole of Burundi or other external interventions.  
7
 For the sake of discretion the identity of the different NGOs is not disclosed. I use pseudonyms, which stand 
for Consortium Inititative Burara (CIBA), Livelihoods Tangara (LITA), and Cumba Livelood Consortium 
(CLC). 
8
 To determine the number of focus groups, I used the theoretical concepts of redundancy and theoretical 
saturation (Krueger and Casey, 2001). Generally between six to ten people participated in the focus groups, 
which conforms to the rule of thumb (Patton, 2002: 385). In total, 81 focus groups were conducted with a total of 




The strengthening of community associations was linked to both the third and fourth 
specific objective within the logical framework of the Consortium project proposal (see 
annex 2, 3, and 4; and LSIC, 2004). On the one hand, associations were used to create 
new economic opportunities via the promotion of agro enterprise development and 
income generating activities (objective three). On the other hand, associations were used 
to reduce community conflicts (objective four). For all consortium partners, strengthening 
associational life, with special attention for the ethnic and gender dimensions, was a 
strategy to increase local capacity for conflict resolution. In fact, the increase in the 
number of associations and the number of households participating in associational life 
have been the only two indicators measuring this specific objective of community conflict 
reduction (Morinière et al., 2007: 25–26).9 As such, the Consortium proposal fits well the 
policy agenda, which urges to combine economic and social reconstruction during post-
conflict reconstruction (for general references, see section on social engineering in the 
introduction, for Burundi see chapter 6, section 6.3). Furthermore, it subscribes the 
hypothesis that associations are able to function as institutions that combine addressing 
concrete practical concerns (e.g. income generating activities) with reconciliation of 
adversial parties (e.g. reduction of community conflicts) through repeated social 
interaction (see e.g. Pickering, 2006: 79).  
It was possible to make a fruitful comparison because all three agencies had different 
philosophies on the use and utility of community associations. As will become clear, 
whereas LITA in Tangara was a strong advocate of working with associations, CLC in 
Cumba was much more critical of the associational approach, and used a more strict 
household approach. CIBA in Burara stood somewhere in between the two. Since all three 
collaborated differently with associations, focus groups discussions were adapted towards 
the different projects. For example, in the LITA case, most associations were producer 
groups and received similar support from LITA (seed credits). As such, focus groups were 
held on these associations in general. By contrast, in the CIBA case, associations had 
substantially different activities and received different support from CIBA: e.g. rice 
associations, tree nursery associations, anti-erosion associations. Here, road maps were 
used to analyse the specific evolution and problems of these particular associations. 
Lastly, since CLC did not work with associations, and a general absence of associations 




 This is a clear example of how ‗counting associations‘ is used as a proxy indicator (or a short-cut) to measure 
all kinds of complex social processes (in this case, local capacity for conflict resolution). It reflects both the 
demand from donors to present measurable results (numbers and percentages) – as if the number of associations 
will tell us anything about the capacity for conflict resolution on the three collines – and the popularity of 
Putnams equation of social capital with associations, exactly because it makes social capital a measurable 
concept in the hands of policy makers. 
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was observed, in this case, discussion groups focused more on the reasons for this 
absence.10  
7.5.1 CIBA on Burara Colline : associations as technical  
subcontractors 
From the three development agencies studied, CIBA had the most explicit focus on 
technical end results. This technical focus substantially guided the constitution of the 
community associations. In general, associations were used to solve collective action 
problems linked to specific technical project objectives. For the entire commune, fifty 
nine associations were set up and supported, of which nine were located on Burara colline. 
A first illustration of this approach are the anti-erosion associations. Because of 
deforestation and extensive land use, each season heavy rains cause floods, landslides and 
further degradation of the soil. Anti-erosion measures (contour lines and hedges) had 
previously been executed through food-for-work (FFW) and cash-for-work (CFW) 
programmes, also under the supervision of CIBA and the World Food Programme (WFP) 
in Burara. After the FFW programme stopped, CIBA preferred to make past efforts 
sustainable, raising public awareness to create one anti-erosion association for each 
colline, since soil protection was best organized by geographical entities. Although the 
associations were set up, the population did not accept these changes. Until that time, food 
aid compensation was the main incentive for the people involved. To their minds, 
associations represented a continuation of the FFW programme, as they expected to 
receive the same incentive (food aid) for the same work (contour lines), but delivered 
through a new channel or ‗gateway‘ (via the association instead of individually). For 
them, the new associations presented a kind of technical subcontractors, which should be 
paid according to the delivered services within the scope of the livelihood project, and not 
as a community association as such. The following quote, in which a man makes the 
comparison with working on his fields, illustrates how the humanitarian logic of 
compensation within the food-for-work programme and the need to see a direct personal 
benefit still determined people‘s motivation:  
We cannot work without compensation [for the anti-erosion association], because 
there is no individual benefit. The time I am working on my fields and I have a 
harvest, then I have a compensation. And if I have to dig contour lines, I want to dig 




 Within the Consortium project CLC did work with some associations, but this was in particular the case in the 
province of Karuzi. However, their overall strategy was to work closely with households. 
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in my own fields. If they don't give, we have not the force to work. (focus group, 
24/04/07, Burara). 
People also referred to a project of the World Bank, the Agricultural Rehabilitation and 
Support Project (PRASAB), as an example of the proper promotion of associations. This 
nationwide project was based on a grant system. Local associations could submit a grant 
proposal to a provincial committee to implement agricultural or livestock activities. For 
example, one association of 45 members, which was explicitly created in function of the 
PRASAB project, received a grant of 6.600.000 Fbu (6.600 USD) for pig farming and 
vegetable production as income generating activities. As one of its members, which also 
had been a member of the anti-erosion association, explained the difference:  
The [anti-erosion] association can only start up again activities, when there are 
compensations. Today, a lot of people join the associations of PRASAB because 
they have compensations. There we receive seeds or goats, these associations help 
us, there is an interest for us in it. (focus group, 12/04/07, Burara).  
 The situation was even more complex, since there was little or no coordination among 
the intervening actors. During the fieldwork, other NGOs like Help Channel and Agro-
Action Allemande (AAA), did compensate for the anti-erosion works on neighbouring 
hillsides. But CIBA also made things difficult for itself. While staff tried to motivate the 
population to implement anti-erosion activities unpaid within an associational logic, other 
staff paid the wages of the casual workers repairing the roads. Thus, when it became clear 
that food compensation would not follow, most of the anti-erosion associations stopped 
with their activities and ceased to exist. 
A second type of associations facilitated the implementation of the rice program in the 
Muhembuzi wetland. First, water user committees were established to maintain the 
irrigation system. Second, these committees were transformed into rice farmer groups: to 
ease the technical support and to structure the rice program. Third, all sixty nine rice 
farmer groups were grouped into a single rice cooperative, to ease commercialisation of 
the rice production, and improve market access. These stages clearly illustrate the 
assumed linear progression of community associations as mentioned in the theoretical 
section: bonding social capital (the ability to maintain local efforts in the management of 
the irrigation system) is complemented by bridging capital (the ability to create bridges 
and unite all rice farmers in the wetland) to create linking social capital (the ability to 
influence the rice market through the rice cooperative). However, also in this case, 
associations functioned as new ‗aid gateways‘. On the one hand, people accepted the new 
social infrastructure of water user committees, rice farmer groups and the cooperative 
because CIBA promised to buy up the rice production during project years. On the other 
hand, community associations served as temporary intermediaries to transfer knowledge, 
skills, and technology. As a member of a rice farmer group argued: 
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The associations were born for the aid of CIBA. Now we have the knowledge of 
modern agriculture. If the aid will stop, we will use this knowledge for our own 
fields, but the associations will stop existing‘ (focus group, 20/04/07, Burara).  
And indeed, when I interviewed one of the technicians of ISABU (Institut des Sciences 
Agronomiques du Burundi – a state agency), responsible for the follow up of the rice 
programme, again in May 2008 (approximately a half year after the end of the CIBA 
project), the majority of the rice farmer groups had ceased to exist (personal 
communication, ISABU technician, May 2008). 
A third and final example is that of tree nursery associations. Together with the 
integration of the contour lines, reforestation of the hillsides was key to preventing further 
erosion and degradation of the soil. Tree nursery associations were created to produce the 
plants necessary to achieve these goals. It is important to mention these tree nursery 
associations because the external development agency had a formal contract with the local 
associations. All tree associations signed a contract with CIBA. It stipulated the required 
production of plants for each year and the agreed purchasing price (15 Fbu / plant). Such a 
formal procedure has the positive potential of creating a more balanced relationship 
between two equal actors, with both rights and duties stipulated in the contract; but it also 
has the negative potential of linking the raison d‘être of the local community association 
too closely to the project. Also in this case, the associations' goals did not exceed the 
project boundaries: activities considerably decreased or stopped once the ‗contract‘ was 
implemented and both parties had been satisfied. As one member comments:  
CIBA had as an objective to protect the hills of Busoni, and especially Burara; they 
achieved this goal, because all activities are realised and the associations which 
have executed these activities all have received a compensation. (focus group, 
03/05/07, Burara). 
The perception of associations as ‗technical subcontractors‘ within the timeframe of the 
CIBA project was perhaps most clear in the case of these tree nursery associations, 
because the reimbursement for services provided was effectively formalized in a signed 
contract.  
 
In all three cases, CIBA used associations in specific situations where collective action 
problems arose, and where the social capital literature confirms their usefulness: natural 
resource management – the maintenance of the irrigation system in the wetland, and anti-
erosion and reforestation measures on the hillsides (e.g. Krishna & Uphoff, 1999; Pretty & 
Ward, 2001); and the commercialisation and marketing of agricultural production – the 
rice program in the wetland (e.g. Bebbington & Carroll, 2000; Sorensen, 2000). However, 
these associations never merged with existing social capital endowments. Most 
associations stayed exogenous or ‗alien‘ institutional settings, only having a reason for 
existence within the scope of the CIBA project.  
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To a great extent, this lack of institutional syncretism (cf. Galvan, 2007) can be 
explained by the fact that the associations, as new institutional settings, were designed 
according to external technological end results, rather than to local social capital 
endowments. In all three cases, their constitution and composition was based on technical 
criteria. For example, in the wetland, farmers were asked to form groups of 30 people with 
plots beside each other: these criteria of proximity and group size were not based on prior 
social organization in the wetland, but on maintaining the newly introduced irrigation 
system. The same holds true for the anti-erosion association: the fact that its scope 
coincides with the boundaries of Burara hillside is not a social but a geographical 
demarcation, based on the technical feasibility of the anti-erosion measures. In the case of 
the three nursery associations, it was the technical capacity of individual farmers that was 
a critical factor in bringing people together. None of these criteria, however, guarantee the 
existence of a ‗social basis‘ to maintain this technical collaboration among community 
members. Because of their close connection to technical end results, the newly created 
community associations were initially perceived as new ‗aid gateways‘; i.e. channels for 
the development agency to achieve technical project goals or for the local population to 
access support from the external agency.  
However, concerning the particular situation of post-conflict reconstruction, the 
associations did succeed in creating bridging ties between the different ethnic groups. The 
NGO kept lists indicating the multi-ethnic and gendered character of both the associations 
and their committees. In all associations both Hutu and Tutsi were represented. Some 
associations even had Twa members, an often forgotten and extremely deprived ethnic 
minority in the past. But the creation of bridging associations presented a potentially ‗false 
sense‘ of inclusiveness. The Busoni community has a segregated ethnic outlook: most 
Tutsi live in the centre, whereas most Hutu live in the surrounding hillsides. Because of 
this clear geographical segregation, and the presence of a large group of Tutsi in the 
centre, ethnicity still played a key role (in comparison to the other studied hills). As a 
consequence, most associations were Tutsi (centre) or Hutu (hills) dominated. Members 
openly indicated that they searched some extra Tutsi or Hutu to make their association 
multi-ethnic because CIBA asked for it. They called them Hutu or Tutsi figurants (or 'bit 
players'). Although this did not result in exclusion or ethnic tensions within associations, it 
does indicate that their multi-ethnic character was to some extent artificial, in order to 
meet CIBA criteria, and was not representative for the actual situation. 
7.5.2 LITA on Tangara Colline: associations of the elite 
LITA, compared to both other development agencies, used the most associational 
approach. LITA favours participatory processes, rather than (technical) end results. 
Favouring the associational approach, they made associations the main beneficiaries of 
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this new livelihood project. Participation in the project was therefore conditional on 
associational membership. This conditionality resulted in a new boost of associations on 
Tangara colline: 
Thereafter LITA has come to sensitize the population that they will ownly help 
associations, by distributing seed and even goats. On that moment, that was the 
motivation to become a member. Since that moment associations have multiplied. 
(focus group, 04/06/07, Tangara). 
For the entire province of Muyinga, the project supported 176 community associations, of 
which 26 were present on Tangara colline.   
By contrast to CIBA, LITA used a relatively open-ended approach for the creation and 
development of community associations. Their use was not linked to specific technical 
end results, and no geographical and/or technical criteria defined membership. LITA only 
required the associations to be agricultural, multi-ethnic and formalized (registration, 
statutes, etc.). Apart from these requirements, all community members could create or join 
an association and every association could define their own goals and activities. To 
motivate the population, LITA offered seed credits to the associations and constructed 
hangars as storage facilities for their harvests. For each hangar, a committee was made 
responsible for monitoring both the seed credits and the storage facilities. 
Unlike CIBA's approach, this helped associations to integrate into community social 
life. The situation in Tangara shows how an exogenous approach can merge with local 
dynamic processes of social capital. At the same time, however, the LITA case 
demonstrates that this does not necessarily lead to better results. The reason was that 
associations, as new institutional settings, did not develop into ‗building blocks‘ of 
bridging social capital. Instead, they reproduced locally ‗unresponsive‘ linking capital 
(Putnam, 2004: 669), manifest in personalistic patron-client ties. This began with the 
problem of elite capture.  
Elite capture of community associations had some previous history on Tangara colline. 
People explicitly referred to the breaking up of the ‗mother of all associations‘ Twiyungwe 
to explain where and when this problem began with associations. The Twiyungwe 
association started in an IDP site near Rugari in Muyinga province, to which Tutsi from 
Tangara fled after the 1993 violence. When the security situation improved, these Tutsi 
returned to a resettlement camp in Tangara, and brought with them their association. At 
that time, it was the only association in Tangara colline, and it was supported by WFP. 
The association was subsequently audited and found to be mismanaged, before the 
president disappeared with the association's funds. Instead of staying unified in one 
association, several members of the committee of Twiyungwe, which belonged to the local 
elite, took advantage of the situation and split to form their own association, motivated by 
a possible collaboration with WFP. The ‗associational logic‘ to access aid was therefore 
already understood by the local elite. With the arrival of LITA's livelihood project, access 
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to project benefits was made conditional on membership in associations. As such, the 
local elite applied the same ‗associational logic‘, many of them becoming the president of 
their own newly created association to access external aid, this time not from WFP but 
from LITA. As a focus group participant summarized the logic behind the splitting and 
multiplication of associations: 
When there was the first association [Twiyungwe], people saw the aid that WFP 
gave. The people were motivated. But the president consumed all aid, and the 
committee members [les comitards] created their own associations to profit. After 
that, LITA came to sensitize that they will only work with associations. Because of 
this aid [of LITA] people were even more motivated, and the problems with the 
presidents got even worse. (focus group, 04/06/07, Tangara). 
In the case of the LITA project, most of the associations were captured by le club 
d‘hangar or ‗the committee of the storehouse‘: a small group of local petty traders and 
members of the local administration under the leadership of the chef de colline. This 
committee centralised the control and supervision of project activities, in particular all 
LITA seed credits that were channelled through the storehouse. The powerful 
intermediary role of the club was based on the fact that committee members played two 
different roles: they not only distributed the seed credits among the associations but also 
received seed credits as presidents of their own associations. Therefore, the local elite 
occupied most leadership positions in both the associations and the storehouse committee. 
How this associational logic of the elite to access project benefits was enmeshed in local 
politics and power struggles was nicely illustrated with what happened to the association 
of the chef de sous-colline of Kivoga after he was not reelected in the 2005 elections? As 
one of the members explained: 
I became member of the association in 2003, after the sensitization of LITA. I‘ve 
contributed 1000 Fbu as contribution [member fee], but until now we haven‘t seen 
anything of our money. Next week we will complain to the committee. We don‘t 
trust the president anymore. If the committee doesn‘t listen to us, we think to go to 
the commune. It was the president himself who created the association. In 2003 he 
was still chef de sous-colline [Frodebu], but he lost the elections. After that the 
association hasn‘t received a lot of aid from LITA because the new chef de sous-
colline [CNDD-FDD] has also created an association and now it‘s this association 
that gets a lot. (focus group, 19/03/07, Tangara). 
This problem of elite capture resulted into two main consequences. First of all, most 
associations had internal problems of mismanagement. The internal democratic character 
of the associations was minimal: presidents rarely accepted criticism, there were no 
information meetings, members were not informed about the financial situation, and 
presidents made financial transactions without any control. There were many reports of 
corruption and embezzlement of project funds, in addition to the embezzlement of the 
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collective harvest and the financial capital of the associations (normally deposited with 
COOPEC, a rural bank), and the complaint by ordinary members that their association 
became simply a vehicle for the president and his friends to access cheaper daily labour to 
prepare their fields. During a focus group with members of associations, one of them 
nicely listed the most widespread internal problems: 
The first problem is the exploitation of the members by the committee [of the 
association], and we can‘t oppose the president. The second problem is the aid, of 
which a large part goes to the committee. The third problem is the lack of benefits in 
the association. It‘s impossible that we always go and work for an association 
without something to take home. The fourth problem is the fact that the presidents 
embezzle the harvests or the goods of the association. You can‘t continue working 
for the committee without taking something home.  (focus group, 31/05/07, 
Tangara).  
The question then is: why ordinary members still accepted these associations? Some 
associations ceased to exist, but most carried on. The reasoning of the members reflected 
the ‗pareto improvement‘ argument of Platteau (2004) in his work on elite capture in 
West-Africa. They preferred the unfair practices within their associations while still 
receiving some aid, rather than quitting the associations and losing all hope: as 
membership of the association still yielded a pareto improvement (ibid.: 227). Both parties 
were also dependent upon each other: the elite needed farmers to populate their 
associations, farmers needed a member of the elite with links to le club d‘hangar. This 
interdependency between elite members and the population, in order to acces project 
benefits, underpinned the creation of many associations, and according to its members, it 
will also mark the end of many associations when project benefits will dry up: 
Even if they are busy with stealing, we wait for the day which brings help of LITA. 
If LITA leaves, we drop it. (focus group, 04/06/07, Tangara). 
 
Even now some members of the association have no confidence [in the committee 
and the president], but they persist because they still hope for aid; so if there is no 
more aid, if there is at least no promise for aid, if there is no sensitization, 
everything will stop. (focus group, 21/06/07, Tangara). 
 
The associations are only here because the comité d‘hangar [responsible for the 
seed credits for the associations] and the presidents had a large profit. The ordinary 
members were happy when they got a small benefit. When LITA leaves, the profit 
for the presidents is finished, so the associations are finished. (focus group, 
04/06/07, Tangara). 
 
If LITA stops with assisting, the profit for the presidents is gone and also for the 
ordinary members it is gone. They no longer need us to enrich themselves and we 
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can‘t hope anymore that we will receive something. (focus group, 04/06/07, 
Tangara). 
A second consequence of the elite capturing the community associations, was its 
impact on the broader community. The associations not only created internal problems, 
but also pitted different groups against each other within the community. Associations 
worked exclusively rather than inclusively. First, their unparalleled splitting and 
multiplication created jealousy and tensions between the associations. Membership was 
kept to a minimum in order to maximise profits. A teacher of the local primary school 
said:  
Mostly, the creation of associations is done secretly, not everyone can join. If you‘re 
not a friend of the creator [of the association], you can‘t know an association has 
been created, and if you ask thereafter to join, he will ask a high contribution. Then 
they are sure that other people will not come to their association and that the 
benefits are for a small group of people. (interview teacher, 16/03/2007, Tangara) 
As a consequence, new associations popped up at regular intervals, increasing 
competition between them to access external aid. In this respect, the situation in Tangara 
reflects an inverse evolution – the opposite – of the assumed linear progression of 
community associations. Instead of opening up to new members or seeking synergy with 
other associations (transforming bonding into bridging social capital), the multiplication 
of associations further fragmented the social arena in Tangara commune (creating more of 
the same bonding social capital).  Second, what was referred to as the ‗secret‘ of le club 
d‘hangar caused a lot of anger. One man created his own association, became president, 
but invented a list of members. With good contacts with le club d‘hangar and some 
bribes, this ‗fake‘ association was put on the list to receive a seed credit from LITA: 
A lot of associations are created by the rich, who say that they have an association 
with for example 25 members or more, but they are alone and they get all aid from 
LITA (focus group, 04/06/07, Tangara). 
 
There are also associations who don‘t exist. There is the president and he puts the 
names of his wife and children and other names that don‘t exist. (focus group, 
04/06/07, Tangara). 
 
A lot of presidents are in the comité d‘hangar or have friends there. It are the 
presidents without members. That way they receive many sacks [of seeds] and there 
are no sacks left for the real associations. This is mainly the case for beans and 
groundnut, there is much profit (focus group, 04/06/07, Tangara).   
An example of such a ‗fake‘ association was Kazoya Neza, of which Rachid was the 
president (see also chapter 5, section 5.6.3. on his function as middleman). As a local 
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petty trader he belonged to the local elite, but he also had good contacts with the chef de 
colline as they were both Muslim, and because Rachid rallied for the CNDD-FDD party. 
Therefore, he belonged to the club d‘hangar (although he was not a formal member of the 
comité d‘hangar) and accessed project benefits through his proper association. Another 
example was Terimbezi, illustrating the individual/familial character of many 
associations: it was created by a man and a family member (who was also conseil 
collinaire of the chef de colline), with the names of still other family members (wife, 
daughter, …) as members of the association. Also one of the daughters of the chef de 
colline was president of her personal association, of which a list of members was hard to 
find (although the association had official papers, as asked by LITA).  
This commerce in associations created tensions between the so-called ‗real‘ and ‗false‘ 
associations. Although they never blamed their own associations, most interviewed 
presidents of associations (in particular those without connections with the chef de colline) 
spontaneously mentioned this conflict between ‗real‘ and ‗false‘ associations, others gave 
particular examples (although it was not always easy to check all these examples). Also 
the staff of LITA was aware of these problems, but for them it was of course impossible to 
check for each association if the list of members matched with physical persons on the 
colline. At the very least it became clear that the use of associations to access project 
benefits created tensions and insinuations between these constantly multiplying 
associations, false or not. 
Lastly, a vast majority of poor people who simply could not afford to pay the 
membership fees or were not ‗invited‘ by the elite to join an association felt excluded 
from the LITA project, as they received no benefits at all. In the perception of these 
people, the associational strategy of LITA deprived them of fair and equal development 
opportunities. For them it was clear that if LITA wanted to include everybody, this could 
not be achieved via associations. 
 
In sum, community associations did succeed in syncretising with local endowments of 
social capital. Unfortunately, they reproduced ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital 
(Putnam, 2004: 669; Titeca & Vervisch, 2008). On the one hand, the internal organization 
of many associations mirrored existing endowments of vertical relations between patrons 
(president/committee) and clients (ordinary members), resulting in mismanagement and a 
lack of accountability and participatory decision-making processes. On the other hand, 
associations reproduced existing power structures within the community, and intensified 
feelings of exclusion, because of elite capture. 
This in turn questions the ethnic focus when promoting bridging community 
associations. As the Burundian conflict is analysed as an ethnic conflict, most post-
conflict activities focus on reconciling both ethnic groups. However, after consulting 
members of these associations in Tangara, they immediately mentioned the fact that 
ethnic groups and women were both represented; they were even more proud that Twa 
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were also members of their association (cf. CIBA in Burara). They knew how external 
actors analysed ‗their‘ conflict, and so presented this discourse automatically. Still, ethnic 
tensions never caused problems in the associations, and in this way they succeeded in 
creating bridging capital.  
However, the associations did create exclusion. Access to project funds through 
community associations was a privilege of the local elite, while the vast majority of the 
community was excluded from membership. This exclusionary governance of 
associations, resulted in a concrete example of structural violence, as discriminatory 
access deprived people from new opportunities to enhance their situation. This triggered 
tensions within the community, but not along ethnic lines.11 The LITA case therefore 
illustrates how a tailored focus on multi-ethnic associations may create a ‗false sense‘ of 
inclusiveness on the ground (the multi-ethnic and bridging character of the associations). 
It may also neglect or reproduce a more general, deep-seated problem of social exclusion 
(the exclusionary and ‗unresponsive‘ linking character of the associations). This is 
because it produced economic (or class), rather than ethnic, exclusion. 
7.5.3 CLC on Cumba Colline – a hillside without associations 
CLC used a strict household approach for the livelihood project. Three reasons explain 
why. First, CLC‘s intervention strategy and philosophy focuses on processes of individual 
change, rather than social processes (LITA) or technical opportunities (CIBA). So, 
whereas CIBA chose specific groups as end beneficiaries according to geographical 
and/or technical criteria, and LITA used associational membership as an explicit 
precondition, CLC identified their beneficiaries along criteria of vulnerability (orphans, 
widows, people living with HIV/AIDS, etc.). Lastly, CLC had previously negative 
experiences with associations, before this livelihood project started, and questioned the 
appropriateness of this strategy to reach the population. This argument is expressed in the 
following quote from the project officer (interview, 29/05/2007, Muyinga):  
The philosophy of the genesis of these associations is to receive aid. If an NGO 
arrives to distribute aid, the people quickly get organized to receive this aid. But if 
the NGO and the donors have cut off funds, the people have divided the aid up 
among each other. Burundians have an individual psychology, not an associational 
one. They want to work individually. These are opportunistic associations and not 
associative [associations].  




 An illustrative example on this point was the fact that both the current (CNDD-FDD party and Hutu) and 
former (Uprona party and Tutsi) chef de collines were members of le club d‘hangar and controlled much of the 
project benefits together. 
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The CLC intervention gave us the opportunity to observe what happened when no 
external agency was raising awareness and motivating the population to create new 
associations. As might be expected, I found almost no associations in Cumba. In Burara 
(CIBA) and even more in Tangara (LITA) the main incentive to create new associations 
was the project aid accessed through these associations. The CLC intervention confirms 
this general observation by turning the argument upside down: precisely because the 
external intervention did not channel project aid through associations, associations were 
almost non-existent on Cumba colline. According to the local population, the raison 
d‘être of associations is to receive aid. As one man explained: ‗There are not many 
associations because even the associations that exist did not succeed once to get help from 
a NGO. That‘s why people abandon their associations and no new associations are 
created‘ (focus group, 25/05/2007, CLC project, Cumba). People also explicitly referred 
to the importance of patrons who could act as gatekeepers: there was a lack of people 
willing to introduce the associations to external agencies in order to receive aid. As there 
was no incentive for the elite to interfere with the creation of associations, the local elite 
was much less involved in associational life and no elite capture was mentioned by the 
population. By contrast, the population of Cumba blamed the local administration for a 
lack of initiative because they did not approach NGOs to gain support for associations. 
As such, the CLC intervention illustrates that reasons, incentives and motivations to 
create associations on Cumba colline became structurally adapted to the presence of 
external assistance. In fact, CLC was criticized because they did not work through 
associations, like all other international organizations. This reasoning was based on 
various experiences. Firstly, CLC had worked with associations in the past, and the 
population urgently asked the organization to start again with supporting associations. 
However, this ‗opportunistic‘ intention to access project aid through associations was 
exactly the reason why CLC stopped their support. Secondly, the population compared 
their situation with other hillsides: ‗Here we don‘t get [aid]. We hear that associations on 
other hillsides are supported and get aid. Why don‘t the NGOs come to here to support the 
associations? If they come, a lot of associations will originate‘ (focus group, 25/05/2007, 
CLC project, Cumba). Lastly, as in Burara, people compared the CLC project with the 
nationwide PRASAB project of the World Bank that was in its initial phase in Cumba. For 
the population, this was a ‗promising‘ project, as associations would be linked to a 
concrete incentive (in particular livestock), so creating the association was clearly 
worthwhile. For the population of Cumba it was ultimately clear that no associations 
would grow without external interest; this was confirmed by the small number of ‗only‘ 
three associations on Cumba colline. 
 
The Cumba case illustrates the long-term effects of the general policy of external actors 
in Burundi to support the creation of associations. The externally driven character of the 
proliferation of associations was already mentioned (Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002). As a 
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consequence, the perception of associations as ‗gateways‘ to aid was widespread on 
Burundian hillsides, and points to the general vulnerability of externally driven 
associations, reducing the incentive to create associations to the availability of external 
funds. In the long-term this can reduce local dynamics of social organization. (Crowley et 
al., 2005: 15). It reflects a situation in which sustained exposure to exogenous new 
‗institutional settings‘ (external agencies working through associations) durably changes 
endogenous local dynamics of social capital building. In contrast with the LITA project, 
where associations became too  embedded in local patron-client networks, the situation on 
Cumba colline illustrates the long-term effects of the other extreme of institutional 
syncretism, i.e. the wholesale adoption of local social organization towards external 
incentives.  
7.6 Conclusions 
All three case studies highlight different problems of the constructability of social capital. 
First, CIBA illustrates how an exogenous process of social capital building can remain 
exogenous. A ‗strong‘ social engineering approach led to ‗alien‘ associations: externally 
introduced ‗institutional settings‘ which never merged with locally produced social capital 
endowments. This enables us to redefine the ‗participation orthodoxy‘ in social capital 
terms: that it is no longer ‗sufficient to permit ―them‖ to participate in ―our‖ projects‘ as 
our projects are not going to change their social capital endowments (McGee quoted in 
Crowley et al., 2005: 16). With its focus on technical end results, CIBA gave the local 
population few opportunities to adapt their social life to the newly introduced institutional 
settings. The associations never disassociated from the project, functioning as technical 
subcontractors.  
Second, LITA illustrates how an exogenous process of social capital building can 
merge with endogenous social capital endowments; but this does not automatically mean 
positive effects: their ‗soft‘ social engineering approach (bottom-up and open-ended) led 
to ‗uncivic‘ associations, as they adapted towards locally produced ‗unresponsive‘ forms 
of linking capital. Because of LITA‘s soft approach, room was left for the local population 
to merge the new institutional setting of the associations with local norms and rules of 
social organization. Because of elite capture, the associations became too embedded in 
existing vertical patron-client ties, a process that was not appreciated by the local 
population. In contrast to the CIBA case, this conclusion highlights the limitations of 
participatory approaches, as they often underestimate the ‗endogenous community 
imperfections‘ (Platteau & Abraham, 2002), and overestimate the homogeneity of 
communities (Williams, 2004). This also highlights the ‗downside‘ (Portes & Landolt, 
1996) of social capital. Most policy has been influenced by a romanticized idea of social 
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capital, only stressing its positive side. This obscures how development agencies are often 
confronted with the negative effects of social capital, in this case the constraining and 
‗unresponsive‘ vertical patron-client ties, restricting the positive work of the newly 
introduced associations. 
Finally, CLC demonstrates how endogenous social capital endowments have the 
potential of being adapted in the long-term towards exogenous processes of social capital 
building. This shows that a policy of external support to creating organizations for the 
poor affected the broader environment and diminished the local dynamic for the poor to 
organize themselves (Crowley et al., 2005: 17).  
 
Although problematic, the three cases support the constructability view, warning not to 
underestimate long-term effects of external interventions on existing social capital. In 
particular, if one accepts that development projects are always about ‗social engineering‘, 
the LITA and CIBA cases indicate that the real challenge lies in developing new 
‗institutional settings‘ that are ‗soft‘ enough to adapt to prior social capital endowments, 
but ‗strong‘ enough to change or reinforce these endowments to bring positive results. 
This puts institutional syncretism at the centre of the debate on social capital building. As 
Galvan (2007: 70) explains: ‗institutional syncretism, […], is neither the wholesale 
adoption of externally derived, ―modern‖ rules and norms, nor the unreflexive 
reproduction of existing local or ―traditional‖ regularised habits and practices‘. In sum, the 
task is to avoid both the absence (cf. the CIBA case) and ‗excess‘ (cf. the LITA case) of 
institutional syncretism (Galvan, 2007: 70). Departing from Galvan, this article focused 
more on the supply side: the new ‗institutional settings‘ offered by the development 
agencies. This leads to practical conclusions for the design of new institutional settings. 
 
First, my findings support the argument that external interventions confuse the 
development of associations, by abruptly inducing a high stock of linking social capital, 
injecting new resources, ideas and information to the association (Titeca & Vervisch, 
2008). This highlights the importance of the ‗right‘ tangible incentives and the functioning 
of ‗incentivised voluntarism‘ (Gillinson, 2004: 6). All three cases have at least one issue 
in common: community associations were primarily perceived as ‗gateways‘ to aid. 
Because of external incentives people no longer joined the associations voluntarily. Their 
voluntarism was incentivised, as the project aid redirected members‘ motivations. This 
explains: a) the subcontracting nature of the associations in the case of CIBA; b) why the 
elite captured the associations in the LITA project; and c) the absence of community 
associations in the case of CLC. The CIBA case further illustrates the need for a 
streamlined approach of incentives, both in time (transition from a food-for-work to a 
developmental logic) and between different actors (some give, others don‘t). The cases 
generally indicate that the incentive should be designed as an initiator but not as the most 
important motivator of participants' behaviour; the external incentive has to be substituted 
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by an internal incentive (which is preferably more attractive). It seems that development 
agencies need to tailor their incentives, adapting them to the local situation. At present, 
they are driven more by the need to disburse funds and distribute resources, rather than 
focusing on the local dynamics of associational life, i.e. they need to act ‗coherent‘ to 
donor logics more than to the needs on the ground (cf. de Sardan, 2005: 141). 
 
Second, the case studies seem to confirm earlier findings which question the reverse 
logic inherent in the ‗social engineering‘ approach of external interventions, that is, the 
‗external‘ constructability of social capital, or the assumption that linkages with the 
external intervener are capable of building ‗bonds and bridges‘ within communities.  
(Titeca & Vervisch, 2008). In the CIBA and LITA cases, the impact of the external 
interventions turned negative because the associations lacked sufficient bonding and 
bridging social capital endowments to handle the externally induced linking social capital. 
In the CIBA case, membership was primarily based on external technical criteria, which 
did not guarantee that there was an effective ‗social basis‘ from which this technical 
collaboration between farmers could be build. Similarly, in the LITA case, associations 
were not externalizations of existing social organization, but predominantly opportunity 
coalitions (between the elite and farmers) to access resources. As explained above, on the 
supply side, the content and phasing of the external incentive (linking capital) will be an 
important factor, but the CIBA and LITA cases also question the demand side (social 
capital endowments): is the presence of locally accepted, appropriated and supported 
social organization not a prerequisite for an external intervention to be successful? At 
least it makes more explicit the difference between ‗strengthening‘ and ‗building‘ social 
structure, or more concretely, between ‗self-organisations of the poor‘ and ‗externally 
created or supported organizations of the poor‘ (Crowley et al., 2005). It moderates the 
expectations vis-à-vis external interventions: are they able to ‗create‘, or should we be 
more modest, and assume that they can only ‗upgrade‘ existing social structure? To a 
great extent, this distinction is a false one, since there is no such society that is free of 
social structure, and therefore every intervention will upgrade (or downgrade) what was 
already there. But it does highlight that the choice of what particular local social structures 
should be upgraded is a crucial one. This engenders a contextual view, since it assumes 
that there is only a potential match when (i) the proper social capital endowments are 
‗triggered‘ by (ii) an external incentive which is tailored and adapted to the particular 
functioning of these endowments and the context in which they inhere. 
 
Which brings me to a third conclusion. If social capital cannot be built from zero, 
correct knowledge of prior social capital endowments is priority number one to design 
new ‗institutional settings‘. One needs to know which endowments should be ‗triggered‘. 
The brief historical summary in section four explained the lack of a strong associational 
tradition in this society. It highlighted how: a) patron-client ties play an important role; b) 
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social organization is weak beyond the family; and c) the civil war shattered social 
cohesion and organization. In addition to the the mechanism of ‗incentivized 
voluntarism‘, and the more contextual and organizational factors influencing the use of 
associations for each NGO-project, such a broader historical view further enabled us to 
better understand why associations did not evolve as expected. This is not to say that 
associations, as new ‗institutional settings‘, cannot become a promising element in the 
further development of Burundian society, as this would follow a radical ‗endowment‘ 
view, in which societies are rigid and can only change over longer periods of time. Based 
on my own experiences when working in Bujumbura Rural with the Organisation d‘Appui 
à l‘Autopromotion (OAP), I believe associations are not a dead-end in Burundi (see 
Beuret & Fino, 2009). From 1992 onwards OAP has supported the population in 
Bujumbura Rural, and associations have since then been used to achieve this objective of 
autopromotion. Because of the sustained efforts of OAP, but also because of the 
proximity of Bujumbura and its economic opportunities (offering a market for products), a 
more ‗entreprenuerial‘ attitude has been (re-)installed in these areas, which today gives 
rise to sustainable local associations. Another example are the long-standing efforts of 
INADES to organize the coffee farmers (Kimonyo & Ntiranyibagira, 2007). Both 
examples illustrate that associations have potential in Burundi, but that success depends 
upon many different contextual factors and variables, of which regional integration (close 
to Bujumbura), and particular crop production (coffee) are only two. In sum, it demands 
correct knowledge of existing social organization, and in particular, the multiplicity of 
contextual factors influencing it. 
 
Finally, can we conclude that community associations were the right ‗idea‘ at the right 
time for post-conflict Burundi? The general idea of multi-ethnic bridging associations 
sheds some light on the matter. After conflict, ethnic bonding social capital should be 
transformed into multi-ethnic bridging social capital, hence the importance of multi-ethnic 
associations. But this led to the creation of a ‗false sense‘ of inclusiveness. In the case of 
CIBA, the multi-ethnic character of the newly created associations was unrelated to the 
actual ethnically segregated and sometimes tense situation in the community. In the LITA 
case, this ‗false sense‘ of inclusiveness even worked as a smokescreen, as these multi-
ethnic associations reproduced the more fundamental problem of ‗unresponsive‘ linking 
social capital, resulting in economic instead of ethnic exclusion.  
 
This echoes the more general critique on community associations as ‗universal 
blueprints‘ to create social capital (e.g. Molenaers, 2003). In the particular case of post-
conflict reconstruction, bridging community associations are indeed a global and 
‗modern‘ idea, which has to be framed within the broader ‗liberal peace‘ model. The goal 
of this model, also applied in Burundi, is the rapid modernization of societies through the 
construction of new and liberal institutions. (Daley, 2008: 34). Uvin (2005) argues that the 
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introduction of such institutions on a national level in Burundi has installed a liberal-
democratic facade, without substance or content, as the existing system and power 
structures undermine the imported system from the inside out. The LITA case describes 
exactly the same process on a micro scale, with a disconnection between the structural and 
cognitive components of social capital (Molenaers, 2003: 114). Although a multitude of 
bridging community associations were present (structural component, as a liberal-
democratic ‗facade‘), these were disconnected from their horizontality and embedded trust 
(cognitive component), and adjusted towards the existing ‗system‘ of vertical power 
relations. As such, the idea of bridging associations in the Burundian context presents us 
with a micro-manifestation of  one of the main shortcomings of this ‗liberal peace‘ model; 
that is, its incapacity and unwillingness to enter into dialogue and syncretise with local 




Chapter 8  
The solidarity chain: post-conflict reconstruction 
and social capital building on three Burundian 
hillsides1 
Rebuilding social capital stocks after conflict has become an essential 
component of post-conflict reconstruction activities. At the community level 
this policy is translated into projects that combine economic recovery with 
reinforcing social cohesion through small-scale participatory 'bottom-up' 
projects. This article presents an ethnographic examination of the ‗solidarity 
chain‘ as an example of this approach. It concerns a livestock credit rotating 
scheme, which combined livestock restocking with the promotion of social 
cohesion on Burundian hillsides after more than 10 years of civil war. Our 
main findings are twofold. First, it is argued that the distinction between 
bonding, bridging, and linking social capital proves a useful, analytical 
framework to assess the impact of such activities on social community 
cohesion. In particular, the findings show how a combination of ‗weak‘ 
bonding and ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital accounts for the solidarity 
chain‘s failure to nurture more inclusive bridging social capital. Second, the 




 In a restricted version submitted to Journal of Eastern African Studies as Vervisch, T. ‗The solidarity chain: 
post-conflict reconstruction and social capital building on three Burundian hillsides‘. 
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general assumption that post-conflict reconstruction policy should focus on 
the transformation of exclusive bonding into inclusive bridging social capital 
is nuanced and refined: the findings present micro-empirical insights 
reaffirming the need to focus also on both the ‗deficiency‘ and ‗dark side‘ of 
social capital in post-conflict situations. 
8.1 Introduction 
Broadly speaking, ‗social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable people to 
act collectively‘. (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000: 226). In the early 1990s, the social capital 
debate focused on development, democracy and civil society; but it has recently been 
integrated into research on violence, conflict and post-conflict reconstruction research and 
policy (e.g. Barron et al., 2004; Colletta & Cullen, 2000a, 2000b; Goodhand et al., 2000; 
Goodhand, 2006; Morfit, 2002; Pickering, 2006; Richards et al., 2004; Varshney, 2001). 
It is assumed that conflict damages and transforms a nation‘s social capital, and as such, 
recovery from conflict demands the reconstruction, not only of a nation‘s infrastructure, 
but also of its social fabric (Colletta & Cullen, 2000a). This social capital argument has 
been used by the World Bank and other international development corporations to justify 
‗social engineering‘ operations, alongside physical reconstruction and rehabilitation 
efforts after conflict (Englebert, 2001: 16-17). Thus, external interventions are requested 
to build social capital, as it serves a double objective in post-conflict situations: economic 
recovery through poverty reduction and peace-building through strengthening social 
cohesion. Central in this social capital approach are projects on the community level that 
rebuild trust and social cohesion through small-scale participatory 'bottom-up' projects 
(Moser & Shrader, 1999:11). 
In this article we examine the solidarity chain as an illustration of such activities. It is a 
livestock rotating credit scheme, designed to link livestock restocking (economic 
recovery) with the restoration of trust and social cohesion (social recovery) in Burundian 
rural communities after 10 years of civil and ethnic strife. The findings are based on 
ethnographic case studies of three collines (hillsides – administrative unit) in northern 
Burundi, where the solidarity chain was implemented as one of the main activities in the 
scope of the Livelihood Security Initiative Consortium (LSIC). 
The article questions the ease with which post-conflict reconstruction activities are 
requested to build new stocks of social capital in post-conflict situations. It is argued that 
the literature referring to the bonding, bridging and linking dimensions of social capital is 
useful as an analytical framework to analyse and assess the effectiveness of such 
activities. Only a close analysis, placing social capital ‗in context‘ and accepting its 
‗multi-dimensional‘ nature, can deliver a realistic appraisal of social capital building. 
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Second, the findings question the general assumption that post-conflict reconstruction 
policy should focus on transforming exclusive bonding social capital into inclusive 
bridging social capital. In the Burundi case this assumption signifies a transformation of 
ethnic bonding into multi-ethnic bridging social networks. Yet the case studies present 
micro-empirical insights that suggest i) a fundamental or general lack of bonding social 
capital and ii) the presence of ‗unresponsive‘ or ‗exploitative‘ linking social capital 
(Putnam, 2004; Titeca & Vervisch, 2008) acting as a conflict trigger.  
The section following the introduction introduces our theoretical framework, applying 
the bonding/bridging/linking social capital distinction to conflict settings. In the second 
section we briefly introduce the research context and methodology. The third section 
introduces the solidarity chain as our case study. In the next two sections a detailed 
analysis of the solidarity chain and the problems encountered will be presented. It will be 
argued that a combination of ‗weak‘ bonding ties and ‗unresponsive‘ linking ties accounts 
for the disappointing social impact of the solidarity chain. Finally, we draw both 
theoretical and policy conclusions.  
8.2 Social capital and post-conflict reconstruction – bonds, 
bridges and linkages  
8.2.1 Analytical framework: bonding, bridging and linking social 
capital 
The distinction between bonding, bridging and linking social capital has pushed the 
analysis of social capital by questioning how these social networks ‗differ from one 
another in ways that are relevant to their consequences‘ (Putnam, 2004: 668-69). Gittel & 
Vidal (1998) define bonding social capital as relations between people who see 
themselves as being similar. Instead, bridging social capital refers to relations between 
people who are not alike in terms of age, gender, class, ethnic group, religion or 
geographical area. Kinship, ethnic and close friendship relations and relationships with 
neighbours are typical examples of bonding social capital. Bridging social capital cuts 
across these social gaps. Szreter & Woolcock (2004) define linking social capital as a 
subtype of bridging social capital, as it connects people across explicit vertical power 
differentials in society. As such, the key function of linking social capital is the capacity 
to leverage resources, information and ideas from formal institutions such as bankers, law 
enforcement officers, social workers, health care providers, NGO officials, politicians and 
public administration in general (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; Woolcock, 2002).  
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All three forms of social capital have their downsides (Portes & Landolt, 1996). Strong 
bonding ties can be a burden in the form of obligations and commitments upon 
community members. These hinder social mobility and can produce exclusionary forms of 
social capital in terms of gender, ethnic group, religion, caste and so on (Colleta & Cullen, 
2000a, 2000b). Although bridging ties have the potential to be more inclusive, they may 
still have antisocial outcomes, as illustrated by drug cartels (Rubio, 1997). Linking social 
capital also features ‗responsive‘ and ‗unresponsive‘ dimensions (Putnam, 2004). 
Whereas the ‗responsive‘ form can for example lead towards trusting ties between 
communities and their representatives, the ‗unresponsive‘ form leads towards nepotism, 
corruption and oppression (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; Titeca & Vervisch, 2008).  
This theoretical framework produces some broad arguments. First, it argues that 
different combinations of social capital dimensions explain the diverse range of outcomes. 
Second, these combinations are dynamic as they vary by context and over time. Third, 
these combinations can produce both positive and negative outcomes. As such, the 
distinction between bonding, bridging and linking social capital points to the multi-
dimensional and contextual character of social capital (De Silva et al., 2007; Szreter, 
2002; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  
8.2.2 Bonds, bridges, linkages and conflict: main arguments 
Social capital scholarship identifies a threefold connection between conflict and social 
capital. First, the basic assumption is that violent conflict destroys social capital. War and 
conflict zones are defined as ‗zones of social capital deficiency‘, as trust and social 
cohesion are eroded in such circumstances (Goodhand et al., 2000: 390).  Second, conflict 
transforms social capital. Conflict is identified with weak bridging and linking, and strong 
bonding social capital (Colletta & Cullen, 2000a, 2000b). In particular, it is assumed that 
conflict transforms inter-group or inclusive bridging social capital into intra-group or 
exclusive bonding social capital. Third, in times of conflict, societies are confronted with 
the ‗dark side‘ of social capital (Portes & Landolt, 1996), as new networks and 
engagements are formed. These are actively used to participate in and prolong conflict, 
leading to social capital with anti-social effects (Goodhand & Hulme, 1997). Warlords or 
other conflict entrepreneurs, for example, nurture new social networks to build up a 
constituency or clientèle. Yet the effects of these social networks will be anti-social, and 
will most likely foster factionalism.  
Throughout the debate, the focus has been on the second ‗transformative‘ assumption. 
As Colletta & Cullen (2000a: 4) argue:  
 
To better understand the emergence of violent conflict, the relationship between 
social capital and the cohesiveness of a society – expressed in the construct of social 
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cohesion, or the nexus of vertical and horizontal social capital and the balance of 
bonding and bridging social capital – needs to be examined. 
It enables them to present a typology of situations. Conflict-prone situations (low social 
cohesion, high conflict) are equated with the sub-optimal combination of strong but 
exclusive bonding social capital, a lack of inclusive bridging capital, and ‗unresponsive‘ 
vertical or linking social capital (oppressive power relations, e.g. authoritarian or corrupt 
state administration). Peaceful situations (high social cohesion, low conflict) are equated 
with the optimal combination of the absence of exclusive bonding capital, strong inclusive 
bridging capital, and ‗responsive‘ vertical or linking social capital (e.g. democratic state 
administration).  
On the policy level, this focus on the ‗transformative‘ assumption has been translated 
into a central policy prescription: post-conflict reconstruction efforts should ease the 
replacement of bonding social capital into its more inclusive bridging counterpart 
(Goodhand, 2006; Morfit, 2002; Pickering, 2006; Varshney 2001). Morfit (2002) presents 
this prescription as the core element of a social capital approach for post-conflict 
assistance. The ‗root cause‘ approach involves the design of programmes that react 
quickly to strong injustice felt by one side of the conflict (i.e. tackling ‗root causes‘ of 
conflict). By contrast, the social capital approach emphasises the need for ‗inclusive‘ 
programmes. These bring together all actors involved in the conflict to convert ‗shallow‘ 
(simple, rigid and exclusive, i.e. bonding) into ‗deep‘ (complex, flexible, and inclusive, 
i.e. bridging) social capital. In the words of Colletta & Cullen (2000a: 27):  
social capital can serve as a key source of reconciliation and reconstruction in 
divided societies through the formation of broad and diverse networks. The 
development of civic institutions that cut across traditional bonding social capital to 
form new links which cross ethnic, religious, age, income, and gender lines can 
provide the basis for the mediation, conflict management, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms that all societies require to sustain peace and development. 
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8.3 Burundi : research context and methodology 
8.3.1 The Burundian context 
Burundi is slowly emerging from a civil war that lasted over 10 years.2 After three 
decades (1960s–90s) of authoritarian and military rule by the ethnic Tutsi minority, the  
first democratically elected Hutu president was murdered soon after his appointment in 
1993. In the civil war that followed, some 300,000 people lost their lives (Lemarchand, 
2009). Recent statistics indicate that 52 per cent of the population have fled their homes at 
least once since 1993 (Uvin, 2009: 29).  The conflict was clearly ethnic in nature: for a 
long period the Hutu majority of the population was deprived economic opportunities, 
political representation, and access to education, and jobs in the administration and the 
army. At the end of the 20th century – during the civil war – Burundi was divided into 
Hutu and Tutsi ‗enclaves‘ or ‗colonies‘ (Laely, 1997: 695). Analysis is prone to ‗ethnic 
regression‘, where social divisions – including regional, rural-urban, inter-elite, inter-
ethnic, and intra-ethnic divisions – are reinterpreted according to the ethnic divide. 
(Reyntjens, 2000: 19). Analysis should also look beyond ethnicity, as the main root cause 
of the conflict is the pattern of ‗exclusionary governance‘ (Uvin, 2007), i.e. ‗the conflict is 
over control of the country‘s limited resources, and the social and economic 
marginalization that has been occasioned by it‘ (Sebundandi et al., 2008: 40–41). 
Burundi presents us with a concrete case study of a ‗social capital‘ approach to post-
conflict reconstruction (cf. Morfit, 2002). In most analyses, ‗ethnic regression‘ aligns well 
with a social capital ‗reading‘ of the Burundian conflict. A World Bank report is 
exemplary in this respect (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005). It adopts the main policy prescription 
of the social capital approach. The core of its conflict-sensitive development assistance to 
Burundi therefore aims at transforming inclusive bonding into exclusive bridging social 
capital (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005). It argues that, historically, Burundi was a country rich in 
multi-ethnic bridging social capital, uniting different identity groups around the King, 
Court, a common language (Kirundi) and cultural tradition. The report continues with a 
description of how 40 years of violence transformed Burundi into a country of ‗weak 
bridges, strong bonds‘, replacing multi-ethnic bridging capital with ethnic bonding capital, 
which ultimately led to an exclusive ‗us versus them‘ rhetoric between both ethnic groups 
(Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 6). That such an analysis informs the policies of many 








international actors in Burundi is confirmed by a recent evaluation of 133 peace building 
programmes in Burundi (Sebundandi et al., 2008).  The survey reveals that most of the 
programmes worked on dialogue and conflict management and resolution, while focusing 
on emotional and attitudinal change and healing of individuals and groups in society. The 
authors of this report conclude that these efforts, of which ‗the promotion of shared spaces 
of expression and communication seems to be the point of convergence‘, played a key 
reconciliatory role in bridging divides between ethnic groups, yet did not tackle structural 
or ‗root causes‘ of the Burundian conflict (cf. ‗root cause‘ versus ‗social capital‘ 
approach, Morfit, 2002).  At community level, the social capital approach has been 
translated into a focus on ‗bricks-and-mortar projects‘, used as a ‗vehicle to address social 
issues by strengthening inter-group trust and the capacity of communities to collaborate 
effectively and manage conflict without resort to violence.‘ (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 4). 
This article examines the solidarity chain – a livestock credit scheme – as an illustration of 
such activities. 
8.3.2 Research methodology 
The article is based on primary data collected during seven months of fieldwork, from 
January 2007 until July of that year, and presents ethnographic case studies of three 
collines3 – Burara, Tangara and Cumba colline – in the northern provinces of Muyinga 
and Kirundo, where the solidarity chain was implemented as one of the main activities in 
the scope of the Livelihood Security Initiative Consortium (LSIC), a collaboration 
between several international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).4 
Focus groups and key-actor interviews were conducted to collect our data. For the 
entire research project, 81 focus groups were held with 693 participants. Key actors were 
interviewed, including NGO staff, local administration and other local actors involved in 
the projects. Again, for the research project as a whole, interviews were conducted with 
77 key actors. The findings in this article are especially, but not exclusively, based on the 
findings of two types of  focus group discussions. The first was based on adoption of the 
resource exchange matrix of Kuehnast & Dudwick (2004) to map the breadth and strength 




 Hillsides, administrative unit in Burundi. The selection of the three collines fits in a broader PhD research 
programme on the interaction between NGO-interventions and social capital in post-conflict settings. The 
identification of the collines used the NGOs as independent variable to select three ‗typical cases‘ (Patton, 2002: 
236) for each of the NGO-interventions. However, in the scope of this article, this variable does not play a role, 
as it focuses on one particular activity – the solidarity chain – which was implemented by all three NGOs. Of 
course, our ethnographic research does not allow for generalizations for the whole of Burundi, Africa, post-
conflict situations or development countries.  
4
 For the sake of discretion, the names of the NGOs are not disclosed. 
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of existing social networks (social capital), which can be relied on for mutual support. The 
second type of focus group analysed the specific functioning of the solidarity chain. 
Linking these findings enables us to present a contextualized analysis of the functioning 
of the solidarity chain and its impact on existing stocks of social capital. To determine the 
number of focus groups, we used the theoretical concepts of redundancy and theoretical 
saturation (Krueger & Casey, 2001). In general, between 6 and 10 people took part in the 
focus groups, which conforms to the rule of thumb (Patton, 2002: 385).  
8.4 Case study: the solidarity chain  
8.4.1 A livestock rotating credit scheme 
In 1989 the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  (FAO) funded a 
project in the province of Gitega, Burundi, involving a livestock credit scheme (FAO, 
2005). Due to disappointing receipts from milk production and the outbreak of the 1993, 
crisis beneficiaries could not reimburse in cash the livestock received through the credit 
scheme. The solidarity chain was developed because the population could not reimburse 
in cash. In 1996 a new project was carried out, switching from reimbursement in cash to 
reimbursement in kind. 
The solidarity chain consists of ‗gradually giving livestock to all the farmers on a 
single hillside, starting with one batch of animals being given to a certain number of 
farmers. The newborn thereafter are then given to other farmers, until the needs of all the 
farmers on the hillside have been met.‘ (Koyo, 2004). Passing on newborn animals creates 
a chain of beneficiaries. The objectives are twofold.  
It first aims to improve access to livestock as an important productive asset for the rural 
population. The livestock sector suffered enormous damage during the protracted crisis 
after 1993. A survey in 1997 showed losses of 32 and 46 per cent respectively for large 
and small stock (Koyo, 2004). Still, livestock are essential for the livelihoods of the rural 
poor: it produces food and cash, it is key to improving soil fertility and agricultural 
production, and it is used as savings to cope with shocks and stress situations.  
Second, it is designed to improve solidarity in targeted communities: participants in the 
chain receive livestock from their fellow community members and solidarity is enhanced 
through shared responsibility for the livestock. As such, the solidarity chain is an excellent 
example of post-conflict reconstruction activities, in which both economic recovery and 
social reconciliation are intertwined. Multi-ethnic bridging networks are rebuilt between 
neighbours via the restocking of livestock, transforming the solidarity chain into a 
‗peacemaker‘ (Beleli, 2001) in Burundian communities. As a consequence, the solidarity 
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chain became popular among donors and development actors in Burundi. Not only FAO 
(2005), but also the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2004, 2007), 
the United Nations Development Department (UNDP, 2006) and the World Bank (RoB & 
World Bank, 2004) integrated the livestock credit scheme into their projects and 
programmes; it is also noted as an important strategy for livestock restocking in the 
Burundian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (RoB, 2006a).  
It was therefore not surprising that the Livelihood Security Initiative Consortium 
followed this trend. All consortium partners used the solidarity chain to distribute their 
livestock. The chain was mainly used to distribute goats. Loan contracts were prepared 
and community committees were democratically elected to follow up the chain. Technical 
criteria were designed to select the beneficiaries, who needed to provide appropriate 
shelters and forage, practice permanent stabling and accept the principles of the solidarity 
chain. The chain was also monitored for its inclusive – multi-ethnic – and gendered 
constitution. The main objective was to restock livestock, but the social objective of 
strengthening community ties was clearly considered. As some staff members explained 
the functioning of the chain: 
If we say solidarity, it is mutual assistance. For the chain, this means that the goat 
belongs to the whole colline, there is a collective responsibility, the solidarity is to 
follow up the maintenance of the goat. It‘s up to them to do that and to distribute.‘ 
(interview staff member CIBA, 04/05/07, Kirundo). 
 
It‘s to restock [cattle] easily [on] the colline, and also, with the chain, people dig 
together the contour lines and the neighbours become friends, because they are 
responsible for the goat. (interview staff member CLC, 29/05/07, Muyinga).  
 
You have to show solidarity in the activities. We have to search for charity between 
the people. [...] First of all, we wanted that the goat was shared. Even if our 
encadreur commits mistakes there are others who are responsible for the good 
condition of the goat. It also facilitates mutual assistance. The person who will 
receive the second [offspring] follows the situation of the goat. Both need to help 
each other to raise the goat. (interview staff member CLC, 08/06/07, Muyinga) 
8.4.2 A solidarity chain or … a chain of conflict?  
The success of the solidarity chain was not always guaranteed. It even sparked two kinds 
of conflicts within the communities. A first group of conflicts resulted in a ‗governance 
deficit‘: the solidarity chain produced conflicts between community members and local 
structures responsible for selecting beneficiaries and monitoring the chain. Although these 
local structures differed slightly, each NGO had some kind of a ‗livestock committee‘. 
These livestock committees restricted information flows between NGOs and the 
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population, even though committees were elected by the population and despite the 
various NGOs making considerable efforts to inform the population. Everyone knew 
about the solidarity chain, as everyone could ‗see‘ the goats; far fewer people however 
knew how to obtain a goat. In Cumba, for example, the first distribution of goats was 
made publicly. Thereafter it became very obscure how the goats were passed on within 
the chain, and in Tangara people told they knew about the chain the day that livestock was 
distributed. As a consequence, bribery and corruption was rife in these committees. Prices 
to ‗buy‘ a goat went from 2000 up to 5000 Fbu (1 USD = 1000 Fbu). In most cases there 
was an official list with the genuine beneficiaries, but just before the distribution, names 
were replaced. Thus, technical criteria – shelter and appropriate forage, permanent 
stabling and accepting the principles of the solidarity chain – were replaced by bribes and 
clientelism, resulting in a ‗governance deficit‘. 
A second group of conflicts created a ‗solidarity deficit‘: conflicts arose within the 
chain, between the beneficiaries, as the newborn were not passed on as scheduled. The 
mismanagement by the livestock committees was one of the reasons why loan contracts 
were not followed up. A second important factor was that several beneficiaries consumed 
or resold goats to relieve immediate needs. In turn, beneficiaries sought bribes from their 
neighbours to pass on the newborn. An NGO staff member was critical about the local 
population, adding: ‗The principal cause is that there are people with greediness, who 
want to keep the goat for themselves. […] they don‘t want to share.‘ (interview staff, 
08/06/07, Muyinga). In many cases the solidarity chain fell apart; instead of building 
solidarity between neighbours it caused a ‗solidarity deficit‘. In sum, because of both this 
‗solidarity‘ and ‗governance deficit‘,  the ‗solidarity chain‘ became a ‗chain of conflict‘. 
The malfunctioning of the chain was most problematic in Cumba, where a combination 
of distress sales by the population and the reselling of the distributed livestock by 
Stéphane, the encadreur de base of CLC and the unchallenged broker within the project 
(see chapter 6, section 6.4.3 for his role as encadreur de base), completely destroyed the 
‗solidarity chain‘. 
Do you know how much energy we have used to install the contour lines and the 
compost bin? Now we have grass [pasture] for our goat, but we don‘t have a goat, 
now we have a compost bin, but we don‘t have a goat to throw [its] manure in it. 
Everything was linked to the goat, everything we have done, all activities (focus 
group, 11/05/07, Cumba). 
 
There were conflicts between people in the solidarity chain, so among neighbours 
who should have received a goat. If Stéphane took your goat, you came into conflict 
with your neighbour. (focus group, 11/05/07, Cumba). 
 
Everything started when the named Stéphane started to confiscate the goats of the 
beneficiaries and went to sell them. The population also sold the goats because the 
encadreur would take all. I also sold one male goat, but the encadreur condemned 
 233 
 
me in front of the chef de zone and I paid [back with] another male goat that I had 
bought, and the ecadreur took them all [the male goat he bought to reimburse, and 
two other goats he had received through the chain]. (interview chef de sous-colline 
Rutamba, 25/05/07, Cumba). 
 
Instead of giving a little [offspring] to the second in the chain Stéphane came and 
took the goat and its offspring with him. Your neighbour thought there was a secret 
between you and Stépahe and this created a conflict in the chain. In fact, because of 
that the solidarity chain doesn‘t exist anymore (focus group, 21/05/07, Cumba). 
 
Because people were hungry they sold their goat. For us, from the [livestock] 
committee, this wasn‘t simple, because the people said that the goat was stolen. 
People also sold because they saw that when they didn‘t Stéphane came to take their 
goat. That gave a lot of problems between the people, but after that the solidarity 
chain was completely destroyed and still more have sold. There are almost no goats 
from CLC here anymore. (interview member livestock committee, 11/05/07, 
Cumba). 
 
The activities with the goats didn‘t work. Partly this was the fault of Stéphane, but 
also without Stéphane there was famine and the people sold, and that created a lot of 
conflicts. But we sold because of Stéphane. It was a race for us. We saw that the 
other goats were sold by Stéphane, so we have tried to sell [our goat] ourselves, 
before he came to take our goats. (focus group, 14/05/07, Cumba). 
 
Now, there are almost no goats anymore. Stéphane took them almost all back. Or he 
sold them on another hill, of he killed them and sold the meat. Now, there are 
almost no goats left, and we have no mature anymore. (focus group, 10/05/07, 
Cumba). 
CLC staff members were aware of the problems (although at least one of them was 
implicated or was aware of Stéphane‘s actions, see chapter 6, section 6.5.1). CLC stopped 
the distribution of goats on several collines because of the problems noted above. Cumba 
was one of these collines, which explained why the negative feelings were most explicit in 
Cumba (in comparison to Burara and Tangara). In addition, towards the end of the 
fieldwork Stéphane was also transferred to another zone of intervention of CLC. Similar 
problems occurred for the other NGO projects, and also there NGO workers tried to tackle 
these problems. CIBA, for example, replaced the committee on Burara colline several 
times. It was created in 2002, and replaced in both 2004 and 2005. In Tangara LITA 
distributed conflict notebooks in which they asked to list all different kinds of conflicts 
that occurred on the collines. Also here, conflicts related to the solidarity chain clearly 
occurred in these conflict notebooks. Although NGO staff made efforts to find solutions, 
through awareness raising, replacing committees and so forth, both kind of conflicts 
related to the solidarity chain could not be eradicated. This points to more profound 
234 
 
reasons of the failure of the solidarity chain in creating new stocks of social capital. Below 
the analytical framework is used to present a more profound analysis. It will be argued 
that a combination of existing ‗weak‘ bonding and ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital 
accounts for the solidarity chain‘s failure, endorsing the view that social capital cannot be 
built in a vacuum. 
8.5 Putting social capital dimensions in context  
8.5.1 The ‘solidarity deficit’ : underestimating weak bonding social 
capital  
The ‗solidarity deficit‘ of the solidarity chain is explained by an underestimation of the 
weakness of existing bonding social capital. Historically, bonding social capital in 
Burundi is based on the traditional institution of ukuterera, in which food and beer are 
exchanged as gifts during ceremonies, which explains why this group of people is called 
abatererezi or ‗beer friends‘ (Trouwborst, 1973). It concerns mutual relations between 
‗equals‘: like articles are exchanged (traditionally, beer for beer) and the network has a 
core, unchanging group of relatives and neighbours linked to each other via solidarité par 
parenté (kinship solidarity) or solidarity residentielle (neighbourhood solidarity) 
(Badionona-Tshondo, 1993: 9; Trouwborst, 1973: 114). Concretely, these bonding ties are 
relied upon for mutual help: preparation of land, small credits, food and other gifts, 
helping the sick, and so on. 
At the time of fieldwork, the analysis of the resource exchange matrix – assessing the 
breadth and strength of these social support networks (cf. Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004) – 
revealed substantially ‗weakened‘ and ‗stressed‘ networks of bonding social capital, and 
thus, weakened capacity for mutual solidarity. A first explaining factor was the 
devastating impact of the civil war, which depleted general levels of trust and severely 
weakened the social fabric of Burundian communities. The Burundian population suffered 
as ‗proxy targets‘ (Human Rights Watch, 1998) in the civil war, and Hutu and Tutsi 
neighbours became direct enemies in recurring ethnic uprisings. Some 52% of the total 
population fled their homes at least once since 1993 (Uvin, 2009: 29), and around 300,000 
lost their lives during the civil war (Lemarchand, 2009). There was also a looming 
humanitarian crisis, which was still not under control at the time of fieldwork (WFP, 
2008). War also created a culture of impunity, resulting in a high prevalence of banditry, 
sexual violence and insecurity, and continuing human rights abuses by the Burundian 
police and the national army (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2006).  
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A second explaining factor is more typical for post-conflict settings. The observed 
downward levels of solidarity reflect a general trend: total impoverishment and urgent 
material preoccupations during post-war settings led to new economic divisions (pushing 
into the background the political – ethnic – divisions) because of an increasing 
competition for scarce post-war reconstruction resources, ultimately contributing to a 
‗general climate of jealousy, competition, and selfishness‘ (World Bank, 2002: 5). Uvin 
(2009) confirms this decline of mutual help within Burundian society, and also 
underscores the primacy of economic above ethnic or other factors explaining the decline. 
Our data adds further evidence to this analysis: bonding social capital was weakened, not 
because of ethnic or political tensions, but because of material preoccupations. The main 
preoccupation for the majority of the population was how to bridge the recurring periods 
of soudure: during these periods the increasing competition for scarce resources to cope 
with food schortages had a negative impact on the ability for mutual help on the three 
collines, and stressed existing social networks by an overload of conflicts. The two most 
prevalent were theft and land conflicts. For example, theft of crops, livestock or other 
valuable assets such as bicycles was widespread. In most cases, not strangers but 
neighbours and even brothers stole from one another, which created an atmosphere of 
suspicion and mistrust among community members. As a consequence, ‗Helping each 
other becomes difficult, even your brother can rob you, or one of your neighbours. If there 
are many cases of theft, how can you help people who are maybe thieves?‘ (focus group, 
30/04/07, Burara colline). Besides this daily confrontation with theft, the ‗land time-
bomb‘ further deteriorated bonding social capital (ICG, 2003b). Burundi is characterized 
by a general lack of fertile land, and the inheritance system creates a further fragmentation 
of agricultural land. Therefore  numerous families were divided because of sometimes 
violent land conflicts; many returnees (IDPs or refugees) were also confronted with the 
occupation of their properties (by family members or neighbours). 
This weakness of bonding social capital resulted in a ‗contraction‘ of both trust and 
reciprocity (Swift, 1993). In a hypothetical ideal situation, the radius of trusting relations 
would span the entire society: trust would be generalized, and people would even trust 
‗strangers‘. By contrast, particularized trust limits trusting relationships to an inner circle 
of family, friends and close others. However, on the studied hillsides, trust was further 
contracted, as even two basic principles of Burundian community life – solidarité par 
parenté (kinship solidarity) or solidarité residentielle (neighbourhood solidarity) – were 
undermined (e.g. theft, land conflicts, etc.), which led to a situation of generalized distrust 
(cf. Uvin, 2009: 167). As such, there was a clear lack of mutual exchange or reciprocity 
(Sahlin, 1968; Swift, 1993). The economic impact of civil war, and the post-conflict 
competition for scarce resources, led to a general regression from ‗general‘ to ‗balanced‘ 
and in many cases finally to ‗negative‘ reciprocity within the bonding social networks. 
This regression of reciprocity materialized in the transition from ‗free‘ gifts to loans 
without and ultimately with interest. General reciprocity produces transactions without 
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any obligation of a return. It embodies altruistic transactions, typically made concrete with 
‗gifts‘, hospitality and generosity. Instead, balanced reciprocity refers to direct exchanges, 
whereby there is a strong obligation to repay with something of equivalent value and 
without much delay. In the case of negative reciprocity, an unbalanced exchange is the 
result of opposing interests by which partners try to maximise utility at the other's 
expense. Concretely, within the bonding support networks free gifts of cash, food or other 
material resources (generalized reciprocity) became an exception and were replaced by 
loans with strict rules of return (particularized reciprocity). When repayment was delayed, 
the lender started to ask interest and relations deteriorated (negative reciprocity). 
The point at issue is that the solidarity chain was at odds with the reality of mutual help 
and solidarity.  First, beneficiaries of the chain did not necessarily have trusting ties before 
the launch of the solidarity chain. The chain was designed to create bridging social capital 
to unite and reconcile different groups of people (ethnic groups, returnees, demobilized 
soldiers or rebels, men/women). Thus, at least partially, the chain demanded generalized 
trust (trusting ‗strangers‘), and this in a situation in which even personalized forms of trust 
were under pressure. Second, when the first beneficiary in the chain had to fulfil his 
commitment of passing on the newborn to the second beneficiary in the chain, this 
required a general form of reciprocity, as this transaction is a ‗free‘ gift. The gift-giver can 
only hope that his generosity will reinforce his social status in the community, but there is 
no promise of tangible return in the short term. Thus, the solidarity chain sought general 
reciprocity, although most mutual help transactions within the bonding support networks 
were based on personalized or even negative reciprocity. In this context, it is unsurprising 
that most beneficiaries failed to adhere to this standard of general reciprocity and sold the 
goat or ultimately adjusted the transaction while contracting the reciprocity down to a 
balanced or even negative level and sought a return (i.e. ‗bribe‘) for the newborn. 
In sum, the ‗solidarity deficit‘ shows how the solidarity chain failed to create bridging 
social capital, because it underestimated the weakness of existing bonding social capital, 
as a first ‗building block‘ to creating these more inclusive bridging social networks. In 
particular, our analysis indicates that not exclusive but a profound and general ‗lack‘ or 
‗weakness‘ of bonding social capital presented the main obstacle. Bonding social support 
networks were primarily composed of interpersonal relationships based on familiarity and 
geographic proximity, not on exclusive group-based (ethnic) identities. In addition, if 
conflicts stressed these support networks, it was mainly because of material 
preoccupations, not because of ethnic tensions. Lastly, conflicts in particular related to the 
solidarity chain were never expressed in terms of ethnic divisions, but revealed a more 
general lack of trust.  
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8.5.2 The ‘governance deficit’ : reproducing ‘unresponsive’ linking 
social capital 
The ‗governance deficit‘ of the solidarity chain is explained by the fact that the chain 
reproduced existing ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital. Concretely, the functioning of 
the livestock committees, responsible for the monitoring of the solidarity chain, became 
adjusted towards the functioning of locally embedded patron-client ties.5 Rather than 
being local examples of participatory and democratic development (the initial objective of 
the NGOs) in order to introduce ‗responsive‘ or ‗democratic‘ linking social capital,  the 
livestock committees were incorporated and adjusted towards existing modes of 
‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital. Historically, the patron-client system refers back to 
the traditional institution of bugabire, which formalized the most common transactions 
between patron and client: land, cows and protection were exchanged for services 
(workforce), offerings in kind (e.g. harvest), and loyalty (Lemarchand, 1995).  As such, in 
the mindsets of the Burundian people, it is perceived as the prototype of all patron-client 
transactions. This system of patronage still carries an important social function in 
Burundian society (e.g. Kamungi et al., 2005), from the top level of national politics to the 
very local level of the functioning of the solidarity chain . 
Throughout post-independent Burundian history, patronage has received a clear 
negative connotation, as this system underpinned the ‗exclusionary governance‘ (Uvin, 
2007) of the country‘s economic resources, and as such, led to widespread social and 
economic exclusion and marginalization. In social capital terms, this system of patronage 
installed ‗unresponsive‘ or ‗oppressive‘ linking social capital, making access to social and 
economic opportunities highly unequal for the Burundian population.  It enabled the 
political (Tutsi) elite to capture and control almost all available resources in the country, 
and since international aid was a substantial part of the national budget, the elite has 
‗gorged itself for decades on aid money‘ (Uvin 2005: 1). In particular, regionalism 
dictated why ‗It always rains in the same place first.‘ (Imvura iragwa ntikwira hose.) 
(Sommers, 2005: 4). Between the 1960s and 1990s, patronage transformed the Burundian 
state into the private business of a small Tutsi-Hima elite of one particular region in 
Bururi (Lemarchand, 1995; Ndikumana, 2000, 2005; Uvin, 2007). Such clientelism 
manifested itself in direct lines between state departments in the capital and the 




 It is important to repeat that ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital does not necessarily imply that linking ties 
loose their instrumental value (see chapter 1, section 1.3.1). For the solidarity chain: the functioning of the 
livestock committees on the basis of clientelism still guarantees access to livestock for at least some of the 




countryside, leading to ‗project islands‘ (Laely, 1997: 710) and serious ‗geographical 
favouritism‘ (Sommers, 2005).  
The ‗governance deficit‘ of the solidarity chain presents us with a micro-empirical 
illustration  of this system of ‗exclusionary governance‘ through patronage on the 
community level. Patronage materialized in the problem of elite capture on the 
community level. In the literature on community development, elite capture is linked to 
the terminology of ‗gatekeepers‘ or ‗development brokers‘ (Bierschenk et al., 2000, 2002; 
Chauveau & De Sardan, 2000; Platteau, 2004; Titeca & Vervisch, 2008). As a 
participatory approach has to be adapted in little time, intervening agencies ask the 
population to organize themselves in groups, committees or associations. A common 
problem with these institutions is that they do not genuinely empower the rural poor, but 
rather the already privileged elite, which act as gatekeepers to access project benefits 
(Platteau, 2004: 227-28). The solidarity chain was no exception on that point. The 
livestock committees were populated by more wealthy community members, which used 
this gatekeeper position to control incoming flows of project benefits and so strengthen 
and maintain their patronage network. This is not surprising, as international aid is one of 
the only resource flows at the community level in Burundi (Uvin, 2009: 67). As such, it 
presents one of the main patronage resources.  As a consequence, access to livestock 
through the solidarity chain became severely restricted, fuelling conflicts because of these 
missed ‗development opportunities‘ for many. As such, the solidarity chain reflects how 
similar mechanisms on the national level play at the local community level: patronage led 
to the ‗exclusionary governance‘ of the solidarity chain, resulting in patterns of 
marginalization and exclusion, nourishing community tensions because of illegitimate 
inequality. 
The solidarity chain also presented a micro-illustration of how easily ethnic tensions 
can be intensified when political entrepreneurs capitalized on the ‗exclusionary 
goverance‘ of the solidarity chain.6 This was illustrated in the case of Burara colline. For 
several reasons the ethnic tensions were much higher in Burara than in the two other 
hillsides (see chapter four, section 4.1). First, Burara has a considerable group of resettled 
Tutsis near its centre. Consequently, because of the presence of this large group of Tutsi, 
the local political struggle between CNDD-FDD (Hutu) party, which won the 2005 
elections, and the Uprona (Tutsi) party intensified. In addition, this Tutsi group has direct 
links with national politics and the Tutsi elite in the capital. Several important figures 
within the Uprona (Tutsi) party originate from Burara colline. Third, a conflict between 
two strongmen from different Tutsi clans complicated the situation. One local Tutsi 
strongman,  Minani, defected from the Parena (Tutsi party) to the CNDD-FDD after the 




 ‗Political entrepreneurship occurs when a individual acts on a political profit opportunity‘, in order to 
consolidate or gain political power (Holcombe, 2002: 143). 
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elections, in order to safeguard his strong position in the community. As such, the other 
Tutsi strongman, Rutayisire, member of the Uprona party leadership and living in the 
capital Bujumbura, lost considerable influence in the commune of Busoni and partially 
lost his hold on the Tutsi community. Therefore, he mobilized his clan-supporters, most of 
them living in one of the IDP sites (Rusarasi site), against the present local authorities.  
His rallying caused frequent tensions particular in Busoni commune, but also in other 
places of the province of Kirundo (see e.g. LDGL, 2007). As a consequence of this strong 
politicization of community life, the problems with the solidarity chain, and aid in general, 
were easily recycled by local political entrepreneurs rallying for Rutayisire and translated 
into problems between the two ethnic groups. Tutsis, in particular of the Rusarasi site, felt 
excluded from aid in general and complained that only Hutus received goats through the 
solidarity chain because  
The displaced [Tutsi] like to discuss things. We will not give money to receive 
livestock. But out there [outside the site] you have simple farmers [Hutu] who never 
discuss and who very easily give the money, because they think things are going 
that way. (focus group, 20/04/07, Burara colline).  
Thus, the mechanism which triggered ethnic tensions, followed two successive steps. 
First, the ‗exclusionary governance‘ of the solidarity chain – not yet in ethnic terms – 
triggered tensions because of unfair access to new development opportunities (livestock). 
Second, the ‗political entrepreneurship‘ translated and generalized these tensions into 
tensions between two ethnic groups.  
It reflects how unfairly distributed economic opportunities result in deprivation or 
discrimination based grievances, which are picked up by political entrepreneurs to 
mobilize certain groups, in turn both strengthening in-group solidarity and increasing 
tensions between different groups (Zartman, 2004: 144). In social capital terms, it 
illustrates the crucial role that vertical linkages with these political entrepreneurs play in 
strengthening mono-ethnic bonding social capital. This was confirmed by the fact that 
ethnic tensions were only triggered on Burara colline. Although the solidarity chain was 
mismanaged on all three collines, and even more on Tangara and especially Cumba 
colline (see above, section 8.4.2), only in Burara was it translated into ethnic terms 
because of the politicization of community life.7 It was therefore the particular interaction 




 How ‗exclusionary governance‘ and its interpretation by the population were always wrapped up in very 
particular local contexts becomes clear when for example comparing with the Tangara colline: as local politics in 
Tangara were not centered around ethnicity, but presented a more ‗classical‘ political party struggle (between 
Frodebu and CNDD-FDD, both Hutu parties), ‗exclusionary governance‘ of the solidarity chain and the other 
benefits of the LITA project was done along party lines. The main difference with Burara, however, was that this 
exclusion along party lines was indeed the case (in Burara exclusion was not necessarily based on ethnic 
240 
 
of ‗exclusionary governance‘ and ‗political entrepreneurship‘ that triggered ‗exclusive‘ 
ethnic bonding social capital and pitted ethnic groups against each other.8 
  
8.6 Conclusions 
On the theoretical level, the analytical framework reveals in depth the impact of the 
solidarity chain as a post-conflict reconstruction activity. By applying the 
bonding/bridging/linking framework, we were able to define more explicitly the problems 
encountered, as it was the combination of ‗weak‘ bonding and ‗unresponsive‘ linking 
social capital that clarified the functioning of the solidarity chain. This indeed reflects the 
idea that activities never have a ‗one shot‘ impact on social capital as a whole, but interact 
with different ‗combinations‘ of social capital dimensions producing a broad range of 
outcomes. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of putting these social capital 
dimensions in context. It was a contextualized analysis of existing bonding social capital 
networks and broader patterns of locally embedded linking social capital, that enabled us 
to explain why the exact combination of ‗weak‘ bonding and ‗unresponsive‘ linking social 
capital prevailed. It underscores the idea that only a close analysis, which places social 
capital ‗in context‘ and accepts its ‗multi-dimensional‘ nature, can lay the foundation of a 
realistic appraisal of social capital building (De Silva et al., 2007; Szreter, 2002; 
Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Our analytical framework proved to be a useful impulse for 
such a close analysis. 
This brings us to some policy conclusions. Broadly defined, our findings question the 
exclusive focus on the transformation of exclusive bonding into inclusive bridging social 
capital as the main policy prescription from a ‗social capital‘ approach (Morfit, 2002) to 
post-conflict reconstruction. In other words, the functioning of the solidarity chain 
presents micro-empirical observations that question the exclusive focus on the 
‗transformative‘ assumption about social capital and conflict settings, yet reconfirms both 
the ‗deficiency‘ and ‗dark side‘ assumptions. As such, our conclusion is threefold. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
identity), and that there was no strong opposition (or political entrepreneurship) to contest and capitalize this 
‗exclusionary governance‘: the CNDD-FDD party was omnipresent. 
8
 It is important to note that ‗exclusionary governance‘ did not transform into ‗political entrepreneurship‘. It 
concerns two different groups of individuals: the more wealthy persons who use the solidarity chain to unfairly 
access and distribute livestock, and therefore prefer a rather peaceful environment, should not be confused with 
the small group of the local political elite which rallied for Rutayisire. To the contrary, some members of the 
livestock committee belonged to the lower echelons of the local administration, to a great extent CNDD-FDD 
and thus Hutu, but many had no political function.  
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First, the primacy of exclusive bonding social capital is questioned. No considerable 
stocks of exclusive bonding social capital which needed to be transformed into more 
inclusive bridging social networks were observed. Distrust and social conflicts were 
primarily centred around material preoccupations (instead of political or ethnic divisions), 
were not group-based but nurtured in interpersonal relationships, and in many cases 
opposed families, neighbours, and close others. This should not be read as an 
underestimation of ethnic tensions within Burundian communities, yet it does echo the 
general tendency that total impoverishment after conflict marks a shift of focus from 
political (ethnic) divisions to material concerns and a focus on urgent material needs 
(World Bank, 2002). 
Second, the assumption that conflict zones are in the first place ‗zones of social capital 
deficiency‘ (Goodhand et al., 2000) is reaffirmed. Instead of exclusive bonding social 
capital a more profound and general ‗lack‘ or ‗weakness‘ of this bonding social capital 
was observed, resulting in a generalized (and not group-based) level of distrust. In our 
case studies, this was illustrated by the fact that even solidarité par parenté (kinship 
solidarity) and solidarité residentielle (neighbourhood solidarity), two basic principles of 
Burundian community life, were eroded. The need to create bridges between the two main 
ethnic groups is indeed a necessary step in Burundi, but the findings indicate that this 
analysis should not be made at the expense of the more profound need to reinforce basic 
levels of trust throughout society. It is plausible that once a Burundian can again trust his 
neighbour and family, reconciliation with others in society will also be improved.  
Third,  also the assumption that conflict zones are not necessarily ‗organization free‘, 
and nurture the ‗dark side‘ of social capital has been reaffirmed. The situation on Burara 
colline illustrates a) how ‗exclusionary governance‘ of the solidarity chain, resulting in 
illegitimate inequality of development opportunities, triggered ethnic tensions within the 
community, and b) how networks of ‗conflict entrepreneurship‘ acted as a catalyst in this 
process. In both cases, not exclusive bonding but ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital was 
at work. This reflects the important idea that the ‗dark side‘ of social capital conflict 
settings is not limited to exclusive bonding social capital, but that a variety of social 
networks can nurture and create anti-social effects, with potentially serious effects on 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
In sum, these three conclusions argue in favour of a more diversified and 
contextualized approach to the analysis of social capital and post-conflict reconstruction, 
in which all three theoretical assumptions on social capital in conflict settings should at 
least be further researched and empirically tested, as such empirical evidence is lacking or 
at least minimal (Goodhand, 2006: 40). This approach reopens debates and enables the 






The main conclusions of chapters 5 to 8 – dealing with the case study research in northern 
Burundi – offer answers to the main research questions that guided this research project. 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis has three goals. First, to analyse critically the 
present conception of social capital in post-conflict reconstruction literature and its effects 
in practice. Second, to present a comparative perspective between the mainstream 
(Putnamian) and political economy (Bourdieuian) views within the social capital debate. 
Third, to offer an empirical analysis of NGO ‗social engineering‘ practice to post-conflict 
reconstruction.  
The dissertation offers an ethnographic micro-perspective on this ‗social engineering‘ 
approach: it focuses on three NGO-interventions in northern Burundi. Much has been 
written about ‗social engineering‘ from a national or international macro perspective, in 
reference to diverse issues such as liberal internationalism (Paris, 1997); complex political 
emergencies (e.g. Goodhand & Hulme, 1999); post-conflict peace-building (e.g. Krause & 
Jütersonke, 2005); global governance, the new wars, and ‗liberal peace‘ (Duffield, 2001); 
state reconstruction (e.g. Milliken & Krause, 2002); institution building (Ottoway, 2002); 
‗no peace, no war‘ societies (Richards, 2005); post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. Rathmell, 
2005); and so on. But within this ‗social engineering‘ approach NGOs have become key 
actors at local level, as their aid has been reinvented as a strategic tool for conflict 
resolution and social reconstruction (Duffield, 2002). Goodhand (2006) wrote a 
comparative study on the role of these NGOs in peace-building, yet he noted that concrete 
ethnographic empirical research at community level was one of the main gaps in peace-
building research. This dissertation aims to help fill this research gap.    
Although this dissertation offers interesting insights into above theoretical issues, there 
are, however, limitations to ethnographic case study research. The dissertation cannot 
claim to represent all NGO work in Burundi, let alone in other conflict-affected countries. 
This is not the purpose of this kind of research. The case studies that comprise the body of 
this dissertation should not be viewed as samples of something else, but as an in-depth 
description and analysis of three cases, in order to grasp the particular reality of three 
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NGO-interventions and their attempts to ‗social engineer‘ peace and development in the 
north of Burundi after more than ten years of civil war. This methodological note should 
be kept in mind when reading the conclusions. 
A Radical Critique 
It has been made clear that Putnam‘s original conception of social capital is still largely 
dominant in both academic and policy literature on post-conflict reconstruction. In brief, 
this conception is based on three broad assumptions. First, the baseline for policy is that 
social capital is an ‗inherently good thing‘ that should be restored post-conflict by all. 
This explains the prevailing demand to build and create ‗new‘ social capital, to the extent 
that whenever civil society institutions can be reinforced, they should be reinforced. 
Second, it supports a communitarian or society-centered approach, celebrating the 
community and its civil society organizations. Third, the ‗bad‘ bonding/‗good‘ bridging 
dichotomy occupies centre stage in the reconstruction argument: this is the much praised 
bridging social capital that brings conflict resolution, reconciliation, and social cohesion 
to the community.  
 
This thesis adds further empirical ethnographic evidence that rejects this conception of 
social capital, and as such, presents a radical critique on contemporary thinking on the role 
of social capital in post-conflict reconstruction. Chapter 5 (social capital and food 
security) strongly refutes the argument that social capital is an ‗inherently good thing‘ in 
the hands of the poor. It demonstrates how social capital may become an unproductive 
asset and even a liability: people‘s social networks no longer provided social support, and 
their dependency on ‗unresponsive‘ linking ties to access credit, labour opportunities, and 
markets reflected the restrictive character of their social networks. Thus, social capital 
expressed people‘s increasing powerlessness and destitution rather than offering a way out 
of poverty. Both chapters 6 (community-based reconstruction) and 7 (bridging 
associations) contest the communitarian notion of social capital. Chapter 6 demonstrates 
how community-based reconstruction did not always prove to be an appropriate 
mechanism to restore social capital after conflict. The introduction of community-based 
local structures did not automatically result in more community participation; on the 
contrary, more than once it nurtured elite capture and ‗exclusionary governance‘ of the 
NGO projects. Similarly, chapter 7 questions community associations as the 
communitarian blueprint to restore social capital: comparable problems of elite capture 
were present, and associations had difficulties going beyond their status of new ‗aid 
gateways‘, i.e., channels for the development agency to achieve technical project goals or 
for the local population to access support from the external agency. Lastly, chapters 7 
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(bridging associations) and 8 (solidarity chain) question the exclusive focus on the 
creation of bridging social capital. The aim of both the community associations and the 
solidarity chain was to create ‗bridges‘ between adversarial ethnic groups, and reconcile 
them around concrete development activities. Their results were mixed. Although ethnic 
groups did cooperate within the associations and the solidarity chain, it resulted in a ‗false 
sense‘ of inclusiveness. In Burara, for example, it did not reflect the real ethnic tensions in 
the community at large. In general, the focus on ‗ethnic inclusion‘ distracted attention 
from the fact that both activities simultaneously produced ‗economic exclusion‘; while 
promoting multi-ethnic bridging social capital, they failed to provide equal access to 
economic assets (because of clientelism, elite capture, exclusionary governance). This 
negatively impacted community cohesion.   
 
The dominance of this social capital concept in policy circles should be questioned. 
The findings herein make some critical contributions to broader debates on social capital 
and poverty reduction, local governance, and in particular, reconciliation and conflict-
resolution policies. With regard to poverty reduction policies, the discussion on food 
insecurity and social capital in chapter 5 was clear: social capital should also be conceived 
as a potential liability that reproduces poverty and inequality. This contrasts sharply with 
the commonly held idea that social networks ‗often mean the difference between day-to-
day survival and despair‘ (World Bank, cited in Cleaver, 2005: 898). The ‗survival myth‘ 
(González de la Rocha, 2007) is indeed a myth: the poor‘s capacity to survive in situations 
of complete destitution will not pull them out of poverty, and social capital is no4 the 
resource par excellence that will provide them a way out. Social capital may well 
facilitate mutual help and act as an informal safety net, but building poverty reduction 
policies on social capital is like putting a cherry on crumbs instead of a cake: social 
support networks can play a role, but they can never replace job opportunities or other 
options to earn an adequate income (González de la Rocha, 2007). 
  
Concerning local governance policies, chapters 6 (community-based reconstruction) 
and 7 (bridging associations) clearly demonstrate that the communitarian notion of social 
capital is an erroneous theoretical point of departure to increase participation and 
empowerment in communities. It starts from a romanticized idea of the community, while 
underestimating the ―endogenous community imperfections‖ (Platteau & Abraham, 2002), 
and overestimating the homogeneity of communities (Williams, 2004). Local governance 
policies that are grounded in this naive concept do more harm than good: they fail to ‗see‘ 
and deal with existing power relations and inequality. They merely reproduce them, albeit 
unintentionally. This is all the more problematic for post-conflict reconstruction policies. 
In post-conflict settings, attempts to introduce local governance without considering local 
power struggles may reproduce the ‗structural violence‘ (Galtung, 1969) – i.e. the social 
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injustice caused by inequality, discrimination and exclusion – that caused the conflict in 
the first place. It could even trigger new tensions or conflicts.  
 
On reconciliation and conflict-resolution policies, chapters 7 (bridging associations) 
and 8 (solidarity chain) question the exclusive focus on the ‗bad‘ bonding/‗good‘ bridging 
dichotomy. It was demonstrated that this approach distracted attention from (i) a profound 
need to reinforce basic levels of trust throughout society instead of narrowing down the 
problem to distrust between the two ethnic groups, and (ii) the prevalence of proper 
conflict entrepreneurship instigating new community tensions. The first point shows how 
post-conflict zones in the first place remain ‗zones of social capital deficiency‘; the 
second point notes that they are also zones with ‗perverse‘ or ‗anti-social‘ social capital 
(Goodhand et al., 2000). In general, the overarching urge to build ‗bridges‘ between the 
adversarial groups fails to understand post-conflict settings as distinctive spaces with their 
own logic (Lambach, 2007). Post-war total impoverishment often marks a shift of focus 
from political divisions that played a central role during conflict to material concerns and 
more economic divisions after conflict (World Bank, 2002). Many are looking for their 
‗peace dividend‘, and the increasing competition for scarce post-war reconstruction 
resources creates new inequality, and offers new potential for conflict. Thus, those 
reconciliation and conflict resolution policies that focus solely on bridging the political 
divisions that sparked the conflict have been overtaken by events, and fail to respond to 
the changing and evolving characteristics of the conflict. 
This focus on the ‗bad‘ bonding/‗good‘ bridging dichotomy still carries another risk for 
reconciliation and conflict-resolution policies: the dominance of cultural vis-à-vis 
economic explanations of conflict. It reflects a broader tendency to argue that only a 
‗culture of peace‘1, as a coherent whole, can counteract a ‗culture of war‘, entailing the 
need to ‗social engineer‘ a entire society to favour peace (de Rivera, 2004). The 
bonding/bridging dichotomy is one of many elements to produce this ‗cultural reading‘ of 
war and peace. Equating war with the prevalence of ‗bad‘ ethnic bonding social capital is 
close to ‗new barbarism‘ that interprets war as ‗ancient hatreds‘ between ethnic groups 
(Richards, 2005: 8). Instead, ‗good‘ multi-ethnic bridging social capital easily fits into the 
‗culture of peace‘ model, in which the promotion of understanding, solidarity and 
tolerance is central (de Rivera, 2004: 531; Paris, 1997: 82). Burundi was also identified as 
a country of ‗weak bridges, strong bonds‘ (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 6), and most peace-
building programmes focused on emotional and attitudinal change and the healing of 
individuals and groups in society. Although these efforts to install a ‗cultural of peace‘ 
have been indispensable to reconcile both ethnic groups, they did not tackle the 
                                               
 
 
1 This ‗culture of peace‘ model  to peace-building has been initiated by the UN, and more in particular by 
UNESCO, see e.g. UN, 1999 and UNESCO, 2002. 
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fundamental issue of the Burundian conflict: the struggle for access to economic assets 
(Sebundandi et al., 2008). As such, the risk of Putnam‘s social capital concept to inform 
one-sided ‗cultural readings‘ of social problems is likewise applicable to post-conflict 
reconstruction policies (Foley & Edwards, 1997).  
 
This anger in academic circles, about the ‗lazy use‘ (Bebbington, 2004: 344) of the 
social capital concept by policy circles, is also justified with regard to post-conflict 
reconstruction policies. The literature review confirms the persistence of Putnams‘ 
outdated concept in much of the debate, and the ethnographic case study research provides 
micro-empirical evidence on how it informs inappropriate policies and interventions.  
A Political Economy of Social Capital? 
The aim of this thesis was also to engage in the debate between more mainstream 
(Putnamian) and political economy (Bourdieuian) views within the social capital debate. 
In particular, it highlighted three basic assumptions of the political economy view (see 
section 1.4). First, a political economy perspective starts from a relational view. Social 
capital is embedded in social networks, which means that any description or analysis of 
social capital should start from the particular social networks in which it inheres. Second, 
it adopts a contextual view, in that social capital is manifested in culturally embedded 
networks, which entails that social capital is a context dependent concept and should 
therefore be analysed in relation to the particular contexts in which it is entangled. Third, 
and most obviously, it applies a political economy analysis: social capital is unequally 
distributed within society, and therefore tends to reproduce existing power relationships. 
 
The added value, in comparison to the Putnamian conceptualization, is mainly the 
result of the contextual and political economy assumptions. Throughout the empirical 
chapters the need for contextual analysis and special attention for power relationships was 
confirmed.  The functioning of social structures, and the way in which the NGO-projects 
were succesful or not in moulding them, was predominantly determined by contextual – 
local level – factors, in particular, local level power struggles around the access and the 
distribution of resources. 
Chapter 5 (social capital and food security) reveals both how access to resources 
through social networks was influenced by broader institutional processes, and confirmed 
the centrality of power relationships in the functioning of these networks. As such, it 
clarified the impact of the distribution of power and powerlessness on food insecurity 
issues. The analysis of shifting social networks revealed and made more tangible how the 
interlocking of the land, labour and credit markets reduced farmers options to access 
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resources (Farrington et al., 2004: 5): as a response to higher levels of risk during the 
periods of soudure people were forced to rely more heavily on a patron, which then 
became the only source to access credit, inputs, and market opportunities while 
strengthening a downward spiral of usury and indebtedness: labour was claimed to repay 
debts, and if not possible, debts were repaid by the usury practice of umugwazo or the 
selling of land (or other assets).  
Chapter 6 (on community-based reconstruction) illustrates one of the central aspects of 
a Bourdieuian perspective, i.e. that social capital is context-contingent, because it is 
inextricably bound up with the other forms of capital (economic, cultural). It shows how 
the ‗exclusive‘ or ‗inclusive‘ effect of community participation within the three NGO-
projects was largely explained by the interaction between social and economic capital. 
The provision of private/strategic resources by NGOs created a higher risk of community 
participation being ‗exclusive‘; by contrast, the distribution of less strategic/public 
resources led to more ‗inclusive‘ community participation and social capital.  
Chapter 7 (on bridging associations) shows that strategies to strengthen social capital 
are condemned to fail if not adapted towards the particular local context. In many post-
conflict countries, bridging (in this case multi-ethnic) associations are used as a passe-
partout strategy to heal communities after conflict, but they failed on the three studied 
collines. Both the focus on associations and multi-ethnicity revealed an unfamiliarity with 
at least the context of Northern Burundi.2 Burundi lacks a strong associational tradition, as 
it is characterized by a past of vertical stratification via patron-client ties, minimal social 
organization beyond the family, and enforced associational experiments by the state. 
Associations were therefore inappropriate instruments to organize community cooperation 
(which does not necessarily implicates this cannot be the case in the future, or is the case 
for entire Burundi, see e.g. Beuret & Fino, 2009 for Bujumbura Rural). In addition, 
without ignoring the ethnical factor, people were primarily concerned with the material 
consequences of the conflict, and climate change (la famine) was no less than the political 
conflict (la crise) a crucial factor affecting the daily lives of the population. As a 
consequence, local conflicts were not necessarily between ethnic groups, but mainly 
around the access to and the distribution of scarce resources (as was the aid channeled 
through the different projects). 
Lastly, chapter 8 (solidarity chain) indicates how different ‗combinations‘ of social 
capital dimensions accounted for a diverse range of outcomes. In this particular case, a 
combination of ‗weak‘ bonding and ‗unresponsive‘ linking social capital explained why 




 There are certainly regions and particular places where ethnic tensions were and still are much intenser than 
was the case on our three collines. (In addition, even between the three collines, the importance of the ethnic 
factor differed, and was shaped by local contexts). Also, climate change had a more marked impact in the 
northern region of Burundi.) 
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the solidarity chain failed to restore social cohesion among community members. Only a 
contextualized analysis of existing social support networks (bonding capital) and existing 
governance patterns (linking capital) yielded this analysis. This corroborates the notion 
that activities never have a ‗one shot‘ impact on social capital as a whole, and that only a 
close analysis, which places social capital ‗in context‘ and accepts its ‗multi-dimensional‘ 
nature, can lay the foundation for a realistic appraisal of social capital building. 
 
However, even if a political economy perspective is adopted, some shortcomings of the 
social capital concept still persist. Most of these shortcomings are linked to the relational 
view (social capital analysis should start from social networks) of this perspective, and 
relate to the project to find a typology of social networks and their consequences, i.e. the 
distinction between bonding, bridging and linking social capital. Three major problems 
can be identified. 
First, the analytical value of these sub concepts. Two issues should be questioned: can 
they be empirically distinguished, and do they not mask a high degree of diversity? The 
functional differentiation between bonding and bridging networks is perhaps the most 
clearly and generally accepted distinction we can make: it refers to the mechanisms of 
closure and brokerage, and distinguishes between relationships facilitating access to 
redundant and non-redundant information and resources. But distinguishing these 
networks on the basis of characteristics of the networks or the people which are connected 
by them, is already much more difficult. The equation of bonding with intra-community 
and bridging with extra-community ties is examplary. First, because ‗community‘ refers 
to both geographical and identity boundaries: ties with a family member which migrated 
to the city have both an intra-community (sharing identity) as an extra-community 
(linking people in different regions) character. Second, because of its different functions: 
it can be assumed that this family member is better of in the city, and therefore can send 
back resources which are not available in the village. As such, this tie is both bonding 
(sharing identity) but also bridging (accessing non-redundant resources). Furthermore, 
also network characteristics are difficult. For example, bonding ties are defined as dense 
links, with a high frequency of interactions, but a Burundian farmer can have dense 
connections with his patron as he works on his fields (bonding), although they belong to 
different socio-economic classes (bridging), and this relationship gives access to non-
redundant resources, for example credit (brokerage function). A second issue is the 
question if these concepts do not hide a wide variety of relationships. Bonding ties refer to 
the inner circle of family, neighbours, friends and close others. But relationships within 
this inner circle can still vary. As we have seen, neighbours occupy a specific position in 
social life on Burundian collines, as households live scattered on the hills, and therefore 
neighbours are the first to help. Family ties have of course particular characteristics 
defining the functioning of these networks. An evident example in the Burundian context, 
with a structural problem of land pressure, is the fact that familial ties are for many the 
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only way to access land. Also the category of friends can hide some particularities, as 
became clear with the relationship of pfampfe or ‗close‘ friends. Another example is the 
concept of linking social capital, which refers to a diverse range of authority relations with 
for example local politicians, NGO staff, patrons, bank employees, and so on. The way 
authority will be executed will differ according to the particular relationship. Furthermore, 
even one individual can perform several authority functions. A nice example of the latter 
was offered during focus groups in Tangara and Cumba, when discussing the work of the 
chef de colline. In both cases the population gave a dual answer: they highly appreciated 
their chef in his traditional role as conflict mediator, but they were very skeptical when it 
concerned his role as local administration, responsible for the identification of 
beneficiaries and the distribution of aid. His role as mediator explicitly refers back to the 
traditional role of the bashingantahe, local wise men, publicly invested by the 
communities in which they live on the basis of their wisdom, impartiality and sense of 
truth and justice; and which manage, mitigate and resolve social conflicts and reconcile 
community members (Ntahombaye et al., 1999).  Instead, the identification and 
distribution of aid is specifically linked to project interventions. In Bourdieu‘s terms, the 
illustration exemplifies the fact that the functioning of one particular social relationship 
can differ, according to the different ‗fields‘ (each with its own ‗rules of the game‘) in 
which it operates (in this case: traditional conflict mediation versus NGO-projects). In 
sum, these critical remarks illustrate the multiple, overlapping and shifting realities in 
which people connect to each other, and how people perform different roles and functions 
at the same time.  
Secondly, and as a consequence of the foregoing, when a typology of social networks 
is the point of departure for social analysis, it engenders the risk of falling back into 
simple structuralism. Focusing on the structure of networks can distract attention from the 
more cognitive aspects of social capital, i.e. the rules, norms and values which govern 
these networks. These cognitive aspects proved much more difficult to grasp. Labeling the 
practices of abakozi (daily labour) and umugwazo (usury practice) as ‗unresponsive‘ 
linking social capital between patron and clients provides a clear illustration of this 
difficulty. From a structural perspective, both relationships fit the label ‗linking‘ social 
capital, as they linked patron and client across a vertical power differential, installing a 
asymmetry in the relation. Yet, the label ‗unresponsive‘ is much less succesful in 
articulating the functioning of these relationships. The reason is that it is much more 
difficult to distinguish clearly the rules, norms an values governing these relationships. In 
both cases, contradictory elements emerged. On the one hand, explicit reference was made 
to the traditional institution of bugabire (implicating serfdom), which expressed negative 
feelings about dependency. On the other hand, in particular abakozi was perceived as a 
relation of solidarity and mutual help, which resulted in feelings of gratitude towards the 
patron. Still, according to contextual factors, the negotiation positions changed (e.g.  there 
was more space to negiotate labour wages outside the periods of soudure), and informal 
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rules and norms were sometimes complemented by formal procedures, rules, and norms 
(e.g. when a conflict related to umugwazo was brought to court). It indicates how a 
complex mix of institutions influence these relationships, and how the latter can change 
according to context and over time. In this respect, the label ‗unresponsive‘ poorly 
articulates this complex reality. 
A third and last risk which relates to the relational view focusing on types of networks, 
is the tendency to essentialism and making generalising conclusions. The objective to 
formulate a typology of networks, reflects the aim to identify concepts which are 
applicable in diverse contexts and cultures. Putnams reworking of bonding and bridging 
into ‗bad‘ and ‗good‘ social capital, and his equation of the latter with associations is 
probably the clearest example. Both bonding and bridging ties can have positive (resp. 
e.g. access to social support and new markets) and negative (resp. e.g. ethnic exclusion 
and drug trafficking) effects, and the univocal link between bridging ties and associations 
is false: every association will to a certain extent include and exclude people, and as such, 
always combines bonding and bridging characteristics, and associations with a strong 
hierarchy are likely more structured along linking social capital. However, based on 
structural characteristics, one tends to essentialize by linking particular networks to 
particular outcomes, which leads to general conclusions as ‗mono-ethnic bonding social 
capital should be replaced by multi-ethnic bridging social capital‘, which in practice is 
then translated in supporting the creation of multi-ethnic ‗bridging associations‘. The 
tendency to equate all patron-client ties with ‗bad‘ linking social capital is another 
example. In development literature, and in social capital literature in particular, patron-
client networks are presented as characteristic for ‗backward‘ societies, and more than 
once reference is made to Banfields (1958) ‗amoral familism‘. However, both in 
Burundian history and in current social life on the three studied collines patron-client ties 
have played and still play a crucial role, not at least because, in many cases, these patron-
client ties remain instrumental for both parties. Although on unequal terms, approaching a 
patron to access credit, inputs or labour opportunities provides a degree of protection 
during periods of soudure (chapter 5, food security). Also when some of the activities of 
the three NGO-projects (chapter 6, community-based reconstruction; chapter 7, bridging 
associations; chapter 8, solidarity chain) are captured by the elite, and participatory 
structures are tailored towards existing patronage and clientelism, they still present a 
pareto-improvement (Platteau, 2004) for some of the population: additional resources 
have been accessed through these patron-client ties (although many have been excluded). 
Both examples illustrate that univocally linking certain types of networks to certain types 
of outcomes, results in essentialising conclusions, which devalue the dynamic and shifting 
functioning of these social networks. 
If one overlooks these shortcomings, an area of tension is revealed within the political 
economy perspective. The relational and contextual views drive research in opposite 
directions. Whereas the focus on a social capital typology reveals a tendency towards 
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essentialising concepts, the contextual view emphasizes the contingent character of social 
analysis, which in fact excludes context-independent concepts. Foley and Edwards (1999), 
both proponents of a Bourdieuian perspective, have warned for this structural bias, exactly 
because it nullifies the other, for them more crucial basic assumption, i.e. that social 
capital cannot be analysed apart from the particular contexts and practices in which it is 
entangled. In fact, it is this structural bias evident in Putnamian thinking that a political 
economy view has been criticizing (Wilhusen, 2009: 393). In particular the structuralist 
part of Putnam‘s analysis (social capital equates civic associations, later on limited to 
‗good‘ bridging associations) has inspired policy, focusing on the structural ‗forms‘ 
(counting associations) and not the  ‗norms‘ of civil society and social capital (Edwards 
2006: 102). 
In sum, the cautions about this structural bias have been confirmed during empirical 
research. Although a typology of networks can guide research (as research is de facto 
guided by analytical concepts), there is the risk of using inflexible concepts, unable to 
account for the rich diversity of social relationships and the ‗everyday enactment‘ 
(Wilshusen, 2009: 393) of social capital in empirical reality. On the other hand, however, 
the case study research also confirmed that the contextual view and the emphasis on 
power relationships did have an added value in comparison with mainstream Putnamian 
thinking, not at least because it is in particular criticizing the latter.  
 
Social capital has been a contested concept in the past, and by all odds, it will remain a 
contested concept in the future. Edwards (2006) distinction between ‗enthusiasts‘, 
‗tacticians‘, and ‗skeptics‘ will probably remain valid, although with some adaptations. 
The ‗enthusiasts‘ will still be in the majority. The Putnamian conception of social 
capital has radically infiltrated the social sciences, in particular political science and 
economics, and has been integrated widely within policy circles. As is the case today, 
these enthusiasts will continue to produce mostly statistical studies which try to prove the 
causal link between high stocks of social capital and positive outcomes, in diverse 
research and policy areas ranging from health care, criminality, democratization, poverty 
reduction, and so on. For the majority of these scholars, social capital has become an 
accepted concept, which is used uncritically.  
A second group of people, the ‗tacticians‘, for whom the concept was a means to break 
the economic hegemony in institutions such as the World Bank, in order to integrate 
social analysis into policy circles, take the view that this objective is to a certain extent 
achieved. For them, social capital lacks the rigor to further deepen social analysis around 
specific policy issues, but it stays capable of expanding social analysis to research and 
policy areas where it is still lacking. As such, in their view, social capital becomes nothing 
more than a conceptual language to introduce and promote social analysis  (see 
Bebbington et al., 2006: 280, although Bebbington himself is not a good example as he 
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still uses social capital as an analytical concept, see e.g. Bebbington, Dharmawan, et al., 
2006, Bebbington, 2007).  
The skeptics will remain skeptical, and they have good reasons. On the one hand, 
because of the ideological – neoliberal – cloud that the concept has. On the other hand, 
because of problems of social capital as a analytical concept. The popularity of the 
concept has stretched its meaning out of all proportion. The ‗banalized‘ use of the 
concept, when applied to policy, has created a fuzzy concept, allowing it to be claimed by 
different agendas (Molyneux, 2002: 169). The concept has become a ‗genotype‘ with an 
unqualified number of ‗phenotype applications‘ (Adam & Rončević, 2003: 158). Their 
ideological critique has interesting things to say about the genealogy of the concept within 
the World Bank and the politics of theory production in such institutions (arguing exactly 
the opposite of the ‗tacticians‘, i.e. social capital showing how social theory is 
colonialized by neoclassical economics), while their analytical critique denounces the 
vague and elastic use of the concept. Yet, others nuance these critiques, because it is 
predominantly a critique on the type of policy based on the concept (and not on the 
concept itself), and this within one particular institution, namely the World Bank. 
Furthermore, their critique on the fluidity of the concept is more convincing, but is also 
applicable to other concepts in the social sciences, which have developed their own 
discursive ‗social life‘ within the development lexicon  (Toit et al., 2007: 3; Bebbington, 
2002). 
A possible further contribution of the political economy scholarship could be twofold, 
both narrowing and broadening the existing debate. One possible way forward is by 
narrowing down what we mean by social capital, in which the operationalization of 
Bourdieu‘s conceptualization could be at the centre. Starting from a clear-cut definition of 
social capital as ‗the ability to secure resources by virtue of membership in social 
networks‘ (Portes & Landolt, 2000: 532), it should examine if social capital can be 
restored as an analytically meaningfull concept, by tracing back its most clear sociological 
origins in the work of Bourdieu (in contrast with Putnam as a political scientist, and 
Coleman leaning against economic rational choice theory). Therefore, it should renounce 
both social capital as a multi-disciplinary concept, and the coupled desire to create a 
unified conceptual field (Mosse, 2008: 83). While revaluing it as a sociological concept, 
Bourdieu‘s main question becomes central, i.e. how differential access to resources 
through the possession of more or less durable social networks reproduces social 
distinction, and influences the opportunities available to individuals to pursue their goals. 
Many, and among them also fierce propononets such as Harris (2001) and Fine (2001), are 
convinced that, if the concept should have any analytical value, it should be understood as 
Bourdieu used it, yet until today this exercise has not been done in a consistent way 
(Bebbington, 2007; DeFilippis, 2001; Portes, 1998; Wilhusen, 2009). 
A second possible way forward is broadening the debate, in order to examine if and 
how critical social science can travel to policy. Political economy scholars are not 
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satisfied by the way social science is represented and used in current policies, not in social 
capital terms, but also not in terms of related concepts such as empowerment, 
participation, civil society, and so on. So, although their work started as a critique on the 
mainstream social capital concept, their alternative is not only linked to the social capital 
concept alone, but to a way of doing social science, and how this can inspire policy. For 
proponents of this political economy view of social capital it is clear that further 
criticizing mainstream social capital thinking is necessary, while reducing high 
expactations about its role and limiting its explanatory potential by demonstrating that 
social capital should be treated ‗as part of a broader (multicausal) model containing 
numerous (sociocultural) variables of factors.‘ (Adam & Rončević, 2003: 178). In other 
words, how can the social capital debate be used to advance the more general debate on 
genuine social analysis, refocusing ‗attention on how non-monetary relationships can be 
important sources of power, influence and the accumulation of economic capital‘ (Vasan, 
2007: 1218), or showing how non-economic resources are ‗crucial to our maneuvering the 
diverse social settings of which the economists‘ ―market-place‖ is only a minor subset.‘ 
(Foley & Edwards, 1999: 164). Third, and subsequently, can we then convince policy 
makers that fine-grained and contextual social analysis will be necessary to unravel these 
issues, indicating that social analysis cannot be tailored towards economists‘ models, the 
latter being more ‗compatible‘ with policy thinking because of their ‗generalizing and 
predictive power‘ (Mosse, 2008: 103). It is not clear if the concept of social capital is 
necessary at all to develop these issues further (something which will depend heavily on 
the first way forward), and probably many will refuse because of its prehistory. However, 
with or without social capital, the current mainstream social capital concept will remain an 
obstacle which should be removed to push towards a more radical and genuine influence 
of the social sciences.  
Engineering Peace and Development – towards ‘Piecemeal’ 
Social Engineering 
What can be learned about the social engineering approach to post-conflict reconstruction 
and peace-building? Proponents of social engineering argue that war-shattered societies 
can only be helped by an all-embracing approach that profoundly transforms state, society 
and the economy, ultimately embedding a ‗culture of peace‘. The social capital argument 
has centre stage in this social engineering model, as it stands for rebuilding those civil 
society institutions that need to promote this ‗culture of peace‘ from the bottom-up. It is 
clearly an appealing view because it responds to the widely accepted opinion that peace 
and development is not only about building bridges, schools, and roads, but above all 
relates to democratic citizenship, good governance, human rights, functioning markets and 
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so on. On the other hand, it has been criticized for seeking to transplant Western models 
of social, economic and political modernization – i.e. the liberal peace – to other parts of 
the world (e.g. Paris, 1997; Duffield, 2001). How should we interpret this social 
engineering approach, and can we learn something from the social capital perspective 
applied in this dissertation? 
 
Krause and Jütersonke (2005) introduced Popper's (1998 [1945], 1974)  concepts of 
‗Utopian‘ and ‗piecemeal‘ social engineering, to distinguish between an improper and 
more realistic approach to achieve social change. First, we should start from the 
assumption that every single type or form of external help to a society or community in 
need is always about ‗social engineering‘: it will interfere and substantially change the 
society or community in which it intervenes, and it has the intentional will to do that. All 
attempts to do so are grounded in the denial of historicism and the belief in the 
manipulability of societies (Popper, 1974). Second, social engineering, as understood 
here, should not be interpreted as solely ‗technical‘ or ‗apolitical‘. There is a false contrast 
between technical and political solutions: every technical solution needs a political will to 
be executed, and every political objective needs a technical solution to be implemented. 
Proponents of the social engineering approach should be persuaded that technical 
solutions alone will not solve any problems, and those who criticize the social engineering 
approach for being ‗apolitical‘ should recognize that they too need to find technical 
solutions to implement political aims. Third, a distinction can be made between ‗Utopian‘ 
and ‗piecemeal‘ social engineering. It is worth quoting Popper at length to explain both 
concepts. Popper (1998 [1945]: 157) describes the ‗Utopian‘ approach as follows: 
Any rational action must have a certain aim. [...] To choose the end is therefore the 
first thing we have to do if we wish to act rationally [...] These principles, if applied 
to the realm of political activity, demand that we must determine our ultimate 
political aim, or Ideal State, before taking any practical action. [...] only when we 
are in possession of something like a blueprint of the society at which we aim, only 
then can we begin to consider the best ways and means for its realization, and to 
draw up a plan for practical action. 
A politician who adopts the method of ‗piecemeal‘ social engineering (Popper, 1998 [1945]: 
158):  
[…] may or may not have a blueprint of society before his mind, he may or may not 
hope that mankind will one day realize an ideal state, and achieve happiness and 
perfection on earth. But he will be aware that perfection, if at all attainable, is far 
distant, and that every generation of men, and therefore also the living, have a claim 
[…] not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided [… and] to be given all 
possible help, if they suffer. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the 
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method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of 
society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good‘ 
Krause and Jütersonke (2005) have applied this distinction to peace-building policies in 
general. They criticized contemporary peace-building for acting according to the 
‗Utopian‘ approach, as it starts from the teleological postulate of ‗liberal peace‘, and as 
such, aims at transplanting Western models of free markets and liberal democratic states 
into conflict-ridden countries, also assuming that these processes can be achieved in a 
short period of time (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; see also Duffield 2001; Paris, 1997). By 
contrast, they argued in favour of a ‗piecemeal‘ approach, which started from the people-
centred concept of human security.  
 
From a social capital perspective, the thesis seems to provide micro-empirical evidence 
that supports the meaningfulness of this analytical distinction. Throughout the 
ethnographic case studies, the distinction between ‗Utopian‘ and ‗piecemeal‘ engineering 
to a great extent ran parallel with what failed and what worked to enhance social cohesion 
on Burundian collines (see Table 13).  
 
Table 13 ‘Utopian’ versus ‘piecemeal’ engineering (source: author) 
‘Utopian’ Social Engineering ‘Piecemeal’ Social Engineering 
Based on blueprint ideas 
Focused on ultimate goals 
Not based on blueprints ideas 
Focused on concrete problems 
 
 Community-Based Reconstruction (wetland 
committees, livestock committees, comité 
d’hangar, encadreur de base, etc.) 
 Bridging Associations 
 Solidarity Chain 
 
 Road Works (mobility) 
 Water Tap Repair (informal meeting places) 
 Public Training (informal meeting places) 
 Training on Sexual violence (reduction of 
conflict) 
 Storage facilities (reduction of conflict) 
 
 
Most activities that failed to restore social cohesion were based on utopian Western 
ideals and were introduced as ‗universal blueprints‘ for community organization. 
Community-based or participatory reconstruction was implemented in the usual way. 
Committees, associations and other local structures were introduced and based on rigid 
ideas of participation, ownership, empowerment, democracy: democratic elections should 
be held, boards of committees installed, articles of association should be submitted, and so 
on. In particular bridging associations presented an illustration of how (i) an associational 
approach to community organization was coupled with (ii) the ‗bridging‘ idea to reconcile 
 257 
 
ethnic groups, although (i) there was no associational tradition in Burundi, and (ii) ethnic 
tensions were not the sole problem in local Burundian communities. The solidarity chain 
reflects perhaps the most clear-cut example of how external intervention tried to ‗micro-
engineer‘ social cohesion on the basis of a Western legalistic formula, i.e. through the 
making of a ‗solidarity contract‘ between beneficiaries of different ethnic groups in the 
solidarity chain. These activities were not necessarily carried out as solutions to concrete 
local problems, but as means to achieve desirable ends. This does not fundamentally 
question values of democratic practice, participation, and empowerment, but it does 
indicate that these utopian objectives did not substantially help people to solve their daily 
problems, and therefore were not taken seriously the local population (cf.  Krause & 
Jütersonke, 2005: 458).  
By contrast, other activities not necessarily designed to strengthen social cohesion did 
succeed in strengthening community cohesion. These activities did not try to achieve a 
predetermined ideal of community organization, yet produced social cohesion as a spill-
over effect. Road works, for example, cut transport costs on rural roads and showed the 
importance of mobility, of how visiting friends and family is a crucial element of 
Burundian social life.  The repairing or replacing of water taps and public training created 
new meeting places, reflecting Burundians‘ preference for informal daily interactions 
rather than formal community associations or committees, designed in the image of 
Putnam‘s (1993) ‗networks of civic engagement‘. Public training on sexual violence 
confronted a daily problem, as rape and sexual harassment constantly fed feelings of 
insecurity and pitted households against each other because of insinuations and forced 
marriages. Similarly, construction of better and safer storage facilities tackled the problem 
of theft of harvests, which pitted neighbours against each other. All these activities were 
characterized by two major elements that marks them as ‗piecemeal‘ engineering 
activities: (i) they were not derived from an ‗ideal blueprint‘ of community organization, 
and (ii) they tackled concrete problems of the people (theft, sexual violence, mobility, 
access to water, absence of informal meeting places, etc.). These activities are clearly far 
removed from the achievement of ultimate goals, including democracy and empowerment, 
yet they helped people to solve daily problems. They were therefore taken seriously and 
appreciated, and above all, represented first steps in the long process of restoring 
community cohesion. 
 
Alongside these empirical observations, two final reasons underscore why this 
‗piecemeal‘ approach should be preferred (Popper,1998 [1945], 1974). First, it is the only 
feasible option. Social science cannot provide a holistic understanding of such a complex 
process of social change as a whole, simply because society is not an uncomplicated 
‗experimental setting‘, in which only a small number of variables play out. Where it seeks 
global solutions, social engineering in post-conflict reconstruction is inevitably autocratic, 
unable to foresee its intentional and unintentional effects, and is based on prophecy rather 
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than on scientific prediction. Second, the piecemeal approach is the most democratic 
option, leaving most space to the people to change the course of their lives themselves. It 
should help them to overcome their suffering and problems, yet it should refrain from 
defining their life goals. Instead of trying to ‗micro-engineer‘ society from top-down, it 
should sow the necessary preconditions, from which a truly bottom-up and organic 
process of locally embedded social engineering can slowly emerge over time.  
 
In sum, this thesis describes the efforts of three international NGOs to ‗engineer‘ peace 
and development in the north of Burundi. One should keep in mind this micro-
perspective, while realizing that NGOs are only one particular cog in the machine of post-
conflict reconstruction. Therefore, their potential damaging or positive effects in conflict-
affected countries should not be overrated and put into perspective (Goodhand, 2006). As 
shown, however, they can make deep inroads on social life in communities, but it is not 
easy to get a clear view of their effects. The three NGO-interventions never had a one-shot 
impact, and both positive and negative effects went hand in hand. This complex 
interaction seems to favour a careful ‗piecemeal‘ engineering approach, in which a 
process of ‗trial and error‘ is primarily concerned with minimizing the negative effects of 
intervention. In the words of Richards (2005: 19): ‗Might not wars sometimes be ended 























Community Map (Tangara) – was often used when arriving on a colline, to receive a 
basic view of the colline. It can present a pictorial overview of geographical, economic, 
and social issues: access to basic services (health centres, schools), the presence of 
different religious groups, access to markets, differences between sous-collines, location 











Institutional Matrix (Cumba) – was used to discuss the performance of institutions on 
accessibility, trust, efficiency and democratic decision making (based on Dudwick et al., 
2006). In the left column different local institutions are enlisted. From top to bottom: the 
nyumbakumi, chef de sous-colline, chef de colline, chef de zone, administrateur, 












Resource exchange matrix (Cumba) – was used to differentiate between what kind of 
resources people gave/received through which kind of social networks. It was adapted 
from Kuehnast and Dudwick (2004) and tailored to the Burundian context. The left 
column represents the different resources which are exchanged between people. For 
example (from top to bottom): food rations, exchanging firewood or water, helping to 
transport a sick neighbour, access to seeds, access to cash, umugwazo, market 







Intervention Map (Burara) - was used as a variant of the venn diagram (itself too 
complex to be used properly). It presents a river which separated the NGO (vehicle) from 
the community population, and participants were asked to list and draw the different 
islands which the NGO vehicle should pass to bridge the river and arrive at the 
community. This way of working was very efficient. Several times, straightforward 
questions on the functioning of intermediation structures found no answer, or at least not a 
detailed one. However, during discussion, participants were occupied with drawing all 
these islands in the river, and only at the end it was asked if any of these mediating 
structures did not function well (in their words: NGO benefits failed to reach the other 





Annex 2:  The CIBA project – Goal, Objectives, Expected 
Intermediary Results, and Activities  
 
NOTE: All three NGOs have their own focus, which means that they do not cover all 
intermediary results. Also, this annex presents a summary of the entire project. Thus, not 
all listed activities have been implemented on the particular collines under study. 
 
 
Program goal:   Improve the Livelihood Security and reduce the vulnerability of 
households in targeted communes in Burundi. 
 
 
Objective 1:  Improve agricultural production in targeted communities 
 
IR 1.1:  Improved management of soil and water resources 
 
 Rehabilitate inland valley wetlands for improved irrigation with community 
participation 
 Train capacity of local committees in soil and water management and conflict 
resolution 
 Oversee community watershed protection efforts (contour lines, agro-forestry, …) 
 
IR 1.2:  Improved access to diverse agricultural inputs 
 
 Improve local access to goats 
 Create community veterinary pharmacies and provide training to community 
veterinarians  
 Train local tree nursery associations for continuation of agro-forestry  
 Conduct on-farm trials of new varieties of seeds with farmers and farmers‘ groups  
 Test, identify and multiply manioc varieties resistant or tolerant to Mosaic virus  
 
IR 1.3:  Increased adoption of good farming practices 
 
 Provide farmers with land management, good farming practices, and other training  





Objective 2:  Improve health and nutritional status of households in targeted 
communities 
 
IR 2.1:  Improved household hygiene and sanitation 
 
 No activities (indirect through IR2.2) 
 
IR 2.2:  Increased access to water in selected communities 
 
 Construct water sources and water points 




IR 2.3:  Increased community support for people affected by HIV/AIDS 
 
 Provide HIV/AIDS prevention information 
 Improve access to high protein, biofortified food items for persons living with 
HIV/AIDS 
 Improve access for persons living with HIV/AIDS and their families to crops that 
demand low labor input relative to other crops 
 
IR 2.4:  Improved knowledge, attitudes and practices of utilizing diverse foods 
 
 Introduce concept of biofortified crops to farmers and households and provide 
seeds and technical support for on-farm testing  
 
Objective 3:  Promote agro-enterprise development and income generating activities 
in targeted communities 
 
IR 3.1: Increased opportunities for farm and non-farm economic activities in targeted 
communes 
 
 Create/train/build capacity of Agro-Enterprise Interest Groups 
 Train Diocesan partners in Agro-Enterprise approach and methodology 
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 Assist formed Interest Groups to identify commodities with market opportunities, 
conduct market chain analysis for identified commodities, and the creation and 
implementation of agro-enterprise plans  
 
IR 3.2: Improved management and organizational skills of targeted associations and 
farmers' groups 
 
 No activities 
 
IR 3.3:  Increased market access 
 
 Road rehabilitation. 
 Reference to activities IR 3.1  
 
Objective 4: Reduction of community level conflicts (with special attention to 
conflicts over natural resources). 
 
IR 4.1. Mixed CBOs have increased their organizational capacity and increased their 
capacity for conflict resolution  
IR 4.2. Local structures, local administration, and the community are engaged in conflict 
management. 
IR 4.3. The capacities of these local structures are reinforced. 
 
 For IR 4.1, 4.2. and 4.3 the main activities were trainings (natural resource 
management, conflict resolution, management of associations, …) given to the 
diverse local structures. 
 
IR 4.4. The research on land issues is promoted and its results are valorised by the 
political decision makers. 
 
 IR 4.4. was rather independent of the different concrete projects and communities, 
and was realized by a research unit based in Bujumbura. 
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Annex 3:  The LITA project – Goal, Objectives, Expected 
Intermediary Results, and Activities 
 
NOTE: All three NGOs have their own focus, which means that they do not cover all 
intermediary results. Also, this annex presents a summary of the entire project. Thus, not 
all listed activities have been implemented on the particular collines under study. 
 
 
Program Goal: Improve the Livelihood Security and reduce the vulnerability of targeted 
communes in Burundi. 
 
 
Objective 1. Improve agricultural production in targeted communities 
 
IR1.1 Improved management of soil and water resources 
 
 Identify sites to be fitted 
 Carrying out technical analysis 
 Establish a work plan with the participants 
 Train members of monitoring and management committees 
 Promote agro-forestry practices necessary for water and soil conserve 
 Set up contour lines and biologic hedges for soil erosion control at hillside 
 Set up drainage and irrigation infrastructures in marshlands 
 Set up infrastructures to stabilize gullies 
 Develop plans for community management of fitted infrastructure 
 
IR 1.2 Improve access to diverse agricultural inputs 
 
 Identification of participants and their needs 
 Facilitate a relationship between suppliers of farmers inputs ( seeds, chemicals, 
pesticides) and the associations involved in seed multiplication 
 Support building of community and household storehouses for seeds storing 
 Identify goats beneficiaries based  criteria with partners 
 Development of goat beneficiaries rotary plans with partners 
 Preparing contracts for livestock loans (partners and communities) 
 Acquire goats and supply them by partners 
 Identification of sites for veterinary pharmacies 
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 Supporting building and equipment of the pharmacies 
 Train associations and individuals involved in storage and supplying of agricultural 
inputs 
 Set up a monitoring committee comprising farmers 
 
IR 1.3 Increased adoption of good farming practices 
 
 Identify farm appropriate techniques with partners and farmers 
 Develop community capacity building plan based on gaps 
 Select community workers and beneficiary committees to train 
 Organize trainings for community workers in agric techniques 
 Establish farmers training program with community workers  
 Implement training of farmer program 
 Organize cross visits with other communities (by partners) 
 Establish pilot activities for technique demonstration (by partners) 
 Providing communities with brochures on farming techniques  
 Elaborate a community based monitoring and evaluation plan 
 
Objective 2. Improve health and nutritional status of households in targeted 
communities 
 
IR 2.1:  Improved household hygiene and sanitation 
 
 No Activities 
 
IR 2.2:  Increased access to water in selected communities 
 
 No Activities 
 
IR 2.3:  Increased community support for people affected by HIV/AIDS 
 
 Select new local associations dealing in HIV/AIDS within the region 
 Establish a memorandum of understanding with existing associations  
 Define with local associations the capacities needed to be reinforced 
 Train local associations in partnerships with other local NGOs  
 Train the local leaders, community workers and community in HIV issues 
 Support local associations involved in assistance of HIV/AIDS infected persons   
 
IR 2.4:  Improved knowledge, attitudes and practices of utilizing diverse foods 
 




Objective 3. Promote agro enterprise development and generating activities in 
targeted communities  
 
IR 3.1 Increased opportunities for farm and non-farm economic activities in targeted 
communities 
 
 Organise farmers associations in networking 
 Facilitate the exchange of participants in the network 
 Provide equipment for food commodity processing 
 Survey on handicraft and other non-farm generating activities 
 Identify income generating activities to be developed 
 Facilitate linkage between associations & micro-finance institutions 
 Sign memorandum of understanding with micro-finance institutions 
 Monitor, review and evaluate the result 
 
IR3.2 Improved management and organizational skills of targeted associations and 
farmers 
 
 Train association members in developing of small economic activities 
 Train associations members in marketing techniques 
 Train associations members in micro-finance management 
 Train associations in accounting techniques 
 
IR 3.3:  Increased market access 
 
 No Activities 
 
Objective 4: Reduction of community level conflicts (with special attention to 
conflicts over natural resources). 
 
IR 4.1. Mixed CBOs have increased their organizational capacity and increased their 
capacity for conflict resolution  
IR 4.2. Local structures, local administration, and the community are engaged in conflict 
management. 
IR 4.3. The capacities of these local structures are reinforced. 
 
 For IR 4.1, 4.2. and 4.3 the main activities were trainings (natural resource 
management, conflict resolution, management of associations, …) given to the 




IR 4.4. The research on land issues is promoted and its results are valorised by the 
political decision makers. 
 
 IR 4.4. was rather independent of the different concrete projects and communities, 






Annex 4:  The CLC project – Goal, Objectives, Expected 
Intermediary Results, and Activities 
 
NOTE: All three NGOs have their own focus, which means that they do not cover all 
intermediary results. Also, this annex presents a summary of the entire project. Thus, not 
all listed activities have been implemented on the particular collines under study. 
 
 
Program Goal: Improved livelihood security and reduce the vulnerability 
of targeted communes in Burundi 
 
 
Objective 1:  Improve agricultural production in targeted communities 
 
IR 1.1:  Improved management of soil and water resources 
 
 Training of staff  
 Training of lead farmers 
 Training of participant households 
 Establishment/maintenance of demonstrations plots (model farms) 
 Exchange visits 
 Production of agroforestry trees in community tree nurseries 
 Support to community reforestation initiatives 
 
IR 1.2:  Improved access to diverse agricultural inputs 
 
 Collaboration with ISABU for improved varieties/new cultures 
 Support to the establishment of commune level veterinary pharmacies 
 Introduction of improved male goats and breeding programme 
 Introduction of cow rotation credit system  
 Support to the development of supplier links 
 Purchase/propagation of strategic planting material 
 
IR 1.3:  Increased adoption of good farming practices 
 
 Training of staff 
 Training of lead farmers 
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 Training of participant households 
 Establishment/maintenance of demonstrations plots (model farms) 
 Exchange visits 
 
 
Objective 2: Improve health and nutritional status of households in targeted 
communities 
 
IR 2.1:  Improved household hygiene and sanitation 
 
 Training of trainers in hygiene and sanitation 
 Training of participant households on hygiene and sanitation 
 
IR 2.2:  Increased access to water in selected communities 
 
 No Activities 
 
IR 2.3:  Increased community support for people affected by HIV/AIDS 
 
 Training of trainers in HIV/AIDS issues 
 Training of participant households on HIV/AIDS issues 
 Support to HIV/AIDS clubs 
 
IR 2.4:  Improved knowledge, attitudes and practices of utilizing diverse foods 
 
 Training of trainers in health, nutrition and culinary practices 
 Training of participant households on health, nutrition, culinary practices 
 Establishment/maintenance of household vegetable gardens 
 
 
Objective 3:  Promote agroenterprise development and income generating activities 
in targeted communities 
 
IR 3.1:  Increased opportunties for farm and non-farm economic activities in targeted 
communes 
 
 Identification of groups/associations involved  
 Identification of appropriate income generating activities 
 Provision of training and necessary inputs to launch activities 




IR 3.2:  Improved management and organizational skills of  targeted associations and 
farmers' groups 
 
 Identification of motivated groups/associations 
 Provision of training and technical support to groups/associations 
 
IR 3.3:  Increased market access (no activities) 
 
Objective 4: Reduction of community level conflicts (with special attention to 
conflicts over natural resources). 
 
IR 4.1. Mixed CBOs have increased their organizational capacity and increased their 
capacity for conflict resolution  
IR 4.2. Local structures, local administration, and the community are engaged in conflict 
management. 
IR 4.3. The capacities of these local structures are reinforced. 
 
 For IR 4.1, 4.2. and 4.3 the main activities were trainings (natural resource 
management, conflict resolution, management of associations, …) given to the 
diverse local structures. 
 
IR 4.4. The research on land issues is promoted and its results are valorised by the 
political decision makers. 
 
 IR 4.4. was rather independent of the different concrete projects and communities, 
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